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INTRODUCTION
The year 2000 brought some major changes for the Federal
Circuit:  the addition of two new judges (Richard Linn1 and Timothy
Dyk2); the semi-retirement of a third judge (S. Jay Plager, who elected
to take Senior Judge status in November 2000); and, for patent
practitioners, the issuance en banc of a critical new opinion, now
being considered by the Supreme Court, dealing with one of the
most controversial aspects of patent practice, the doctrine of
equivalents.3  Additionally, the court continued to wrestle with a
number of other thorny but recurring issues in patent law, including
questions of patentability, trial court procedure, and sanctions.  In
the pages that follow, we will address these and many other
developments reflected in the Federal Circuit’s Y2K patent
jurisprudence, concluding with an addendum that discusses the
statistical output of the Federal Circuit and its judges.
I. FEDERAL COURT AND AGENCY PRACTICE
The cases decided by the Federal Circuit in the year 2000 involved
numerous procedural issues.  Particularly significant were cases
involving sanctions,4 the use of stipulations at trial,5 questions of
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction,6 and the standard of review for
decisions of the PTO and Board of Patent Appeals.7
                                                          
1. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President William J. Clinton on September
28, 1999, confirmed by the Senate November 19, 1999, and assumed duties of the
office on January 1, 2000.
2. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President William J. Clinton on April 1,
1998, confirmed by the Senate May 24, 2000, and assumed duties in office on June 9,
2000.
3. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519
(2001).
4. See infra Part I.A.18.
5. See infra Part I.A.13.
6. See infra Part I.B.1.
7. See infra Part I.C.
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A. District Court Practice
1. The prevalence of summary judgment
The frequency with which district courts grant summary judgment
in patent cases is remarkable.  Of the Federal Circuit’s seventy-nine
published opinions in cases arising from the district courts in the year
2000, forty-eight of them involved resolution of at least one
substantial issue on summary judgment or dismissal.8  As discussed in
                                                          
8. See Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for non-
infringement by defendant and supporting jury verdict against defendant for literal
infringement); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Dragon Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment on non-
patented claims and findings of infringement for certain claims, but vacating and
remanding for further findings on issue of obviousness applying Graham standard);
LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d
558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
2519 (2001); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement of
defendant’s product); Bottom Line Mgmt., Inc. v. Pan Man, Inc., 228 F.3d 1352, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district court’s grant of
summary judgment to appellee and finding its actions of repair to be within the
scope of the patent and not reconstruction, which could constitute infringement);
Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(reversing and remanding district court’s grant of summary judgment where there
was a genuine issue as to whether an implied-in-fact contract existed that assigned
the patent rights); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary
judgment for defendant for non-infringement holding that infringement is not
established under the doctrine of equivalents where a change in the arrangement of
elements produces the same results); Cultor Corp. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d
1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district court’s grant of
summary judgment to defendant and finding no literal infringement or
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Deere & Co.,
224 F.3d 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s
grant of summary judgment because it failed to raise genuine issues of material fact
to a jury); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming in part the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on one claim on the grounds that the invention was “obvious” and
“anticipated,” but reversing and remanding the judgment invalidating several other
claims); C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s decision awarding damages to the plaintiff
for violation of a trade secret, finding a Kansas statute preempted any fraud claims,
but reversing the dismissal for failure to state a claim); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v.
Heinrich Fiedler GMBH & Co., 224 F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (upholding district court’s summary judgment and dismissal of claims because
no reasonable jury could find literal infringement or infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents); KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s grant of summary
judgment to appellee where prosecution history showed the device in question did
not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222
F.3d 973, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Genetech, Inc. v. Chiron
Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hilgraeve Corp. v.
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McAfee Assocs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(vacating and remanding district court’s summary judgment ruling where there was a
genuine issue as to the opposing opinions offered by proffered experts and an
unresolved question); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc.,
222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221
F.3d 1310, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Canton Bio-Med., Inc. v.
Integrated Liner Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (upholding district court’s summary judgment holding that prosecution
history estoppel barred the infringement claim); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s
summary judgment in favor of defendant where it invalidated inappropriately the
plaintiff’s claims based upon plaintiff’s deposition testimony); Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch
Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming
district court’s summary judgment where plaintiff tried to circumvent the appeal
process by seeking an improper declaratory judgment); Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N.
Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming
district court’s summary judgment where there was no genuine issue of fact
regarding infringment); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s summary
judgment invalidating plaintiff’s patent for violation of best mode requirement);
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement
because there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendants supplied or
caused to supply any element of the patent in question); Reiffen v. Microsoft Corp.,
214 F.3d 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s
summary judgment due to an error in application of the “written description”
requirement where plaintiff’s definition at the time of filing described accurately the
patent in question); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d
1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s summary
judgment holding of infringement because it erred in claim construction); Vehicular
Techs. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment for defendants, holding that no
reasonable jury could find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Bayer
AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1710 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants
holding no infringment); Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same); Envirco Corp. v. Clestra
Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(vacating and remanding district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants
because the court erred in construing the relevant claim as a means-plus-function
element under 35 U.S.C. § 112, and thus improperly limited that element to
structure described in the specification); Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson, 209
F.3d 1328, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating and remanding
district court’s summary judgment for defendant because the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office abused his discretion under the Administrative
Procedure Act); Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s judgment for the
defendants, agreeing with the claim construction, and holding no literal
infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); STX, LLC v. Brine,
Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district
court’s summary judgment for the defendant holding that its invention was ready for
patenting and that plaintiff’s contentions were unfounded); Kemco Sales, Inc. v.
Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court’s partial summary judgment for appellee holding no
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208
F.3d 1339, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s
summary judgment for the plaintiff because unresolved factual questions existed);
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289
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Part III below, one reason for the prevalence of summary-judgment
determinations may be the recent clarifications that claim
construction is an issue of law, thereby making many infringement
disputes amenable to summary-judgment determinations,9 and that
infringement-by-equivalents claims are subject to several threshold
legal limitations.10  One thing is certain: the Federal Circuit has
authorized, even encouraged, a liberal use of summary judgment to
dispose of patent claims.
2. Standing
A party has standing to bring suit only if he has a legally sufficient
“personal stake” in a dispute to justify exercise of a court’s remedial
powers on his behalf.11  The Patent Act provides that a “patentee” may
                                                          
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment for defendants
holding no literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents);
Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating and remanding district court’s summary
judgment for defendants because it erred in its claim construction of the patent);
IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s summary judgment for defendants, holding
that the court erred in claim construction and that there was a genuine issue of
material fact that could result in a holding of infringement); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant
supporting its right to refuse to sell patented products to plaintiff because its right to
exclude did not conflict with antitrust laws); Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co.,
203 F.3d 1362, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district
court’s holding of no literal infringement but remanding because the court
misapplied the doctrine of equivalents); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d
1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s holding
of no literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, but
remanding to address defendant’s trademark claim); In re Spalding Sports
Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating
district court’s decision requiring petitioner to produce an invention record and
granting a writ of mandamus holding that the attorney-client privilege protects the
invention record); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s denial of transfer of action and granting
transfer); Automated Bus. Machs. v. NEC Am., Inc., 202 F.3d 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment
for defendant based on a holding of non-infringement and awarding full attorneys’
fees to defendant and its parent company where the latter was the original
manufacturer and participated in the litigation); Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
201 F.3d 1363, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district
court’s summary judgment for defendant holding that plaintiff’s patent was invalid).
9. See Markman v. Westview Instruments., Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
10. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997) (declaring two principal legal limitations:
prosecution history estoppel and the “all elements” rule); see also Festo Corp., 234 F.3d
at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69 (articulating that the first limitation to be
addressed is prosecution history estoppel, and that estoppel does not bar the
doctrine of equivalents from proceeding with an “all elements” analysis).
11. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
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bring an action for “infringement of his patent.”12  The term
“patentee” includes “not only the patentee to whom the patent was
issued but also the successors in title to the patentee.”13  The courts
have recognized that in some instances a patent licensee may have
standing to sue for infringement, but in others it may not.14
The Federal Circuit decided three cases in the year 2000 involving
the issue of whether a party suing for patent infringement had a
sufficient ownership interest in the patent at issue to confer
standing.15  In Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co.,16 the Federal Circuit
held that an exclusive license that did not transfer “all substantial
rights” in the patents did not confer standing on the licensee such
that it could maintain a suit for patent infringement without joining
the patentee as a co-plaintiff.17  Prima Tek I was granted an exclusive
worldwide license to make, use and sell the products and processes
covered by the patents for a two-year term that could be extended by
the parties.18 The license to Prima Tek I, however, was limited to exist
“only to the extent necessary to grant a license to Prima Tek II” to
make, use and sell the products and processes covered by the
patent.19  The license also contained provisions granting Prima Tek I
the exclusive right to sue third parties for infringement of the patents
at issue and providing that the patentee would be bound by any
judgment regarding the validity, infringement, and enforceability of
the licensed patents.20  The defendant, A-Roo, urged that standing
was lacking because (1) the license agreement between the patentee
and Prima Tek I was limited in duration, and (2) the agreement
granted Prima Tek I only the rights to sub-license the substantive
                                                          
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994 & Supp V. 1999) (declaring the right to a civil action
as a “remedy for infringement” under the Patent Act).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1994).
14. Compare, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (holding that
an exclusive territorial licensee has standing to sue for patent infringement), and
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding same), with Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (holding that a non-exclusive licensee does not have standing to sue for patent
infringement).
15. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff has standing); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(finding standing).  But see Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding plaintiff lacked standing).
16. 222 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
17. Prima Tek II, 222 F.3d at 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
18. See id. at 1374, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 .
19. See id. at 1374-75, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743-44.
20. See id. at 1374-75, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
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rights in the patent to Prima Tek II.21  The court rejected A-Roo’s first
challenge to standing, holding that the mere presence of a
termination clause did not prevent a licensee from suing in its own
name.22  The court, however, embraced A-Roo’s second challenge,
reversing the district court and holding that Prima Tek I lacked
standing because—both prior and subsequent to its contemplated
sub-license to Prima Tek II—it did not possess the “right to exclude
others from making, using and selling the patented inventions.”23
Finally, the court concluded that the patentee’s agreement to be
bound by any judgment regarding the patents did not preserve Prima
Tek’s standing, for if it had, patent owners would be allowed to grant
improper “hunting license[s]” to other parties for the purposes of
litigation.24
In contrast, in Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.,25 the court held that a
licensee (Speedplay) had obtained all substantial rights to the patent
at issue and thus had standing to sue for infringement.26  There, the
court rejected the argument that a provision of the licensing
agreement erroneously referring to an unrelated patent meant that
Speedplay did not have a license for the patent at issue.27  More
substantively, the court rejected the argument that Speedplay lacked
standing based upon the patentees’ retention of a reversionary right
to institute infringement litigation in the event that Speedplay did
not bring such litigation within three months of discovering
infringement.28  The court held that such a right to sue “would not
hinder Speedplay’s enjoyment of the patent rights in any meaningful
way” because Speedplay could have rendered that right “nugatory” by
granting the alleged infringer a royalty-free sublicense.29
Furthermore, the court held Speedplay’s inability to assign its rights
                                                          
21. See id. at 1378-79, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746-48.
22. See Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1378, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1742, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro
Italia, 944 F.2d 870, 874, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
23. See Prima Tek II,  222 F.3d at 1380, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
24. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (citing Crown Die & Tool v. Nye
Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 42 (1923) in emphasizing that standing is
established by proprietary interests and not by agreements that bind parties to
judgments or that contain “right to sue” clauses).
25. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
26. See Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1250, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1987.
27. See id. at 1250-51, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1987.
28. See id. at 1251, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1987.
29. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988 (distinguishing Abbott Labs. v. Daimedix
Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1771 (Fed. Cir. 1995) from the case at bar
where the licensee is permitted to grant licenses, bring an action on its own behalf
without including the licensor and is not bound solely to making, using and selling
products reflecting the patented invention).
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in the patent without the patentees’ consent (which the license
agreement provided “shall not be withheld unreasonably”), its
obligation to assign to the patentees all improvements that would
then be licensed back to Speedplay, and its obligation to permit the
patentees to dictate the markings sold abroad and to inspect its books
and records, were not “substantial rights” that divested Speedplay of
standing to sue for infringement in its own name.30  Finally, the court
noted that there were few concerns about multiple suits on the same
operative facts because of the close relationship of the licensee to the
patentee (an employee of Speedplay); the judgment would, by
operation of agency principles, have “preclusive effect with respect to
any parallel claim that might be brought” by the patentee.31
The court also rejected a standing challenge in Ajinomoto Co. v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,32 where the accused infringer questioned
the authenticity of Ajinomoto’s rights in the patent at issue because
neither of the two documents transferring the rights from the
inventors to Ajinomoto were present in the record.33  The court
rejected the challenge, holding that the lack of written
documentation confirming the transfer of the foreign patent rights
from the Soviet government to the inventors was unimportant in the
absence of any evidence demonstrating that such a transfer had not
occurred or that the transfer ran afoul of Soviet law.34  The court also
held that the accused infringer was estopped from objecting that the
assignment to Ajinomoto from the inventors was not introduced at
trial because the standing challenge was commenced after the trial
had concluded; thus, the accused infringer’s litigation tactics had
“effectively prevented” Ajinomoto from proffering the document.35
3. Personal jurisdiction
A federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a party so
                                                          
30. See id. at 1252-53, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988-89.
31. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1984, 1989 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
32. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
33. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1343-44, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336-37.
34. See id. at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (noting that according to Soviet
policy, the government owned the inventions in question because the inventors were
employees of state institutions and when the government conveyed the patents back to
the original institutions, the originator of the patent was able to properly assign the
patent rights to Ajinomoto).
35. Compare Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335, with
Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1254, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting, in a
similar vein, that the accused infringer could not “reasonably complain” that the
patentee had not been joined as a party, since the accused infringer had opposed
Speedplay’s motion in the district court to join the patentee).
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long as two requirements are fulfilled: “[f]irst, a defendant must be
amenable to process in the forum state.  Second, the court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction must comply with the precepts of federal due
process.”36  A party is “amenable to service of process” if it could be
“subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the
state in which the district court is located,” such as under a state
“long-arm” jurisdictional statute or “nonresident motorist statute.”37
In LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc.,38 the court examined
whether an accused patent infringer, Hubbell, was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Ohio.39  The district court held that there was no
personal jurisdiction over Hubbell.40  According to the district court,
Hubbell was not subject to Ohio’s long-arm jurisdictional statute
because it did not sell its accused product in Ohio.41  The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that personal jurisdiction did exist,
pursuant to Ohio Supreme Court precedent that permitted
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation “doing business” in Ohio,
even when the cause of action did not “arise” or “relate to the
corporation’s business transacted” in Ohio.42  The Federal Circuit
explained:
In essence, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a federal due process
general jurisdiction standard as a hook for prong one of the
personal jurisdiction inquiry.  That is, when an out-of-state
defendant conducts “continuous and systematic” business in Ohio,
it is “doing business” in Ohio and is amenable to process there,
even if the cause of action did not arise from activity in Ohio.43
The court held Hubbell was subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment44 because
Hubbell had “significant” contacts with Ohio, including “millions of
dollars of sales” and “a broad distributorship network” in Ohio, and,
                                                          
36. LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1965, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of
Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
37. LSI, 232 F.3d at 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967.
38. 232 F.3d 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
39. See LSI, 232 F.3d at 1370-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965-67.
40. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
41. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
42. See id. at 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 107 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ohio 1952)).
43. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
44. See LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.5, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965, 1969 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that in federal question
cases, such as patent cases, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, like the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, requires sufficient minimum contacts
with the relevant venue as a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction).
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therefore, LSI had jurisdiction under Ohio law.45 Accordingly, LSI
demonstrates that amenability to process in a forum state can be
established by state common law as well as by state statute.
4.  Res judicata/collateral estoppel
The doctrines of res judicata (or claim preclusion) and collateral
estoppel (or issue preclusion) serve to prevent unnecessary multiple
lawsuits on matters that parties have had a “full and fair” opportunity
to litigate.46  Under the doctrine of res judicata/claim preclusion, “a
final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their
privies based on the same cause of action.”47  Thus, such a judgment
prevents relitigation of claims that were or could have been brought
in the first action.48  Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue
preclusion, “once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in
subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party
to the prior litigation.”49
The Federal Circuit issued three rulings in the year 2000
implicating these doctrines.50  In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering
Corp.,51 the court determined that a challenge to Embrex’s standing
was precluded for two reasons.52  First, a consent judgment in prior
litigation between the parties had incorporated by reference the
parties’ settlement agreement, which stated that “Embrex has
standing as exclusive licensee under the ‘630 patent”.53 Accordingly,
the court held that, under the doctrine of res judicata, the agreement
precluded the alleged infringer’s challenge to Embrex’s status as an
exclusive licensee.54  Second, the court held that the standing
challenge was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue
preclusion because the alleged infringer’s attack on Embrex’s status
as an exclusive licensee had been rejected on the merits in a different
                                                          
45. See LSI, 232 F.3d at 1375, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
46. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
47. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
48. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998).
49. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
50. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bepop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209
F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
51. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
52. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (affirming district
court’s decision dismissing SEC’s standing defense because of the applicablity of res
judicata).
53. Id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
54. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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lawsuit.55 Thus, the court reasoned, the alleged infringer “has had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the standing issue at least
once . . . .”56
In Speedplay, Inc. v. Bepop, Inc.,57 the court addressed the
relationship between a patentee and an exclusive licensee for
purposes of preclusion.58  The court observed in dicta that, because
both patentee and licensee had been actively involved in the
licensee’s infringement litigation, “the judgment in this case will have
preclusive effect with respect to any parallel claim that might be
brought” by the patentee.59  Presumably, the court concluded this
because the patentee and licensee were in privity with one another,
and thus a subsequent suit would be barred by res judicata.60
Finally, in Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,61 the court addressed
the preclusive effect of a district court’s rejection of an invalidity
defense when it ultimately rendered a judgment of non-
infringement.62 The Federal Circuit ruled that because the district
court had made a ruling of non-infringement, “the district court’s
resolution of the issue of invalidity was not necessary to the judgment.
For that reason, the court’s invalidity ruling will have no collateral
estoppel effect in any possible future dispute between the parties
involving the ‘346 patent.”63  Thus, Hill-Rom demonstrates that if the
resolution of an issue is not “necessary” to a court’s judgment, e.g.,
the judgment is bottomed on alternative grounds, that resolution will
not have a preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel/issue preclusion.64
5. Estoppel based on conduct
The Federal Circuit addressed three varieties of estoppel based on
conduct in the year 2000: the doctrines of “quasi-estoppel,” “judicial
estoppel,” and “equitable estoppel.” In In re Baker Hughes, Inc.,65 the
                                                          
55. Id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
56. Id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
57. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
58. See Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1253-54, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989.
59. Id. at 1253, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989.
60. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (holding that
parties or their privies are barred from further claims where there has been a final
judgment on the same cause of action).
61. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877) and Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349
U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
62. See Hill-Rom, 209 F.3d at 1344, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
63. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
64. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. h, illus. 14 (1982).
65. 215 F.3d 1297, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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court rejected the government’s position that Baker Hughes was
precluded under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel from defending, in a
reexamination proceeding, a patent that it had initially challenged in
a third-party request for reexamination.66  In the reexamination
request, Baker Hughes raised a “substantial new question concerning
the patentability” of claims of the 1991 patent.67 Subsequently,
however, Baker Hughes became the owner of that patent and
ultimately defended it in the reexamination proceeding.68  The
government argued that such an about-face was precluded under the
doctrine of “quasi-estoppel,” also known as the “duty of consistency.”69
This is apparently different from the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  The
latter doctrine prohibits a party from taking a position in a legal
proceeding and then taking a contrary position in the same or a
subsequent legal proceeding.70  The court noted that quasi-estoppel
originated in tax cases to prevent a taxpayer from taking a position in
one year to his advantage and then in a future year “shifting to a
contrary position touching on the same facts or transaction.”71  The
court then explained that the doctrine applied only (1) “when the
earlier position amounts to a misstatement of fact, not of law,” and
(2) when the misstatement is “one on which the government
reasonably relied, in the sense that it neither knew, nor ought to have
known, the true nature of the transaction mischaracterized by the
taxpayer.”72  The court held that the doctrine did not apply in the
case at bar for three reasons:  (1) the government had not shown that
Baker Hughes had made “any specific factual misstatements” or that
the government had “relied on any such misstatements”;
(2) regardless of Baker Hughes’ change in position, the PTO had a
“duty to conduct the reexamination”; and (3) the government had
not shown “that the PTO or the public has suffered any harm from
the change in Baker Hughes’ position.”73  Accordingly, the court
concluded that the public interest lies in having patents “reexamined
when a substantial question of patentability is raised,” regardless of
                                                          
66. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
67. See id. at 1299, 1301-02, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50.
68. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
69. See id. at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151-52 (citing Lewis v. Comm’r, 18
F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1994)).
70. See id. at 1302 n.2, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 n.2.
71. See In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149,
1152 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. United States, 612 F.2d 558,
566 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
72. Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (citations
omitted).
73. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
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which party initiates or defends in the reexamination proceedings.74
The Federal Circuit discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel on
three occasions in 2000.75  That doctrine generally “prevents a party
from contradicting previous declarations made during the same or a
later proceeding if the change in position would adversely affect the
proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court.”76  The Federal Circuit
applies the law of judicial estoppel of the circuit from which the case
arose.77  Most, but not all, courts apply judicial estoppel only “where a
party [has] successfully urge[d] a particular position in a legal
proceeding” and later takes “a contrary position” in the same or
subsequent proceeding.78
In Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products, Inc.,79 the court
considered whether Lampi was judicially estopped from arguing that
the patented invention had not been on sale prior to January 31,
1986 because Lampi had stated to the PTO that the device had been
“use[d] in commerce” in July 1985.80  Lampi had submitted
declarations and its attorneys had argued to the PTO in the course of
an application for a trademark that the external design of the
patented product, a fluorescent light, had been “use[d] in
commerce” since July of 1985.81  Thus, in the district court, American
Power urged that Lampi was judicially estopped from taking the
position that the patented product had not been on sale before
January 31, 1986, and therefore that the patent was invalid under the
                                                          
74. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
75. See Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1251,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d
1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Interactive Gift Express,
Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (noting that “a party will be judicially estopped from asserting a position on
appeal that is inconsistent with a position it advocated at trial and persuaded the trial
court to adopt”) (discussing Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 715-
16, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1916 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
76. Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1302 n.2, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 n.2 (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 571 (7th ed. 1999)).
77. See Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
78. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1302 n.2, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 (quoting
Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  See generally Kelly L.
Morron, Time for the Federal Circuit to Take a Judicious Approach to Judicial Estoppel, 28
AIPLA Q.J. 159, 171-77 & nn.69-108 (2000) (noting that the Tenth and D.C. Circuits
have rejected entirely application of judicial estoppel in cases presenting federal
questions but also noting that, of the remaining circuits, only the Third Circuit does
not have a requirement that a litigant have achieved “success” or “litigation benefit”
from its original position before a change in that position can lead to judicial
estoppel).
79. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
80. See Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1371, 1376-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
81. See id. at 1370-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
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on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).82  The district court rejected this
argument and held that Lampi should not be judicially estopped
because the Lampi officer who had made the relevant statements to
the PTO had “misunderstood” the meaning of “use in commerce,”
and as of July 1985, Lampi had only submitted preliminary plans to a
manufacturer, whereas the patented products had not gone on sale
until September 1986; furthermore, after the statements were made,
Lampi had amended its trademark application to assert that the
products had not gone on sale until September 1986.83  The Federal
Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had not abused its
discretion in determining that Lampi’s original statements to the
PTO were mistaken, that the patented products were actually on sale
as of September 1986 and that Lampi had not gained an “unfair
advantage” before the PTO because trademark protection was
available even if the products were not sold until September 1986.84
The court did note, however, that it was “troubled by the
inconsistencies between Lampi’s statements to the PTO—particularly
the statements made by Lampi’s attorneys—and the position taken by
Lampi in this litigation.”85  Thus, the court deferred to the district
court’s evaluation of whether Lampi’s assertion of contradictory
positions was intentional and whether it provided an unfair
advantage.86
In Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,87 the court
addressed whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits parties
from challenging on appeal a claim construction it advocated in the
same case at the trial level.88  In the district court, Samsung had urged
that the terms “aluminum and aluminum oxide” meant “pure
aluminum and aluminum oxide—that is, not any other metals or
alloys in combination with aluminum”; on, appeal, however, Samsung
argued that the definition it had urged below was incomplete, and
that, as properly construed, “the aluminum must be arranged in a
‘layer’ to meet the requirements of the ‘aluminum and aluminum
oxide’ limitation.”89  The Federal Circuit decided not to rule upon
the question of “whether Samsung is judicially estopped from
                                                          
82. See id. at 1376-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
83. See id. at 1370-72, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450-51.
84. See id. at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
85. See Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1445, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
86. See Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
87. 215 F.3d 1281, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
88. See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1290, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
89. Id. at 1290, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
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challenging its own claim construction adopted by the trial court”
because it found meritless Samsung’s argument that the district court
erred in adopting its original claim construction.90  The court noted,
however, that judicial estoppel “prevent[s] a party from changing its
position over the course of judicial proceedings when such positional
changes have an adverse impact on the judicial process,”91 and that
“we look with ‘extreme disfavor’ on appeals that allege error in claim
constructions that were advocated below by the very party now
challenging them.”92
It is neither clear nor free from controversy that judicial estoppel
should bar a party from articulating different claim constructions at
trial and on appeal.  On the one hand, the doctrine of “invited error”
usually precludes a party from “complain[ing] on appeal of errors
that he himself invited.”93  Indeed, in Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon
Laboratories Corp.,94 the court noted that the doctrines of “invited
error” and “judicial estoppel” preclude a party from urging that “the
trial court erred by adopting the position it advocated at trial.”95  On
the other hand, because claim construction is a question of law,
reviewed “without deference” to the trial court,96 it is entirely possible
that the Federal Circuit will adopt a claim construction different from
any asserted in, or adopted by, the district court.  Thus, the Federal
Circuit has stated that in construing patent claims the court’s role is
“not to decide which of the adversaries is correct,” but to “determine
the meaning of the claims, notwithstanding the views asserted by the
adversary parties.”97  In Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,98
the court purported to do just that, adopting a claim construction
                                                          
90. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
91. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727,
738 (9th Cir. 1991)).
92. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (citing Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp.,
161 F.3d 709, 714-15, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
93. Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 715 n.1, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1911, 1916 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2558, at 470 (2d ed. 1995)).  Two of the
authors were counsel to Hercon Laboratories in this case.
94. 161 F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95. Key Pharms., 161 F.3d at 715, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.  The court did not
apply such preclusion doctrines in Hercon because the court had not previously publicly
condemned a party from urging on appeal that the claim construction advocated in
the district court was error and because Key had not objected to Hercon’s conduct or
sought to invoke estoppel.  Id. at 715-16, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
96. See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1556, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1803 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the issue of claim
interpretation is reviewed on appeal “without deference to the trial judge”).  Two of
the authors were counsel to The Lubrizol Corporation in this case.
97. Id. at 1555-56, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
98. 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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that, while virtually identical to that advocated by Lubrizol, was
asserted by the court to be different from that urged by the parties as
well as that adopted by the district court.99  Accordingly, while it may
be appropriate in some circumstances to prohibit a party from
challenging the precise claim construction it urged in the trial court,
such a prohibition conflicts with the notion that the Federal Circuit
itself may issue claim interpretations never proposed by either party
in the course of district court litigation.
Finally, in Zacharin v. United States,100 the court addressed whether
the government could be estopped from asserting the on-sale bar as a
defense although it had not raised the issue when the patent
application was filed.101  The government argued that the patent at
issue was invalid under the on-sale bar because the patented
invention was offered for sale by a contract signed in April 1980,
more than one year before Zacharin’s patent application had been
filed.102  Zacharin, an Army employee, asked Army counsel in
September 1980 to file a patent application for the invention but was
told by Army counsel that due to a backlog, the application might be
delayed for more than a year; the application was in fact submitted to
the PTO on September 24, 1981.103  Zacharin argued that the
government was estopped from asserting the on-sale bar as a defense
because the government attorney who filed the patent application
had not raised the on-sale bar issue at the time of the patent
application.104  The court rejected this argument noting that “if
equitable estoppel is available at all against the government some
form of affirmative misconduct must be shown . . . .”105  The court
held that “[t]here is no evidence that any representative of the
government gave Mr. Zacharin incorrect legal advice or engaged in
any other affirmative misconduct . . . .”; and thus, that the
government could not be equitably estopped.106
                                                          
99. See Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1556-61, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803-07 (providing
independent claim construction); see also Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
77 F.3d 450, 451, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1768 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Mayer, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing in banc) (opining that “[t]wo judges have divined an
interpretation of the claim that occurred to no one else in this extensive litigation.”).
100. 213 F.3d 1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
101. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1371-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
102. See id. at 1368-69, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
103. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
104. See id. at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051 (discussing Zacharin’s equitable
estoppel argument).
105. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
106. Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1371-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047,
1051 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  In light of this holding, the court declined to address a second
argument against the assertion of equitable estoppel stating that to preclude the
government from asserting the on-sale bar would provide Zacharin with a money
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6. Waiver and collateral attack
In Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch Engineering Co.,107 the court held that a party
that had failed to timely raise a patent misuse defense in an
infringement action could not later bring a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration of patent misuse and vacatur of any
damages award in the original action.108  In the original infringement
action, Glitsch had attempted to amend its answer to assert defenses
of patent and trade-secret misuse after the district court had ruled on
liability but before it had ruled on damages.  The district court
denied Glitsch’s motion to amend as untimely because the defenses
at issue related to the already-determined issues of liability.109  Glitsch
then filed a separate declaratory-judgment action seeking to have the
patent and trade secrets at issue in the first action declared
unenforceable because of patent and trade-secret misuse and any
award of damages in first action vacated.110  The district court held
that Glitsch had waived its right to have the patent and trade-secret
misuse claims litigated by failing to raise them timely in the original
action.111
The Federal Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that Glitsch could
not circumvent its error in the first action via a collateral attack in its
second action.112  As the court stated,
[w]hen a court enters an order that a party does not like, the
party’s recourse is to seek relief on appeal; it is not appropriate for
the party to contest the court’s order by filing a new action seeking
a declaratory judgment challenging the court’s ruling in the first
case.113
The court explained that permitting Glitsch’s declaratory
judgment action would be tantamount to permitting “an
interlocutory appeal of an adverse ruling” on the merits of the misuse
defenses.114  The court noted that its holding was compelled by three
                                                          
remedy that Congress had not authorized, contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426 (1990).  Id. at 1371-72, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
107. 216 F.3d 1382, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
108. See Glitsch, 216 F.3d at 1383-86, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
109. See id. at 1383, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-77 (discussing the proceedings in
the district court).
110. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-77.
111. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-77.
112. See id. at 1384, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.  The court ultimately made clear
that it was taking no position on the merits of the waiver ruling which presumably can
be raised on any appeal that may be taken in the original infringement action.  Id. at
1386, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
113. Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 1384, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
114. See Glitsch, 216 F.3d at 1385, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
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important policies of federal procedure:  “(1) that litigation relating
to a single matter should take place in a single action”; “(2) that a
district court’s order in one action should be reviewed by the
statutory method of appeal, not by a collateral proceeding for
declaratory judgment”; and “(3) that, with limited exceptions, review
of a district court’s ruling should take place only after a final
judgment is entered in that case.”115
Finally, the court rejected Glitsch’s argument that the Supreme
Court had established that patent-misuse defenses cannot be
waived.116  The Federal Circuit noted that in the Mercoid case, the
Supreme Court ruled that failing to assert a patent-misuse defense in
an infringement action against a party’s privy did not preclude that
party from raising that equitable defense in a subsequent action
directly against that party in which the equitable remedy of an
injunction was sought.117  The Federal Circuit distinguished that
situation, involving the balance between patent misuse and res
judicata, from the case at bar which did not involve successive
infringement actions and in which Glitsch still had the right to appeal
in the original action.118  Consequently, the court held that “the
rationale of Mercoid does not justify allowing a party to launch a
collateral attack on a ruling in the first action, the effect of which
would be to alter the judgment in that action.”119
7. Order of addressing arguments
In Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,120 the court made clear that a
district court may decide the issue of patent validity, “even if the issue
was raised only as an affirmative defense and even if the court finds
that the patent was not infringed.”121  There, the district court’s
opinion stated both that the patent was not infringed and that the
affirmative defense of invalidity was meritless; however, the judgment
stated only that “judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants
Kinetic Concepts Inc. and KCI Therapeutic Services Inc.”122  On
                                                          
115. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (citations omitted).
116. See id. at 1385-86, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (analyzing Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)).
117. See id. at 1385, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (discussing Mercoid, 320 U.S. at
670).
118. See id. at 1386, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (discussing Mercoid).
119. Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 1386, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
120. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
121. Hill-Rom, 209 F.3d at 1344, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (citing Multiform
Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1436
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
122. Id. at 1340, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
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appeal, KCI argued that, should the Federal Circuit uphold the
judgment on noninfringement grounds, it should vacate the district
court’s discussion of validity in its opinion.123  Although the Federal
Circuit upheld the judgment on grounds of noninfringement, it
declined to vacate any part of the district court’s judgment or
opinion.  First, the Federal Circuit found it unnecessary to vacate any
part of the judgment because the district court’s ruling on invalidity
was not mentioned anywhere in the judgment.124  Second, as noted in
Part I.A.4, supra, the court reasoned that because the ruling on
invalidity was not necessary to the court’s judgment, it would have no
binding effect in any future proceedings between the parties.125  Thus,
the Federal Circuit had no reason to modify the district court’s
judgment or opinion in any way.
8. Trial procedure/motions to dismiss and adequacy of pleading
The Federal Circuit carefully scrutinizes dismissals under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to adequately plead a
claim upon which relief could be granted.  Because the question of
whether a district court’s ruling on such a motion “is a purely
procedural question not pertaining to patent law,” the court applies
the rule of appellate review of the regional circuit in which the case
arose.126  Thus, in Phonometrics v. Hospitality Franchise Systems,127 the
court noted that the Eleventh Circuit “has made clear that the
dismissal standard is extraordinary, and one not to be taken
lightly.”128  Similarly, in C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc.,129 the court
emphasized that the Seventh Circuit has held that a complaint “need
not specify the correct legal theory, or point to the right statute, to
survive a motion to dismiss.”130
In Phonometrics, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of
an infringement complaint for pleading deficiencies.131  After the
second remand in that case from the Federal Circuit on claim-
                                                          
123. See id. at 1343, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
124. See id. at 1344, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
125. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
126. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1871 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Seventh Circuit law); see also Phonometrics, Inc.
v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 793, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762, 1764
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Eleventh Circuit law to the same issue).
127. 203 F.3d 790, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
128. Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 793, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (citing Brooks v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997)).
129. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
130. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1306, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (citing Tolle v.
Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1992)).
131. Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 793-94, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764-65.
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construction issues, the district court had dismissed the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) and granted leave to amend the complaint
requiring Phonometrics to include specific infringement allegations
for each claim element, in accordance with the Federal Circuit’s
claim construction.132  Rather than amend the complaint,
Phonometrics appealed the dismissal to the Federal Circuit.133  The
Federal Circuit held, contrary to the district court’s ruling, that “Rule
12(b)(6) pleading requirements for a complaint of infringement
cannot be extended to require a plaintiff to specifically include each
element of the claims of the asserted patent.”134  Rather, “a patentee
need only plead facts sufficient to place the alleged infringer on
notice.  This requirement ensures that an accused infringer has
sufficient knowledge of the facts alleged to enable it to answer the
complaint and defend itself.”135  To require otherwise “would
contravene the notice pleading standard, and would add needless
steps to the already complex process of patent litigation.”136
In C&F Packing, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).137  There, C&F had argued that Illinois
law governed its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and
alleged a violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. The district court
disagreed, concluding that Kansas law governed C&F’s claims.138  The
district court thus dismissed C&F’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6)
because they had purportedly been brought under the wrong
statute.139  The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that even if C&F had
chosen the “law of the wrong state under which to bring its claim,
such a mistake is akin to that of bringing a case under an incorrect
legal theory” and, consequently, “the district court should have
proceeded to try the case on its merits under the state law it found
more appropriate.”140  The Federal Circuit also criticized the district
court’s dicta that C&F’s claims should have been dismissed even
under Kansas law as barred by the statute of limitations.141  The court
noted that the parties disputed when C&F knew or should have
                                                          
132. See id. at 792, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763-64.
133. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763-64.
134. See id. at 794, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
135. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
136. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
137. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306-07,  55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1871 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
138. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1306, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (discussing the
district court’s holding).
139. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
140. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
141. See id. at 1306-07, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (noting that the district court’s
dicta “foreshadows a possible verdict on remand”).
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known that its trade secrets had been misappropriated and explained
that Kansas law requires such a dispute to be resolved by “the trier of
fact.”142  Accordingly, the court remanded for further fact-finding on
those limitation issues.143
9. Trial procedure/motions for judgment as a matter of law
In 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed a few important procedural
issues regarding motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”).
A JMOL is appropriate if “during a trial by jury a party has been fully
heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.”144  Such a
motion must be made before submitting the case to the jury.145  In
reviewing district court judgments in patent cases, the Federal Circuit
applies Federal Circuit law to patent law issues, which include
procedural issues relating to patent law, but applies “the law of the
circuit in which the district court sits” to nonpatent issues.146
Consequently, the court applies Federal Circuit procedural law to
JMOL decisions on patent issues, and regional circuit procedural law
to JMOL decisions on nonpatent issues.147
With regard to patent law issues, the Federal Circuit reviews district
court decisions on motions for JMOL by applying the same standard
used by the district court.148  Thus, the court determines “whether
‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party,’ and giving the non-movant ‘the benefit of all reasonable
inferences,’ there is sufficient evidence of record to support a jury
verdict in favor of the non-movant.”149  In doing so, the court does
“not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or
                                                          
142. See id. at 1307, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (citing McCaffree Fin. Corp. v.
Nunnink, 847 P.2d 1321, 1331 (Kan. App. 1993)).
143. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1307-08, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2).
146. See, e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1674-75 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
147. Compare, e.g., Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1289-
90, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Federal Circuit
procedural law to decision on JMOL regarding patent infringement), with C&F
Packing, 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Seventh
Circuit procedural law to decision on JMOL regarding misappropriation of trade
secrets).
148. See Southwest Software, 226 F.3d at 1289, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (citing
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) in reviewing the lower court’s holding by reapplication
of the same standard).
149. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1167 (quoting Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1573, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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decide disputed facts,” but rather determines whether “there can be
but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable jurors could have
reached.”150
The Federal Circuit, however, cannot determine that a district
court should have granted a JMOL on a ground not properly
advanced in the district court.151  “Failing to properly move for JMOL
at the close of evidence precludes a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying fact findings.”152  Thus, in Southwest Software, Inc.
v. Harlequin, Inc., the court held that Harlequin had waived its right
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on a particular
infringement claim because it had failed to move for JMOL on that
claim at the close of evidence.153  Similarly, in Advanced Display Systems,
Inc. v. Kent State University,154 the court held that Kent had waived its
right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the claim that its
patent was invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because it
had not moved for JMOL at the close of evidence.155  Kent was not
foreclosed, however, from challenging the verdict and seeking a new
trial on the ground that the judge had given the jury a legally
erroneous jury instruction relating to the anticipation claim because
Kent had properly objected to the jury instruction.156
The court does not hold parties to particularly severe standards of
form in complying with the requirement that a JMOL motion be
made at the close of evidence.157  Thus, in Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v.
Hoffinger Industries, Inc.,158 the court held that Hoffinger had not
waived its right to renew its JMOL on infringement, even though it
had not presented argument on that element of its JMOL motion
after the close of evidence.159  The district court, in granting JMOL,
noted that it “understood [Hoffinger] to be renewing its Rule 50
motion in its entirety, but only rearguing the point relating to the
issue of lost profits.”160  The court characterized the question of “what
constitutes a directed verdict” as a purely procedural issue governed
                                                          
150. Id. at 1289-90, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (quoting Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at
1573, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841).
151. See id. at 1290, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
152. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
153. See Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1290, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
154. 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
155. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1282-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80.
156. See id. at 1281-82, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
157. See Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 1412, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
158. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
159. See Zodiac Pool Care, 206 F.3d at 1412, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
160. Id. at 1412-13, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
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by regional circuit law and noted that the Eleventh Circuit took a
“liberal view” on that issue.161  The court then held that “in light of
the trial judge’s declaration of this understanding, we find no
compelling reason why counsel for Hoffinger should have
emphasized issues that have already been ruled upon by the trial
court”; accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of JMOL.162  Thus,
the court largely deferred to the district court’s determination in
light of the “wide discretion” given a trial judge in characterizing the
arguments of counsel.163
10. Trial procedure/post-judgment motions to amend
District court rulings on motions to amend complaints or
judgments are generally governed by the law of the regional circuit
from which the case originated and are reviewed for “abuse of
discretion.”164  In reviewing a denial of a motion to amend a
complaint following summary judgment, a party must at least present
a “colorable argument of possible success” on other claims; a distrcit
court need not allow a proposed amendment if it would be futile to
do so.165  Thus, in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,166 the
court affirmed the district court’s denial of such a motion, even
though the district court had denied the motion “without
comment.”167  The court acknowledged that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) permits a complaint to be amended “when justice so
requires,”168 and stated that “[o]rdinarily, courts of appeals frown on
unexplained exercises of discretion by trial judges.”169 However, the
court held that any amendment of the complaint at issue to assert
infringement of additional claims of the patent would have been
“futile,” since under the “district court’s claim construction,” none of
                                                          
161. See id. at 1416, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
162. See id. at 1417, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
163. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (relying on Motorola Inc. v. Interdigital
Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1470, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1487 (Fed. Cir. 1997))
(citations omitted).
164. See, e.g., Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1332-33, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Second Circuit law to motion
to amend complaint after grant of summary judgment and reviewing for “abuse of
discretion”); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1350, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Third Circuit law to motion
to amend judgment and reviewing for “abuse of discretion”).
165. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
166. 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
167. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1332-33, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211-12 (rejecting
Cultor’s argument that the court’s lack of explanation was antithetical to the Federal
Rules).
168. See id. at 1332, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
169. Id. at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
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the claims could have been infringed.170  Accordingly, the court
affirmed the district court’s “terse ruling.”171
In Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co.,172 the court affirmed
the district court’s denial of a motion to amend the judgment.173  The
court noted that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), as
interpreted by the Third Circuit:
A proper motion to alter or amend the judgment “must rely on one
of three major grounds:  ‘(1) an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence [not available previously];
[or] (3) the need to correct clear error [of law] or prevent
manifest injustice.’”174
The court reasoned that there had been no change in the law and
that the evidence the defendant had wished to submit after the
judgment—that it had changed to a non-infringing product—had
been available to it and within its control prior to the entry of
judgment on damages, and that the defendant made numerous
strategic choices during the pendency of the litigation not to
introduce that evidence.175  Therefore, the court concluded that the
district court had not abused its discretion in refusing to “re-open”
the case to permit an additional evidentiary hearing on that issue.176
11.  Trial procedure/motion to transfer venue
Pursuant to statute, a district court may transfer an action to
another district court for “the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice.”177  The Federal Circuit reviews a decision on
such a procedural motion under the law of the regional circuit from
which the case arose.178  Thus, in Winner International Royalty Corp. v.
Wang,179 the court applied the law of the District of Columbia Circuit
to determine whether the district court had abused its discretion in
denying Wang’s motion to transfer to the Central District of
California.180  The court affirmed the district court’s decision,
                                                          
170. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
171. Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 1328, 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1208, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
172. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
173. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1349-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341-42.
174. Id. at 1350, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
175. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341-42 (holding the defendant’s silence
justified the lower court’s decision).
176. Id. at 1351, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
177. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1580, 1589 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994)).
178. See Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
179. 202 F.3d 1340, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
180. See Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589-90.
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reasoning:  (1) that with numerous witnesses close to either the
District of Columbia or California, it was just as convenient to litigate
in the District of Columbia; and (2) that the case was tried and
resolved in just six months after the motion for transfer was denied,
“presumably much more quickly than would have been the case if the
action were transferred.”181
12. Trial practice/challenge to jury instructions
A party may challenge a jury verdict on the ground that an
instruction to the jury was legally erroneous.182  To make such a
challenge, a party must establish that “(1) it made a proper and
timely objection to the jury instructions, (2) those instructions were
legally erroneous, (3) the errors had prejudicial effect, and (4) it
requested alternative instructions that would have remedied the
error.”183  (It is questionable whether the fourth requirement, of
correct alternative instructions, should apply in all cases in light of
Rule 51’s prescription that a party need only “stat[e] distinctly the
matter objected to and the grounds of the objection,”184 and Rule 46’s
command that “formal exceptions” to district court actions are
unnecessary so long as a party expresses its “objection to the action of
the court and the grounds therefor.”185  Indeed, in many
circumstances, a party will request that no instruction at all be given
rather than propose an alternative instruction.)
In Advanced Display Systems v. Kent State University,186 the court
reversed a jury finding of patent invalidity by anticipation because of
an erroneous jury instruction.187  The court first sought to determine
whether Kent had objected timely to the relevant jury instruction, a
procedural issue determined by the law of the regional circuit from
which the case arose.188  Applying Fifth Circuit law, the court ruled
that, by objecting to the relevant jury instruction before the jury had
been charged and explaining the basis for the objection, Kent had
properly objected.189  The court next examined whether the
                                                          
181. See id. at 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589-90.
182. See, e.g., Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that a “jury verdict may be
altered if the instructions ‘were incorrect or incomplete as given’”) (quoting Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomed. Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 854, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1255
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
183. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citations omitted).
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 51.
185. FED. R. CIV. P. 46.
186. 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
187. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1281-84, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-80.
188. See id. at 1281-82, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
189. See id. at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing A.B. Baumstimler v.
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instruction, which required the jury to determine whether a prior-art
document had incorporated by reference other material such that
the substance of both could be considered to evaluate whether the
patent at issue had been anticipated, was legally erroneous.190  The
court held that the instruction was erroneous because “[w]hether
and to what extent material has been incorporated by reference into
a host document is a question of law” that the court below should
have determined, rather than leaving it to the jury.191  Further, the
court held that the error was “prejudicial” because “determining what
material was incorporated by reference into the Haas patent was a
critical question of law for the [court] to resolve before submitting
the factual issue of anticipation to the jury.”192  Finally, the court held
that Kent had properly demonstrated that its objection would cure
the defect because “the proper jury instruction on incorporation by
reference would have been no instruction at all.”193  Consequently,
the court remanded for a new trial on anticipation.194  Advanced
Display demonstrates that, where no instruction would have been
appropriate, the court will not require that an alternate instruction
should have been proposed.195
In Environ Products, Inc. v. Furon Co.,196 the court examined whether
a jury instruction contained the correct burden of proof—“clear and
convincing evidence”—for a party claiming inventorship.197  The
court first concluded that the proper burden of proof would have
been the “preponderance of the evidence” standard applicable in a
patent interference proceeding because both parties had patent
applications that were “co-pending,” and thus the higher burden of
proof usually placed upon a challenger to a presumptively valid
patent should not have been applied.198  The court next examined
whether the district court’s error was prejudicial; it concluded that
there was no prejudice because, regardless of the burden of proof,
                                                          
Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1069, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 575, 581-82 (5th Cir. 1982)).
190. See id. at 1282-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing Ultradent Prods., Inc. v.
Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc., 127 F.3d 1065, 1069, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1336, 1339-40
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
191. Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
192. Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (noting that
“[p]rejudicial legal error exists when it ‘appears to the court [that the error is]
inconsistent with substantial justice’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 61).
193. Id. at 1284, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
194. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
195. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
196. 215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
197. See Environ Prods., 215 F.3d at 1265-66, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041-42.
198. See id. at 1266, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
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the jury’s determination of the identity of the inventor would have
been the same—the jury found that the named inventor was the
actual inventor, by a preponderance of the evidence, which negated
the possibility that the challenger could have been the inventor,
regardless of what burden the challenger had to shoulder.199  Thus,
the court held that the error was “harmless” and that Furon was not
entitled to a new trial.200
A variation on the problem of an erroneous burden of proof was at
issue in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.201  There the district
court had improperly instructed the jury that “willfulness” of
infringement (for which enhanced damages can be awarded) could
be proven by “a preponderance of the evidence” instead of the
correct and more exacting “clear and convincing evidence”
standard.202  The jury found, based on this improper statement of the
burden of proof, that the defendant’s infringement had been
willful.203  The defendant, however, had not timely objected to the
erroneous jury instruction.204  Under Fourth Circuit law, applicable to
this procedural issue, appeal would still be permitted if the error were
“plain,” if it affected the aggrieved party’s “substantial rights,” and if
failure to correct the error “would result in a miscarriage of justice.”205
The court concluded that the error was plain, but it held that failure
to correct it would not result in a miscarriage of justice because in the
court’s evaluation of the evidence presented at trial, “the jury would
have reached the same conclusion under either” evidentiary
standard.206  The accuracy of this court’s holding, where a
“willfulness” finding required the jury to determine its certainty of
willful infringement (a determination which required the jury to
evaluate the evidence through the prism of the burden of proof—i.e.,
if the jury were only fifty-one percent convinced of willfulness, it
could not render a willfulness verdict under the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard), is less clear than the court’s holding
in Environ, where the jury’s answer to other interrogatories gave the
                                                          
199. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042-43.
200. See id. at 1266-67, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043 (noting that “[e]rrors in
instructions routinely are ignored if . . . the error could not have changed the result”)
(quoting 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2886 (2d ed. 1995)).
201. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
202. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
203. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
204. See id. at 1350-51, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
205. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (quoting United States v. Jennings,
160 F.3d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1998)).
206. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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court more assurance that any error assigning burdens of proof was
in fact harmless.207
Lastly, in C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc.,208 the court found that the
jury instruction on the definition of trade secret misappropriation
was not erroneous.209  The court, in applying Seventh Circuit law to
the procedural issue of the “correctness of jury instructions,” noted
that the instruction needed only to “convey the correct message to
the jury reasonably well.”210  Based upon that standard, the court
concluded that the instruction did not mislead the jury because it
conveyed the critical message that it may be relevant to, but cannot
be dispositive of, the question of trade secret misappropriation that
the alleged wrongdoer had hired a former employee of the
complaining party.211
13. Trial practice/use of stipulations
The use of stipulations between the parties either before or during
trial is an increasingly common litigation practice.212  As a handful of
Federal Circuit cases from year 2000 demonstrate, the use of such
stipulations can have significant consequences for the parties.  In
Watts v. XL Systems, Inc.,213 the parties agreed to the following
stipulations prior to a determination on summary judgment:  “that
XL (1) does not infringe any of the three claims [at issue in the
litigation] when [two] functional statements [in the claims] are
construed as means-plus-function limitations; (2) does not use
differing taper angles between connecting pipe ends; and (3) does
not use any structure that is insubstantially different from the use of
differing taper angles.”214  Based upon its claim construction and
                                                          
207. Compare Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000), with Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (illustrating the difficulty in determining
whether an erroneous jury instruction regarding the assignment of burden of proof
was harmless or prejudicial).
208. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
209. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869-70.
210. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (citing Dawson v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
135 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1998)).
211. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869-70.
212. See, e.g., Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
213. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
214. Watts, 232 F.3d at 879-81, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.  Pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, para. 6, “an element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material or
acts, in support thereof,” and “such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.”  Such claims are generally referred to as “means-plus-function” or
“step-plus-function” claims.
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these stipulations, the district court concluded that the claims had
not been infringed.215  On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the “functional statements” in the claims were not means-plus-
function claims.216  Watts had argued on appeal that noninfringement
was not conceded by the stipulations.217  However, the Federal Circuit
disagreed, holding that the second and third stipulations, which do
not refer to means-plus-function restrictions, precluded Watts’s
infringement arguments regardless of the resolution of the means-
plus-function claims.218  The court reasoned that the claims at issue,
regardless of whether the claim elements were in means-plus-function
format, required “differing taper angles,” but that the second
stipulation “unequivocally concedes” that XL did not use such
angles;219 moreover, the third stipulation disclaimed any possible basis
for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.220  Therefore, the
stipulations Watts had agreed to in the district court ended up
foreclosing its arguments on appeal.221
Similarly in Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,222 the court
held that ADM’s pre-trial admissions foreclosed one of its arguments
on appeal.  ADM argued that it should be permitted to have an
evidentiary hearing before the district court to present evidence
regarding damages—that it had allegedly begun to use a non-
infringing product—never previously proffered to the district court.223
However, ADM’s pre-trial admissions and the parties’ joint pre-trial
statement of stipulated facts both contained statements that ADM was
using only the product found to be infringing.224  Thus, the court
held that ADM was bound by those admissions, at least until it
expressly informed the district court that they were incorrect,
something it did not attempt to do until after trial.225  Ultimately, the
court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion in
refusing to grant ADM a hearing to present its desired evidence.226
                                                          
215. See id. at 879-80, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
216. See id. at 884-85, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42.
217. See id. at 884, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
218. See id. at 884-85, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42.
219. See Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 884, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1842
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
220. Watts, 232 F.3d at 885, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
221. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
222. 228 F.3d 1338, 1350-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
223. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1350, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
224. See id. at 1351, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
225. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (noting that “[a]ny matter admitted under
this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or
amendment of the admission”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b)).
226. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
1466 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1435
While the court did refer to other factors, such as ADM’s resistance to
discovery on the issue and the actual testimony at trial in upholding
the district court’s ruling,227 ADM’s admissions plainly played an
important role in the court’s rejection of its arguments on appeal.228
In Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.,229 the parties’
stipulations had the effect of advancing, rather than hampering,
Interactive Gift Express’s (IGE) appeal.  There, after the district court
had completed its claim construction of five disputed claim
limitations, the parties entered into a Stipulated Order and Judgment
providing that there was no infringement of any of the five claims as
construed by the district court.230  Based upon this stipulation, which
permitted a rapid appeal, counsel for IGE acknowledged at oral
argument that “IGE must show that the district court was wrong in its
construction of all five of the disputed claim limitations to prevail in
[its] appeal.”231  Hence, IGE’s stipulations required it to sustain a
heavy burden on appeal.  Nonetheless, it was able to do so, as the
court held that the district court had erred “in at least one aspect of
its construction of each of the five claim limitations”; consequently,
the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.232
These cases demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of the
use of stipulations in the trial court.  They are very likely to bind the
parties even on appeal, and may therefore preclude certain
arguments a party may wish to pursue in the Federal Circuit.  On the
other hand, such stipulations can be used to narrow the issues in a
case and/or facilitate a rapid appeal.  The use of stipulations may be
especially helpful in light of the court’s ruling in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.,233 that claim construction is an issue of law
determined exclusively by the court.234  As we discuss in Part III.A,
infra, in most infringement cases, the real (indeed, the only) dispute
is over claim construction.235  Thus, it may be increasingly
advantageous for parties to stipulate to factual issues such as literal
infringement—if there is no real dispute about the resolution of the
                                                          
227. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
228. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1351, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
229. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
230. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
231. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651.
232. Id. at 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
233. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
234. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
235. See infra notes 1192- 1311 and accompanying text.
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issue should a particular claim construction be adopted—to expedite
review of an adverse claim-construction ruling.
14. Trial practice/admissibility of evidence
District court decisions regarding the admission or rejection of
evidence at trial are reviewed under the deferential “abuse of
discretion” standard.236  Moreover, the Federal Circuit has noted that,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c),237 “the right to be ‘fully
heard’ does not amount to a right to introduce every shred of
evidence that a party wishes, without regard to the probative value of
that evidence.”238  Thus, in Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical v. Danbury
Pharmacal, Inc.,239 the court held that the district court had not abused
its discretion in refusing Danbury’s request to present testimony of
the inventor of the patent alleged to be invalid.240  The Federal
Circuit embraced the district court’s reasoning that the inventor’s
testimony would be offered only to contradict the testimony of
Danbury’s own expert and that Danbury could have previously
deposed the inventor but chose not to do so.241  Hence, the court
agreed that Danbury had been “fully heard” at trial.242  In a similar
vein, the court upheld the district court’s exclusion of hearsay
evidence in Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp.243  There, Rotec wished to
introduce a declaration from its President recounting the statements
of others regarding the activities of a competitor.244  The district court
held that the plainly hearsay statement could not properly be
characterized as a statement furthering a conspiracy or as describing
                                                          
236. See, e.g., Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339,
1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1256, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(c) states:
JUDGMENT OF PARTIAL FINDINGS. If during a trial without a jury a party had
been fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that
issue, the court may either enter judgment as a matter of law  against the
party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling
law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or
the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence.  Such a judgment shall be supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by subdivision (a) of this rule.
238. See Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (quoting First
Va. Banks, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 206 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2000)).
239. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
240. See Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (holding that
the right to be fully heard at trial does not indicate that the district court lacks
discretion in excluding testimony).
241. See id. at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
242. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
243. See 215 F.3d 1246, 1255-56, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
244. See Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1256, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007-08.
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the statement of an agent of Mitsubishi, since the statement
recounted information provided by innocent third parties.245  Thus,
the Federal Circuit held that the district court had not abused its
discretion in excluding the declaration.246
Likewise, the court deferentially reviews decisions by district courts
to admit evidence of questionable probative value.  In Winner
International Royalty Corp. v. Wang,247 the court found that the district
court had not abused its discretion in allowing Winner to introduce
evidence from allegedly late-disclosed witnesses and a survey
regarding the commercial success of the patented invention.248  The
Federal Circuit held that Wang’s failure to identify precisely which
witnesses were purportedly disclosed late249 and its incorrect
argument that the survey was relevant demonstrated that the district
court’s decision was within its sound discretion.250  Similarly, in Fiskars,
Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.,251 the court upheld the district court’s
refusal to strike Fiskars’ damages case for failure to disclose certain
sales information.252  The district court ruled that Hunt’s argument
was suspicious because Hunt had declined the court’s offer to
exclude the same sales information prior to trial and could not after
trial “attack an evidentiary ruling it requested.”253  The Federal Circuit
held that such a ruling was within the district court’s discretion.254
15. Trial practice/expert testimony
Expert testimony is admissible in patent cases for a variety of
purposes.255  It is particularly common with regard to issues of patent
infringement and is frequently offered to oppose summary
judgment.256  In Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd.,257 the
court held that an expert’s unsupported conclusion of infringement
                                                          
245. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
246. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
247. 202 F.3d 1340, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
248. Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1351-52, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
249. See id. at 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
250. See id. at 1351-52, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
251. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
252. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
253. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
254. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
255. See Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators, Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 1244 n.3, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567, 1568 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
256. For a detailed discussion of the role of extrinsic evidence in claim
construction, see infra Part III.A.
257. 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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did not defeat summary judgment of noninfringement.258  There,
Collins proffered an expert declaration that purported to generate
genuine issues of material fact regarding the structures of the
accused products:  the patent required “TST switches” and the expert
declared that the accused products were TST switches.259  The court
noted that this was an unsupported declaration and explained that
“an expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of
infringement is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
fact.”260  Hence, the court affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment of noninfringement.261
In the proper circumstances, however, expert testimony can
preclude summary judgment.  In Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar
Avionics,262 the court relied upon an expert declaration and report to
vacate and remand the district court’s determination of
noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents.263  The expert’s
submissions there contained a “detailed” factual analysis of the patent
claims and the accused device and concluded that there was
infringement.264  The Federal Circuit noted that “[n]o evidence was
offered by Del Mar in rebuttal,” and concluded that a reasonable
factfinder could find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
based on Optical Disc’s expert submissions.265
These cases demonstrate that expert testimony can, in the proper
circumstances, defeat motions for summary judgment.  If the
testimony is factually specific, it can, as in Optical Disc, demonstrate a
genuine issue for trial.  If, however, the testimony is conclusory, it will
fail to prevent summary judgment.
16. Trial practice/management of discovery
In Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,266 the Federal Circuit
noted that “[i]ntrusions into a district court’s trial management are
rarely appropriate on appeal.”267  There, the court affirmed the
                                                          
258. See Arthur A. Collins, 216 F.3d at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146
(maintaining that Collins relied on an unsupported expert declaration in opposing
summary judgment and failed to set forth specific facts sufficient to demonstrate a basis
for the claim).
259. Id. at 1045-46, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
260. See id. at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citing Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp.,
185 F.3d 1311, 1317, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
261. See id. at 1047-48, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48.
262. 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
263. See Optical Disc, 208 F.3d at 1336, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296-99.
264. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
265. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296-97.
266. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
267. Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
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district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement and
refusal to permit Moore to conduct additional discovery in the hopes
of averting summary judgment.268  In response to Standard’s motions
for summary judgment, Moore had filed declarations under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f),269 stating that it required additional
discovery to respond adequately to those motions.270  The district
court had refused Moore’s request, stating that it would not permit
Moore “to conduct ‘fishing expeditions in hopes of finding products
that might be infringing’ to oppose summary judgment.”271  The
Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Moore’s Rule 56(f)
declarations did not indicate how additional discovery would create a
genuine issue of material fact regarding infringement and did not
contest Standard’s claim that Moore had been allowed to inspect all
the accused products at Standard’s headquarters.272  The court
concluded that the “district court here should be applauded for his
expedient handling of this case” and rejected Moore’s claim that the
district court’s grant of summary judgment should be overturned.273
17. Trial practice/privilege issues
In 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed important issues regarding
the attorney-client privilege and its application to patent documents.
In In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc.,274 the court analyzed a petition
for mandamus to hold that the attorney-client privilege applied to
protect from discovery an “invention record prepared and submitted
to house counsel relating to a litigated patent.”275  The court began by
holding that Federal Circuit law would apply because the decision
“whether particular written or other materials are discoverable in a
patent case . . . relate[s] to an issue of substantive patent law.”276
Next, the court noted that the attorney-client privilege “exists to
                                                          
268. See id. at 1115-16, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242-43.
269. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) provides:
 WHEN AFFIDAVITS ARE UNAVAILABLE.  Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
270. See Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1115, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
271. Id. at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242 (internal citation omitted).
272. Id. at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
273. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
274. 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
275. Spalding Sports, 203 F.3d at 803, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
276. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (citing Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan, 175
F.3d 1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in relevant
part)).
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protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act
on it, but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him
to give sound and informed advice.”277  Because the “invention
record” at issue was compiled for and submitted to Spalding’s patent
counsel “for the purpose of making patentability determinations,” the
court held that the record “constitute[d] a privileged
communication.”278  In response to Wilson’s contention that the
technical portions of the invention record should be disclosed in
redacted form, the court also held that:
to the extent that Spalding’s invention record may contain
technical information, or refer to prior art, the inclusion of such
information does not render the document discoverable, because
requests for legal advice on patentability or for legal services in
preparing a patent application necessarily require the evaluation of
technical information such as prior art.279
Having ruled that the attorney-client privilege applied, the court
subsequently determined that the “crime-fraud exception” to the
privilege did not apply.280  The court explained that “[t]o invoke the
crime-fraud exception, a party challenging the attorney-client
privilege must make a prima facie showing that the communication
was made ‘in furtherance of’ a crime or fraud.”281  Wilson argued that
its allegations of “inequitable conduct”—that Spalding had
purportedly made a misrepresentation to the Patent and Trademark
Office by failing to cite a relevant prior art reference—satisfied this
standard for invocation of the crime-fraud exception.282  The court
disagreed, holding that Spalding’s alleged misrepresentation, while it
might demonstrate inequitable conduct, did not rise to the higher
level of fraud necessary to invoke the crime-fraud exception because
Wilson had failed to provide any evidence of “fraudulent intent.”283
Accordingly, the court granted a writ of mandamus vacating the
order directing the invention record to be produced.284
                                                          
277. Id. at 805, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 390 (1981)).
278. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
279. Id. at 806, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
280. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 806-08, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1747, 1752-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
281. See Spalding Sports, 203 F.3d at 807, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
282. Id. at 807-08, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
283. See id. at 808, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
284. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
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18. Sanctions
The year 2000 produced several notable sanctions rulings from the
Federal Circuit.  In most circumstances, the court is highly
deferential to sanctions determinations by district courts and has
maintained that “in matters of trial management and attorney
discipline, marked deference is owed to the discretionary rulings of
the judge conducting the trial.”285  The court will not disturb such
rulings “[a]bsent a clear abuse of the trial judge’s discretion.”286
Thus, in Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.,287 the court affirmed
the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction against Hunt
for advancing a frivolous inequitable conduct claim.288  The district
court had awarded the sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for
“multiply[ing] the [trial] proceedings . . . unreasonably and
vexatiously”289 because Hunt had charged Fiskars with intentional
withholding from the PTO of a prior art citation that Fiskars, in fact,
had disclosed “in accordance with the rules of the PTO.”290  The
Federal Circuit noted that Section 1927 does not require a showing
that “the actions were taken in bad faith,” and upheld the district
court’s ruling as a legitimate exercise of discretion in light of Hunt’s
plain failure to “make out a prima facie case” of inequitable conduct.291
In Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed Inc.,292 the court upheld the
district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions for an allegedly insufficient
pre-filing investigation of a patent infringement claim.293  In
Hoffmann-La Roche, defendants moved for sanctions after a settlement
of the case, which had included the dismissal of plaintiffs’
complaint.294  Defendants urged that Hoffman’s pre-filing inquiry was
                                                          
285. Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
286. Id. at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577-78 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Brennan,
952 F.2d 1346, 1351, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
287. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
288. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577-78.
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
Counsel’s liability for excessive costs.
 Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
290. Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
291. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
292. 213 F.3d 1359, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
293. See Invamed, 213 F.3d at 1363, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
294. See id. at 1360-61, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1473
inadequate under Rule 11 because the inquiry did not confirm that
defendants had infringed any of Hoffman’s patents.295  The district
court had denied any sanctions, reasoning that, since plaintiffs’ pre-
suit investigation resulted in “neither evidence of infringement nor
non-infringement,” plaintiffs were permitted, consistent with Rule 11,
to “file suit and engage in discovery.”296  The Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling, explaining that plaintiffs’ pre-filing inquiry
was “extensive,” including chemical analysis of the allegedly
infringing drugs, and that “[i]t is difficult to imagine what else”
plaintiffs could have done as part of their investigation.297
Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court had not
abused its discretion.298
But parties will not be able to escape sanctions when they bring
infringement claims without performing any claim-construction or
written infringement analysis prior to filing suit.  In View Engineering,
Inc. v. Robotic Vision Systems, Inc.,299 the court upheld a district court’s
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.  There, the district court held that
Robotic had failed to investigate counterclaims of infringement for
six of eight patents at issue in violation of Rule 11 and the court
awarded almost one hundred thousand dollars in fees as a “future
deterrent” to other attorneys who might consider filing claims
without first investigating their merits.300  The Federal Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that Robotic had done very little to investigate its
infringement counterclaims.301  The court noted that Robotic
admitted it had no factual basis for those claims,302 that its attorneys
had not performed any claim-construction or written infringement
analysis prior to filing suit,303 and that it had four months after View
filed suit to conduct a reasonable inquiry before it filed its
counterclaims.304  The court also rejected Robotic’s primary argument
that View’s lack of pre-suit cooperation prevented Robotic from
gaining access to the accused devices to make a full infringement
assessment, reasoning that View had no duty to permit pre-litigation
discovery and had not conducted itself improperly during the
                                                          
295. See id. at 1361-62, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847-48.
296. Invamed, 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
297. Id. at 1363-64, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
298. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1365, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
299. 208 F.3d 981, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
300. See View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 984, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
301. See id. at 984-85, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181-82.
302. See id. at 984, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
303. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
304. See id. at 986, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183.
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litigation.305  The Federal Circuit also analyzed the amount of the
sanctions and held that they were reasonable.306  View had
documented over $240,000 in fees and costs incurred in defending
against Robotic’s counterclaims.307 The district court then reduced
that amount by roughly $4000 to account for the rates charged by
View’s attorneys, which were slightly higher than normal.308  Because
only six of the eight counterclaims were completely baseless, and
because a substantial amount of the work was focused on the two
non-baseless counterclaims, the district court reduced the sanctions
by a further forty percent.309  Finally, the district court looked at
Robotic’s counsel’s ability to pay and reduced the sanctions by
another twenty-five percent.310  The court arrived at a figure just
under $100,000.311  The Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court’s analysis had been thorough and proper and affirmed the
sanctions amount.312
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Advanced Display Systems v. Kent
State University,313 stands as a rare exception to the court’s general
deference to sanction determinations by district courts.  It also is a
truly exceptional case.314  There, the court reversed a magistrate
judge’s denial of a new trial as a sanction for discovery abuse.315
During discovery in a different (but related) case, counsel for
Advanced Display attempted to terminate a deposition that would
have been damaging in the Kent case,316 instructed the court reporter
not to make a transcript of the damaging deposition,317 and ultimately
failed to disclose the deposition’s existence during discovery in the
Kent case.318  Counsel also failed to list the deponent in the Kent
litigation as a person with knowledge even though he had been
                                                          
305. View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
306. See View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 987-88, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183-85.
307. See id. at 987, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184.
308. See id. at 987-88, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184 (noting the trial court utilized an
economic survey published by the American Intellectual Property Law Association to
determine what the normal rate for each attorney who worked on the case should have
been in reaching its decision to lower the sanctions by $4000).
309. See id. at 988, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184.
310. See id. at 988, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184-85.
311. See View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 988, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1179, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the final sanction amount was
$97,825.48).
312. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1185.
313. 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
314. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1288-89, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
315. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
316. See id. at 1288, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
317. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
318. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
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directly involved in developing the accused product at issue in Kent.319
Moreover, counsel had withheld a damaging photograph as
“Attorney Work Product” on the sole basis that an attorney had
photocopied the original copy of the photograph.320  The magistrate
judge had been “deeply concerned” by this conduct, but refused to
award the extraordinary remedy of a new trial as a sanction.321  The
Federal Circuit, however, determined that the conduct “evinced a
brazen disregard for the legal process” and constituted “bad faith
conduct on the part of [Advanced Display’s] counsel.”322  Therefore,
the Federal Circuit held:
[T]he acts of [Advanced Display’s] counsel strike at the heart of
the discovery process, and they deprived Kent of its full measure of
a right to a fair trial based upon all the relevant evidence.
Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate judge’s denial of a motion
for sanctions by granting a new trial.323
Finally, the court “strongly encourage[d] the magistrate judge to
follow through on his desire to review very carefully the conduct of
ADS’s counsel and to consider, within his discretion, imposing
disciplinary actions and additional sanctions beyond the granting of a
new trial.”324
B. Federal Circuit Practice and Procedure
While there were many notable decisions in year 2000 concerning
Federal Circuit practice and procedure, one significant appellate
practice development involving unpublished opinions took place in
the Eighth Circuit.  In 2000, the Federal Circuit decided several
hundred appeals dealing with issues of patent law; of that number,
the court issued—by our count—only ninety-two published,
“precedential” patent or patent-related opinions.325  The remainder
were decided by unpublished, “nonprecedential” opinion326 or by
                                                          
319. Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1288, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1673, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
320. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1288-89, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
321. See id. at 1288, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
322. Id. at 1289, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
323. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
324. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
325. See FED. CIR. R. 47.6(a) (“A disposition may be cited as precedent of the court
unless it is issued bearing a legend specifically stating that the disposition may not be
cited as precedent.”).
326. See FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b):
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION OR ORDER.  An opinion or order which is
designated as not to be cited as precedent is one unanimously determined by
the panel issuing it as not adding significantly to the body of law.  Any
opinion or order so designated must not be employed or cited as precedent.
This rule does not preclude assertion of claim preclusion, issue preclusion,
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summary affirmance.327  In a highly publicized but now vacated
opinion, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. Anastasoff328 declared that court’s rule
regarding reliance on not-for-publication opinions to be
unconstitutional, based on a historical evaluation of Article III and
the original understanding of what “precedent” is: “8th Circuit Rule
28A(i), insofar as it would allow us to avoid the precedential effect of
our prior decisions, purports to expand the judicial power beyond
the bounds of Article III, and is therefore unconstitutional.”329  What
is potentially remarkable for purposes of future Federal Circuit
practice is the fact that the Federal Circuit’s rule on not-for-
publication opinions is mandatory and thus even more restrictive
than the Eighth Circuit’s formerly unconstitutional rule, which was
merely hortatory.330  While the panel opinion in Anastasoff was later
vacated by the Eighth Circuit en banc without consideration of that
issue, a panel of the Ninth Circuit nonetheless took a recent
opportunity to attack that panel decision,331 and the Anastasoff panel
                                                          
judicial estoppel, law of the case, or the like based on a decision of the court
designated as nonprecedential.
327. See FED. CIR. R. 36 (stating that the Court of Appeals may issue a summary
affirmance when the case has no precedential value and one of the following
conditions applies: the judgment, order, or decision below was not clearly erroneous;
there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings; summary judgment,
judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict is supported by the record; the statute
authorizing a review of an agency decision supports affirmance; or there has been no
error of law in entering the judgment or decision).
328. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
329. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
330. Compare FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (“Any opinion or order so designated must not be
employed or cited as precedent.”) (emphasis added), with 8TH CIR. R. 27A(i)
(“Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them.”)
(emphasis added).
331. See Hart v. Massanari, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 1111647, *15 (9th Cir. Sept. 24,
2001).  Writing for a unanimous panel in Massanari, Judge Kozinski stated:
Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within Article III of the
Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and orders issued by
appellate courts be binding authority.  On the contrary, we believe that an
inherent aspect of our function as Article III judges is managing precedent
to develop a coherent body of circuit law to govern litigation in our court
and the other courts of this circuit.  We agree with Anastasoff that we—and
all courts—must follow the law.  But we do not think that this means we must
also make binding law every time we issue a merits decision.  The common
law has long recognized that certain types of cases do not deserve to be
authorities, and that one important aspect of the judicial function is
separating the cases that should be precedent from those that should not.
Without clearer guidance than that offered in Anastasoff, we see no
constitutional basis for abdicating this important aspect of our judicial
responsibility.
Id. at *15.
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decision has already been the subject of scholarly criticism.332
Nevertheless, the first Anastasoff opinion and its reasoning remain
available for whatever persuasive value they might have in future
cases.  Given the Federal Circuit’s extensive reliance on unpublished
dispositions, we would not be at all surprised to discover that the issue
is already percolating in a case now pending in the Federal Circuit.
Indeed, already in year 2001, the Federal Circuit has made the very
important determination—that the court’s en banc holdings in Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.333 regarding patent
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents apply retroactively—
in the guise of an unpublished opinion.334
Other areas in which the Federal Circuit issued significant
decisions in the year 2000 regarding appellate practice and
procedure are discussed below.
1. Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction
One of the more complex areas of Federal Circuit procedure is
that of the court’s appellate jurisdiction.  In the year 2000, the court
helped to clarify its jurisdiction to hear patent appeals.  Pursuant to
statute,335 the court has jurisdiction to hear appeals “arising under
patent law in a district court.”336  The Supreme Court has made clear
that such patent-law jurisdiction
extends only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action
or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that
patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
claims.337
                                                          
332. See, e.g., Constitutional Law—Article III Judicial Power—Eighth Circuit Holds that
Unpublished Opinions Must Be Accorded Precedential Effect—Anastasoff v. United States, 223
F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 940, 940-41 (2001) (“Although the policies
implemented in Anastasoff are sound—courts should not be able to ignore the body of
law they have created—the Eighth Circuit jeopardized the viability of its decision by
basing its interpretation of the Constitution on an inadequate historical inquiry.”); Alex
Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This!  Why We Don’t Allow Citation to
Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43 (contending that policy
considerations argue against giving unpublished decisions precedential effect).
333. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.
Ct. 2519 (2001).
334. See Insituform Tech., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 2001 WL 294164, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1392 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2001) (unpublished disposition); see also 61
PAT. COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 538-39 (Apr. 6, 2001) (commenting that it is
“surprising that the court chose to issue this ruling in a non-precedential opinion”).
335. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994).
336. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834, 1837
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
337. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (quoting
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
1478 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1435
In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray,338 the Federal Circuit described this
standard as a “lenient” one.339  There, the court held that it had
jurisdiction over a patent-licensing dispute because “[t]o show that
Dray sold valves in contravention of U.S. Valves’ exclusive rights to
such sales, U.S. Valves must show that Dray sold valves that were
covered by the licensed patents,” a determination which, in turn,
required an “interpret[ation]” of the patents and an
“[infringe]ment” analysis—obviously issues of patent law.340  Hence,
the court determined that “patent law is a necessary element of U.S.
Valves’ breach of contract action.”341  Similarly, in Helfgott & Karas v.
Dickenson,342 the court held that it had jurisdiction over an appeal of a
challenge to the actions of the Commissioner of the PTO.343  The
court reasoned that the “performance (or lack thereof) of the
Commissioner’s duties under the provisions of” the Patent
Cooperation Treaty “clearly raise[d] substantial questions under the
patent laws.”344
A somewhat different question arose in Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc.345
There, the Federal Circuit addressed whether it had jurisdiction over
an appeal from an action in which the patent-law claims had been
dismissed without prejudice before the district court had rendered its
judgment on non-patent claims.346  In Nilssen, Judge Lourie, writing
for the majority, held that the dismissal of the patent claims without
prejudice had divested the Federal Circuit of jurisdiction.347  Judge
Lourie noted that the complaint “originally contained a well-pleaded
                                                          
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).  The Federal
Circuit has also held that it had jurisdiction over a state tort claim of injurious
falsehood where a necessary element of the claim was that a patent was invalid. See
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1769 (Fed. Cir. 1998), partially overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v.
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999).  The Federal Circuit further held that it had jurisdiction
over an appeal of state-law business disparagement where a necessary element of the
claim was that a patent was not infringed. See Additive Controls v. Flowdata, 986 F.2d
476, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
338. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834, 1837
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
339. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
340. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
341. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
342. 209 F.3d 1328, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
343. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1333-35, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428-29 (holding that
while the claims raised in this case involved the Administrative Procedure Act, the
conduct of the officials involved in the case is ultimately governed by patent law and
must be judged by those standards).
344. Id. at 1334, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
345. 203 F.3d 782, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
346. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 783-84, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765-68.
347. Id. at 784-85, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
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claim for patent infringement and that the court’s jurisdiction at that
point was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.”348  He also noted that
“[j]urisdiction normally attaches at the time of filing based on
pleadings.”349  However, Judge Lourie reasoned, “when the patent
claims were dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(b), the
district court’s jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims ceased
to be based, either in whole or in part, on § 1338.”350  Judge Lourie
followed the court’s prior ruling in Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,351
in which the court had held that the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of
his patent claim under Rule 41(a) divested the Federal Circuit of
appellate jurisdiction over the case.352  He concluded that, in the
somewhat different context of an involuntary dismissal of a patent
claim under Rule 41(b) present in Nilssen, Gronholz nonetheless
compelled the conclusion that the Federal Circuit had been divested
of appellate jurisdiction.353
Judge Rader dissented in Nilssen.  He believed that the “overriding
and compelling logic” of Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.,354 should
have governed the case.355  In Atari, the court had held as a general
matter that “jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1338 according to
the terms of the complaint as originally filed.”356  Judge Rader argued
that Atari should have controlled over Gronholz for three reasons:
(1) Atari was an en banc pronouncement;357 (2) Atari had dealt more
thoroughly with the statutory language and jurisdictional policies at
stake such as forum shopping;358 and (3) Atari was procedurally more
apposite than Gronholz because the latter case involved a voluntary
dismissal of claims, whereas Atari had involved a separation of claims
                                                          
348. See id. at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.  Section 1338 confers jurisdiction
in the district courts for, among other things, “any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents.”  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§  295, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over district court
decisions “based, in whole or in part, on section 1338.”  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
349. Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
350. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
351. 836 F.2d 515, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
352. See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1767 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
353. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784-85, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767-68.
354. 747 F.2d 1422, 1431, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
355. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Rader, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Atari is more applicable than Gronholz because Atari was an en banc
decision, dealt more with the relevant jurisdictional and statutory issues and because
Atari is closer procedurally than Gronholz).
356. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
357. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
358. See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1768 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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for trial.359
While, as Judge Rader conceded, neither Atari nor Gronholz directly
controls the issue,360 it would appear that Judge Lourie’s position—
the court’s holding—is slightly more persuasive.  For one, while the
court in Atari disclaimed application to circumstances such as those
in Nilssen,361 to the extent it were applicable as Judge Rader contends,
the court in Atari emphasized that “[t]he controlling fact here is that
the district court’s jurisdiction of the case was and still is based in part
on § 1338.”362  Of course, in Nilssen the district court’s jurisdiction
ceased to be based on § 1338 once the patent claims were voluntarily
dismissed.363  For another, forum-shopping concerns would tend to
favor the court’s view over Judge Rader’s.  Under Judge Rader’s view,
a procedurally defective or facially implausible patent claim could be
intentionally added to non-patent claims to gain appellate access to
the Federal Circuit, for even when such a claim were dismissed
without prejudice the appeal would—under Judge Rader’s analysis—
be within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.364  By contrast, under the
court’s holding in Nilssen, such a tactic would be foreclosed.365
Finally, contrary to Judge Rader’s position, the procedural posture of
Nilssen would seem to be much closer to that in Gronholz than to that
in Atari.  The only difference between the disposition of the patent
claims in Nilssen and Gronholz is that in Nilssen the district court
suggested a dismissal without prejudice to which the plaintiff did not
object,366 whereas in Gronholz, the plaintiff himself moved for
voluntary dismissal.367  In Atari, however, the patent and non-patent
claims remained in the same case at all times; while they were
separated for trial, the patent claims were never removed from the
case entirely—hence the court’s observation there that the district
court had retained jurisdiction under Section 1338.368
                                                          
359. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 795, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Rader, J., dissenting).
360. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Rader, J., dissenting).
361. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1428, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1074, 1077-78 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (stating that the court explicitly does not
“explore” in its opinion any questions regarding jurisdiction not currently before it).
362. Id. at 1429, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1079 (emphasis added).
363. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (noting that the
plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal left only a single claim that did not concern patent
law).
364. See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1768 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J. dissenting).
365. See id. at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
366. See id. at 783, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
367. See Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 516, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1269, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
368. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429-30, 223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1074, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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2. Appealable orders
Another type of jurisdictional quandary—the question of when a
district court order is sufficiently final to permit appeal—was
addressed in Phonometrics v. Hospitality Franchise Systems.369  There,
Phonometrics filed its notice of appeal after the district court
dismissed its complaint for failure to state a claim, but before the
period to amend expired.370  The court determined that the dismissal
was sufficiently final to permit the appeal.371  The court first held that
the “finality of [a] dismissal” is a “procedural issue not related to
patent law” such that regional circuit law applied to that issue.372
Under Eleventh Circuit law, a party may appeal a dismissal of a
complaint in such circumstances after the amendment period has
expired, or before the period has expired, “provided the plaintiff
stands on his complaint as dismissed.”373  Consequently, the court
held that, based upon that rule, and since the appellee had not
identified any prejudice from the filing of the premature notice of
appeal, the court did have jurisdiction over the appeal.374
The question of whether a district court order was sufficiently final
to permit appeal was also addressed, albeit in a somewhat different
context, in CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG.375
The district court granted partial summary judgment to Fiedler on
noninfringement but denied partial summary judgment on patent
invalidity.376 Subsequently,  the parties jointly moved for the entry of
final judgment by the district court and invited the district court to
“make its judgment of non-infringement final and certified under
Rule 54(b).”377  The district court granted the parties’ motion but did
                                                          
369. 203 F.3d 790, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
370. See Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 792-93, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763-64.
371. See id. at 793, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
372. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
373. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (citing Briehler v. City of Miami, 926 F.2d
1001, 1003 (11th Cir. 1991)).
374. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
375. 224 F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
376. See CAE Screenplates, 224 F.3d at 1313, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807-08.
377. Id. at 1313, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (noting the district court left one
issue remaining for trial).  FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment.  In the absence of such determination
and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
1482 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1435
not certify it under Rule 54(b), after which CAE appealed.378  The
Federal Circuit addressed whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal,
noting that ordinarily, “[a]n order granting partial summary
judgment is not a final appealable order under [the final judgment
rule of] section 1291, because it does not dispose of all claims raised,”
but that a partial summary judgment ruling can be appealed if the
district court makes a proper Rule 54(b) certification.379  The court
then looked to the law of the regional circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, to
determine whether the order of judgment, even though not certified
under Rule 54(b), was sufficiently final to permit appeal.380  The court
noted that the Eleventh Circuit has held that “there is some flexibility
in this [finality] rule in order that justice and the economic
termination of litigation may not suffer from an overly strict
adherence to formalism.”381  The court then examined CAE’s
statement regarding infringement, which implied that it was
conceding infringement of the accused products under the district
court’s claim construction, but used contingent language and stated
expressly that it was “not an admission that there is no
infringement.”382  The court noted that the statement itself was not
sufficiently clear or definite as to concede infringement based on the
challenged claim construction, and would itself not have rendered
the district court’s judgment appealable.383  The court stated,
however, that “[a]t oral argument, counsel for CAE conceded under
questioning that the district court’s claim construction resolved the
issue of non-infringement” for all of the accused products.384  The
court held that, because that “concession, although more appropriate
had it been made before the district court, appears to satisfy the
general purpose of the finality requirement,” the Federal Circuit
exercised jurisdiction over the appeal.385
The court’s resolution of the jurisdictional issue in CAE is notable.
As the court recognized, it is extremely unusual for a partial summary
judgment ruling to be held appealable in the absence of a Rule 54(b)
                                                          
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
378. See CAE Screenplates, 224 F.3d at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
379. See id. at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
380. See id. at 1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
381. CAE Screenplates v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG., 224 F.3d 1308, 1315-
16, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804, 1809 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc.,
616 F.2d 191, 194 (11th Cir. 1980)).
382. Id. at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
383. See id. at 1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
384. Id. at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
385. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
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certification.386  Indeed, Rule 54(b) allows for an appeal from a partial
judgment “only upon an express determination” of finality by the
district court,387 which was not made in this case.388  Thus, CAE cannot
be understood as allowing a Rule 54(b) appeal, but instead must be
viewed as an application of the final judgment rule on the particular
facts of the case.  Even so, CAE’s concession at oral argument should
have been made much earlier, for example, by stipulation in the
district court.389  Indeed, the court criticized CAE for its use of “non-
committal language” in its stipulation in the district court, stating that
it is “loath to sanction this type of appellate practice.”390  It is thus most
likely that in future cases CAE will be viewed as an application of the
final judgment rule under unique circumstances.  Nonetheless, CAE
could have the perverse effect of encouraging gamesmanship in
drafting district court stipulations by providing hope that, should a
crafty stipulation ultimately be rejected by the Federal Circuit, the
drafter could simply concede the relevant point in the stipulation and
suffer no adverse consequence.  CAE might also encourage litigants—
wrongly—to seek appeals of partial summary judgment rulings
without the benefit of a Rule 54(b) certification.
3. Mandamus
“A writ of mandamus may be granted to overturn a district court
order ‘only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion or
usurpation of judicial authority in the grant or denial of the
order.’”391  To obtain the writ, a petitioner must establish “‘that its
right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, . . . and that it
lacks adequate alternative means to obtain the relief sought.’”392  In In
re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc.,393 the court addressed whether
mandamus was an appropriate form of relief for a trial court order
compelling discovery of an allegedly privileged document.394  The
                                                          
386. See id. at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
387. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (emphasis added).
388. See CAE Screenplates v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG., 224 F.3d 1308,
1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
389. See CAE Screenplates, 224 F.3d at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
390. Id. at 1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (“The demands placed on the
dockets of both this court and those of the federal district courts are severe enough
without the added burden created by uncertain concessions made by parties eager for
appellate review.”).
391. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1747, 1750 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Connaught Lab. Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham
P.L.C., 165 F.3d 1368, 1370, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
392. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (quoting In re Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1784, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
393. 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
394. See id. at 802, 804-05, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749-51.
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court held in Spalding that mandamus was an appropriate remedy to
prevent the disclosure of a privileged communication, explaining
that:
When a writ of mandamus is sought to prevent the wrongful
exposure of privileged communications, the remedy of mandamus
is appropriate “because maintenance of the attorney-client
privilege up to its proper limits has substantial importance to the
administration of justice, and because an appeal after disclosure of
the privileged communication is an inadequate remedy.”395
Other factors favoring mandamus noted by the court were that the
substantive privilege question was an “important issue of first
impression” and that “immediate resolution” of the question would
avoid the development of discovery practices that could undermine
the attorney-client privilege.396
4. Pendent appellate jurisdiction
In Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd.,397 the court addressed the doctrine
of pendent appellate jurisdiction.  The district court denied Helifix’s
request for a preliminary injunction after it granted Blok-Lok’s
motion for summary judgment of patent invalidity.398  While it was
undisputed that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) over the denial of Helifix’s request for a
preliminary injunction, Helifix also appealed the adverse summary
judgment determination.399  The court noted that it could exercise
“pendent appellate jurisdiction” over the summary judgment
determination if the determination were “inextricably intertwined”
with the denial of the preliminary injunction.400  The court held that,
because the district court “based its denial of the preliminary
injunction request on its summary judgment ruling,” the two decision
                                                          
395. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (quoting Regents, 101 F.3d at 1387, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785).
396. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.  For a discussion of the substantive
privilege question at issue in Spalding, see supra notes 274-284 and accompanying text.
397. 208 F.3d 1339, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
398. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
399. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
400. Id. at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302-03 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681, 707 n.41 (1997)) (finding that review of the cross-appeal was “inextricably
intertwined” with Clinton’s appeal and necessary to ensure meaningful review).  The
court also articulated the standard for pendent appellate jurisdiction as whether the
grant of summary judgment was “‘closely interrelated factually’ to the preliminary
injunction.”  See id. at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302-03 (quoting Gerber Garment
Tech., Inc. v. Lectra Sys., Inc., 916 F.2d 683, 686, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1439
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).  The court did not state which of the standards articulated would
govern but, through its silence, indicated that meeting the less exacting standard of
Gerber would be sufficient.  See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302-03.
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were “inextricably intertwined.”401  Accordingly, the court did exercise
pendent appellate jurisdiction over the summary judgment
determination.402
5. Joinder of parties to appeal
In 2000, the Federal Circuit also addressed the issue of the
circumstances under which a party can be joined to an appeal.  In
Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co.,403 the court held that Prima Tek II, a
licensee that did not possess all substantial rights under certain
patents, lacked standing to bring its patent infringement action
absent the participation of the patents’ owner.404  Prima Tek II urged
that it should be permitted, under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 27 (the general motions rule), to join the owner as an
indispensable party to correct standing.405  The court rejected Prima
Tek II’s argument and refused to join the owner to cure the standing
deficiency.406  The court noted that its “authority to join or dismiss a
party on appeal ‘should be exercised sparingly.’”407  The court then
reasoned that A-Roo had specifically challenged Prima Tek II’s
standing in the district court and that A-Roo would likely be
“prejudiced” by the joinder of the owner on appeal because it had
been deprived the opportunity to conduct discovery on the patent
owner in the district court.408 Consequently, the court held that “the
facts of this case do not warrant exercise of [the] power” to join the
owner on appeal.409
6. Choice of controlling appellate law
A fairly common, albeit thorny issue of Federal Circuit practice is
the choice of controlling appellate law in cases involving procedural
and/or non-patent issues.  The general rule is that, in reviewing
district court judgments in patent cases, the Federal Circuit applies
                                                          
401. Id. at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
402. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
403. 222 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
404. See Prima Tek II, 222 F.3d at 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746.
405. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (noting that the licensing
agreement did not convey the right to sue and therefore subsequent licencees can
possess only what the original licensee had to transfer).
406. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
407. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfanzo-
Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989).
408. Id. at 1381-82, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (noting that A-Roo was unable to
conduct discovery on the patent owner, Southpac, because Southpac was beyond the
reach of the district court).
409. Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1742, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Federal Circuit law to “patent law issues,” which include “procedural
issue[s]” that “pertain to patent law,” but applies “the law of the
circuit in which the district court sits” to “nonpatent issues.”410
The distinction between patent law and non-patent issues can
sometimes be easily drawn.  Thus, in U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray,411 the
court applied Illinois state law to a state breach-of-contract action.412
But the line between patent and non-patent issues is not always so
clear.  In In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,413
the court noted that “when reviewing a district court’s judgment
involving federal antitrust law,” a non-patent issue, the court applies
the law of “the regional circuit in which that district court sits.”414
However, the court also explained that, for questions such as
“whether and to what extent patent law preempts or conflicts with
other causes of action,” the court applies Federal Circuit law to fulfill
the court’s “obligation of promoting uniformity in the field of patent
law.”415  Thus the court in Independent Service held that:
The district court’s grant of summary judgment as to [the] antitrust
claims arising from Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts is
therefore reviewed as a matter of Federal Circuit law, while
consideration of the antitrust claim based on Xerox’s refusal to sell
or license its copyrighted manuals and software is under Tenth
Circuit law.416
The line between procedural issues that pertain to patent law and
those that do not can also be very difficult to discern.  In In re
Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., the court held that Federal Circuit law
                                                          
410. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating that the purpose of
the distinction is to “promote uniformity in the law with regard to subject matter within
our exclusive appellate jurisdiction”).  See also, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal
Sovereign Co., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(applying Federal Circuit law to questions of personal jurisdiction in a patent suit);
Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n.12, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191,
1195 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (applying Federal Circuit law to questions of preliminary
injunctions in a patent suit); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824
F.2d 953, 954-55 n.3, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1311 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying
Federal Circuit law to questions involving declaratory judgment in a patent suit);
Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying Federal Circuit law to questions of discovery
under FED. R. CIV. P. 26 in a patent suit).
411. 212 F.3d 1368, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
412. See id. at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
413. 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
414. Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1325, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (noting that
intellectual property does not confer a privilege to violate antitrust laws, nor do
antitrust laws negate a patentee’s right to exclude).
415. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (citing Midwest, 175 F.3d 1360, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1676).
416. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
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applied to the question of whether the attorney-client privilege
applied to an “invention record prepared and submitted to house
counsel relating to a litigated patent.”417  The court reasoned that “a
determination of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to
Spalding’s invention record clearly implicates, at the very least, the
substantive patent issue of inequitable conduct” because the record
“relates to an invention submitted for consideration for possible
patent protection.”418  The court went to great lengths, however, to
distinguish a prior ruling which held that regional circuit law did
apply to determine whether “communications between a licensor and
the attorneys of its licensee were protected by the attorney-client
privilege.”419  Apparently, the key distinction for the court was that the
relationship at issue in Spalding was between a patent applicant and
the PTO, whereas the relationships at issue in the prior case were
merely between “parties to a contract.”420  While such a distinction
may have theoretical merit, as a practical matter, it must have been
extremely difficult for the parties to foresee.
7. Waiver of appellate argument
Parties that do not carefully preserve their appellate arguments
may be found to have waived those arguments.  As a general matter,
“absent exceptional circumstances, a party cannot raise on appeal
legal issues not raised and considered in the trial forum.”421  In
Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., the court found that
Harlequin had waived two arguments on appeal for failure to raise
them in the district court.422  First, the court held that Harlequin had
“waived” its argument that the patent at issue was invalid due to an
on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because it had “failed to
adequately raise this issue before the district court.”423  Second, the
court concluded that, because Harlequin “did not properly move for
[judgment as a matter of law] concerning infringement under [35
U.S.C.] § 271,” it could not challenge the “sufficiency of the
                                                          
417. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1747, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recounting that the district court had held that a showing
of inequitable conduct was enough to pierce the attorney-client privilege).
418. Id. at 803-04, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
419. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
420. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
421. Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1289 n.7, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
926 F.2d 1574, 1577, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914, 1916 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
422. See Southwest Software, 226 F.3d at 1289 n.7, 1290, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167
n.7.
423. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 n.7.
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evidence” underlying the jury’s verdict on that issue.424  Thus, in both
instances, failure to raise the argument in the district court precluded
assertion of the argument on appeal.
In a somewhat different context, the court in In re Hyatt425 ruled
that the appellant had failed to preserve an appellate argument in
the trial forum.426  There, Hyatt argued that the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences had erred in its ruling that certain claims
of his patent were invalid as having been anticipated by the prior
art.427  Hyatt had raised his specific argument with the Board, but only
in a “second request for rehearing on that issue.”428  The court
examined the regulations applicable to the Board and discerned that
a party is normally entitled only to one request for rehearing on an
issue.429  Indeed, the Board had rejected Hyatt’s second request for
rehearing on that basis.430  Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that
Hyatt had not “properly” raised his argument before the Board and,
“[a]s such, he is not entitled to rely on it as a basis for overturning the
Board’s decision.”431  Thus, Hyatt had waived his argument by failing
to raise it earlier at the required phase of the litigation.
Shortly before publication of this Area Summary, the Federal
Circuit explained how the doctrine of waiver applies in the context of
claim construction.432  In Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
Compuserve argued that Interactive Gift (“IGE”) had waived any
claim-construction arguments based on portions of the specification
of the patent at issue that were not pointed out to the district court.433
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that, because IGE’s
arguments did not “change[] the scope” of any of its prior claim-
construction position; rather, the court held, IGE “is not barred . . .
from proffering additional arguments from the specification in
support of its existing claim construction.”434  The Federal Circuit
explained that the doctrine of waive has been held to “preclude a
                                                          
424. Id. at 1290, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
425. 211 F.3d 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
426. See Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1373, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
427. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
428. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
429. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (stating the appellant may file one request
for rehearing “unless the original decision is so modified by the decision on rehearing
as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences so states.”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.197(b) (1997)).
430. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
431. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
432. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1346-49,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, ___ (Fed. Cir. 2001).
433. See id. at 1348, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
434. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
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party from adopting a new claim construction on appeal” only when
its “new” construction “changed the scope of the claim
construction.”435  The court explained the concerns relating to waiver
as:
(1) whether the claim construction and arguments on appeal are
consistent with those tendered at trial; (2) whether there is a clear
presentation of the issue to be resolved; (3) whether there was an
adequate opportunity for response and evidentiary development by
the opposing party at trial; and (4) whether there is a record
reviewable by the appellate court that is properly crystallized
around and responsive to the asserted argument.436
The court found, however, that “ a party’s proffer of additional
support from a specification, for an existing claim construction, will
not violate these concerns.”437  Accordingly, the court held that
“arguments that are based on a specification in evidence and that are
in support of an existing claim construction are not barred by the
doctrine of waiver for the sole reason that they were not first
presented to the trial court.”438
8. Appellate review/need for clear district court ruling
In the year 2000, the Federal Circuit twice addressed unexplained
district court rulings and how the court was to review them.  In
Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on
noninfringement of certain claims of the patents at issue because the
district court had not adequately justified its ruling.439  The court
explained:
The district court ruled from the bench when it granted
Harlequin’s motion for JMOL and did not provide any written
opinion, so it is not entirely clear under what reasoning the court
granted the motion.  In addition, the court did not state at any
time its construction of the disputed “mapping means” claim
limitation.  In short, the record does not reflect any claim
construction or analysis by the district court as to the “mapping
means” limitation.  Under these circumstances, we are unable to
                                                          
435. Id. at 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
436. Id. at 1357, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___ (citing Finnegan Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and Sage
Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
437. Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1347, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
438.   Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
439. See Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1298, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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review the decision of the court on this issue.440
Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s ruling.441
But a district court’s failure to explain its ruling is not always fatal.
In Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,442 the court affirmed
the district court’s denial without explanation of Cultor’s motion to
amend its complaint.443  The court noted that “[o]rdinarily, courts of
appeals frown on unexplained exercises of discretion by trial
judges.”444  However, in Cultor the reason for the trial court’s decision
was “apparent”—based on the district court’s claim construction, the
proposed amendments to the complaint would have been “futile.”445
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s decision
would be sustained based upon the “[f]utility” of the requested
relief.446  Accordingly, the reasoning and outcomes of Southwest
Software and Cultor imply that unexplained district court rulings will
not be upheld by the Federal Circuit unless their bases are readily
apparent.
9. The record on appeal
Parties are generally not permitted to supplement the record on
appeal.447  In Moore U.S.A., Inc. v . Standard Register Co.,448 the Federal
Circuit refused to permit a party to supplement the record on
appeal.449  The court noted that the evidence at issue (allegedly
showing patent infringement) “had been made available to” Moore
during the district court litigation and that Moore had possession of
the evidence even before it filed its lawsuit.450  Consequently, the
court concluded that Moore had offered “no reasonable basis for its
failure to produce the preferred evidence at an earlier time,” and
held that Moore would not be permitted to supplement the record
on appeal with that evidence.451
The ruling in Moore stands in contrast to the panel opinion on
                                                          
440. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
441. See id. at 1298-99, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (remanding on the issue of
infringement).
442. 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
443. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1332-33, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
444. Id. at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
445. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
446. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (finding no abuse of discretion in a “terse
ruling”).
447. Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
448. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
449. See Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
450. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
451. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
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remand from the Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.452   There, the court did permit supplementation
of the record on appeal, but only in the rather unusual circumstances
of a “GVR” decision by the Supreme Court.453  As the Festo panel
noted, “[a] GVR occurs when intervening developments, or recent
developments that [one] ha[s] reason to believe the court below did
not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the decision
below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given
the opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that
such a redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of the
litigation.”454  Thus, the court explained that, in those unique
circumstances, it was appropriate to permit the supplementation of
the record on appeal to “ improv[e] the fairness and accuracy of
judicial outcomes and to full[ly] implemen[t] the GVR.”455
10. Sanctions for frivolous appeals
In Sparks v. Eastman Kodak Co.,456 the Federal Circuit decided to
“comment on the concept of frivolous appeals.”457  Kodak urged that
the court’s disposition of the appeal “without a written opinion”
under Federal Circuit Rule 36 justified an award of sanctions.458  The
court emphatically rejected the notion that a summary affirmance is
either a necessary or sufficient condition for the imposition of
sanctions for a frivolous appeal, stating that “[o]ur legal system is . . . 
currently biased toward maintaining open courts rather than
deterring appeals.  It favors the allowance of appeals, even in cases
having little chance for success, without subjecting appellants to an
undue risk of damages for a frivolous appeal.”459  Therefore, the court
identified two categories of appeals that would be considered
frivolous:
First, an appeal is considered “frivolous as filed” when an appellant
has raised issues that are beyond the reasonable contemplation of
fair-minded people, and “no basis for reversal in law or fact can be
or is even arguably shown” . . . [s]econd, an appeal is considered
                                                          
452. 172 F.3d 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 187 F.3d 1381,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc, rev’d, 234 F.3d 558, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
453. A U.S. Supreme Court order that certiorari is granted, the judgment vacated,
and the case remanded.  See generally Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996).
454. Festo, 172 F.3d at 1365, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
455. See id. at 1374, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting Lawrence, 516 U.S. at
167).
456. 230 F.3d 1344, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
457. See Sparks, 230 F.3d at 1345-46, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
458. See id. at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
459. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
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“frivolous as argued” when an appellant has not dealt fairly with the
court, has significantly misrepresented the law or facts, or has
abused the judicial process by repeatedly litigating the same issue
in the same court.460
The court held that Sparks’s appeal fell into neither category,
explaining that so long as a party identifies what it sees as the district
court’s error, it may raise the same claims on appeal that it raised
below.461  Consequently, the court denied Kodak’s motion for
sanctions, explaining that “the doors of the courthouse must remain
open for losing appeals as well as winning appeals.”462
C. Review of Decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
The Federal Circuit reviews legal conclusions of the Board “without
formal deference,”463 and reviews the Board’s findings of fact “for
substantial evidence because they are ‘on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute.’”464  To review the Board’s rulings,
however, the Federal Circuit must have “a clear understanding of the
grounds for the decision being reviewed.”465  Therefore, in a Board
decision, the “[n]ecessary findings must be expressed with sufficient
particularity to enable [the] court, without resort to speculation, to
understand the reasoning of the Board, and to determine whether it
applied the law correctly and whether the evidence supported the
underlying and ultimate fact findings.”466  Thus, in In re Hyatt, the
court held that the Board had adequately articulated its ruling that
certain claims of Hyatt’s patent were invalid as anticipated by the
prior art.467  There, the Board “addressed the limitations of each
claim,” and while “the Board could have been more expansive,” its
analysis was “sufficient to apprize [the Federal Circuit] of the basis on
                                                          
460. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159-60 (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1578, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1991))
(internal citations omitted).
461. See id. at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160 (citing Connell v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 722 F.2d 1452, 1454, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 203 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
462. Sparks v. Eastman Kodak Co., 230 F.3d 1344, 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1158,
1160 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
463. In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1151
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
464. In re Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151 (quoting In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
465. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1666 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (quoting Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030,
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (explaining that the “central threat of Gechter” is that the
Patent Board must explain sufficiently its rulings in order to facilitate meaningful
judicial review )).
466. Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666 (brackets in original)
(quoting Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1457, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033).
467. See id. at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
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which [it] rejected each of the disputed claims.”468  Accordingly, the
court refused to vacate the Board’s decision on the grounds that its
ruling had been insufficiently explained.469
Another procedural issue was addressed in Winner International
Royalty Corp. v. Wang.470  There, Wu, a party to an interference
proceeding, brought a complaint in district court pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 146.471  The court noted that in such appeals, unlike in direct
appeals to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141, “the
parties before the district court are not limited to the evidentiary
record before the Board.”472  On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Wang
argued that the district court was not permitted to hear live testimony
from witnesses who had already testified before the Board.473  The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding that “[t]he fact that
the district court heard live testimony, gave more weight to some
witnesses than to others, and came to a different conclusion than that
reached by the Board, was not improper.”474  The court explained
that “the admission of live testimony on all matters before the Board
in a section 146 action,  as in this case, makes a factfinder of the
district court and requires a de novo trial.”475  Consequently, because
the district court had conducted a de novo trial and made de novo
factual findings, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s
actions had been proper.476
                                                          
468. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666-69 (rejecting the appellant’s argument
that the Board failed to address his claims on “an element-by-element and claim-by-
claim basis”).
469. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
470. 202 F.3d 1340, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
471.
Any party . . . dissatisfied with the decision of the Board . . . may have remedy
by civil action . . . [i]f there be adverse parties residing in a plurality of
districts not embraced within the same state, or . . . residing in a foreign
country, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall
have jurisdiction.
Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1345, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
472. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1994), which states
that “the record in the Patent and Trademark Office shall be admitted on motion of
either party . . . without prejudice of the right of the parties to take further
testimony.”).
473. See id. at 1346, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584 (arguing that the testimony was
not dissimilar enough to prior testimony to be allowed).
474. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585.
475. Id. at 1347, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585 (explaining that such review presents
the district court with a profound advantage over the patent examiner and the Board).
476. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1347-48, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1580, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting as well that the district court should “trea[t]
the record before the Board when offered by a party ‘as if [it was] originally taken and
produced in the district court.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 146). The Federal Circuit’s
holding that a de novo trial was appropriate also means, of course, that when it
functions as a factfinder, the district court does not apply the “substantial evidence”
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D. International Trade Commission Practice and Procedure
The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from final
determinations of the International Trade Commission (“ITC”)477
and may rule on issues of ITC practice in cases originating in the
district courts.  In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc.,478 the court
held that proceedings before the ITC are properly characterized as
“litigation.”479  There, the parties had been engaged in a patent
licensing dispute involving a license agreement with a “Governing
Law” clause providing that “any litigation between the parties relating
to this Agreement shall take place in California.”480  Tessera initiated
an ITC investigation, charging that Texas Instruments’ (“TI’s”)
importation of certain devices arguably covered by the license
agreement infringed Tessera’s patents.481  Texas Instruments, citing
the governing law clause, brought suit in district court in California
seeking an injunction to prevent Tessera from participating in the
ITC proceeding.482  The district court denied TI’s application for
injunctive relief, holding that TI was not likely to succeed on the
merits of its claim because “the agreement’s governing law clause ‘is
limited to “litigation” and that [TI] has not established a likelihood
                                                          
standard of review usually accorded the PTO’s findings of fact.  See In re Gartside, 203
F.3d 1305, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  For a discussion of the
“substantial evidence” standard and its application, see generally infra notes 555-567
and accompanying text.
477. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1994) (stating, in part, “[a]ny person adversely affected
by a final determination of the Commission. . . . may appeal such determination . . . to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6)
(1994) (stating that “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
have exclusive jurisdiction . . . to review the final determinations of the United States
International Trade Commission . . . made under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930”).
478. 231 F.3d 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  All four of the
authors were counsel to Texas Instruments in this case.
479. See Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1329-32, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79.
480. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.  The clause stated in its entirety is as
follows:
Governing Law.  The Agreement shall be governed, interpreted and
construed in accordance with the laws of the Stat[e] of California as if
without regard to its provisions with respect to conflicts of Laws.  Both
[parities] shall use their best efforts to resolve by mutual agreement any
disputes, controversies, claims or differences which may arise from, under,
out of or in connection with this Agreement.  If such disputes, controversies,
claims or differences cannot be settled between the parties, any litigation
relating to this Agreement shall take place in California.  The parties hereby
consent to personal jurisdiction and venue in the state and federal courts of
California.
Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
481. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (regarding TI’s exportation of microchip
technology for which negotation proved fruitless).
482. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675-76 (seeking to enjoin Tessera “from
pursuing any disputes, controversies, claims or differences” outside of California).
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of proving that [Tessera’s] action before the ITC is litigation.’”483
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the term “litigation” in
the governing law clause did encompass the ITC proceeding.484  Judge
Rader, writing for the majority, first noted that Federal Circuit
procedural law governed review of the district court’s denial of the
requested preliminary injunction.485  The court then held that
interpretation of the license agreement, pursuant to the governing
law clause, would be governed by California state law.486  Turning to
the merits, the court stated that both Tessera and TI are
“sophisticated corporations with experience in patent licensing,” and
would have been “well aware” of the remedies for alleged patent
infringement, including proceedings in the ITC.487  Judge Rader then
stated that in the relevant field of “patent law . . . ‘litigation’ does not
exclude ITC proceedings under section 337”:
Section 337 proceedings are inter partes actions initiated by the
filing of a complaint and including discovery, filing of briefs and
motions, and testimony and arguments at a hearing before an
administrative law judge.  See 19 U.S.C. § 337(c).  In section 1337
proceedings relevant to patent infringement, the ITC follows Title
35 of the United States Code and the case law of this Court.  See 19
U.S.C. § 337(c).  In sum, this court has consistently treated section
337 patent infringement proceedings as litigation.488
Judge Rader next explained that, under California law, “[i]n
interpreting contracts, words are given their ‘clear and explicit’
meaning in the field of agreement unless it is clearly shown that the
parties intended a different meaning.”489  The court concluded that
“[t]he governing law clause, therefore requires any litigation between
the parties, including ITC proceedings, to take place in California.
Because ITC actions cannot be brought in California, it follows that
                                                          
483. See Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676  (relying
on the definition of “litigation” in Section 391(a) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, the district court found that the licensing agreement did not extend to
Federal administrative proceedings) (brackets in original).
484. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1328-32, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674, 1678-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that “this court has
consistently treated section 337 patent infringement proceedings as litigation.”).
485. See id. at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (stating that the court “generally
views the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction as a procedural issue not unique
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit”).
486. See id. at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd.
of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1988) as stating, “the
interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law”).
487. Id. at 1329-30, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
488. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1674, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
489. Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1638, 1649).
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the parties did not agree to the ITC as a forum for litigation.”490  The
court also emphasized that the injunction TI sought would not enjoin
the ITC proceeding per se, but would merely enjoin Tessera’s
participation in that proceeding.491  Accordingly, the court reversed
the district court’s ruling and remanded for a determination of
whether the other preliminary injunction factors (irreparable harm,
balance of hardships, and the public interest) support granting an
injunction.492
Judge Lourie dissented, conceeding that while “[e]veryone familiar
with patent litigation knows that ITC proceedings are considered
‘litigation,’” the parties to this license agreement did not intend ITC
proceedings to be covered by the governing law clause.493  Judge
Lourie reasoned that the limitation in the clause to “California”
referred only to the location of litigation and not to the “type of
forum.”494  Judge Lourie also stated that the injunction, while not
enjoining the ITC, “would potentially impede and complicate the
Commission’s opportunity to pursue its own statutory duty to
investigate possible violations of the Tariff Act” because Tessera could
not participate to vigorously advance its case.495  Finally, Judge Lourie
noted that, although contract interpretation is a matter of law, the
Federal Circuit should be reluctant to overturn a district court’s
denial of an injunction.496
In Nutrinova Nutrition v. International Trade Commission,497 the court
addressed the standard of review over ITC determinations.498  The
                                                          
490. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (re-emphasizing that the court “attributes
knowledge of patent law and its language and usages” to both contracting parties).
491. See id. at 1332, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (explaining that the ITC action
could continue with Sharp Corporation and Sharp Electronics Corporation as
respondents, but that litigation between TI and Tessera would have to take place in a
California court).
492. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
493. See id. at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (arguing
that as sophisticated parties, had they intended to exlude the ITC as a forum, the
parties would have explicitly said so).
494. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1674, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Lourie, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the
governing law clause was a geographical limitation, i.e., Texas or Delaware, and did not
apply to the type of court).
495. Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (Lourie, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that while TI could assist Sharp in ITC proceedings, Tessera
would have effectively “one hand tied behind its back”).
496. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (implying that the
majority had not adhered to the standard that denials of injunction be reviewed for
“abuse[s] of discretion”).
497. 224 F.3d 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
498. See Nutrinova Nutrition, 224 F.3d at 1359-60, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951-53
(reviewing a patent infringement claim brought to enjoin the importation of allegedly
infringing artificial sweetener from China).
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court rejected Nutrinova’s invitation to overturn the ITC’s fact
findings, noting that the standard of review is “whether substantial
evidence in the record supports the agency’s findings”; thus, the
court will not “reweigh the evidence and reexamine the credibility of
the witnesses.”499  Accordingly, because substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s determination that the burden-shifting
provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 295 did not apply,500 the Federal Circuit
affirmed that determination.501
The substantial evidence standard is marginally different from the
“clearly erroneous” standard that governs appellate review of district
court factual findings:  the substantial evidence standard is “highly
deferential” and can be satisfied by showing “a rational connection
exists between an agency’s factfindings and its ultimate action,”502
while the clearly erroneous standard has been described by the
Supreme Court as “somewhat” less deferential, requiring the
reviewing judge to have a “‘definite and firm conviction’ that an error
has been committed.”503  However, in practice, the difference between
the two standards is “subtle” and highly unlikely to be outcome
dispositive.504  That is because of the “similarity of the reviewing task,
which requires judges to apply logic and experience to an evidentiary
record, whether that record was made in a court or by an agency.”505
                                                          
499. Id. at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (declining to extend appellate review
even where the appellate body “might have found some of the facts differently . . . or
drawn some inferences . . . differently”).
500. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953-54 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 295 (1994)).
Section 295 states:
In actions alleging infringement of a process patent by virtue of the
importation, sale, offer for sale or use of a product made from that process
(so-called “product by process” infringement), the product shall be
“presumed” to have been made by that process if the court finds (1) “that a
substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented
process,” and (2) “that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to
determine the process actually used in the production of the product and
was unable so to determine.
Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
501. See Nutrinova Nutrition, 224 F.3d at 1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954-55.
502. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312-13, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (describing the
substantial evidence standard “as requiring a court to ask whether a ‘reasonable
mind might accept’ a particular evidentiary record as ‘adequate to support a
conclusion.’”) (citation omitted).
503. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
504. Id. at 162-63 (asserting that the difference is one “so fine that . . . we have
failed to uncover a single instance” where the application of the other standard
would have been outcome determinative).
505. Id. at 163 (opining that this subtle difference also may reflect the difficulties
of capturing intangible factors in judicial decsion-making, or the weight accorded to
agency expertise, or other more influential factors than the standard of review).
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Accordingly, it is quite unlikely that the somewhat more deferential
standard by which the Federal Circuit reviews ITC factual findings
than by which it reviews district court factual findings would be
outcome determinative in any given case.
E. Interference Proceedings
An interference is a proceeding in the PTO or a district court to
determine the priority of inventorship when two or more parties have
claimed the same patentable invention.506  The Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over appeals from interference proceedings.507  In the
year 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed both jurisdictional issues
regarding interference proceedings and substantive issues of priority
of inventorship.
In In re Gartside,508 the court examined whether the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences has jurisdiction to continue an
interference proceeding to determine whether the patentability of a
party’s claims after the other party asserting priority has withdrawn
from the proceeding.509  Initially, Gartside provoked an interference
proceeding by copying claims from an existing patent held by Forgac,
and arguing that its application should be granted priority over
Forgac’s patent.510  After substantial proceedings before an
Administrative Patent Judge (“APJ”), Forgac withdrew from the
proceeding and authorized the APJ to cancel certain claims from his
                                                          
506. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1988) (stating that “[t]he owner of an interfering
patent may have relief against the owner of another by civil action”); id. § 135(a)
(providing that “[w]henever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any
unexpired patent, an interference may be declared”); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,
1308 n.1, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1770 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“An interference is a
proceeding instituted in the Patent and Trademark Office before the Board to
determine any question of patentability and priority of invention between two or more
parties claiming the same patentable invention . . . . An interference may be declared
between one or more unexpired patents naming different inventors when, in the
opinion of an examiner, any application and any unexpired patent contain claims for
the same patentable invention.”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) (1999)).
507. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), 1295(a)(4)(A) (1994) (“The United States Courts
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a
final decision of a district court of the United States . . . [and] of an appeal from a
decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences . . . .”).
508. 203 F.3d 1305, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
509. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316-18, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776-78.
510. See id. at 1308-09, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71 (noting that the claims that
Gartside copied all pertained to catalytic cracking processes, whereby low-weight,
purified hydrocarbons are created through the breaking down of feed oil).  Even
though Gartside copied the claims, the judge designated Gartside the “senior party” in
the interference proceedings since Gartside filed the patent application prior to
Forgac.  See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71.
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patent.511  The APJ held that despite Forgac’s withdrawal, the
interference should proceed to determine the patentabilty of
Gartside’s claims, and ultimately held that many of those claims were
unpatentable.512  On appeal, the Board held that the APJ had
properly retained jurisdiction over the patentability issues raised in
the interference because those issues had been fairly raised and fully
developed in the earlier proceedings.513
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed the Board’s
conclusion that the APJ had properly retained jurisdiction.514  The
court first noted that it reviewed de novo the Board’s jurisdiction.515
The court then emphasized that, pursuant to statute, when an
interference is declared, it is imperative that the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences decide issues of priority, but that the panel
must resolve questions of patentability.516  The court has interpreted
this language to mean that “the Board should decide issues relating to
priority and patentability that are fairly raised and fully developed
during the interference . . . .”517  The court then explained that in a
prior case, Guinn v. Kopf,518 it had held that the Board should decide
priority issues that have been fairly raised and fully developed, even
when a party attempts to terminate the interference and disclaim
priority of inventorship.519  Based on this precedent, the Federal
Circuit held in Gartside that “Forgac’s withdrawal did not divest the
                                                          
511. See id. at 1309-10, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72 (indicating that prior to
Forgac’s withdrawal, both parties requested a final hearing after the APJ ruled that
certain claims were unpatentable, and the parties’ responses to the judge’s
reconsideration were unpersuasive).
512. See id. at 1310-11, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (determining that Gartside’s
claims had been fairly developed and should be resolved in the name of public
interest) (citing Perkins v. Kwon, 886 F.2d 325, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
513. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (holding that the APJ did not abuse his
discretion in declaring that Gartside had failed to demonstrate certain claims were
patentably distinct from other claims in dispute).
514. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1318, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1778 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (agreeing that Forgac’s withdrawal did not preclude the APJ from
adjudicating the case since the interference had been declared properly prior to the
submission of the withdrawal request).
515. See id. at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (noting also, on a related but
distinct issue, that the court reviews for an abuse of discretion “the Board’s decision to
resolve issues of patentability that were not placed in issue by the parties during the
interference . . . .”).
516. Id. at 1316, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (“The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences shall determine questions of priority and may determine questions of
patentability.”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)).
517. Id. at 1316-17, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (citing Perkins, 886 F.2d at 328-30,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310-11) (emphasis in original).
518. 96 F.3d 1419, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
519. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1317, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1777 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (explaining that Guinn extended the holding in Perkins).
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Board of jurisdiction over the interference, and that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in deciding the patentability of Gartside’s
claims.”520  The Board then explained that the resolution of
patentability issues serves the public interest by settling the rights of
concern to the public.521
The Federal Circuit also addressed substantive issues relating to the
criteria for determining priority of inventorship in the year 2000.  To
determine priority, the PTO or district court primarily evaluates the
parties’ dates of conception522 and reduction to practice of the
invention.523  “A conception must encompass all limitations of the
claimed invention, and ‘is complete only when the idea is so clearly
defined in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary skill would be
necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive
research or experimentation.’”524  To establish a reduction to
practice, a party “must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the party
constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met every
element of the interference count, and (2) the embodiment or
process operated for its intended purpose.”525
In Singh v. Brake, the court examined whether Singh had conceived
of the invention at issue—a DNA construct—before January 12, 1983,
the date of Brake’s patent application.526  The Board held that Singh
had failed to prove that he “had formulated a clear and complete
picture in his mind” of the invention prior to January 12, 1983,
thereby awarding priority to Brake.527  However, the Federal Circuit
vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further
                                                          
520. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1317, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777 (concluding that
Forgac’s withdrawal and consequent cancellation of claims were analogous to
Guinn’s disclaiming of a claim corresponding to the patent’s count and that the
patentability issues in Forgac were similar to the priority issues raised in Guinn).
521. Id. at 1318, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
522. See Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1676 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“Conception is ‘the formulation in the mind of the inventor[] of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is
thereafter to be applied in practice.’”) (brackets in original) (quoting Kridl v.
McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1449, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1686, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
523. Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1698 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (noting that in a priority determination, the court also may consider “‘the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice,
from a time prior to conception by the other [party]’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(1994)).
524. Singh, 222 F.3d at 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (quoting Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
525. Eaton, 204 F.3d at 1097, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
526. Singh, 222 F.3d at 1365-66, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-76.
527. Id. at 1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (explaining why the court awarded
priority to Blake) (quoting Singh, Paper No. 164, 29 (BPAI May 11, 1998)).
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proceedings.528  In its review of the case, the court focused on a key
piece of evidence: Singh’s notebook entry of December 21, 1982,
which noted a DNA construct of the same precise length and
complementarity needed to complete the experiment to create the
construct at issue in the interference.529  The court concluded that the
Board should have considered this notebook entry in determining
whether Singh had, in fact, conceived the invention prior to January
12, 1983.530  Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration of
that evidence and a reevaluation of the conception issue.531
In Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,532 the court examined whether
Genentech had reduced its invention—a genetically engineered
protein—to practice prior to Chiron’s patent application.533  The
critical issue presented was whether the “fusion protein” created by
Genentech scientists had been properly recognized as operating for
its intended purpose.534  The Board held that the tests performed on
the protein did not confirm that it functioned for its intended
purpose and ruled that Genentech had not reduced the invention to
practice before Chiron’s application date.535  When Genentech
challenged the Board’s decision in district court, they submitted new
                                                          
528. See Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
529. See Singh, 222 F.3d at 1368-69, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78 (noting that the
Board disregarded the case notebook entry contained in a “synthetic DNA” request
form as well as a notation next to the order explaining Singh’s intended use for the
special DNA despite the fact that they served as important corroborating evidence).
530. See id. at 1369-70, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (clarifying the use of notebook
entries to corroborate conception and emphasizing that a failure to witness such
entries in prompt fashion does not automatically reduce its corroborative value) (citing
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1378, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 81, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); Mikus v. Wachtel, 542 F.2d 1157, 1161, 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 571, 575 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that notebook entries not witnessed until
several months to a year after entry were not incredible nor of little corrobative value).
The court went on to explain that notebook entries are more likely to be considered
corroborative in a conception analysis than in a reduction to practice analysis.  See id.,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
531. See id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
532. 220 F.3d 1345, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
533. See Genentech, 220 F.3d at 1348-49, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638-39 (noting that
since Chiron was the senior party in the proceeding, it was Genentech’s burden to
establish that the invention had been reduced to practice before the filing date of
Chiron’s application).
534. See id. at 1349-50, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639-40 (explaining that, in general,
Genentech must prove a reduction to practice by showing “(1) its inventors had made
an embodiment of the count prior to the critical date; (2) that sufficient tests had been
conducted prior to the critical date . . .; and (3) that the inventors recognized, prior to
the critical date, that the invention worked for its intended purpose.”).
535. See id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638-39 (indicating that the results from
a radioreceptor assay test, which determines the ability of a protein to bind to a
receptor, did not correlate to the use of a fusion protein as a growth promoting
therapeutic agent, which was the intended purpose of the invention).
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evidence.536  The new evidence included testimony that the test
performed on the protein would have indicated to one skilled in the
art that the protein worked for its intended purpose.537  Based upon
that evidence, the district court ruled that Genentech had reduced
the invention to practice before Chiron’s date of conception, and
awarded priority to Genentech.538
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Genentech
had not properly reduced the invention to practice before Chiron’s
date of conception.539  The court first noted that the district court had
properly considered the reduction to practice issue de novo and heard
live testimony on the issue of whether Genentech had established a
practical use for the fusion protein.540  The court explained that it had
previously held that reduction to practice does not occur unless
testing conducted to prove practical utility is deemed successful by
the appropriate parties541 and emphasized that the record established
that the Genentech scientists who had created the fusion protein did
not contemporaneously understand that the tests they had performed
would have established that the protein worked for its intended
purpose.542  Therefore, the court considered whether the
contemporaneous recognition of the significance of the tests
performed for Genentech by an outside scientist, Dr. Hintz, would
“inure” to Genentech’s benefit.543  The court held that the findings
would not inure to the benefit of Genentech because the Genentech
scientists had not known that the tests they had asked Hintz to
perform could have established that the protein worked for its
                                                          
536. See id. at 1349-50, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
537. See id. at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640 (indicating that Genentech’s
intended purpose for the fusion protein, use as a growth-promoting therapeutic
agent, did relate to the results gleaned from the radioreceptor assay test).
538. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1636, 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (amending its initial judgment, and noting that despite the
inventor’s failure to recognize the practical utility of the invention prior to the critical
date, the scientist who ran the radioreceptor assay test actually appreciated the results
of the test and thereby, through association, the inventors could be held to have
reduced the invention to practice).
539. See Genentech, 220 F.3d at 1352-54, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640-43.
540. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640 (stating that the court heard live
testimony from seven experts on whether Genentech had established a practical utility
for the fusion protein).
541. See id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642 (“When testing is necessary to
establish utility, there must be recognition and appreciation that the tests were
successful for reduction to practice to occur.”) (quoting Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal,
S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 594-95, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
542. See id. at 1352-54, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641-43 (affirming the Board’s initial
decision).
543. See id. at 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642 (defining “inurement” as a
situation where the inventor benefits from the actions of another individual).
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intended purpose.544  Accordingly, the court concluded that
Genentech should not be awarded priority of the invention.545
In a similar vein, the court in Eaton v. Evans546 evaluated whether
Evans had reduced to practice his invention—an electric memory
cell—before Eaton had filed his patent application.547  The Board
held that Evans had reduced the invention to practice because he
had performed tests that reasonably established that the invention
would operate for its intended purpose.548  The Federal Circuit,
however, reversed, holding that the tests relied upon by the Board
might have satisfied the second prong of the test for reduction to
practice, which requires that an invention work for its intended
purpose.549  However, Evans failed to satisfy the first prong, which
requires the party to have constructed an embodiment, to include
each element listed in the interference count.550  While Evans argued
that the device he used was the equivalent of the “sense amplifier”
required by the interference count, the court emphasized that “the
doctrine of equivalents does not pertain to an interference.”551  Thus,
Evans must have used an actual “sense amplifier” to fulfill the first
prong of the test.552  Consequently, the court vacated the Board’s
priority decision and remanded for further analysis.553
All three Federal Circuit rulings in the year 2000 addressing the
substantive issues of priority in interference proceedings reversed the
decisions of the lower tribunals (the Board or the district court).554
                                                          
544. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1636, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Because the inventors did not submit the fusion protein
samples to Dr. Hintz for testing for growth-promoting activity, his uncommunicated
recognition that the fusion protein has that activity does not inure to their benefit.”).
545. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (asserting that the district court erred, and
that the Board’s determination should be reinstated).
546. 204 F.3d 1094, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
547. See Eaton, 204 F.3d at 1095-96, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696-97.
548. See id. at 1098, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (concluding that Evans had
reduced the invention to practice from testimony given by Evans’ colleague and notes
taken in his laboratory notebook).
549. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (recognizing that proof of the second
prong does not automatically satisfy the first prong).
550. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (indicating that Evans did not use a sense
amplifier, one of the elements in the count, as part of his single-cell memory circuit).
551. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
552. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (noting that an oscilloscope or other
similar tool could not have been used in place of the amplifier).
553. See Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1098, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1699 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
554. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1636, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding the district court erred in its holding);
Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (concluding that the Board erred in denying priority to Singh by failing to
address important issues); Evans, 204 F.3d at 1096, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1697 (reversing
the Board’s holding that the inventor had reduced the invention to practice).
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While such a small sample may merely reflect happenstance, one
could also conclude that the rules for priority are sufficiently unclear
that they have created problems for the lower tribunals on these
difficult issues.
F. PTO Practice & Procedure
The Federal Circuit resolved an important issue of PTO practice in
In re Gartside.555  There, the court held that the “substantial evidence”
standard applies to the court’s review of PTO’s findings of fact.556
The Federal Circuit had previously reviewed factual findings under
the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.557  However, in Dickinson v.
Zurko,558 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit could no
longer use that standard and directed the Federal Circuit to select
one of the standards of review set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).559  Thus, the court considered whether the
extremely deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard or the
somewhat less deferential “substantial evidence” standard would
apply.560  The Zurko Court noted that the arbitrary and capricious
standard is “highly deferential,” can be satisfied by demonstrating a
rational connection exists between the agency’s fact findings and the
actual result, and becomes the default standard when the substantial
evidence standard does not apply.561  In contrast, the substantial
evidence standard reviews the agency’s record as a whole and takes
into account the evidence that supports as well as negates an agency’s
determination.562  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[s]ubstantial
                                                          
555. 203 F.3d 1305, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
556. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
557. See id. at 1311, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73.
558. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
559. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1311, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73 (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).  The relevant part of the APA is found at 5 U.S.C. § 706,
providing that “the reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, . . . (E) unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case subject to Sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”  Id. at 1311-12, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
560. See id. at 1312, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (recognizing that the Supreme
Court did not decide which standard is the correct one for PTO findings in Zurko).
561. Id. at 1313-14, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773-74 (citing Hyundai Elec. Indus. Co.
v. ITC, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting
that rationality is the basis for the arbitrary and capricious standard); Assoc. of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting the arbitrary and capricious standard applies when all else
fails)).
562. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1773 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (explaining that the substantial evidence standard “involves examination of
the [agency’s] record as a whole, taking into account evidence that both justifies and
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evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion . . . Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence.”563
The court found the substantial evidence standard was more
appropriate than the arbitrary and capricious standard.564  It noted
that the substantial evidence standard usually applies under the APA
to review “on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”565
The court then determined that the Federal Circuit plainly reviews
PTO factual decisions on the record developed by the Board.566
Accordingly, the court concluded that the substantial evidence
standard governs review of PTO factfindings.567
Another Federal Circuit decision in the year 2000 implicating PTO
practice and procedure is Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson.568  In
Helfgott, the issue was whether the Commissioner had abused his
discretion in refusing to grant Helfgott relief from a series of mistakes
that had led to the rejection of an international patent application.569
In March 1996, Helfgott filed two international patent applications
with the PTO—the ‘856 and ‘218 applications.570  Applicants for such
a patent have a right to file a “Demand for International Preliminary
Examination” to gain an initial evaluation of the patentability of the
claimed invention.571  Thus, in October 1996, Helfgott filed such a
Demand for the ‘856 application, but had mistakenly included the
application number, filing date, and priority date for the ‘218
application.572  The PTO treated the Demand as applying to the ‘218
application and sent an “Invitation to Correct Defects in the
Demand,” which contained the reference number for the ‘218
                                                          
detracts from an agency’s decision.”).
563. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1312, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938)).
564. See id. at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
565. Id. at 1313, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(1994)).
566. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (“The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record
before the Patent and Trademark Office.”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1994)).
567. See id. at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
568. 209 F.3d 1328, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (addressing
questions of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion on part of the PTO).
569. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1330-33, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-28.
570. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
571. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (explaining that the Demand is a request
for international examination of patentability that must be filed with an international
authority such as the PTO in accordance with the provisions of the Patent Cooperation
Treaty, which is an international agreement enabling inventors to obtain patents more
efficiently).
572. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
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application.573  Since the ‘218 application had been abandoned, a
Helfgott employee deposited the Invitation into the “dead file” of the
‘218 application.574  Subsequently, the Commissioner sent Helfgott
other documents pertaining to the ‘218 application.575  In September
1997, when Helfgott had still not received documentation regarding
the ‘856 application and having discovered the errors on the original
Demand, he filed a “Petition for Expedited Action,” requesting that
the errors be corrected.576  The Commissioner dismissed this petition
as untimely, so Helfgott requested an examination of the
circumstances and a suspension of nonstatutory rules under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.183, which permits suspension when justice requires.577  The
Commissioner rejected this request and two other requests for
reconsideration.578  Helfgott then filed suit in district court,
challenging the Commissioner’s decision as arbitrary and capricious,
and the district court sustained the Commissioner’s positions.579
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the PTO had
contributed to the series of errors and that the Commissioner should
have exercised his discretion to rectify the situation.580  The court
emphasized that under the applicable regulations, the Commissioner
had discretion to suspend or waive the PTO’s non-statutory
requirements, including the time limits it imposed to Helfgott’s
detriment.581  The court further explained that the Commissioner’s
position was “wooden,” that the changes to its application requested
by Helfgott were “obvious,” and that the PTO had amplified
                                                          
573. See id. at 1331, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-27.
574. Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson, 209 F.3d 1328, 1331-32, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1425, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
575. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1332, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427 (stating that the
Commissioner sent Helfgott a “Notification of Receipt of Demand,” an “Opinion on
Patentability,” an “International Preliminary Examination Report,” and a “Notification
of Transmittal of International Preliminary Examination Report”).
576. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
577. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427-28 (noting that Section 1.183 permits the
PTO Commissioner to suspend nonstatutory rules when justice requires and the
circumstances are extraordinary).
578. See id. at 1332-33, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (noting that the Commissioner
maintained that it would be inappropriate to correct the errors not only because the
preliminary examination had already taken place for the ‘218 application, but also
because the errors did not constitute the type of obvious mistakes that are
characterized as correctable under the PCT).
579. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (upholding the Commissioner’s decisions
regarding the untimeliness of Helfgott’s application under 36 C.F.R. § 1.181 as well as
the inappropriateness of allowing Helfgott to correct his errors under PCT Rule 91.1).
580. See Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson, 209 F.3d 1328, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1425, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
581. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1335-36, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-31 (referring to
37 C.F.R. § 1.183).
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Helfgott’s errors.582  Ultimately, the court, noting that substance is
more important than form, but attention to detail in all aspects of the
patent application process is vital to insure success,583 held that the
Commissioner acted unreasonably by refusing to correct the
Demand.584
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. Preliminary Injunction—Validity
For a moving party to obtain a preliminary injunction, that party
must establish that “(1) it has a reasonable likelihood of succeeding
on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
not granted; (3) the balance of hardships tips in its favor; and (4) an
injunction would be consistent with the public interest.”585  In Helifix,
Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., the Federal Circuit considered the patentee’s
request to overturn the district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction.586  The court explained that for the patentee to be
successful in overturning the denial, the patentee must demonstrate
(1) clear error by the district court on one or more factors, and
(2) an abuse of discretion in denying preliminary relief.587  The
Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction
despite reversing the district court’s summary judgment decision of
invalidity, which formed the basis for the district court’s denial of the
preliminary injunction.  The court held that the patentee had not
sufficiently demonstrated a clearly erroneous finding and an abuse of
discretion.588
The patent holder bears the burden of establishing a likelihood of
success on the merits to the patent’s validity when seeking a
preliminary injunction.589  The court in Helifix explained that the
presumption of validity created by 35 U.S.C. § 282 does not relieve
the patentee of the burden of proving that it will likely succeed at
                                                          
582. See id. at 1336-37, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-31 (holding that Helfgott’s
errors were synonymous with those described in the PCT and were correctable).
583. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
584. Id. at 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
585. Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1350-51, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
586. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
587. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (quoting New England Braiding Co. v.
A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1625 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
588. See id. at 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
589. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (citing Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930
F.2d 867, 869, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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trial on all matters of disputed liability regardless of whether the issue
is patent validity.590  Where the alleged infringer raises a substantial
question concerning validity through an invalidity defense, and the
patentee cannot prove the defense lacks substantial merit, the court
should not issue a preliminary injunction.591  Although the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment of invalidity,
the court nonetheless stated it could not conclude, based on the
record, that the district court abused its discretion in denying the
preliminary injunction.592  Recognizing the summary judgment
requirement that the accused infringer must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
the court still refused to equate that standard with the patentee’s
burden at the preliminary injunction stage to show that the invalidity
defense lacks substantial merit.593  The court concluded that the
record raised a significant question of patent invalidity even though
the district court did not substantiate a granting of summary
judgment.594  Furthermore, in view of the substantial question
regarding likelihood of success on the merits of validity, the court did
not find error in the district court’s failure to consider the other
preliminary injunction factors.595
B. Standard of Review—Generic Validity
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,596 the Federal Circuit
reviewed the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary
judgment that claims of the patent in suit were not invalid for either a
failure to comply with the best mode requirement or for double
patenting.597  In its decision, the Federal Circuit repeated the well-
known standard under 35 U.S.C. § 282 that patents enjoy a
presumption of validity that can be overcome only through clear and
                                                          
590. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (explaining that the presumption of
validity “does not relieve a patentee who moves for a preliminary injunction from
carrying the normal burden of demonstrating that it will likely succeed on all
disputed liability issues at trial, even when the issue concerns the patent’s validity.”)
(quoting New England Braiding, 970 F.2d at 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625)).
591. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
592. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
593. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
594. See id. at 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
595. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308 (“A district court may properly deny a
motion for preliminary injunction simply based on the movant’s failure to establish a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.”) (quoting Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker
Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1784 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
596. 222 F.3d 973, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
597. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 976, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
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convincing evidence.598  To invalidate a patent on summary judgment,
therefore, the moving party must submit clear and convincing
evidence of invalidity to the extent that no reasonable jury could find
otherwise.599  On the other hand, a party seeking to have a patent
held not invalid through summary judgment must show that the non-
moving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial to show
invalidity, “failed to produce clear and convincing evidence on an
essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could
invalidate the patent.”600  In the context of summary judgment
motions, the panel noted that the evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.601
C. Anticipation
Each of the Federal Circuit’s year 2000 cases that addressed
anticipation to any significant degree began by stating that
anticipation is a question of fact,602 even when considered on appeal
from a rejection in the PTO.603  Therefore, the Federal Circuit will
affirm a trial court’s finding regarding anticipation if substantial
evidence supports the jury’s verdict.604  When considering an
anticipation decision from a bench trial, the Federal Circuit stated it
reviews the district court’s decision for clear error.605  The court,
                                                          
598. See id. at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613 (citing United States Surgical Corp.
v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
599. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
600. Id. at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14.
601. See id. at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
602. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1227, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“This court reviews a finding of anticipation as a
question of fact.”); Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Blok-Lok had to establish that there were no
material facts in dispute relating to its assertion of anticipation.”); Advanced Display
Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“Anticipation is a question of fact.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate
Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 20, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Whether such art is anticipating is a question of fact.”).
603. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1666-67 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“[A]nticipation is a question of fact.”).
604. Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (“[T]his court must
affirm the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law.”); Advanced Display,
212 F.3d at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (holding that an appellate court may
reverse a judgment as a matter of law motion only if substantial evidence does not
support the jury’s factual findings) (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d
1321, 1332, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
605. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison, 227 F.3d 1361, 1367, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v.
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 488 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
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however, reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment of
anticipation de novo.606
Whereas the first step of an anticipation analysis is claim
construction,607 the second step involves a comparison of the
construed claim to the prior art.608  Furthermore, “to be anticipating,
a prior art reference must disclose ‘each and every limitation of the
claimed invention[,] . . . must be enabling[,] and [must] describe . . .
[the] claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it in possession of
a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.”609
The panel in Advanced Display Systems v. Kent State University defined
invalidity by anticipation in a slightly different fashion, requiring the
prior art document to be so precise in its description of the invention
that anyone with average skill in the art can construct the invention
without difficulty.610  True to their word, a great number of the
anticipation cases decided by the Federal Circuit expend many pages
considering construction of the claims and applying those claim
constructions to the facts presented.611  A recitation of each case and
its facts, thus, provides minimal insight into the overall state of the
Federal Circuit law.612  Nevertheless, the decisions warrant an
examination of the relevant legal issues and facts.
                                                          
606. See Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96
F.3d 1423, 1425, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
607. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303; see also Union Oil,
208 F.3d at 995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (“The first step in any invalidity . . .
analysis is claim construction.”) (quoting Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147
F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
608. See Helifix, 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1911, 1915, (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
609. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478-
79, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 20, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1061 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires the disclosure in a single piece
of prior art of each and every limitation of a claimed invention.”).
610. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that anticipation requires
“that the four corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the
claimed invention, either expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill
in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.”) (citing
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347,  51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1947
(Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he reference must be enabling and describe the
applicant’s claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it in possession of a person of
ordinary skill in the field of the invention.”).
611. See supra note 607.
612. See generally Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 994-96,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227, 1230-32 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (observing that the Federal
Circuit simply reviewed the claim construction as well as the facts applied by the
district court to conclude that the alleged references did not anticipate).
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In Helifix, for example, the Federal Circuit considered whether a
brochure anticipated the claims at issue.613  The parties agreed that
the alleged anticipatory reference did not expressly disclose (in
words) elements eight through ten of the claim at issue.614  However,
the court acknowledged the possibility of the brochure being
anticipatory in the event someone would understand elements eight
through ten, as being otherwise disclosed by the brochure, and could
construct the invention on his own.615  The court reversed the district
court’s determination of invalidity on this basis because it concluded
the district court applied an incorrect standard to determine what
constituted a person of ordinary skill in the art.616  The district court
did so by determining which persons working in the field of the
invention were likely to be familiar with the relevant literature; the
Federal Circuit, however, held that the district court should have also
considered other relevant factors in reaching its conclusion.617  The
court held that neither party presented evidence of how such a
person of ordinary skill would consider the brochure, which raised a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overturn the trial court’s
summary judgment decision.618
Additionally, in Helifix, the court explained that a disclosure that is
not enabling will not suffice as prior art, despite the claimed
                                                          
613. Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1346-49, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303-05 (stating that the
district court did not find error in the claim construction but did find that Blok-Lok
failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the brochure enables a person
of ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed method).
614. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (instructing that elements eight through ten refer to the
description in the patent for a tool that “impactingly drives the tie and rotably
permits the same to rotate”) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,687,801 (issued Sept. 27,
1996)).
615. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (“The brochure might nevertheless be
anticipating if a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the brochure as
disclosing elements (8)-(10) and if such a person could have combined the
brochure’s description of the invention with his own knowledge to make the claimed
invention.”) (citing In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619, 621
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
616. See id. at 1347, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (noting the district court’s
assumption that because a person of ordinary skill in the art is aware of relevant prior
art, he or she is familiar with the pertinent literature and is likely to attend trade
shows).
617. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (noting other such relevant factors as “the
educational level of the inventor; the type of problems encountered in the art; the
prior art solutions to those problems; the rapidity with which innovations are made;
the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of workers in the
field.”).
618. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (stating that the only evidence relating
to the brochure’s meaning is the testimony of an author of the brochure, who is also
an inventor of the claimed invention).
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invention being disclosed in a printed publication.619  The court
concluded that the accused infringer had failed to provide clear and
convincing evidence that the brochure would have enabled a person
of ordinary skill to practice the claimed method.620  The Federal
Circuit explained that the accused infringer failed to present any
evidence to meet the standard.621  On the enablement issue, the court
concluded that the accused infringer did not present sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the brochure enabled the claimed
method; therefore, clear and convincing evidence did not exist to
show that the brochure anticipated the patent in suit.622
In Ecolochem, the court considered whether two articles and a
related presentation anticipated the claims at issue.623  The Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that the articles
anticipated, holding that the trial judge had clearly erred by
misconstruing the relationship between a figure in the article and the
text of the article.624  Despite its holding that the articles did not
anticipate, the court affirmed the district court’s holding of
anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), based upon the
presentation.625  In affirming this portion of the district court’s
decision, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the patentee’s argument
that the presentation alone cannot anticipate the asserted patent
claims.626  The court quoted Section 102(a) and explained that “[a]
presentation indicative of the state of knowledge and use in this
country . . . qualifies as prior art for anticipation purposed under
§ 102.”627  In response to the patentee’s argument that the
presentation could not qualify as anticipatory prior art because Dr.
Martinola, the presenter, could not remember what he had said
twelve years earlier, the Federal Circuit said that whether Dr.
Martinola remembered correctly was an issue of credibility, and it
would review the lower court’s factual determination with
                                                          
619. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
620. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1348, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
621. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1348, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citing In re
Sheppard, 339 F.2d 238, 242, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 42, 45 (C.C.P.A. 1964)).
622. See id. at 1349, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305.
623. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison, 227 F.3d 1361, 1363-64, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
624. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1363, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
625. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066 (remanding the case for a damages
determination because the district court’s findings of willful infringement were
unchallenged).
626. See id. at 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
627. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
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deference.628  The Federal Circuit, however, did not agree that the
presentation anticipated all of the claims at issue and reversed the
district court’s finding that certain claims were invalid based on the
presentation.629  The Federal Circuit reversed because the evidence
regarding the presentation did not demonstrate all claim elements
had been discussed at the presentation.630
In Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., the court considered
whether a document, together with a second document that the first
one incorporated by reference, could anticipate the claimed
invention.631  The court held that it could, and explained that
“[m]aterial not explicitly contained in the single, prior art document
may still be considered for purposes of anticipation if that material is
incorporated by reference into the document.”632  The court went on
to describe incorporation by reference as a method for integrating
material from documents into a host document, and citing such
material so as to make clear that the material is effectively part of the
host document.633
The court stated that the degree and extent of incorporation by
reference is a matter of law.634  Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted
that “one reasonably skilled in the art should be used to determine
whether the host document describes the material to be incorporated
by reference with sufficient particularity.”635  The court summarized
the analysis by stating that a factfinder’s role is to determine whether
the claimed invention is described by the single reference while the
court is to determine “what material in addition to the host
document constitutes the single reference.”636  The factfinder should
“determine whether that single reference describes the claimed
invention.”637  Because the trial judge gave the entire determination
                                                          
628. Id. at 1369-70, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
629. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison, 227 F.3d 1361, 1369-70, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
630. See id. at 1370, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
631. Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1678, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
632. Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing
Ultradent Prods., Inc. v. Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc., 127 F.3d 1065, 1069, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1336, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
633. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (explaining that in order to incorporate
material by reference, the host document must be specific regarding what material it
incorporates and where that material is found in the various documents) (citations
omitted).
634. See id. at 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (citing Quaker City Gear Works,
Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453-54, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
635. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
636. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
637. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (explaining that anticipation is a
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to the jury and did not answer the first question, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the trial judge had committed legal error and
remanded for a new trial on anticipation.638
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc.,639 the court clarified
and corrected several aspects of the trial court’s holding that each of
the asserted claims was anticipated.640  The patentee argued that the
district court’s claim construction caused the patent in suit to read on
prior art considered by the examiner during prosecution, and, as a
result, the court should interpret the patent more narrowly to avoid
that art.641  Although the Federal Circuit agreed that the district
court’s interpretation caused the claims to read on the art considered
by the examiner, it nevertheless rejected the patentee’s argument
aimed at narrowing the construction.642  The court explained that the
fact the district court’s construction reads on the prior art of record
did not negate the district court’s claim construction or its finding of
anticipation; rather, the court held that it provides further evidence
that the claimed invention was not novel.643  The Apple panel also
acknowledged the axiom that a court should ordinarily avoid reading
claims such that they would ensnare prior art.644  The court, however,
countered with the often-stated response: “[w]here ‘the only claim
construction that is consistent with the claim’s language and the
written description renders the claim invalid, then the axiom does
not apply and the claim is simply invalid.’”645  Finally, the court noted
the district court failed to review each claim independently and noted
that a patent claim is presumed valid independent of other claims:
therefore, a claim dependent on an invalid claim is still valid.646
                                                          
question of fact while incorporation by reference is a question of law).
638. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1283, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the district court had a
duty to determine whether and to what extent the material was incorporated by
reference).
639. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
640. See Apple Computer, 234 F.3d at 20-26, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061-67.
641. See id. at 23, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
642. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
643. See id. at 23-24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
644. Id. at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064 (“[C]laims should be read in a way that
avoids ensnaring prior art if it is possible to do so.”) (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1556, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1743
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
645. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1057, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 799 n.6, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1102 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding that judicial redrafting of claims to preserve validity is
impermissible).
646. Apple Computer, 234 F.3d at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
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In In re Hyatt,647 a patent applicant appealed an anticipation
rejection of certain claims by the Patent Office.648  Because this appeal
originated from the Patent Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, the Federal Circuit undertook an analysis somewhat
different than the anticipation analysis arising in enforcement
litigation.  The court described the analysis in three parts.649  First, the
court reiterated that anticipation is a question of fact.650  Second, the
court explained that it upholds decisions of the Board on factual
matters if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
Board’s findings.651  Third, so long as they are consistent with the
specification, claims are given their broadest reasonable
interpretation during the examination proceedings.652  This
proposition, the court noted, “‘serves the public interest by reducing
the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope
than is justified.’”653  Relying on the notion that it must apply the
claims in their broadest possible way, the court concluded that the
Board had correctly rejected the claims on the basis of anticipation
and affirmed the decision.654
D. On-Sale Bar
The on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is properly considered as a
specific subset of anticipation.  In STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc.,655 the court
explained the burden of proving an on-sale bar as follows:
[The party challenging validity] must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that there was a definite sale or offer to sell
more than one year before the application for the subject patent,
and that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully
anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered the
                                                          
647. 211 F.3d 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
648. Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1369, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665 (stating that the patent
office upheld the rejection of several of Mr. Hyatt’s patent application claims).
649. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
650. Id. at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 812, 814-15, (1869); In re Schriber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1429, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
651. See id. at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d
1305, 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
652. See id. at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147,
1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
653. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing In re Yamamoto, 74 F.2d 1569, 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
654. See Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1372-73, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668 (noting that
although the Board’s interpretation was broad, it was not unreasonable).
655. 211 F.3d 588, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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claimed invention obvious by its addition to the prior art.656
The Supreme Court recently revised the test to determine whether
a patent is invalid based on an on-sale bar in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,
Inc.657  Under the Pfaff test, a claimed invention is considered to be
“on sale” within the meaning of Section 102(b) if, more than one
year before the filing date to which the claim is entitled (the critical
date), two conditions are satisfied.658  First, the product must be the
subject of a commercial offer for sale more than one year before the
subject patent application was filed.659  Second, the invention must
have also been ready for patenting more than one year prior to the
filing of the subject patent application.660  This second prong can be
satisfied by (1) proof of reduction to practice prior to the critical
date, or (2) by proof prior to the critical date, that the inventor had
prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention, and the
drawings were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art
to practice the invention.661  The overriding concern of the on-sale
bar is to protect against an inventor’s “attempt to commercialize his
invention beyond the statutory term.”662  In Vanmoor, the court stated
that the determination of whether a product was placed on sale is a
question of law, based on underlying facts.663
In Vanmoor, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
summary judgment that the invention was on sale prior to the critical
date.664  The court explained that the facts were not typical of most
on-sale bar cases, wherein a “‘patentee has placed some device on sale
prior to the critical date and the accused infringer must demonstrate
                                                          
656. STX, 211 F.3d at 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1349.
657. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
658. See Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
659. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049; Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201
F.3d 1363, 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Helifix Ltd. v.
Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1349, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
660. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049; Vanmoor, 201
F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (explaining that the second prong of the
Pfaff test is a departure from the previous “totality of the circumstances” test).
661. Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1349, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305; Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at
1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379; see also Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68.
662. STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1567, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1512, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
663. See Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (explaining that
the ultimate determination is reviewed by the court without deference, and subsidiary
fact finding is reviewed for clear error) (citing Ferag AG, 45 F.3d at 1566, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1514-15); see also STX, 211 F.2d at 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
664. See Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379-80 (concluding
that Vanmoor failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact because he proffered
no evidence in support of his trade secret misappropriation allegations).
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that this device actually embodied or rendered obvious the patented
invention.’”665  Rather, in Vanmoor, Wal-Mart and the other
defendants asserted that they had been selling the actual devices in
dispute prior to the critical date.666  While the court acknowledged
that the defendants bore the burden of proving the products that
were the subject of the pre-critical date sales anticipated, the court
also noted that the defendants were able to carry that burden based
on the patentee’s allegation that the very same products infringed the
patent in suit.667  The court rejected the patentee’s argument that no
evidence had been presented to show the accused products were
ready for patenting by noting that the products had been actually
reduced to practice, which itself satisfied the second prong of the
Pfaff test.668
In Zacharin v. United States, the Federal Circuit also affirmed a
finding of invalidity based on an on-sale bar.669  The issue in Zacharin
boiled down to whether the alleged on-sale activity actually
constituted a sale; the court held that it did.670  Zacharin, the
patentee, asserted that the alleged invalidating contract did not
constitute a commercial offer to sell because the contract was not a
commercial supply contract with fixed unit prices and a definite
supply schedule.671  Additionally, the patentee asserted the contract
was simply an extension of joint work between the inventor and the
United States Army for the evaluation of the patented invention.672
The court rejected Zacharin’s arguments.673
First, the court defined a sale as “a contract between parties to give
and pass rights of property for consideration which the buyer pays or
promises to pay the seller for the thing bought or sold.”674  The facts
showed that the contract required a manufacturer to produce 6000
units of the invention, deliver them to the Army and that Mr.
Zacharin inspected and accepted the devices for the Army. The court
                                                          
665. Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Evans Cooling Sys. Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
125 F.3d 1448, 1451, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1037, 1039-40 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
666. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
667. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
668. See id. at 1366-67, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (finding that the specification
drawings were used to produce the accused cartridges).
669. 213 F.3d 1366, 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
670. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50.
671. See id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
672. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
673. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
674. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (quoting In re Caveney, 761 F.3d 671, 676,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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held that this constituted a sale.675  The court further noted that
Zacharin had disclosed his invention to a third party, the Army, with
the hope and expectation that his design would be used; moreover,
he placed no restriction on this disclosure.676  Finally, the court held
that the “fact that the sale in question was made in the context of a
research and development contract and that there was no fixed price
set for the [invention products] does not suffice to avoid the on-sale
bar.”677  The fact that the Army used the devices for testing, rather
than routine production units also did not avoid the effect of the on-
sale bar.678  Ultimately, the court concluded that “[a] contract to
supply goods is a sales contract, regardless of the means used to
calculate payment and regardless of whether the goods are to be used
for testing in a laboratory or for deployment in the field.”679
In STX, the court also affirmed a district court’s grant of summary
judgment of invalidity based on an on-sale bar.680  The court
succinctly addressed and dismissed each of the patentee’s arguments
against invalidity.681  First, the court explained that the fact that
delivery of the invalidating articles was set for a time after the critical
date was of no consequence.682  Next, the court rejected the
patentee’s assertion that the pre-critical date product did not embody
all of the claim limitations because the purposes and objectives stated
in the claim’s preamble had not been shown to be present in the
early device.683  The court responded by explaining that “where a
patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body
and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the
invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.”684  In this case, the
court held, the preamble did not state a limitation, and therefore the
patentee could not rely on it to avoid the on-sale bar.685  Finally, after
reviewing the facts, the court confirmed that the device was ready for
                                                          
675. See Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
676. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
677. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (citing RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887
F.2d 1056, 1062-63, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
678. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States,
654 F.2d 55, 59 & n.6, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, 871 & n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).
679. Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050-51.
680. See STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 589-90, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
681. See STX, 211 F.3d at 589-90, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
682. See id. at 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
683. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
684. Id. at 591, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349 (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473,
478, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
685. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349 (concluding that the first prong of the
Pfaff test requiring an offer to sell was satisfied).
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patenting prior to the critical date, and reiterated that the patentee
could not rely on the preamble’s subjective product quality
recitations, such as “improved playing and handling,” as an escape
hatch to circumvent the bar.686
In the other two year 2000 cases in which the court considered the
on-sale issue, the court held that the patents were not invalid by
reason of pre-critical date sales.  In Helifix, the court reversed the trial
court’s summary judgment ruling and held that material issues of fact
existed relating to both of the Pfaff conditions because the evidence
of record was not shown to disclose or enable each element of the
claimed method.687  And, finally, in Lampi Corp. v. American Power
Products, Inc.,688 the court refused to overturn the trial court’s decision
regarding Section 102(b).689  In Lampi, the patentee had made
statements during the course of trademark prosecution that indicated
the claimed product was on-sale prior to the critical date.690  The
defendant sought to use those statements as admissions of pre-critical
date commercial activity.691  The district court refused to apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel to those statements based on testimony
and other evidence presented at trial.692  The Federal Circuit noted
that it applies the law of the regional circuit when considering the
issue of judicial estoppel,693 and in this case the Seventh Circuit
provided the trial court with discretion in the application of the
doctrine.  The Federal Circuit concluded that the record did not
support a holding that the district court abused its discretion.694
E. Obviousness
The Patent Act defines obviousness in Section 103(a):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been made obvious at the time the invention was
                                                          
686. See STX, v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 591, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
687. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1349-50, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
688. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
689. See Lampi, 228 F.3d 1376-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
690. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
691. See id. at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
692. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
693. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
694. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (noting that although the court was
troubled by Lampi’s inconsistent statements, the inconsistency alone did not warrant
a holding that the district court abused its discretion).
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made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
subject matter pertains.  Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.695
The Federal Circuit has uniformly defined this issue as a question
of law based on underlying factual questions.696  The Federal Circuit
reviews obviousness de novo but reviews the underlying factual issues
for clear error because the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a
legal conclusion.697  Furthermore, the court has clarified that, with
respect to decisions originating from the patent office, like jury
decisions,698 it reviews the factual record for the presence or absence
of substantial evidence.699  In In re Baker Hughes, Inc., the court also
explained that it reviews claim construction decisions made by the
patent office de novo, like it reviews district court claim construction
decisions.700  The PTO, however, does not apply the same rules of
claim construction as does the district court.  Unlike the district
court, the PTO reviews claims with the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the written description.701
                                                          
695. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
696. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1284-85, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang,
202 F.3d 1340, 1348, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that
“[o]bviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual inquiries”); In re
Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1152 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Whether an invention satisfies the section 103 nonobviousness requirement
is a question of law with subsidiary factual inquiries.”); Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v.
Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (explaining that several factual inquiries underline the determination of
obviousness).
697. See Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1348, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586 (observing that
this court renews a district court’s determination of obviousness de novo while reviewing
the underlying factual inquiries for clear error); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury
Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1643 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“This court reviews the conclusion on obviousness, a question of law, without
deference, and the underlying findings of fact for clear error.”); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456,
1459 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“This ultimate determination of obviousness is reviewed
without deference, while any factual findings are reviewed for clear error.”).
698. See Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1310, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the underlying factual findings made
by a jury on the issue of obviousness are reviewed merely to ascertain whether they
are supported by substantial evidence).
699. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1776 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (explaining that the court now reviews the Board’s factual determinations
for substantial evidence); In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the Board’s underlying factual findings
are reviewed for substantial evidentiary support).
700. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (comparing
the standard of review for claim construction used for reviewing decisions made by the
patent office and the district court).
701. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (citing In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1459,
1464, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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The Supreme Court defined the underlying factual questions in
Graham v. John Deere Co.,702 to include the following: “(1) the scope
and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the prior
art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.”703  In Brown &
Williamson, the court expounded on the statutory standard for a
determination of obviousness as “whether the prior art would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this process should
be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success,
viewed in light of the prior art.”704  The Brown & Williamson panel
went on to divide the obviousness criterion into two requirements.705
First, the court emphasized that there must be a showing of a
suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the prior art
references.706  Second, there must be a “reasonable expectation of
success.”707  Additionally, in Ruiz, the court stressed that a district
court must make Graham findings before invalidating a patent for
obviousness708 and that failure to do so may result in a judgment that
                                                          
702. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (stating that several factual inquiries must be
satisfied to determine patent validity).
703. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,
1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Upjohn, 225 F.3d at
1310, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289 (stating that these facts must support a jury
verdict of obviousness); Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d
1349, 1355, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“These [factual]
inquiries include the scope and content of the prior art, the level of ordinary skill in
the field of the invention, the differences between the claimed invention and the
prior art, and any objective evidence of non-obviousness such as long-felt need, and
commercial success.”); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d
1339, 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1643-44 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the
several critical factual underpinnings used to determine obviousness); Ruiz v. A.B.
Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 662-63, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(setting forth the four factual inquiries that need to be made to determine
obviousness).
704. Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (citing In
re Dow Chem., 837 F.2d 469, 473, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
705. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
706. See id. at 1124-25, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (noting that a showing of the
motivation to combine is an “essential evidentiary component of an obviousness
holding”) (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
707. Id. at 1125, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (noting the second requirement of
obviousness “’does not require absolute predictability of success’”) (quoting In re
O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
708. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 663, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1166 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 220 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (“Graham was cited but its guidance was not applied,
resulting in the application of hindsight and speculation.”); Custom Accessories, Inc.
v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1200 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen significant legal errors are reflected in the opinion . . . which
themselves shed doubt on the district court’s use of Graham, the need for findings
becomes greater and their absence rises to the level of error.”).
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must be vacated, remanded, or reversed.709
Of all the factors recited by the Federal Circuit regarding
obviousness, the court focused most on the issue of “motivation to
combine.”710  Because inventions almost always result from the
combination of old elements,711 the court has stressed the need to
find a motivation to combine these old elements into one new
invention.
In In re Kotzab, the court explained, “every element of a claimed
invention may often be found in the prior art.  However,
identification in the prior art of each individual part claimed is
insufficient to defeat patentability of the whole claimed invention.”712
The court went on to state that in order to establish obviousness
based on a combination of elements in the prior art, there must be a
showing of “some motivation, suggestion or teaching of the
desirability of making the specific combination that was made by the
applicant.”713  Indeed, the court repeated the point that combination
claims need not be declared invalid based solely upon finding similar
elements in separate prior patents because such a practice would
negate nearly all patents.714
In Ecolochem, the court explained that the need for finding a
motivation to combine helps to guard against an illegitimate
hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. 715
                                                          
709. See Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 664, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (reasoning that the
district court’s failure to apply the Graham factors can require that the previous
judgment be vacated and the case remanded).
710. See Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1931 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a factual question
subsidiary to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is determining whether there is
a motivation to combine a prior art reference); In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1369, 1370,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reiterating the standard that to
establish obviousness based on a combination of references, there must be a showing of
some motivation or suggestion to make the specific combination that was made);
Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065,
1073 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that the best defense against hindsight-based
obviousness is application of the requirement for a showing of a motivation or
suggestion to combine the prior art references), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1607 (2001);
Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (indicating that the court has recently
re-emphasized the importance of the motivation to combine).
711. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that most inventions arise from a combination of old
elements).
712. Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
713. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316 (citations omitted).
714. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1167 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561,
1575, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593, 1603 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
715. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371-72, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that “[o]ur case law makes
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The court stressed this point in Yamanouchi as well, repeating its
previous warning from In re Rouffet,716 where the court explained that
the counter to the fact that virtually all inventions are combinations
of old elements is “the suggestion to combine requirement[, which]
stands as a critical safeguard against hindsight analysis and rote
application of the legal test for obviousness.”717
In several of its decisions from the year 2000, the court described
the motivation–to-combine analysis in detail.  In Ecolochem, for
instance, the court explained that in matters of rejection or
invalidation on a combination of art references, “[o]bviousness
cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to
produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion
supporting the combination.”718
The court further stated that the teaching or suggestion to
combine may flow from the nature of the problem but cannot define
the problem in terms of its solution.719  To do so, the court explained,
would impermissibly allow one to rely on hindsight in selecting prior
art for purposes of determining obviousness.720  In examining a
patent application where two known elements have been combined,
the issue is whether the prior art contains something to motivate the
combination, thereby creating obviousness.721
In Ruiz, the court stated that the motivation to combine may be
found:
(1) in the prior art references themselves; (2) in the knowledge of
those of ordinary skill in the art that certain references, or
                                                          
clear that the best defense against hindsight-based obviousness analysis is the
rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of a teaching or motivation to
combine the prior art references.  ‘Combining prior art references without evidence
of such a suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply takes the inventor’s disclosure as
a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability—the essence of
hindsight.’”) (citations omitted).
716. 149 F.3d 1350, 1357-58, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
717. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,
1319, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Dembiczak, 175
F.3d 994, 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
718. Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1372, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting ACS Hosp.
Sys., Inc. v. Montfiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929, 933 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
719. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
720. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp.
v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 880, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1977, 1981 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
721. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1372, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen determining the patentability of a
claimed invention which combines two known elements, the question is whether
there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus
obviousness, of making the combination.”) (internal citations omitted).
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disclosures in those references, are of special interest or
importance in the field; or (3) from the nature of the problem to
be solved, leading inventors to look to references relating to
possible solutions to that problem.722
Additionally, the court explained that neither the parties, the
district court, nor the patent office may satisfy this requirement with
conclusory statements and must produce specific evidence of
motivation to combine.723
With this background, the following section specifically explores
the obviousness decisions issued by the Federal Circuit during 2000.
In Winner International Royalty Corp. v. Wang, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court decision holding that a patent was not
obvious.724  The Federal Circuit found no clear error in either the trial
court’s factual findings relating to obviousness or its ultimate
determination of non-obviousness.725  The Federal Circuit agreed with
the district court’s finding of no motivation to combine the alleged
invalidating references because: (1) there was no perceived
disadvantage in the cited reference that would motivate one of
ordinary skill to combine references, and (2) the primary reference
relied upon taught away from the patent’s claimed invention.726  The
court also noted that a “teaching away” from the claimed invention
alone can defeat an obviousness claim.727  After reviewing the first
three Graham factors, and holding in favor of patentability,728 the
court explained that if the party asserting obviousness had succeeded
on these issues, the burden would have shifted to the patentee to
                                                          
722. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“While the references need not expressly teach that the disclosure
contained therein should be combined with another, the showing of combinability
must be clear and particular”) (quoting Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lake Plastics,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1572, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 1630 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal
citations omitted).
723. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Broad conclusory statements standing alone are not ‘evidence.’”)  (citing In
re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
724. 202 F.3d 1340, 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580, 1590 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1238 (2000).
725. Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1342, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
726. See id. at 1349, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (describing the district court’s
reasoning in concluding that no motivation to combine existed).  The court also
explained that “[w]hat a reference teaches and whether it teaches toward or away
from the claimed invention are questions of fact.”  Id. at 1349, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1587.
727. See id. at 1349-50, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (noting that a reference
teaches away “if it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s
disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant”)
(quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130, 1131 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
728. See id. at 1350, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
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show objective indicia of non-obviousness such as commercial
success.729  Because the patent challenger failed to satisfy its burden,
the court held the burden did not shift, and that the patentee had
shown commercial success attributable to the patent.
In In re Gartside, the court faced an appeal from the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences, wherein the Board found certain
claims of a patent were unpatentable as obvious.730  In a brief opinion,
the court reviewed and accepted the Board’s explanation and
evidence showing a motivation to combine the cited references.731
With respect to other claims, the court agreed that a motivation to
combine the references existed based upon the teachings of the
references themselves and the problem to be solved.732  The court also
agreed with the Board’s decision not to rely on a declaration
submitted by the patentee regarding “unexpected results.”733  The
court held that the examples in the declaration did “not correspond
to any process within the scope of the claims” and, therefore, was
“not probative of non-obviousness.”734
In Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co.,735 the court affirmed
the trial court’s conclusion that the claim at issue was not obvious.736
The patent challenger asserted invalidity based on the same
references that were before the examiner during prosecution, and
the Federal Circuit identified the added burden placed on the party
attacking validity.  The court quickly dismissed the challenge,
concluding that the party had offered no serious argument.737
In Advanced Display Systems, the court remanded the case for a new
trial on the obviousness issue.738  The court focused on the objective
considerations of non-obviousness in its decision.739  The court first
explained that the patent challenger’s repeated failures to design the
                                                          
729. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
730. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1308, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1770 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
731. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1319-20, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780 (concluding
that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and the Board
did not err in finding the claim invalid as obvious).
732. Id. at 1320-21, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779 (agreeing with the Commissioner
that substantial evidence existed to support the Board’s finding that a motivation to
combine the claims arose from the teachings and references and from the nature of
the problem to be solved).
733. See id. at 1321, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
734. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
735. 204 F.3d 1360, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
736. See Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1367-68, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
737. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
738. 212 F.3d 1272, 1289, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1673, 1684-85 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
739. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1285, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
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claimed invention supported non-obviousness.740  “[E]vidence of
failed attempts by others could be determinative on the issue of
obviousness.”741  Next, the court wrote that the evidence showed the
patent challenger had “wholesale” copied the claimed invention and
replicated the claimed invention, rather than copying one in the
public domain.  This evidence is demonstrative of indicia of non-
obviousness.742  As discussed in Section I, supra, the overall decision in
Advanced Display Systems seems geared toward giving the patentee a
second trial because of severe discovery abuses committed by the
patent challenger’s counsel.743  Indeed, much of the objective
evidence of non-obviousness was improperly withheld from the
patentee until very late in the proceedings.744
In Riverwood International Corp. v. Mead Corp.,745 the court reversed
the district court’s conclusion that the patent claims were not invalid
for obviousness.746  The art primarily relied upon indisputably showed
three of the four elements of claim one.747  The court agreed with a
special master’s decision, (rejected by the district court) regarding a
person’s level of skill in the art.748  With respect to objective factors of
non-obviousness, the court also sided with the special master’s
finding that the success of the product was attributable to factors
outside the scope of the claims at issue.749  The patentee also failed to
prove copying, a long-felt need for improvement in the field of the
invention, and failures of others.750  In view of these findings, the
objective factors lacked sufficient weight to reverse the court’s
                                                          
740. See id. at 1285, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681-82 (recognizing that the court has
previously held that an infringer’s inability to develop a product made possible by the
claimed invention supports a finding of non-obviousness).
741. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
742. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 (citing Specialty Composites v. Cabot
Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 991, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
743. See id. at 1287, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (reasoning that the earlier trial
was “manifestly unjust” due to all the discovery abuses).
744. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1286, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the patentee did not
receive important evidence until after the jury went into deliberations).
745. 212 F.3d 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1012 (2000).
746. See Riverwood, 212 F.3d at 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
747. See id. at 1366-67, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765 (agreeing with the special
master that the first three limitations were admitted).
748. See id. at 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765 (concluding that the claimed
invention would have been obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention).
749. Id. at 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
750. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765 (stating that much of the patent
challenger’s evidence of commercial success was attributable to factors outside the
scope of the claims).
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determination of obviousness.751
In In re Baker Hughes,752 the Federal Circuit reversed the patent
office’s decision that the claims at issue were unpatentable as
obvious.753  The court based its decision primarily on its holding that
the PTO had erred in construing the term “hydrocarbon.”754  After
construing “hydrocarbon” correctly, the court concluded that readily
apparent differences existed between the claims and the cited art.755
In In re Kotzab,756 the court similarly reversed the patent office’s
determination that the claims were unpatentable as obvious.757  The
invention at issue involved “an injection molding method for forming
plastic articles,” and the claims at issue required the use of a single
temperature sensor to control a plurality of flow control valves.758  The
patent applicant argued, and the court agreed, that the reference did
not teach or suggest this limitation.759  The court held that “[n]one of
the Board’s comments relate to the issue of . . . teaching or
suggesting the use of one sensor to control” the plurality of valves.760
The court explained that the PTO’s decision lacked substantial
evidence to show the one sensor element, and thus rejected the
PTO’s argument that the reference teaches that a single sensor may
be used.761
Ultimately, the court found that the evidence failed to show the
necessary motivation to combine the references cited.762  The court
                                                          
751. See Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Mead Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1763, 1765 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
752. 215 F.3d 1297, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
753. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1304, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 (concluding
that because the Board misconstrued the claims, it erred in finding that the claims
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art).
754. Id. at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153 (agreeing with Baker Hughes that the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences erred in constructing the term
“hydrocarbon” as including gases).
755. Id. at 1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153 (explaining the differences in the
processes).
756. 217 F.3d 1365, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
757. See Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
758. Id. at 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
759. Id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317 (agreeing with the applicant that the
reference at issue in view of secondary references does not teach or suggest the use of a
single temperature sensor to control a plurality of flow control valves).
760. Id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
761. Id. at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317 (“While the test for establishing an
implicit teaching, motivation, or suggestion is what the combination of these two
statements of [the reference] would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the
art, . . . they must be considered in the context of the teaching of the entire
reference.”).  The court went on to note that “particular findings must be made as to
the reason the skilled artisan, with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would
have selected these components for combination in the manner claimed.”  Id., 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
762. See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1318 (Fed.
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wrote that the examiner had fallen into “the hindsight trap.”763  The
court warned that in cases with relatively simple concepts, finding
prior art statements that appeared in the abstract to suggest the
solution was not difficult; the court must nevertheless still make a
determination of the specific principle that motivated the inventor to
make the combination.764  There being no such evidence, the Federal
Circuit reversed.765
In Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharmaceutical Corp., the court reversed a
jury’s finding that the patent in suit was invalid on the ground of
obviousness.766  With respect to the first combination of references,
the court held that the record lacked substantial evidence in support
of the challenger’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to
realize the claimed invention.767  The court emphasized the
requirement for factual support for an expert’s conclusory opinion of
obviousness, and the challenger’s lack of factual support gave the
expert’s testimony little probative value.768  The court also dismissed
the second combination, holding that the challenger’s expert had
failed to provide documentary support for his statements, and that
recollections about what “general scientific knowledge” was widely
known required “support by documentary evidence in order to
receive probative weight.”769  On the final piece of art, the Federal
Circuit repeated its conclusion that the patent challenger had failed
to present evidentiary support for the jury’s obviousness verdict.770
In Sibia Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharmaceutical, the court considered
whether the trial court erred in denying the accused infringer’s
                                                          
Cir. 2000) (concluding that there was not substantial evidence in the record to modify
the teachings of the reference).
763. Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
764. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (noting that a court must make a
“finding as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a
skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of [the claimed]
invention to make the combination in the manner claimed.”).
765. See id. at 1371-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (concluding that the decision
must be reversed because the Board did not make out a prima facie case of
obviousness).
766. 225 F.3d 1306, 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(ruling that the judgments of invalidity based on obviousness were without adequate
evidentiary support and must be reversed).
767. See Upjohn, 225 F.3d at 1311, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (finding that there
was not substantial evidence to support the experts’ conclusion that the claimed
invention was obvious).
768. Id. at 1311, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital
Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1473, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1997));
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 657, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
769. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
770. See id. at 1312, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291 (finding that the challenger
provided no evidence to support the verdict of obviousness).
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judgment as a matter of law motion that sought to overturn a jury
verdict in favor of the patentee.771  The jury found the patent was not
invalid for obviousness.772  The Federal Circuit reversed the district
court’s denial and held the patent invalid for obviousness.773  The
accused infringer asserted that a single prior-art reference was
sufficient to invalidate the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the
court recognized that in “appropriate circumstances, a single prior
art reference can render a claim obvious.”774  As with any other
obviousness attack, even with a single reference, there must be
evidence of a motivation to modify the teachings of the single
reference.775  Contrary to the jury’s conclusion, the Federal Circuit
found that there was a motivation to modify the single reference such
that it covered the claimed invention.776  The court held that
undisputed evidence (in the form of an article and a patent)
provided the motivation to modify the single reference.777  The court
continued that the undisputed teachings, “‘as filtered through the
knowledge of one skilled in the art,’ as well as the nature of the
problem to be solved, provide a suggestion and motivation” to modify
the reference to cover the claimed invention.778  The patentee tried to
rebut this “undisputed evidence” by pointing out that the article itself
does not teach the modification, yet the court rejected the argument.
The court explained that such a claim fails to provide substantial
evidence of no motivation to modify, and that the patentee ignored
the possibility that the motivation to modify can be found outside the
reference.779  Additionally, the court disregarded persuasive the
testimony from the author of the reference because the court found
                                                          
771. 225 F.3d 1349, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(reviewing the denial of a judgment as a matter of law motion on the issues of
infringement and invalidity).
772. See Sibia, 225 F.3d at 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
773. See id. at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933 (holding that the “district
court’s denial of Cadus’s motion for JMOL on the issue of invalidity must be
reversed”).  Chief Judge Mayer dissented, arguing that the majority was making “an
end-run around the requirement that there must be a motivation to modify.”  Id. at
1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
774. Id. at 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
775. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (setting forth the standard that to
support a claim of obviousness, there must be a showing of a suggestion or
motivation to modify the teachings of that reference to the claimed invention).
776. See Sibia Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharm., 225 F.3d 1349, 1357, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1927, 1932 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
777. See id. at 1357, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 (stating that the motion to
modify the reference stemmed from the nature of the problem to be solved).
778. See id. at 1357-58, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v.
Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1489 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
779. See id. at 1358, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932-33.
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his testimony irrelevant to the fundamental issue of whether the
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, when confronted with
the relevant problem, would have been motivated to use the
reference.780
The Sibia panel also rejected the patentee’s arguments regarding
secondary considerations.781  The court noted that the licenses relied
upon to show commercial success were part of larger licensing
packages, and did not exclusively encompass the patent in suit.782
Finally, based on its holding of invalidity of independent claim one,
the court also held the dependent claims invalid.783  The court
explained that the patentee had failed to argue validity of the
dependent claims separately from the independent claim.784
In Ecolochem, the court sustained the trial court’s summary
judgment decision of invalidity based on obviousness for one claim
but reversed the decision of invalidity for the remaining claims.785  In
its reversal, the court opined that the trial judge had used the patent
in suit as a “blueprint” for determining obviousness and by doing so
violated the rule against using hindsight.786  The court also held that
the district court had provided no support for its conclusory
statements of obviousness or any evidence that suggested, taught or
motivated one of ordinary skill to combine the recited art.787  The
Federal Circuit went on to explain that the primary reference actually
taught away from the necessary combination.788  The court regarded
                                                          
780. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
781. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
782. See Sibia Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharm., 225 F.3d 1349, 1358, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1927, 1933 (stating that “the mere existence of these licenses is insufficient to
overcome the conclusion of obviousness, as based on the express teachings in the
prior art that would have motivated one of ordinary skill to modify [the reference’s
teachings.]”).
783. See Sibia, 225 F.3d at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
784. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933 (“[T]hese claims do not stand on their
own, and given our determination that claim 1 is invalid, the remaining dependent
claims must fall as well.”) (citing MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d
1362, 1367, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Gardner v. TEC Sys.
Inc., 725 F.2d 1338, 1350, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
785. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
786. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1372, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (reasoning that
the district court used the claimed invention as a blueprint and looked to other prior
art for the elements present in the claimed invention but missing from the prior art
reference).
787. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (explaining that the district court did not
discuss any specific evidence of motivation to combine, but only made broad
conclusory statements, which did not constitute evidence).
788. See id. at 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (establishing that the district court
erred in finding that the claimed reference implicitly suggests the combination of the
two elements).
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the lack of a convincing discussion regarding motivation to combine
as a “critical omission” in the district judge’s decision and rebuked
the judge for a “reference-by-reference, limitation-by-limitation
analysis” that used hindsight and an erroneous “obvious to try”
standard.789
In its decision sustaining the invalidity of claim 20, the Ecolochem
panel carefully reviewed secondary considerations of non-
obviousness.790  First, the court reviewed whether a long-felt, but
unresolved need existed in the field of the invention.791  The court
agreed with the district judge that no such need existed, and pointed
out that guidelines urging the use of what became a part of the
patented invention were issued in 1982, and the patentee filed its
patent application approximately one year later, in December,
1983.792  Second, the court considered alleged commercial success of
the invention.793  The court explained that “a presumption arises that
the patented invention is commercially successful ‘when a patentee
can demonstrate commercial success, usually shown by significant
sales in a relevant market, and that the successful product is the
invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.’”794  The court also
explained that once a patentee makes this showing, the burden shifts
to the patent challenger to show that the commercial success resulted
from factors extraneous to the patented invention.795  The Federal
Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the patent
challenger had met its burden, holding that the patentee had instead
met its burden of showing that the success resulted from the patented
invention.796  Third, the court reviewed whether others had tried, but
failed, to make the claimed invention.797  The Federal Circuit
determined that this question, in this case, rested on credibility
                                                          
789. Id. at 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
790. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076 (stating that it is necessary to
review the district court’s findings on the evidence of secondary consideration).
791. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
792. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077 (finding no clear
error in the district court’s decision that no long-felt need existed).
793. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
794. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077 (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste &
Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
795. See id. at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077 (explaining that “[o]nce [the
patentee] made the requisite showing of nexus between commercial success and the
patented invention, the burden shifted to the [patent challenger] to prove the
commercial success . . . due to other factors”).
796. See id. at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078 (holding that the district court
clearly erred in finding that the patent challenger met its burden).
797. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1378-79, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077, 1078-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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issues, and deferred to the district court’s decision on that basis.798
Fourth, the court acknowledged that the “fact of near-simultaneous
invention, though not determinative of statutory obviousness, is
strong evidence of what constitutes the level of ordinary skill in the
art.”799  The district court found that the facts in the case favored
obviousness, and the Federal Circuit agreed.800  Fifth, the court
disagreed with the district court and held that the prior art did teach
away from combining the references relied upon.801  Finally, the
Ecolochem panel held that the district court had clearly erred when it
discounted evidence of copying simply because it did not believe the
claimed process to be novel.802  Nonetheless, the court held that the
error did not carry substantial weight because evidence of copying is
only “equivocal evidence of non-obviousness in the absence of more
compelling objective indicia of other secondary considerations.”803
After weighing all of the factors together, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court’s obviousness conclusion as to claim 20 was not
clearly in error.804
In Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical v. Danbury Pharmacal,805 the court
affirmed the trial court’s decision that the patent was not invalid as
obvious.806  This case focused on whether a chemical compound was
obvious, and the court explained that for a chemical compound, “a
prima facie case of obviousness requires ‘structural similarity between
claimed and prior art subject matter . . . where the prior art gives a
                                                          
798. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1378-79, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078-79
(acknowledging that the district court’s decision was based on the credibility of a
witness and because the court “gives great deference” to such decisions, there was no
clear error in finding no evidence of failure by others).
799. Id. at 1378-79, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (quoting Int’l Glass Co. v. United
States, 408 F.2d 395, 405, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434, 442 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
800. See id. at 1379, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (reasoning that the district court
found the expert’s testimony credible on the issue of obviousness, and there was no
clear error in that decision).
801. See id. at 1379-80, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (holding that the body of
available evidence clearly shows that the prior art taught away from the claimed
reference).
802. See id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (stating that it was clearly
erroneous that the district court gave little credit to the copying argument and found
only that the process was novel).
803. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1077, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
804. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (holding that the
secondary considerations, taken as a whole, do not overcome the other evidence of
obviousness).
805. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
806. See Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (“Because
Danbury did not show even a prima facie case for obviousness, this court has
considered, but need not separately address, the strong objective of non-
obviousness.”).
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reason or motivation to make the claimed compositions.’”807  The
court defined the issue of validity as whether one of skill in the art
would have found the motivation to combine pieces from
compounds found in prior art patents.808  The Federal Circuit held
that the district court correctly rejected the patent challenger’s
arguments because it had failed to show sufficient motivation to
combine by one of ordinary skill in the art.809  In its decision, the
court noted that there must be a reasonable expectation of success
through the combination, and that no such expectation existed,
particularly given the large numbers of possible compounds that
exhibit the desired activity, without the unwanted side effects.810
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris,811 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision of invalidity based on
obviousness.812  The court examined the facts relating to each
reference relied upon by the accused infringer and held that the
district court did not commit clear error when it concluded that
there was a motivation to combine these references.813  Furthermore,
the court closely examined the issue of commercial success.814  Like
the Ecolochem panel, the Brown & Williamson panel also recognized
that a nexus between commercial success and the patent is presumed
if the marketed product embodies the claimed features.815  If the
presumption stands, the burden shifts to the party asserting
obviousness to show the contrary.816  The court found ample evidence
to rebut the nexus.817  The Federal Circuit, however, went on to hold
that the district court erred when it did not consider the commercial
success of the accused product, which had been found to infringe.818
                                                          
807. Id. at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (citing In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
808. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
809. See id. at 1344-45, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45.
810. See id. at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (“If activity alone was the sole
motivation, other more active compounds would have been the obvious choices . . . .”).
811. 229 F.3d 1120, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
812. See Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1132, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
813. See id. at 1125-29, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459-63.
814. See id. at 1130-31, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464 (stating that the district court’s
error in not considering the success of the product is harmless “because the modest
level of commercial activity and limited market share achieved by the VSSS cannot
overcome the strong evidence of obviousness.”).
815. See id. at 1130, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
816. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (“In this case, a nexus should be
presumed because the Capri encompasses the claimed features.”).
817. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,
1130, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1463-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describing the “ample
evidence of record”).
818. See Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1130, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464
(“considering the commercial success of the infringing product as evidence of the
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The court also noted (1) the absence of evidence relating to attempts
and failures of others to create the claimed invention, long-felt need,
and no unexpected results; and (2) that there was evidence that the
defendant was skeptical, and had praised the invention as well as
copied it.819  In the end, the court held that the patentee had not
shown the district court’s decision was clearly erroneous.820
Finally, in Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,821 the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s judgment of obviousness and remanded the case to
the district court to make Graham findings.822  Essentially, the district
court simply found the invention obvious because the necessary
combination was apparent.823  According to the Federal Circuit, this
conclusion did not constitute specific findings that proved why such
combinations were apparent, and the court could not determine
what evidence the district court considered in its obviousness
analysis.824  The court also remanded for a more specific finding of
the level of ordinary skill in the art although the court acknowledged
that the uncertainty in this aspect of the district court’s decision did
not alone warrant reversal or vacating the decision.825  Ultimately, the
Ruiz panel explained that it could not determine whether the district
court considered the secondary considerations of non-obviousness,
and remanded with instructions for the judge to make findings
regarding secondary considerations and whether a nexus between the
claimed invention and commercial success existed.826
                                                          
commercial success of the claimed invention”) (citing Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1384. (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
819. See id. at 1130-31, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463-64 (describing the secondary
indicators of non-obviousness).
820. See id. at 1131, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (“The district court’s errors in not
considering various secondary indicators are, therefore, harmless.”).
821. 234 F.3d 654, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
822. See id. at 663-64, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (discussing the necessity of
making the Graham findings).
823. See id. at 665, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (“The district court concluded that
it would have been obvious to combine screw anchors and metal brackets, because the
need for a bracket ‘was apparent.’”).
824. See id. at 666, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (reviewing the district court’s
analysis).
825. See id. at 666-67, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (stating that the district court’s
failure to make this and other Graham findings shows that Graham was not likely
applied by the court).
826. See id. at 667-68, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (“Our precedents clearly hold
that secondary considerations, when present, must be considered in determining
obviousness.”).
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F. Enablement
Section 112, paragraph one, requires a patent application to
“adequately disclose the claimed invention so as to enable a person
skilled in the art to practice the invention at the time the application
was filed without undue experimentation.”827  In Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., the court faced an enablement question,
and wrote that enablement is determined from the viewpoint of
individuals skilled in the art.828  The court in In re Swartz, classified the
enablement inquiry as “a legal conclusion based on underlying
factual inquiries.”829
In In re Swartz, Swartz appealed a holding of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences that a patent application for cold fusion
neither enabled nor satisfied the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.830  The Board found that Swartz had failed to provide a
disclosure of an operative embodiment.831  In addressing this issue,
the court explained that “to practice the claimed invention, a person
of ordinary skill in the art would have had to rely on the art known at
the filing date, September 19, 1991.”832  The court affirmed the
Board’s finding that no evidence showed that one of skill in the art
would have been able to rely on the known art at the time, and
ultimately concluded lack of enablement.833
In Ajinomoto, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that the
patent at issue fulfilled the enablement requirement.834  While
reviewing the evidence considered by the district court, the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed that the enablement requirement did not reach
subject matter well known in the art.835  The Federal Circuit agreed
                                                          
827. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1703 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371-72, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
828. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1345, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
829. Swartz, 232 F.3d at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
830. See id. at 863-64, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703-04 (discussing the “utility”
holding in the case).
831. See id. at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“[T]he PTO found that the
written description in Mr. Swartz’s application contains no disclosure of any
operation embodiment.”).
832. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
833. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1704 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (rejecting all of Swartz’s arguments).
834. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, 228 F.3d 1338, 1345-46, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describing and agreeing with the
district court’s analysis).
835. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (asserting that
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with the district court that the evidence of record showed that the
process at issue applied conventional genetic engineering
techniques.836  Finally, the court recognized the validity of depositing
biological products pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 122 to satisfy the
enablement requirement.837  In such cases, the court explained that
PTO and international treaty procedures require a deposit of physical
samples that are available to the public before granting a patent.838
The Federal Circuit faced another enablement issue in Singh v.
Brake,839 which also reached the court from the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences.840  The court, however, did not resolve the
enablement issue and decided instead to remand to the Board.841
The court based its decision on the determination that the Board did
not explicitly reach any of the parties’ Section 112, paragraph one
arguments and that the Board should decide such arguments first.842
G. Utility
According to the utility requirement of Section 101, an invention
must be operable to achieve useful results.843  While considering an
appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the
Federal Circuit explained that the issues of utility and enablement
are closely related.844  The court elaborated further that application
                                                          
“[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”)
(quoting Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 94. (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
836. See id. at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (“ADM has not shown clear error
in the district court’s findings and in the conclusion that invalidity on the ground of
enablement has not been shown.”).
837. See id. at 1345-46, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337-38 (“The deposit of biological
organisms for public availability satisfies the enablement requirement for materials
that are not amenable to written description or that constitute unique biological
materials which cannot be duplicated.”).
838. See id. at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 (noting it is “a condition of the
patent grant that physical samples of such materials be deposited and made available
to the public, under procedures established by the PTO and by international
treaty.”).
839. 222 F.3d 1362, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
840. See Singh, 222 F.3d at 1370-71, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (regarding
interference of DNA construct).
841. See id. at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79 (finding the Board’s analysis
inconclusive).
842. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (“We remand to the Board for a
determination of those issues that were properly raised during the earlier
proceedings.”).
843. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1703-04 (Fed Cir.
2000) (“The utility requirement of § 101 mandates that the invention be operable to
achieve useful results.”).
844. See Swartz, 232 F.3d at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703 (“The questions of
whether a specification provides an enabling disclosure under Section 112, paragraph
1, and whether an application satisfies the utility requirement of Section 101 are closely
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claims that do not meet the utility requirement because the invention
cannot be operated also fail to meet the enablement requirement.845
The court held, moreover, that the issue of utility is a question of
fact.846
When issues of utility arise at the patent office, the court explained
that the PTO bears the initial burden of challenging the patent’s
utility.847  To sustain this burden, the PTO should provide evidence
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt
the asserted utility.848  If the PTO presents such evidence, then the
burden shifts to the applicant to submit sufficient evidence that
would convince a person of ordinary skill of the invention’s alleged
utility.849  In In re Swartz, the PTO shifted the burden to the applicant
when it provided several references showing that cold fusion (the
subject of the application) results were irreproducible; the PTO
resolved that the applicant had failed to submit sufficient evidence of
operability to overcome the PTO’s evidence.850  On appeal, the
applicant invited the court to review the voluminous record
submitted to the PTO, but apparently failed to cite to any specific
evidence.851  The Federal Circuit refused this invitation, stating that
the applicant’s use of “conclusory allegations” was insufficient to
prove the Board erred on the issue of utility.852  The court affirmed
                                                          
related.”).
845. See id. at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“[I]f the claims in an application
fail to meet the utility requirement because the invention is inoperative, they also fail
to meet the enablement requirement because a person skilled in the art cannot
practice the invention.”) (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190
F.3d 1350, 1358, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also In re
Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1603 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The
how to use prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 101 that the specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for
the invention.”).
846. See id. at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
847. See id. at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (asserting that “[t]he PTO has the
initial burden of challenging a patent applicant’s presumptively correct assertion of
utility.”) (citing In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1441
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
848. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
849. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1704 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (describing the shift of burden from the PTO to the applicant).
850. See Swartz, 232 F.3d at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“The examiner
found that Mr. Swartz had not submitted evidence of operability that would be
sufficient to overcome reasonable doubt.”).
851. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (stating that Mr. Swartz invited the court
to review record material that he claimed supported his position on the utility issue).
852. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“Such conclusory allegations in an appeal
brief are quite insufficient to establish that the Board’s decision on the issue of utility
is not supported by substantial evidence or to establish that the Board’s ultimate
conclusion of a lack of enablement is incorrect as a matter of law.”).
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the Board’s decision.853
H. Adequate Written Description
Paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same.854
The provision’s purpose is to ensure that the scope of the
exclusion right does not exceed the ambit of the inventor’s
contribution to the field of art.855  The primary consideration in
written description cases depends on the invention’s nature and the
knowledge provided by the disclosure.856
To comply with the written-description requirement, the patentee
need not describe precisely the subject matter claimed; rather, the
description must be clear to individuals of ordinary skill in the art.857
Stated another way, by a different panel, a patentee need not
“provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at
issue.”858  Nevertheless, the Purdue panel explained that “the
disclosure must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in
the art that . . . [the inventor] was in possession of the invention.”859
In other words, the court wrote that one skilled in the art must be
                                                          
853. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (holding that “the Board did not err in
concluding that the utility of Mr. Swartz’s claimed process had not been established
and that his application did not satisfy the enablement requirement”).
854. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000).
855. See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345-46, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1915, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the
scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope
of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent
specification.”); see also Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Adequate description of the
invention guards against the inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he recount his
invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed
within his original creation.”) (quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535,
551, 211 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 303, 321 (3d Cir. 1981)).
856. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 996, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1227, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262, 191
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 96 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
857. See Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 997, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (stating that “the
description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that
[he or she] invented what is claimed”) (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) (citations omitted).
858. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895, 1904 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
859. Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
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able to understand the limitation of the claims.860  Furthermore, the
disclosure may convey the information either explicitly or
inherently.861  Because the written-description analysis is a factual one,
the Federal Circuit reviews the district court’s decision for clear
error.862
In Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Federal
Circuit reviewed and affirmed the trial court’s denial of a judgment
as a matter of law motion, after a jury verdict,863 that the patent
complied with the written-description requirement.  The patent at
issue claimed its “inventive products in terms of ranges of chemical
properties, which work in combination with ranges of other chemical
properties to produce a gasoline that reduces emissions.”864  The
appellee, Union Oil, argued that the specification failed to satisfy
Section 112, paragraph one, because it did not describe the exact
chemical component of each combination that falls within the range
of claims of the patent.865  The court held that the Patent Act does not
require such specificity.866  To the contrary, the court explained that
describing an invention in terms of ranges does not offend Section
112, paragraph one.867  The court noted, before it undertook its
analysis, that the focus was not whether the ranges found in the
claims corresponded exactly to those found in the specification, but
whether those skilled in the art could derive the claimed ranges from
                                                          
860. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (stating that “one skilled in the art,
reading the original disclosure, must immediately discern the limitation at issue in
the claims”) (citing Waldemar Link GmbH & Co. v. Osteonics Corp., 32 F.3d 556,
558, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1855, 1857 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
861. See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1915, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d
1264, 1268, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (descriptive matter may
be inherently present in a specification if one skilled in the art would necessarily
recognize such a disclosure)).
862. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (“When the
question whether a patent satisfies the written description requirement is resolved by a
district court’s sitting as the trier of fact, we review the court’s decision for clear
error.”).
863. See Union Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d 989, 997, 1001-02, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1232, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the court went out of its way to recognize
and repeat that the trial judge required the jury to answer special verdicts, and by
doing so the jury answered forty-one times that the patent satisfied the written
description requirement of § 112).
864. Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 997, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
865. See id. at 997, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (describing the written description
requirement).
866. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (noting that the written description
requirement does not demand that the applicant describe the exact subject matter
claimed).
867. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (stating that Section 112, ¶ 1 “ensures that, as
of the filing date, the inventor conveyed with reasonable clarity to those of skill in the
art that he was in possession of the subject matter of the claims.”).
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the disclosure.868  Indeed, to emphasize this point, the court quoted
from its predecessor court’s decision in In re Wertheim:
If lack of literal support alone were enough to support a rejection
under § 112, the statement of In re Lukach . . . that “the invention
claimed does not have to be described in ipsis verbis in order to
satisfy the description requirement of § 112,” is empty verbiage.869
The court also cited to Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc.,870 to
reiterate that the same component proportion ranges in an
applicant’s claims are not required to correspond with what is shown
in the patent application.871  The court indicated that it would “let
form triumph over substance” if it allowed the written description
requirement to supercede claims that are narrowed during
prosecution.872  Ultimately, the court held that the written description
requirement does not demand that the applicant provide an identical
description of claimed compounds; rather, that the inventor provide
adequate disclosure in the patent to show one skilled in the art that
the applicant actually invented the claim at issue.873  After reviewing
the evidence, including testimony presented at trial, the court found
that substantial evidence existed in the record regarding written
description to support the verdict that the inventors had possession
of the claimed subject matter.874
In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc.,875 the Federal Circuit
reached an opposite holding and found that the patent at issue failed
to satisfy the written-description requirement.  In Purdue, the patent
claimed methods of treating pain in patients by administering an
                                                          
868. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233 (“The Patent Act and this court’s case law
require only sufficient description to show one of skill in the refining art that the
inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing.”).
869. 541 F.2d 257, 265, 191 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 90, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1976).  The court
explained that, “[i]n Wertheim, the circuit court held that the specification supported
the claimed range, even though the precise range of the claim was not repeated
verbatim in the specification . . . .”  Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1000, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1235.  The majority asserted that Judge Lourie, by his dissent, would require just
such a verbatim repeat.  See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (stating “as the dissent
in this case would appear to require”).  Furthermore, the Union Oil majority stressed,
again by reference to Wertheim, that written description questions are intensely
factual and should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.  See id. at 1000, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1235.
870. 772 F.2d 1570, 1575, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
871. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 1001, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1227, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
872. Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1001, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
873. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
874. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (“Because the record shows substantial
evidence of adequate written description for each claim as the jury found, this court
affirms.”).
875. 230 F.3d 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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opioid, such as morphine, once a day.876  The claim included a
limitation that the maximum plasma concentration (“Cmax”) is more
than twice the plasma level of the opioid at about twenty-four hours
(“C24”) after administration of the dosage.
877  At issue was whether this
limitation requiring Cmax/C24 to be greater than two was adequately
described in the disclosure of the application as originally filed.878
The district court found that the specification of the patent failed to
convey that the Cmax/C24 limitation fell within the original application,
and the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not commit
clear error in its finding.879
Recognizing that written-description inquiries are intensely factual,
the Federal Circuit painstakingly reviewed the evidence, including a
detailed study of the patent’s specification and other evidence
including publications and expert testimony presented at trial.880  The
court addressed at length the patentee’s argument that two examples
within the patent disclose the Cmax/C24 ratio.
881  The Federal Circuit,
however, agreed with the district court’s finding that the patent
included examples that also disclose a Cmax/C24 ratio of less than
two.882  The Federal Circuit, like the district court, explained that
while the examples showed the various ratios, nothing in the
specification emphasized the Cmax/C24 ratio; therefore, “one of
ordinary skill in the art would not be directed to the Cmax/C24 ratio as
an aspect of the invention.”883  Nothing in the written description
indicated that the particular ratio was an important element of the
formulation.884  Seemingly scolding the patentee, the court went on to
say:
What the ‘360 patentees have done is to pick a characteristic
possessed by two of their formulations, a characteristic that is not
discussed even in passing in the disclosure, and then make it the
                                                          
876. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482 (stating
that the patent disclosed “a once-a-day formulation exhibiting a rapid initial rise in
the opioid in the patient’s blood.”).
877. See id. at 1322-23, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482-83 (describing the claims at
issue in the case).
878. See id. at 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-84.
879. See id. at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
880. See id. at 1324-28, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-88.
881. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1324-38, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1484-88 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (detailing Purdue’s arguments and
evidence).
882. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1325-26, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485-86.
883. Id. at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485-86.
884. See id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (“[T]here is nothing in the
written description of [the examples] that would suggest to one skilled in the art that
the Cmax/C24 ratio is an important defining quality of the formulation, nor does the
disclosure even motivate one to calculate the ratio.”).
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basis of claims that cover not just those two formulations, but any
formulation that has that characteristic.  This is exactly the type of
overreaching the written description requirement was designed to
guard against.885
The court also rejected the patentee’s arguments that the trial
court had committed errors of law.886  During this review, the court
stated one of the written description legal rules, namely, that the
amended claims must define and provide support for the invention.
The patentee must also include the support in the specification as
filed without the aid of amended claims.887  In other words, the
amended claims cannot be used to support claims themselves.
Finally, the patentee argued that during prosecution the examiner
stated in an interview summary that the claims are supported by the
patent’s specification, and that this statement is binding on the
district court.888  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
explaining that (1) even if the examiner’s statement was directed to
the issue at hand, the district court properly concluded that any
deference due the examiner had been overcome by clear and
convincing evidence, and (2) that the substantial evidence standard
enunciated in Dickinson v. Zurko889 did not apply because this was not a
review of an administrative decision.890  After reviewing this evidence
and the legal arguments, the court held that the trial court had
reached the proper conclusion and affirmed the decision invalidating
                                                          
885. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (“What the ‘360 patentees have done is to
pick a characteristic possessed by two of their formulations, a characteristic that is
not discussed even in passing in the disclosure, and then make it the basis of claims
that cover not just those two formulations, but any formulation that has that
characteristic.”).  “This is exactly the type of overreaching the written description
requirement was designed to guard against.”  Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
886. See id. at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (stating that the court
“examined each of the claimed legal errors and conclude[d] that the district court
did not commit any error of law that had a material effect on the court’s judgment”).
887. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
888. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (“Purdue
argue[d] that the district court should have deferred to the examiner’s finding on
that issue and that the district court failed to do so because the court improperly
regarded the written description issue to be an issue of law rather than an issue of
fact.”).
889. 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999) (“A reviewing court reviews an agency’s reasoning to
determine whether it is ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ or, if bound up with a record-based
factual conclusion, to determine whether it is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’”).
890. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (noting,
with respect to Dickinson, that decisions of the PTO are accorded “deference that
takes the form of the presumption of validity provided under 35 U.S.C. § 282”).  The
court, however, clarified that it is “not bound by the examiner’s finding in the ex parte
application proceeding that the new claims were supported by the specification,”
particularly in view of the extensive evidence heard by the trial court.  Id. at 1329, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
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the claims for failure to satisfy the written-description requirement.891
The respective panels in Union Oil and Purdue Pharma both
addressed In re Ruschig,892 where the Federal Circuit’s predecessor
court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, found that the claim
at issue violated the written-description requirement.893  The way in
which Ruschig was handled by the different panels is noteworthy.  In
Union Oil, where the Federal Circuit found that the patent complied
with the written-description requirement, the panel distinguished
Ruschig.894  The court seemed to rely heavily on the fact that the claim
in Ruschig was copied from another patent to provoke an
interference.895  The Union Oil panel therefore explained that
“[b]ecause another inventor, not Ruschig, drafted the claim at issue
to fit another specification, it is not surprising that the disputed claim
did not find support in Ruschig’s specification, even though the
inventions were similar.”896  Additionally, the Union Oil panel wrote
that the Ruschig court was concerned over the extent to which the
patentee had relied on variables to describe structures.897  Such
concern apparently did not exist for the Union Oil panel because the
court determined that “[a]rtisans skilled in petroleum refining, in
contrast, are aware of the properties of raw petroleum sources and
know how to mix streams of such sources to achieve a final product
with desired characteristics.”898
In Purdue Pharma, however, the court did not look so favorably
upon the level of skill in the relevant art.899  The Federal Circuit
quoted a passage from Ruschig, where the court analogized the
importance of documenting the steps taken in inventing a product to
                                                          
891. See id. at 1329-30, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
892. 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
893. The Purdue Pharma panel described Ruschig as a case where the claim at issue
was directed to a single compound, and “[t]he applicants argued that, although the
compound itself was not disclosed, one skilled in the art would find support for the
claimed compound in the general disclosure of the genus of compounds to which
the claimed compound belonged.”  Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d
1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
894. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 1000, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227, 1234-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the various reasons why
Ruschig is different than the case at bar).
895. See Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1000, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234 (stating that
“the Ruschig case involved a copied claim (another inventor’s claim copied into
Ruschig’s application), which did not find support in Ruschig’s application because
Ruschig had invented and disclosed a broad set of the compounds that was similar,
but not entirely within the scope of the claim.”).
896. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
897. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
898. Id. at 1000-01, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
899. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the marking of a trail by making blaze marks on trees.900  The Purdue
Pharma panel noted that its case differed from Ruschig, which
involved a genus encompassing potentially half a million
compounds.901  Nevertheless, the Ruschig rationale applied equally
because the patent in Purdue Pharma disclosed many pharmacokinetic
parameters without any evidence of the process followed to explain
the Cmax/C24 ratio or what value that ratio should exceed.”
902  The
Purdue Pharma panel applied Ruschig, therefore, to state that the
patentee must demonstrate in its original disclosure the steps taken
to achieve its result to meet the written-description requirement.903
Two of the Federal Circuit’s decisions dealing with the written-
description requirement—Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp.904 and Lampi Corp.
v. American Power Prods., Inc.905—did so in the context of 35 U.S.C.
§ 120, the provision of the Patent Act that permits continuation
applications.  First, in Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., the court held that the
district court erred when it looked to an original 1982 patent
application to determine if the patents at issue, filed in 1990 and
1994, complied with the written description requirement.906  The
Federal Circuit reasoned that the district court should only rely on
the earlier application for relevant specifications when a patentee
seeks the benefit of the earlier date under 35 U.S.C. § 120.907  Indeed,
the Federal Circuit noted that Microsoft did not dispute that the 1990
and 1994 patents met the written description requirement as to their
claims.908  Instead, Microsoft had the district court look at the 1982
grandparent application for compliance with the written-description
requirement, in apparent reliance on Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline
                                                          
900. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (“It is an
old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze marks on the trees.  It is of
no help in finding a trail or in finding one’s way through the woods where the trails
have disappeared—or have not yet been made, which is more like the case here—to
be confronted simply by a large number of unmarked trees.”) (quoting In re Ruschig,
379 F.2d 990, 994-95, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118, 122 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).  The court went
on to say that “[w]e are looking for blaze marks which single out particular trees.  We
see none.”  Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
901. See id. 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
902. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
903. See id. at 1326-27, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (“In order to satisfy the written
description requirement, the blaze marks directing skilled artisans to that tree must
be in the originally filed disclosure.”).
904. 214 F.3d 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
905. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
906. See Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
907. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (“For purposes of § 112, ¶ 1, the
relevant specifications are those of the [1990 and 1994] patents; earlier specifications
are relevant only when the benefit of an earlier filing date is sought under 35 U.S.C.
§ 120.”).
908. See id. at 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1545
Corp.909  The court explained, however, that this reliance was
misplaced because Gentry did not invoke prior applications, and the
original disclosure belonged with the issued patent.910  Furthermore,
Reiffin, the patentee, stated that he did not need the benefit of the
1982 filing date.911  The Federal Circuit explained that analysis of
ancestor applications is appropriate when the benefit of the earlier
filing date is sought under Section 120.912  The court, therefore, held
that the district court had erred when it invalidated the claims of the
patents, and at worst, those claims would not receive the benefit of
the 1982 application’s filing date.913
In the second case, Lampi, the Federal Circuit reiterated that in
order for a claim in a subsequently filed application to receive the
filing date of a previously filed application, the earlier application
must describe the invention.914  The accused infringer in Lampi
asserted that the claims of the patent at issue, a continuation
application, were not entitled to the filing date of the parent
application due to its failure to meet the written description
requirement.915  Specifically, the claims at issue encompassed “non-
identical half-shells,” and the defendant argued the original
application did not support claims for “non-identical half-shells,” only
“identical half-shells.”916  The district court held, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed, that the patent satisfied the written description
                                                          
909. 134 F.3d 1473, 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498, 1503 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[The
inventor’s] original disclosure serves to limit the permissible breadth of his later-
drafted claims.”).
910. Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915,
1917-18 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]here were no prior applications and the original
disclosure was that of the issued patent . . . [this] ‘original disclosure’ reference
simply recognized that ‘the sufficiency [of a disclosure] under § 112, first paragraph
must be judged as of its filing date.’”) (quoting Application of Glass, 492 F.2d 1228,
1232, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 31, 34 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
911. See Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
912. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (“In accordance with § 120, claims to
subject matter in a later-filed application not supported by an ancestor application in
terms of § 112 ¶ 1 are not invalidated; they simply do not receive the benefit of the
earlier application’s filing date.”).
913. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (“The district court erred in holding the
‘603 and ’604 claims invalid for failure to comply with the written description
requirement.”).
914. Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1445, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to
the filing date of an earlier-filed application under 35 U.S.C. § 120, the earlier
application must comply with the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, that the
specification ‘contain a written description of the invention.’”).
915. See id. at 1377-78, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
916. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (“APP argues that the specification of the
875 patent describes only identical half-shells and thus does not provide sufficient
support for claims . . . which encompass non-identical half-shells.”).
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requirement.917  In so holding, the Federal Circuit relied on the
principle that claims need to be limited to a preferred
embodiment.918  Using this statement of law, the fact that non-
identical half-shells were not specifically disclosed in the original
application did not bother the court.919  Indeed, the panel pointed to
references in the specification where half-shells appeared without the
modifier “identical,” which the court stated were not critical to the
invention.920  The fact, moreover, that the drawings only disclosed
identical half-shells also did not trouble the court because “drawings
in the patent are merely a ‘practical example’ of the invention.”921
Finally, the Federal Circuit made passing reference to the written-
description requirement in three additional cases.  In KCJ Corp. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,922 the court used the written-description
requirement in the context of performing its claim-construction
analysis, not surprisingly, to determine whether the article “a”
received a singular or plural interpretation.923  The KCJ decision,
however, does not provide an analysis of the patent to determine
compliance with Section 112, paragraph 1.  Also, in Hockerson-
Halberstadt v. Avia Group International, Inc.,924 the court addressed the
issue of whether patent drawings appear to scale.  The court cited to
In re Wright,925 to explain that the established rule of law is that patent
drawings do not define the precise proportions of the elements and
may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the specification is
completely silent on the issue.  The court stated in Wright that the
drawings offer little guidance unless accompanied by quantitative
measures.926  This decision, like KCJ, does not analyze the patent at
                                                          
917. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (describing how the district court was
correct in its finding on the written description issue).
918. Id. at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
919. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (“Although the patent drawings show
only identical half-shells . . . that does not compel the conclusion that the written
description of the ‘875 patent is so narrowly tailored as to preclude Lampi from
claiming non-identical half-shells in the ‘227 patent.”).
920. See Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1378, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
921. Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
922. 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
923. See KCJ, 223 F.3d at 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (“The written
description supplies additional context for understanding whether the claim
language limits the patent scope to a single unitary [element] or extends to
encompass a device with multiple [elements].”) (citing Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,
122 F.3d 1019, 1024, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
924. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
925. 569 F.2d 1124, 1127, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 332, 335 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
926. See Hockerson-Halberstadt, 222 F.3d at 956, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491
(“Absent any written description in the specification of quantitative values,
arguments based on measurement of a drawing are of little value.”).
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issue for compliance with the written description requirement.
Finally, in Singh v. Brake,927 the court remanded the case to the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences for a determination of the
written-description requirement because the Federal Circuit refused
to undertake the analysis in the first instance.
I. Best Mode
Pursuant to Section 112, paragraph 1, a patent specification must
set forth the “best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.”928  In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,929 the
Federal Circuit wrote that this requirement “creates a statutory
bargained-for-exchange by which a patentee obtains the right to
exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a certain
time period, and the public receives knowledge of the preferred
embodiments for practicing the claimed invention.”  The court
reiterated case law that focuses on a two-prong inquiry:930 “First, the
factfinder must determine whether, at the time of filing the
application, the inventor possessed a best mode for practicing the
invention.”931  Second, the court wrote, “if the inventor possessed a
best mode, the factfinder must determine whether the written
description disclosed the best mode such that one reasonably skilled
in the art could practice it.”932  The first prong focuses on the
inventor’s state of mind at the time of filing and is a subjective
inquiry, while the second prong comprises an objective inquiry that
focuses on the scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in
the art.933  In view of these factual inquiries, the Federal Circuit
considers the best mode requirement to be an issue of fact.934
In both Eli Lilly and Northern Telecom, the panels began their
respective analyses with the second prong of the test and clarified
that the requisite amount of information that an inventor must
                                                          
927. 222 F.3d 1362, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
928. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (1994).
929. 222 F.3d 973, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
930. See, e.g., N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
931. Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614; see also United States
Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388,
1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
932. Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (setting forth the
second prong of the inquiry into the best mode requirement); see also United States
Gypsum, 74 F.3d at 1212, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
933. Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
934. See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068 (stating that the
determination of compliance with the best mode requirement is a matter of fact).
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disclose is contingent upon the scope of the claimed invention.935
Accordingly, the court explained that an inventor need only disclose
the subject matter that is novel and critical to carrying out the best
mode of the invention.936  The court explained further that the best-
mode requirement does not cover production details or routine
details, reasoning that such details do not refer to the quality or
nature of the claimed invention or to commercial and manufacturing
considerations.937  Furthermore, while routine details may implicate
the quality and nature of the invention, they are readily apparent to
one of ordinary skill in the art.938  The court reiterated these
boundaries on the best-mode requirement in Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., writing:
Requiring inclusion in the patent of known
scientific/technological information would add an imprecise and
open-ended criterion to the content of patent specifications, could
greatly enlarge the content of patent specifications and
unnecessarily increase the cost of preparing and prosecuting
patent applications, and could tend to obfuscate rather than
highlight the contribution to which the patent is directed.  A
patent is not a scientific treatise, but a document that presumes a
readership skilled in the field of the invention.939
In Ajinomoto, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that the patent complied with the best-mode requirement.940
In so doing, the court pointed to the district court’s finding that the
alleged omitted information was information that one skilled in the
art would have recognized.941
                                                          
935. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (elaborating on the second prong of the best mode test);
see also N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068 (applying the best
mode requirements).
936. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
937. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (stating the “step or source or technique
considered ‘best’ in a manufacturing circumstance may have been selected for a non-
’best mode’ reason.”) (citing Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575,
1581, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
938. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (explaining why
routine details need not be disclosed under the best mode test).
939. Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1332, 1346-47, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that disclosure is addressed to
those skilled in the art, not to the general public);  see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.
v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(reiterating that patents are written in order to enable those skilled in the art to
practice the invention); In re Storrs, 245 F.2d 474, 478, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 296-
97 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
940. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(finding that the patent could not be invalidated for violating the best mode
requirement).
941. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (explaining that the investor disclosed
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1549
Similarly, in Eli Lilly, the court rejected the defendant’s two best-
mode attacks on the patent’s validity.942  First, the court addressed the
defendant’s assertion that the patentee had failed to disclose its
preferred method for synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol.943  The
court began its analysis by reiterating that it must examine the scope
of the claimed inventions.944  According to the court, neither of the
disputed covered p-trifluoromethylphenol or a method for
synthesizing it.945  The fact that the claimed inventions involved the
use of p-trifluoromethylphenol did not raise a best-mode issue since
the claims did not provide the patentee with the right to exclude
others from practicing the alleged best mode method for synthesizing
p-trifluoromethylphenol.946  The Eli Lilly panel distinguished its facts
from Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd., Partnership,947 and Northern Telecom, Inc. v.
Datapoint Corp.,948 where it was held that the inventors failed to
disclose unclaimed subject matter that was necessary for carrying out
the invention.949  In the present case, the inventor disclosed his
preference for using p-trifluoromethylphenol to make the claimed
invention but was not required to disclose the unclaimed method for
synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol.950  The court clarified its
holding by explaining that the best mode for carrying out the
claimed invention involves novel subject matter, and a method for
obtaining that subject matter regardless of whether it is claimed.951
Because p-trifluoromethylphenol was commercially available at the
time the patentee filed its application, he did not need to disclose a
method for synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol.952
                                                          
the only mode known, thereby making it the best mode, and acknowledging that it
was recognized as such by those skilled in the art).
942. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 984, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that no facts existed upon which a jury could
find that the investor had failed to meet the best mode requirement).
943. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
944. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
945. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
946. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (explaining why the best mode
requirement did not mandate disclosure in the case).
947. 860 F.2d 415, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
948. 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
949. See N. Telecom, 908 F.2d at 940-41, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1321 (agreeing
that the inventor knew that the best mode set forth in the application was not, in
fact, the best mode).
950. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 922 F.3d 973, 982, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing why there was no disclosure violation).
951. See Eli Lilly, 922 F.3d at 982, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (citing Applied
Med. Res. Corp. v. United States Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374, 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
952. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.  The Eli Lilly Court also distinguished
Clayton v. Akiba, 214 U.S.P.Q. 374, 381 (Bd. Pat. App. 1982), explaining that in
Clayton, the intermediate compound was “itself admittedly a novel compound . . .
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The Eli Lilly panel addressed the defendant’s second argument
regarding violation of the best-mode requirement, namely, that the
patentee had failed to disclose its preferred solvent for recrystallizing
the fluoxetine hydrochloride compound.953  The court again began its
inquiry with a review of the scope of the claimed invention stating
that the two claims at issue respectively covered the compound
fluoxetine hydrochloride and a method for administering it.954  The
court found no genuine issue that one of ordinary skill in the art
possessed the requisite knowledge to select a solvent for
recrystallizing fluoxetine hydrochloride, thus recrystallization served
as a routine detail that fell outside the scope of the best mode
disclosure.955  The court interpreted the defendant’s argument as one
that would require the patentee to disclose a preferred mode for
carrying out an unclaimed routine detail and flatly rejected the
argument as being in conflict with the scope of the claims at issue.956
Instead, the court stressed that the intent of Section 112, paragraph
one is to prohibit concealment of the best mode of practicing the
claimed invention.957  Finally, the court explained that section 112
requires only “an adequate disclosure of the best mode,” and that this
adequate disclosure requirement does not preclude some
experimentation.958
In Northern Telecom, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision that the inventors violated the best mode requirement.959
The court did so by holding that the lower court misunderstood the
invention at hand and erred in its determination as to the scope of
the claimed invention—the pivotal best-mode inquiry.960  The Federal
Circuit determined the scope of the claimed invention using the
standard claim-construction analysis.961  Like the panel in Eli Lilly, the
                                                          
and, thus, its preparation [was] part and parcel of ‘carrying out’ the invention.”  Eli
Lilly, 222 F.3d at 982, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (citations omitted).  In its
opinion, the court explained that p-trifluoromethylphenol was commercially
available and described in the prior art.  See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
953. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 983, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
954. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
955. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
956. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 983, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant’s contention also conflicted
with precedent and the purpose of the best mode requirement).
957. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
958. See id. at 984, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1025-26 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
959. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
960. See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1287-88, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
961. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
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court distinguished Dana Corp. and Northern Telecom.962  The court
explained that each of those cases involved a situation where the
patentee had omitted the best mode related directly to the claimed
invention.963  Unlike the present case, where the alleged omitted best
mode did not fall within the scope of the claims, in Dana Corp. and
Northern Telecom, the asserted best modes directly related to the
claimed utility of the invention and to a specific limitation in the
claims.964
J. Signature Requirement
In Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., the accused infringer
asserted that as a result of certain flaws in the application that led to
the patent-in-suit, the patent was invalid.965  The United States patent
originated from a Soviet Union Inventor’s Certificate.966  In
particular, the defendant argued that at least one of the inventors
had not personally signed the application, but that it had been signed
by another in the inventor’s absence with authorization.967  The
defendant argued that the inventor must sign the application, and
failure to do so rendered the patent invalid.968  The defendant further
asserted that the inventors could not fix this flaw in the application by
ratification.969  During the litigation, the patent owner submitted a
declaration signed by all fourteen inventors that stated the
application filings signed by others with authorization occurred as a
result of “lack of knowledge of the technical requirements of U.S.
patent law and was made without any deceptive intent.”970  The
defendant attacked this declaration through a handwriting expert,
and argued that at least six or seven of the signatures did not appear
to be authentic.971  The district court, which required clear and
convincing evidence of fraud or inequitable conduct to invalidate the
patent on the basis of failure to comply with the signature rules, ruled
that technical errors made without deceptive intent could not serve as
                                                          
962. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
963. See id. at 1288, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
964. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
965. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
966. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1332, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..
967. See id. at 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
968. See id. at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
969. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
970. Id. at 1344, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
971. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that comparing the
handwriting samples was difficult because they were written in different languages).
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the basis for holding the patent invalid or unenforceable.972
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding,
explaining that the “law does not bar the correction of defects when
the defect was not the product of fraud.”973  The Federal Circuit also
rejected the accused infringer’s argument that the district court
erroneously placed the burden of proof upon the party asserting
failure to comply with the signature requirement, and reiterated that
the burden of proving patent invalidity is upon the party who asserts
the defense.974
Furthermore, the court referred to the standard for inequitable
conduct when describing the burden associated with invalidating a
patent based on a flawed signature.  Relying on Kingsdown Medical
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,975 the court wrote that a moving party
must prove by clear and convincing evidence the defendant’s failure
to disclose or submission of false material information and an intent
to deceive.976  Thus, in the absence of deceptive intent, technical
defects in an application, such as the signature requirement, can be
cured and do not invalidate a patent.977
K. Indefiniteness
For a claim to satisfy the two requirements for compliance with
Section 112, paragraph 2, it must:  (1) explain what the “applicant
regards as his invention,” and (2) describe the invention with
“sufficient particularity and distinctness.”978
In Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,979 the Federal Circuit
considered whether the term “distance sufficient” defined the claim
with sufficient particularity and distinctness, where the patent
claimed a “mailer” with adhesive applied at a distance sufficient from
the edge of the paper to avoid interference with the printer rollers.980
The PTO examiner had rejected the “distance sufficient” term as
indefinite several times but ultimately allowed the claim.981  To obtain
                                                          
972. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (recounting the district court finding
that there was no deceptive intent present in the case).
973. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
974. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
975. 863 F.2d 867, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
976. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
977. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
978. Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1377, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2; IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT
PROSECUTION ch. 9.VIII, at 933 (2d ed. 1999)).
979. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
980. Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1099, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
981. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238 (noting that the examiner denied the
application because it was impossible to determine what distance was being claimed).
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allowance, the patentee had argued the term was a permissible
functional description.982  The district court held that the examiner
allowed the claim because the term was limited by a specific IBM
printer mentioned in the preferred embodiment portion of the
specification.983  Judge Michel, writing for the court, disagreed
because the examiner’s approval signified the “acceptance of the
‘distance sufficient’ limitation as functionally claimed and as properly
definite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2.”984  The court noted “that there is
nothing wrong with defining the dimensions of a device in terms of
the environment in which it is to be used.”
In Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,985 the court considered what
evidence may be evaluated when considering a patent’s compliance
with the “definiteness” requirement of Section 112.986  In reversing
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity on the
basis of indefiniteness, the court first reiterated that compliance with
Section 112, paragraph 2 creates a question of law reviewable de
novo.987
The district court had invalidated the patent based on evidence
from the inventor’s deposition testimony that contradicted
statements in the patent specification.988  The Federal Circuit
overruled the district court’s use of this evidence because an
inventor’s testimony obtained during litigation should not be relied
upon to invalidate claims under Section 112, paragraph 2.989  Basing
its holding on an interpretation of Section 112 requiring a claim to
be sufficiently definite, the court wrote:
Determining whether a claim is definite requires an analysis of
whether one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the
claim when read in light of the specification.  If the claims read in
light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the art
of the scope of the invention, § 112 demands no more.990
                                                          
982. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
983. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238 (referring to an IBM 3800 computer).
984. Id. at 1111, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.  Judge Newman disagreed with the
court’s claim construction and dissented.  Id. at 1118, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243
(Newman, J., dissenting).
985. 216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
986. See Solomon, 216 F.3d at 1377, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (finding that it
was inappropriate to consider evidence beyond the patent application).
987. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (citing Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage
Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
988. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
989. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
990. Id. at 1378, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (quoting Personalized Media
Communications, LLC v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1888
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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The court noted that disregarding the inventor’s testimony
obtained during litigation was consistent with the logic of Markman,
because in both the claim-construction context and the definiteness
context, the inventor is not competent to construe the claims.991  The
court has the duty to construe the claims; therefore the inventor’s
testimony has no probative value.992
The court further noted that extrinsic evidence is appropriate for
the PTO to review during the examination context because the
claims can be freely amended and an important function of patent
examinations includes insuring that claims are clear and accurate.993
The court also distinguished the evidence appropriate for the court
to consider in evaluating patentability as opposed to validity.994  The
focus of the definiteness inquiry is whether the claims adequately
notify the public of the patentee’s right to exclude.995  As such,
extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to the definiteness inquiry.996
L. Patent Ownership
“The general rule is that an individual owns the patent rights to the
subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived
it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment.”997  The
Federal Circuit has acknowledged two exceptions to the general rule.
First, an employer owns the rights to his invention if an express
contract creating that right exists; second, an employer may own the
invention if it hired the employee “to invent something or solve a
particular problem.”998  Although the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over disputes of patent ownership, the exceptions to the rule are
grounded in contract law, and as such are governed by state contract
                                                          
991. See Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 967, 985, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (other
internal citations omitted).
992. See Solomon, 216 F.3d at 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
993. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (“’[A]n essential purpose of the patent
examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous.’”)
(quoting In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
994. See id. at 1379, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
995. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (citing United Carbon Co. v. Binney &
Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233 (1942); 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.03, at 8-14
(1997)).
996. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (concluding that extrinsic evidence,
such as inventor testimony obtained in the context of litigation, has little, if any,
probative value and should not be considered in determining definitiveness).
997. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1224
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
998. See Banks, 228 F.3d at 1359, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
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principles.999
In Banks v. Unisys Corp.,1000 the Federal Circuit considered the issue
of patent ownership in the employer-employee context.  Gerald
Banks was hired as an expert by Unisys to work on the Image Camera
Project.1001  At the time of his hiring, he refused to sign a standard
agreement assigning all patent rights to Unisys.1002  On his own time
and at his own initiative, Banks developed several patentable
inventions for use with a high-speed document sorter.1003  Unisys,
without Banks’ knowledge, listed Banks as a co-inventor on three of
six patents that were received and based on Banks’ work.1004  The
district court granted summary judgment on the patent ownership
issue, agreeing with Unisys that Banks was “employed to invent,” and
therefore Unisys owned the rights to the patents.1005  Unisys argued
that the “employed to invent” exception does not require an express
agreement, and that an implied-in-fact contract existed between
Banks and Unisys under the “employed to invent” rule.1006  The
Federal Circuit disagreed.  Citing Banks’ refusal to sign the initial
employment agreement, as well as his refusal to sign a “Restricted
Information Obligation” form the last day of his employment, the
court found material issues of fact “about whether there was a
meeting of the minds necessary for an implied-in-fact contract.”1007
Therefore, the court reversed the lower court’s decision to grant
summary judgment.1008
M. Inequitable Conduct
Patent applicants and their legal representatives have a duty of
candor, good faith, and honesty in representations to the PTO
during prosecution of a patent application.1009  A breach of this duty is
                                                          
999. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224 (discussing the application of contract
principles to employee contracts where an employee is hired to invent).
1000. 228 F.3d 1357, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1001. See Banks, 228 F.3d at 1358, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1002. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1003. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (noting that the application of the
inventions involved the same principles as the image camera project).
1004. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (explaining that the subject matter of
the patent applications included optics designed by Banks).
1005. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1006. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1223
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding that the fact that Banks did not sign the agreement was
irrelevant).
1007. Banks, 228 F.3d at 1360, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1008. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1009. See Life Techs. v. Clontech Labs., 224 F.3d 1320, 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178,
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1999)).
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considered inequitable conduct, and a patent may be rendered
unenforceable on that basis.1010  “Inequitable conduct consists of
affirmative misrepresentations of material fact or the submission of
false material information during the prosecution of a patent, both
coupled with an intent to deceive the PTO.”1011  The determinations
of materiality and intent are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard.1012  Once the threshold levels of materiality and intent are
proven, it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine by
weighing the levels of materiality and intent if the principles of equity
require the conclusion that inequitable conduct has occurred.1013
The greater the showing of one factor, the lesser the required
showing of the other for a determination of inequitable conduct.1014
As to the standard of review, the Federal Circuit noted that it will only
overrule a lower court’s determination of inequitable conduct for an
abuse of discretion.1015
In Li Second Family Ltd. Partnership v. Toshiba Corp.,1016 the Federal
Circuit considered whether failure to disclose to the examiner a PTO
Board of Appeals decision that a related patent was not entitled to
the benefit of the earlier filing date of any of the patentee’s earlier
applications, constitutes inequitable conduct.1017  The Board had
determined that the earlier ‘758 application was not entitled to the
benefit of an earlier filing date in an appeal from the examiner’s
rejection of Li’s claim for the earlier filing date.1018  A different
examiner was responsible for the prosecution of the ‘102
                                                          
1010. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (citing
LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1070, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the effects of a breach of
the duty of candor, good faith, and honesty)).
1011. Id. at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (“Materiality and intent to deceive
are distinct factual inquiries, and each must be shown with clear and convincing
evidence.”) (internal citations omitted).
1012. See id. at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (discussing the standard of
review utilized by the Federal Circuit in reviewing district court inequitable-conduct
determinations).
1013. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
1014. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1378, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing N.V. Akzo v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours, 810 F.2d 1148, 1153, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
1015. See Life Techs. v. Clontech Labs., 224 F.3d 1320, 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“We must reverse a discretionary ruling of the district
court when it is premised upon clearly erroneous findings of fact or on a
misapplication or misinterpretation of applicable law, or evidences a serious error in
judgment.”) (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
1016. 231 F.3d 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1017. See Li Second Family, 231 F.3d at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685
(discussing Toshiba’s claim of inequitable conduct).
1018. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
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application—the application subject to the inequitable conduct
claim.1019  While Li did disclose a genealogy chart showing the parent
applications to the ‘102 application, he disclosed nothing more,
particularly the Board’s decision.1020  The Federal Circuit held that the
genealogy chart was not sufficient to disclose the Board’s decision
regarding the priority date of the ‘758 application.1021  Compounding
his problems was the fact that Li had repeatedly argued to the
examiner that the ‘102 patent application was entitled to the benefit
of the earlier filing date.1022
Turning to the materiality element, the Federal Circuit stated:
Because the effective filing date of each claim in a patent
application determines which references are available as prior art
for purposes of §§ 102 and 103, information regarding the effective
filing date is of the utmost importance to the examiner.
Consequently, an applicant’s misrepresentation that he is entitled
to the benefit of an earlier filing date is highly material.1023
The Federal Circuit noted that the information on the effective
filing date was highly material in this case because the earlier filing
date eliminated a reference specifically cited by the examiner.1024  The
Federal Circuit rejected Li’s argument that the reference was not
material to his patent application and that the application was
patentable even without the benefit of the earlier filing dates.1025  The
court observed that concealing information from the PTO may be
material regardless of whether it invalidated the patent.1026
A court need not base its finding of intent to deceive the PTO
solely on direct evidence, which is rarely available, and may instead
infer intent “from clear and convincing evidence of the surrounding
                                                          
1019. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (indicating that Examiner
Larkins processed the ‘758 application while Examiner Saba examined the ‘102
application).
1020. See id. at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1021. See id. at 1378-79, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (finding no error in the
district court’s determination of failure to provide adequate disclosure of the
previous Board decision).
1022. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1379, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the inconsistency between Li’s
statements to the examiner and the Board decision).
1023. Li Second Family, 231 F.3d at 1379-80, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
1024. See id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (noting that the eliminated
reference disclosed an important feature of the disputed invention).
1025. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (emphasizing the materiality of the
missing priority date information and not the missing reference and noting that if
the missing reference was at issue, it would have been material).
1026. Id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (remarking that “the test for
materiality is whether a reasonable examiner would have considered the information
important, not whether the information would conclusively decide the issue of
patentability.”) (internal citations omitted).
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circumstances.”1027  A court must weigh all evidence when
determining intent, including evidence of good faith.1028  In Li, the
court inferred intent from Li’s affirmative misrepresentations.1029  Li
argued that the inclusion of the patent reference in the genealogy
chart as well as his disclosure of the Board’s decision in a later filed
patent application was evidence of good faith and a lack of deceptive
intent.1030  The court disagreed and concluded that the district court
did not commit clear error in finding that Li intended to deceive the
PTO.  The court also found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding Li’s non-disclosure and misrepresentation
constituted inequitable conduct.1031
In Life Technologies, Inc. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc.,1032 the patentees
failed to disclose the key role of an article in the motivation and
development of their invention and that another inventor was
working with the technology involved with their invention.1033  The
inventors did disclose the Johnson article and even discussed it in the
written description of their patent application but did not disclose
their reliance on the article or how it motivated them.1034  In
evaluating the district court’s application of the law, the court wrote:
“Thus the district court determined that the manner in which the
inventors used a disclosed prior art reference is material information
and must be revealed to the PTO.  Because this factual finding was
premised upon a misapprehension of the legal standards of
patentability, it is clearly erroneous.”1035
Turning to materiality, the Federal Circuit found that an inventor’s
subjective motivations are immaterial because the courts apply an
objective standard from the perspective of an individual of ordinary
skill in the art.1036  The district court found that the inventors made
                                                          
1027. Id. at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1329, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1028. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1381, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1029. See Li Second Family, 231 F.3d at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (finding
the misrepresentations equivalent to deliberate concealment of the previous Board
decision).
1030. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1031. Id. at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1032. 224 F.3d 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1033. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1323-24, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188-89 (noting
patentees’ failure to disclose its reliance on the Johnson article and the fact that Goff
also applied the technology used in the invention at issue).
1034. See id. at 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189-90.
1035. Id. at 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
1036. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190 (“Because patentability is assessed from
the perspective of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art information
regarding the subjective motivations of inventors is not material.”).
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material misrepresentations regarding the Johnson article, thereby
rendering their patent obvious.1037  At the district court level, the
inventors argued that the Johnson article was irrelevant because a
person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable
expectation of success using Johnson’s teachings.  However, the
Federal Circuit characterized this exchange as follows: “In effect, the
[district] court determined that inventors could not truthfully argue
lack of reasonable expectation of success as a basis for non-
obviousness when they successfully used the prior art reference at
issue.”1038  The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
determination, believing the district court was impermissibly using
hindsight in its analysis.1039  The examiner was free to accept or reject
the inventors’ interpretation of the article.1040  Accordingly, the
district court committed clear error because the inventors made no
affirmative misrepresentations giving rise to a finding of inequitable
conduct.1041
With regard to the inventors’ knowledge of Goff’s work, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court’s determination that this
information was material also constituted clear error.1042  The
inventors knew only that Goff claimed to have reduced to practice a
similar invention and claimed to have presented the invention at a
conference they did not attend.1043  The inventors lacked specific and
definite information to prove Goff was a prior inventor.1044  Thus, the
court held that a reasonable examiner would not have considered the
information important in deciding whether to allow the application
to issue, which is the standard for materiality.1045  In fact, the inventors
disclosed the limits of their knowledge in a telephone conversation
with the examiner.1046  The examiner’s decision not to act on this
                                                          
1037. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
1038. Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1039. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (determining
that expectation of success cannot be inferred from the inventor’s eventual success).
1040. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (determining that advocacy of an
interpretation by the inventor does not lead to a finding of misrepresentation).
1041. See id. at 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (finding no clear error because
“the inventors’ non-obviousness arguments were not affirmative misrepresentations
and cannot give rise to a determination of inequitable conduct”).
1042. See id. at 1326-27, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (noting that the information
possessed by the inventors regarding Goff’s work was limited).
1043. See id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
1044. See Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1327, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1045. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1326-27, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
1046. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (“[T]he examiner stated the
information had ‘no bearing on the patents issued or the instant application.’”).
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information clearly showed a lack of materiality.1047
In Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.,1048 the defendant claimed that the
patentee had engaged in inequitable conduct by failing to disclose
material prior art during the prosecution of three patents.1049  Both
the patentee and his counsel acknowledged their familiarity with
much of the prior art cited by Bebop, however, they asserted that
(1) they had no intent to deceive the PTO; and (2) the prior art was
not material.1050  The Federal Circuit held that the trial court’s finding
of lack of intent was not clearly erroneous.1051  In addition, in order to
hold all three patents unenforceable due to an alleged pattern of
inequitable conduct, the court held that “we would have to find
inequitable conduct sufficient to hold at least one patent
unenforceable before considering whether to hold an entire group of
related patents unenforceable.”1052
In In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc.,1053 the Federal Circuit
reiterated the difference between inequitable conduct and common-
law or Walker Process fraud.1054  The court stated:
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Walker Process . . .
we have distinguished “inequitable conduct” from Walker Process
fraud, noting that inequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive
concept than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker
Process counterclaim . . . Inequitable conduct in fact is a lesser
offense than common law fraud, and includes types of conduct less
serious than “knowing and willful” fraud.1055
The court continued, elaborating on the differences between
Walker Process fraud and inequitable conduct:
A finding of Walker Process fraud requires higher threshold
showings of both intent and materiality than does a finding of
inequitable conduct.  Moreover, unlike a finding of inequitable
                                                          
1047. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (noting “such a strong statement
regarding the Goff information is highly probative of its immateriality”).
1048. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1049. See Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1258-59, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (stating that
the party alleging a patent unenforceable must show the failure to disclose material
information by an offering of clear and convincing evidence).
1050. Id. at 1259, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (noting that the district court
accepted the patentee’s arguments).
1051. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (finding the lack of intent was supported
at trial by adequate evidence).
1052. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
1053. 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1054. See Spalding Sports, 203 F.3d at 806-07, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752
(discussing whether privileged communications between inventor and attorney are
abrogated by the crime-fraud exception on a showing of inequitable conduct).
1055. Id. at 807, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752-53 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1098, 1105
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1561
conduct . . . a finding of Walker Process fraud may not be based upon
an equitable balancing of lesser degrees of materiality and intent.
Rather, it must be based on independent and clear evidence of
deceptive intent together with a clear showing of reliance, i.e., that
the patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or
omission.  Therefore, for an omission such as a failure to cite a
piece of prior art to support a finding of Walker Process fraud, the
withholding of the reference must show evidence of fraudulent
intent.  A mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO will not
suffice.1056
The court concluded that inequitable conduct alone does not
constitute common law fraud.1057  Wilson alleged that failure by
Spalding to disclose to a prior art reference in the invention record
constituted fraud.1058  The court held that Wilson’s allegation that
Spalding failed to cite a reference, without more, did not constitute a
prima facie showing of fraud.1059
In Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharmaceutical Corp.,1060 the Federal Circuit
reversed a jury finding of inequitable conduct, finding lack of
evidence of an intent to deceive.1061  MOVA alleged that Upjohn
misrepresented certain facts relating to experiments, withheld
adverse test data, and failed to ask the added inventors if they were
aware of any information relating to patentability.1062  As to the first
allegation, that Upjohn had misrepresented the content of tested
formulations, the court found no evidence of guilty intent.1063
MOVA’s second allegation claimed that the results from tests
conducted three years before the testing of the patented invention
were material, that Upjohn admitted having knowledge of the test,
and that from these facts a jury could infer intent to deceive.1064
                                                          
1056. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (quoting Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 1070-
71, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106-07).
1057. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
1058. See id. at 802, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (responding to a motion to
compel discovery of the invention record made by Wilson in a suit brought by
Spalding).
1059. Id. at 808, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (noting that in order to overcome the
attorney-client privilege, a party need not conclusively prove fraud, but that Wilson did
not show any evidence of intent to commit fraud).
1060. 225 F.3d 1306, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1061. See Upjohn, 225 F.3d at 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (stating that the
requirement of disclosure of material prior art does not require an inventor to
disclose his entire knowledge regarding the field of the invention).
1062. See id. at 1312-13, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
1063. Id. at 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 (“There was no evidence that the
content of the formulations was intentionally withheld.  The evidence before the jury
was not clear and convincing evidence of material withholding with culpable
intent. . . .”).
1064. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 (asserting that Upjohn failed to disclose
the prior tests knowing they would be “fatal to patentability”).
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Upjohn argued that the tests were immaterial because they dealt with
subject matter outside of the claims of the patent and that there was
no intent to deceive.1065  The Federal Circuit agreed with Upjohn,
holding that the failure to disclose the earlier tests “did not establish
intent to deceive, and that a reasonable jury’s verdict could not have
been based thereon.”1066  Finally, MOVA alleged that two of the newly
named inventors had knowledge regarding the invention and that
this knowledge should have been disclosed to the PTO.1067  Upjohn
stated that it disclosed in the specification the knowledge that MOVA
referred to in its allegation.1068  The Federal Circuit agreed, finding
no evidence of an intent to deceive.1069  In addition, the court stated
“[t]o require the inventor to describe his entire personal knowledge
in the field of the invention, however the knowledge was obtained,
would be an unmanageable assignment.  It is prior art that must be
disclosed, prior art that is material to patentability.”1070
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co.,1071 the defendant argued that
although the patentee had disclosed one item of prior art, the
examiner had not considered the art—as evidenced by the line drawn
through the reference by the examiner.1072  Hunt alleged the line
through the listed prior art imposed an obligation on Fiskars of
explaining the significance of that item.1073  The Federal Circuit
disagreed and asserted that an applicant cannot commit inequitable
conduct where he cites to the reference.1074  In addition, the court
held that Hunt failed to provide any evidence of intent, and that “the
inequitable conduct claim [was] ‘so lacking in substance as to
constitute a waste of the time and resources of all participants,’” and
merited sanctions.1075
                                                          
1065. See id. at 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93.
1066. Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1067. The original patent application did not properly disclose the true inventors.
Upon discovering the error Upjohn corrected the named inventors.
1068. See Upjohn, 225 F.3d at 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (noting the product
in question was commercially available).
1069. See id. at 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93.
1070. Id. at 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
1071. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1072. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (stating that the
examiner manuals require the drawing of a line through a reference that is not to be
considered).
1073. Id. at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (explaining that Hunt argued “that
this placed on Fiskars the obligation to stress to the examiner the relevance of [the
prior art]”).
1074. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (“An applicant cannot be guilty of
inequitable conduct if the reference was cited to the examiner[.]”).
1075. Id. at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577-78.
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In Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,1076 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding of no inequitable
conduct.1077  The district court determined that withheld test data was
not material, that there was no evidence of intent to deceive, and that
Unocal had acted in good faith during the prosecution of the
patent.1078  The Federal Circuit agreed, finding neither clear error nor
abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding of no inequitable
conduct.1079
In Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,1080 the
Federal Circuit considered the patentee’s submission of a foreign
language reference along with a one-page partial translation to the
PTO.1081  The court found no clear error in the district court’s
holding that the reference was not cumulative and established a prima
facie case of unpatentability, therefore making the reference
material.1082  Intent presented a more difficult issue because the
patentee had submitted the entire untranslated reference to the
PTO, which the patentee offered as evidence of good faith.1083  In
addition, the patentee noted that the PTO rules do not require the
patentee to submit a translated version of foreign references.1084  The
district court nonetheless held that the patentee had willfully
misrepresented the reference, and the Federal Circuit agreed.1085  The
district court found that the inventor, Dr. Yamazaki, knew the
materiality of the reference because he could read Japanese.1086  The
district court also believed that Dr. Yamazaki failed to provide a more
complete translation because he knew from his experience with
patent prosecution that it would decrease Semiconductor’s ability to
obtain the patent.1087  “The district court thus concluded that Dr.
                                                          
1076. 208 F.3d 989, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1077. See Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1002, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236 (describing the
district court opinion as “thorough and well reasoned”).
1078. See id. at 1001-02, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235-36 (noting that a district court
opinion will not be overturned without a finding of abuse of discretion).
1079. Id. at 1002, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
1080. 204 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1081. See Semiconductor Energy, 204 F.3d at 1371-72, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003
(noting that the original reference consisted of a twenty-nine page document in
Japanese).
1082. See id. at 1374, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (detailing the basis for the
district court’s findings).
1083. See id. at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
1084. See id. at 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1085. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (noting that the district court found the
Semiconductor’s witnesses to be uncredible).
1086. See Semiconductor Energy Lab Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368,
1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the inventor’s
native language was Japanese).
1087. See Semiconductor Energy, 204 F.3d at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006
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Yamazaki must have consciously decided which sections to reveal to
the PTO through [Semiconductor’s] partial translation.”1088
Semiconductor (“SEL”) pointed to its technical compliance with
37 C.F.R. § 1.98 in providing the foreign language reference in its
defense.1089  However, the court noted that “Rule 98 provides neither
a safe harbor nor a shield against allegations of inequitable
conduct.”1090  In addition, the court stated:
By submitting the entire untranslated Canon reference to the PTO
along with a one-page, partial translation focusing on less material
portions and a concise statement directed to these less material
portions, SEL left the examiner with the impression that the
examiner did not need to conduct any further translation or
investigation.  Thus, SEL deliberately deceived the examiner into
thinking that the Canon reference was less relevant than it really
was, and constructively withheld the reference from the PTO.
SEL’s submission hardly satisfies the duty of candor required of
every applicant before the PTO.1091
Finally, the court noted that SEL’s argument—that the patent
office should not require the translation of all foreign references into
English by the applicant—missed the point.1092  “The duty of candor
does not require that the applicant translate every foreign reference,
but only that the applicant refrain from submitting partial
translations and concise explanations that it knows will misdirect the
examiner’s attention from the reference’s relevant teaching.”1093
Therefore, the court found no clear error with the district court’s
finding on materiality and intent and no abuse of discretion with its
holding of inequitable conduct.1094
In PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc.,1095 the Federal
Circuit considered the materiality of falsehoods and omissions to the
                                                          
(observing the inventor’s vast experience in the prosecution of patents and his
understanding of the contents of the entire reference).
1088. Id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
1089. See id. at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (arguing that technical
compliance with patent manuals should be taken into consideration when gauging
intent to deceive).
1090. Id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1091. Id. at 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1092. See Semiconductor Energy Lab Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368,
1378, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (referring to the inclusion of
the partial translation as an attempt to mask the contents of a full translation).
1093. Semiconductor Energy, 204 F.3d at 1378, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1094. See id. at 1378, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (holding the patent to be
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct).
1095. 225 F.3d 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Two of the
authors were counsel to Pharmacia Biotech in this case.
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1565
PTO regarding inventorship.1096  The district court held that the
patentees demonstrated a “persistent course of material
representations, omissions, and half-truths to the PTO . . . on
inventorship.”1097  The court noted that the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (hereinafter “MPEP”) “specifically notes that
information about inventorship is material under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56[.]”1098  PerSeptive argued that the district court erred in
concluding that others should have been named as joint inventors to
the patent, and that the claims had been narrowed during
prosecution, curing any inventorship problem with the application.1099
The Federal Circuit viewed PerSeptive’s arguments as missing the
point:
First, whether the inventorship of the patents as issued is correct
does not determine the materiality of the statements in this case,
just as whether concealed prior art would actually invalidate the
patent is irrelevant to materiality.  Second, the materiality of
intentional false statements may be independent of the claims of
the patent.1100
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit stated that “the issue is not
inventorship per se, but misinformation about inventorship.”1101  The
inventor’s falsehoods, misrepresentations and omissions all dealt with
inventorship, a material issue.1102  Therefore, the inventors engaged in
inequitable conduct, and the patents are unenforceable.1103
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman stated that “the court
cannot ignore the correct inventorship, for when inventorship is
correctly viewed as directed to that which is claimed, the information
that the district court held should have been disclosed to the
examiner is not material.”1104  In addition, Judge Newman believed
                                                          
1096. See PerSeptive, 225 F.3d at 1319-20, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04.
1097. Id. at 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (quoting PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v.
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Mass. 1998)).
1098. Id. at 1321, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (detailing rules of inventorship to be
used by examiners and noting that disputes regarding inventorship are material, and
the duty to disclose requires careful consideration on the part of applicants) (citing
MPEP § 2001.06(c) and § 2004).
1099. See id. at 1321-22, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005-06 (arguing that error in
naming of inventors originally eliminates the later finding of inequitable conduct).
1100. Id. at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (internal citations omitted).
1101. PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, 225 F.3d 1315, 1322, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1102. See PerSeptive, 225 F.3d at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (finding no
error in the district court’s decision regarding materiality).
1103. See id. at 1322-23, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (upholding the district
court’s finding of five specific instances of falsehoods, misrepresentations, and
omissions and finding no evidence that the district court abused its discretion).
1104. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
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the “acts with which the panel majority impeaches the named
inventors are overstated if not irrelevant.  By no stretch do they
represent clear and convincing evidence of material omission or
misrepresentation with intent to deceive the examiner as to
inventorship.”1105
N. Certificates of Correction
Section 254 of the Patent Act, entitled “Certificate of correction of
Patent and Trademark Office mistake,” provides:
Whenever a mistake in a patent, incurred through the fault of the
Patent and Trademark Office, is clearly disclosed by the records of
the Office, the Director may issue a certificate of correction stating
the fact and nature of such mistake, under seal, without charge, to
be recorded in the records of patents. A printed copy thereof shall
be attached to each printed copy of the patent, and such certificate
shall be considered as part of the original patent. Every such
patent, together with such certificate, shall have the same effect
and operation in law on the trial of actions for causes thereafter
arising as if the same had been originally issued in such corrected
form. The Director may issue a corrected patent without charge in
lieu of and with like effect as a certificate of correction.1106
In Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc.,1107 the Federal Circuit
considered for the first time the effect of a correction issued
subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit.  Southwest, the patentee, had
obtained a certificate of correction from the PTO in order to add the
Program Printout Appendix (which the PTO mistakenly omitted) to
the patent.1108  However, the lawsuit against Harlequin was filed two
years before the certificate of correction was issued.1109  The Federal
Circuit held that “the certificate of correction that added the
Program Printout Appendix is not to be given effect in this pre-
certificate lawsuit” and that it “is only effective for causes of action
arising after it was issued.”1110  Judge Schall, writing for the court,
concluded that after the PTO issues the certificate, a court should
consider it as part of the original application in subsequent causes of
                                                          
1105. Id. at 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
1106. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
1107. 226 F.3d 1280, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1108. See id. at 1287 n.6, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1166 n.6 (noting that another
certificate of correction had been issued previously for the ’257 patent, and inserted
a missing comma).
1109. See id. at 1293, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1171.  Southwest filed its lawsuit against
Harlequin on January 20, 1995, but the PTO did not issue the certificate of
correction until April 1, 1997.  See id.
1110. Id. at 1294, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (recognizing that this holding was
based upon an interpretation of the language of § 254).
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action.1111
The Harlequin court rejected a Third Circuit decision, Eagle Iron
Works v. McLanahan Corp.,1112 issued before the Federal Circuit came
into being, which interpreted the same language in a sister statute, 35
U.S.C. § 255, in the opposite manner.1113  The court rejected that
prior decision because the Federal Circuit had not adopted Third
Circuit precedent,1114 and because the Eagle Iron Works court did not
explain its holding with respect to the certificate-of-correction
issue.1115  The Federal Circuit thus held that the patent without the
certificate of correction may be invalid for purposes of the lawsuit,
and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the
patent’s validity without the certificate of correction.1116  However, the
court noted that any invalidity due to the missing Program Printout
Appendix ceased upon the issuance of the certificate of correction.1117
O. Inventorship
A patent application must name all of the actual inventors and only
the actual inventors.1118  Section 102(f) of the Patent Act states that
“[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself
invent the subject matter sought to be patented . . . .”1119  The Federal
Circuit, relying upon a leading treatise, has explained section 102(f)
in the following manner:
[Section 102(f)] bars issuance of a valid patent to a person or
persons who derive the conception of the invention from any other
source or person.  A corollary of this requirement is the rule of
                                                          
1111. See Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1295, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the language of
§ 254 mandated that in causes of action arising after the issuance of a certificate of
correction, the patent together with the certificate, should be given the same effect
and operation in law as if the same had been issued originally in such corrected
form).
1112. 429 F.2d 1375, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 225 (3d Cir. 1970).
1113. See Harlequin, 226 F.3d at 1296, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (rejecting the
reasoning of Eagle Iron Works in supporting Southwest’s claim against Harlequin).
1114. See id. at 1296, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (citing Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 672, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
1991), which found that decisions of other circuit courts are not binding for matters
within its exclusive subject matter jurisdiction).
1115. See id. at 1297, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (concluding that the effectiveness
of the certificate of correction was not supported by the language of 35 U.S.C. § 255).
1116. See id.
1117. See id. (reasoning that any causes of action arising after the date the
certificate of correction was issued will treat the certificate, including the Program
Printout Appendix, as part of the original patent, thus eliminating a finding of
invalidity based on the absence of the Program Printout Appendix).
1118. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2001).
1119. Id.
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proper joinder of inventors.  The rule operates both as to
misjoinder (erroneous addition of a person who is not in fact a
joint inventor) and as to nonjoinder (failure to add a joint
inventor).  Potentially, misjoinder and nonjoinder are as fatal to
the validity of a patent (or the effectiveness of a filed application)
as a case of complete inventorship error.1120
A patent may be held invalid if a party proves, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the patentee failed to comply with section
102(f).1121  The operation of the corrective process in 35 U.S.C. § 256
may help to save the patent from invalidity.1122
In Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,1123 the Federal Circuit held that
Kimberly-Clark had failed to prove the patent invalid under § 102(f)
by clear and convincing evidence.1124  Kimberly-Clark asserted that,
based upon the inventor’s deposition testimony, either the named
inventor was not the true inventor or someone else (perhaps
Solomon’s patent attorney) should have been joined as an
inventor.1125  In finding that Kimberly-Clark failed to prove the
assertions by clear and convincing evidence,1126 the Federal Circuit
also noted that the suggestion that Solomon’s attorney was the true
inventor was misguided.1127  However, the court found the fact that
the attorney did not assume the role of inventor was not a ground for
invalidating the patent.1128
                                                          
1120. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 2.03, at 2-40 & nn.1-2; Solomon v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1121. See Pannu v. Idolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1349, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657,
1661 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (applying the “clear and convincing” standard where
nonjoinder in patent cases and where nonjoinder of parties is not at issue); see also
Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279,
1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying the “clear and convincing” standard as set forth in
Pannu).
1122. See Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1350, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (stating that
whenever a person is named or not named in error in an issued patent, the involved
parties and assignees may use the remedies available under 35 U.S.C. § 256 to correct
the error and save the patent from invalidity).
1123. 216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1124. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (agreeing that the district court
correctly held that Kimberly-Clark failed to introduce clear and convincing evidence
that the claims were invalid under Section 102(f)).
1125. See id. at 1381-82, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (noting that although
Solomon’s testimony was vague and inconsistent at times, she steadfastly maintained
that she was the inventor and submitted evidence demonstrating that her prototype
was the foundation of the invention).
1126. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (finding Solomon’s evidence
compelling while there was a total absence of evidence in support of Kimberly-Clark’s
assertion that Solomon was not the inventor).
1127. See id. at 1382, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (clarifying that the attorney
should not be a competitor of the client or an inventor).
1128. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (suggesting that Kimberly-Clark failed to
understand the proper role of a patent attorney).
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1569
In Environ Products, Inc. v. Furon Co.,1129 the Federal Circuit affirmed
a jury finding regarding the true inventor in a dispute among three
parties.1130  Two patents were issued, another application was pending
for the same invention and all three applications had been co-
pending in the PTO. 1131  The trial dealt with the limited issue of
inventorship, in the context of an invalidity defense to Environ’s
infringement suit.1132  The district court accorded the asserted patent
the presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 and required
Furon to prove inventorship by clear and convincing evidence.1133
The Federal Circuit began by noting that the burden is on the junior
applicants to establish prior invention by a preponderance of the
evidence in a PTO administrative hearing.1134  Likewise, a district
court proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 2911135 also would have required
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.1136
The issue, then, was the appropriate burden to place on the
alleged infringer when inventorship is raised as an invalidity
defense.1137  The Federal Circuit held that the standard of proof
should not vary based upon the context of the suit.  As between co-
pending interfering patents, the junior patentee bears the burden, by
a preponderance of the evidence, of pleading and proving priority.1138
Although the district court erred, the error was harmless because the
jury had determined Environ was the inventor by a preponderance of
evidence, precluding any finding that Furon was also the inventor
under the preponderance of the evidence standard.1139
                                                          
1129. 215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1130. See id. at 1267, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043 (affirming the jury verdict and
remanding for further proceedings based on a finding of harmless error).
1131. See id. at 1265, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
1132. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042 (noting that “the challenge to
inventorship was raised as an invalidity defense to Environ’s charge of
infringement . . . under 35 U.S.C. § 271” rather than pursuant to §§ 291 and 282).
1133. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
1134. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (“In a interference . . . a junior party
shall have the burden of establishing priority by a preponderance of the evidence.”)
(citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.657(b) (1998) and Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 685-86, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1135. See 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1994) (“The owner of an interfering patent may have
relief against the owner of another by civil action, and the court may adjudge the
question of the validity of any of the interfering patents. . . .”).
1136. See Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 1265, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1038, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble
Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 914, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1137. See id. at 1266, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (recognizing that this issue arises
in the instances where patent applications are co-pending).
1138. See id. at 1266 n.4, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042 n.4 (stating that this standard
of proof does not apply to other questions that may be in dispute).
1139. See id. at 1266-67, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043 (finding the error harmless
because the error in weight of proof terminology in the instructions would not have
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In PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc.,1140 the Federal
Circuit considered the materiality of falsehoods and omissions to the
PTO regarding inventorship.  The district court held that the acts by
the patentees demonstrated a “persistent course of material
misrepresentations, omissions, and half-truths to the PTO . . . on
inventorship.”1141  The court observed that the MPEP “specifically
notes that information about inventorship is material under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56.”1142  PerSeptive argued that the district court erred in
concluding that other parties should have been named as joint
inventors to the patent, and the fact that the claims had been
narrowed during prosecution thereby cured any inventorship
problem with the application.1143  The Federal Circuit believed the
arguments missed the point:
First, whether the inventorship of the patents as issued is correct
does not determine the materiality of the statements in this case,
just as whether concealed prior art would actually invalidate the
patent is irrelevant to materiality.  Second, the materiality of
intentional false statements may be independent of the claims of
the patent.1144
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit’s key concern was misinformation
about inventorship, rather than inventorship per se.1145  The inventor’s
inequitable conduct, consisting of falsehoods, misrepresentations and
omissions concerning inventorship—a material issue—rendered the
patents unenforceable.1146
Judge Newman’s dissent noted that when inventorship was viewed
as directed to that which is claimed, the information that the district
court believed should have been disclosed to the examiner was
immaterial.1147  In addition, Judge Newman believed that the majority
                                                          
changed the result).
1140. 225 F.3d 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  As noted above,
two of the authors were counsel to Pharmacia Biotech in this case.  See supra note
1101.
1141. Id. at 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (quoting PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v.
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Mass. 1998)).
1142. See id. at 1321, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (citing MPEP §§ 2001.06(c),
2004).
1143. See id. at 1321-22, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006.
1144. Id. at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (internal citations omitted).
1145. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (affirming the district court’s opinion
finding no clear error in the materiality of the named inventors’ actions).
1146. See PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s
holding).
1147. See id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010 (Newman, J., dissenting) (taking
issue with the majority’s conclusion that PerSpective neglected to challenge the district
court’s finding of material misrepresentation and deceptive intent).
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treated the named inventors too harshly under the facts of the case
because there was not clear and convincing evidence that the
inventors’ acts constituted a “material omission or misrepresentation
with intent to deceive the examiner as to inventorship.”1148
P. Double Patenting
The judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double
patenting embodies the legislative limitation on the duration of a
patentee’s right to exclude others from practicing a claimed
invention in order to prevent extensions on exclusive rights through
claims in a subsequent patent that are not patentably distinct from
those in the earlier patent.1149  In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories,
Inc., the Federal Circuit held a claim invalid under this doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting. 1150
The obviousness-type double patenting inquiry, like many patent-
based inquiries, requires a two-step analysis.  First, the court construes
the claim in the earlier patent and the claim in the later patent, and
makes a determination as to whether the later claim encompasses the
subject matter of the earlier claim.1151  The second part of the inquiry
requires the court to determine whether the differences in subject
matter between the two claims renders the claims patentably
distinct.1152  Consistent with this analysis, the court began by
construing claims of the earlier and later patents.1153  After construing
the claims, the court addressed and rejected the patentee’s argument
that the subject matter of the later claim would not be obvious to one
of ordinary skill in the art.1154  The court explained that obviousness-
type double patenting is more concerned with the inventions that
claims define than with what one skilled in the art would
                                                          
1148. See id. at 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
1149. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 985, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also In re Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 943-44, 214 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 761, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Schenller, 397 F.2d 350, 380, 158 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 210, 284 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (acknowledging the principle underlying
obviousness-type double patenting is to prevent unjustified timewise extension of the
“right to exclude” that a patent grants).
1150. See Eli Lilly Co., 222 F.3d at 988, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (holding
invalid Lilly’s attempt to extend term of exclusivity for an additional nine years
beyond the statutory term).
1151. See id. at 985, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (citing Georgia-Pac. Corp. v.
United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1593
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 972 F.2d 1272, 1279,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1152. See id. (citing Georgia-Pac. Corp., 195 F.3d at 1327, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1595; Gen. Foods Corp., 972 F.2d at 1279, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844).
1153. See id. at 985-86, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617-18.
1154. See id. at 986, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618.
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recognize.1155
In addition, the court distinguished two of its prior decisions, In re
Baird1156 and In re Jones,1157 in which the court held that a species claim
is not necessarily obvious in light of a prior-art disclosure of a
genus.1158  In the present case, the same party claimed a genus in an
earlier patent and then claimed a species in a later patent, while in
Baird  and Jones, the prior art “merely disclosed a genus” and a
subsequent patent claimed a species.1159  The court explained further
that because the earlier patent broadly disclosed and claimed the
right to exclude others from administering any of thousands of
compounds for the treatment of depression, the patentee could not,
now that the earlier patent had expired, disavow its earlier broad
disclosure and claims to argue that the selected class of compounds
would not have been obvious.1160
The court continued its analysis, explaining that it had construed
the respective claims and determined that the earlier claim covered
the use of fluoxetine hydrochloride claimed in the later claim.1161  In
the second prong of the inquiry, the court held that the differences
between the claims were not patentably distinct as past precedent had
already established that a “later genus is not patentable over an
earlier genus claim.”1162
In early 2001, the Federal Circuit accepted a petition for rehearing
en banc in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.1163  The en banc court
vacated the panel’s original decision and reassigned the opinion to
the panel for the purpose of revising the section concerning double
patenting.1164  The panel reaffirmed that the claim at issue was invalid
due to obviousness-type double patenting, using a different analysis
to reach the same result.1165  Specifically, the panel re-phrased the first
step of the two-step analysis employed in an obviousness-type double
                                                          
1155. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618 (quoting In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005,
1013, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 474, 481 (C.C.P.A. 1964)).
1156. 16 F.3d 380, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1157. 958 F.2d 347, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1158. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 986, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1159. See id. at 986, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1160. See id. at 986-87, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618-19 (discussing the “expansive
right of exclusivity,” the “written description requirement” and the “enablement
requirement” of patent claims).
1161. See id. at 987, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (indicating that the court would
proceed to resolve the issue of whether the two claims were patently distinct).
1162. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (citations omitted).
1163. See 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1164. See id. at 958, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (reaffirming the district court’s
determination of the issue of best mode).
1165. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
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patenting case.1166  Focusing on a different earlier patent than in the
original opinion, the court concluded that “[T]he only difference
between claim 1 of the ‘213 patent and claim 7 of the ‘549 patent is
that the former addresses a method of treating anxiety in humans
with fluoxetine hydrochloride while the latter claims a method of
using fluoxetine hydrochloride to block serotonin uptake in
animals.”1167
After determining the differences between the claims, the court
proceeded to the next step, resolving whether the differences
rendered the claims patently distinct.1168  On this point, the court
concluded that the inhibition of sertonin uptake is a natural result of
the administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride.1169  As a result, “the
limitation of claim 7 of the ‘549 patent directed to blocking serotonin
uptake by use of fluoxetine hydrochloride is an inherent
characteristic of the administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride for
any purpose, including the treatment of anxiety.”1170  Thus, the earlier
claim anticipated the later claim and no patentable distinction
existed.1171  Lastly, the court noted that the fact that the later claim
was directed to animals rather than humans was not a patentable
distinction, as humans are a species of the animal genus.1172
Judge Newman dissented from the court’s refusal to consider the
case en banc.1173  Judge Newman believed that the law of double
patenting should be limited to the situation where “neither patent is
prior art against the other, usually because they have a common
priority date.”1174  Therefore, Judge Newman concluded that the law
of double patenting could not be applicable in this case because the
‘213 patent was filed nine years after the effective filing date of the
now invalid ‘549 patent.1175  In addition, the ‘549 patent was listed as
                                                          
1166. See id. at 968, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878 (“First as a matter of law, a court
construes the claim in the earlier patent and the claim in the later patent and
determines the differences.” (quoting Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
1167. Id. at 969, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1168. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1169. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 970, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (analyzing evidence submitted by Barr Laboratories).
1170. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1171. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (finding factual similarities between the
present case and Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
1172. See id. at 971, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (reciting the principle that later
genus claim is anticipated by an earlier species claim and not patently distinct)
(citations omitted).
1173. See id. at 972, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1174. Id. at 973, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (Newman, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the en banc panel misapplied and misstated the law of double patenting).
1175. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 973, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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prior art against the ‘213 patent.1176  Ultimately, Judge Newman
concluded that the panel erred in holding that ‘213 claim that was
issued prior to the ‘549 claim but filed nine years later rendered the
‘549 claim obvious.1177
Q. Subject Matter (Plants)
In Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc.1178 the Federal
Circuit considered whether plants and seeds for new varieties of
hybrid and inbred corn are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The
district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
noting that in the past fifteen years, the Patent and Trademark Office
had granted patents on new and unobvious varieties of seed-grown
plants.1179  The defendants argued that seeds and seed-grown plants
are not protectable under Section 101 of the Patent Act because
Congress provided for protection of this subject matter under the
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).1180  The Federal Circuit, in
ruling on an interlocutory appeal, affirmed the district court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.1181
The Pioneer court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,1182 where the Court concluded that Congress
intended the statute to encompass a broad subject matter.1183  Hence,
the district court held that an individual who develops a new plant
variety may “have recourse to patenting under Title 35 or to
registration under the PVPA.”1184  In fact, Pioneer held both a patent
on the plants and a certificate under the PVPA.1185  The court noted
that the PVPA does not remove seeds and seed-grown plants from the
patent statute because the conflicting laws do not invalidate either
statute.1186  Seeds and seed–grown plants are patentable under Section
                                                          
1865, 1867 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1176. See id. at 974, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
1177. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867 (Newman, J., dissenting) (finding
insufficient support for the majority’s conclusion).
1178. 200 F.3d 1374, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1179. See id. at 1376, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (citing the district court opinion
in In re Hubbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985)).
1180. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (citing the Plant Variety Protection Act,
7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (1970)).
1181. See Pioneer, 200 F.3d at 1375, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1182. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
1183. See id.
1184. Id. at 1377, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.
1185. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374,
1378, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (comparing the application
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 7 U.S.C. § 2321).
1186. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (reasoning that the two statutes merely
create different rights and obligations).
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101 of the Patent Act.1187
III. INFRINGEMENT
A person infringes a valid and enforceable U.S. patent when he
makes, sells, offers for sale, or imports, without authorization, any
patented invention within the United States during the term of the
patent.1188  The Federal Circuit has established a two-step analysis for
determining when infringement has occurred.1189  First, the claim
must be properly interpreted (“construed”) to determine its meaning
and scope.1190  Second, a court should compare the properly
construed claim to the accused product to determine whether the
accused product contains every element of the properly construed
claim.1191
A. Claim Construction
At least since 1995, it has been clear that, as a matter of law, the
interpretation and construction of patent claims is reserved
exclusively for the court.1192  As a consequence, the Federal Circuit
reviews questions of claim construction de novo, without the
requirement of any deference to the district judge below who initially
construed the claim.1193  Nevertheless, the standard of de novo review
does not require the court of appeals to ignore the district court.
Former Chief Judge Archer, author of the Markman decision and two
other recent Federal Circuit opinions, stressed that this de novo review
requires careful consideration of the trial court’s work.1194  In other
words, the Federal Circuit will give as much respect to a district
court’s claim construction as it deserves, but it also signals that the
judges of the Federal Circuit will not, under the guise of de novo
appellate review, rigidly ignore what has occurred in the district
court.
                                                          
1187. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443 (holding patentable subject matter under
Section 101 includes seed and seed-grown matter).
1188. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (defining patent infringement).
1189. See, e.g., Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836,
1838 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
1190. See id.
1191. See id.
1192. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (1996).
1193. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (affirming the
district court’s decision upon de novo review).
1194. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 20, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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For example, in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,1195 the Federal
Circuit insisted that to interpret an asserted claim, a court must first
examine the intrinsic evidence on the record, including the patent
itself, the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history.1196
While there is a “hierarchy among the intrinsic evidence,”1197 claim
construction takes on a special and primary function, for it is through
the claim language that the patent applicant must “distinctly claim[]”
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”1198
Thus, in some cases, the Federal Circuit has described the analysis of
intrinsic evidence as “begin[ning] with the claim language itself,” and
utilizing the “ordinary and accustomed” understanding of the claim
term as a presumptive, “default meaning”:
The claim term’s ordinary and accustomed meaning initially serves
as a default meaning because the patentee may act as a
lexicographer and ascribe a different, or modified, meaning to the
term.  The court, therefore, must examine a patent’s specification
and prosecution history to determine whether the patentee has
given the term an unconventional meaning.  If the patentee has
not done so, the term’s ordinary and customary meaning
controls.1199
Similarly, the court in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve,
Inc.1200 recognized that where the claim language is facially clear, an
evaluation must look only at whether other aspects of the intrinsic
evidence deviate from the clear language of the claims.1201  A
deviation may be necessary in instances when a patentee decides to
be his own lexicographer and uses terms in a context outside their
ordinary meaning or in circumstances in which the patentee, by
amendment or through argument to distinguish or overcome a
reference, renders untenable a potential claim construction.1202
In the rare instance where the intrinsic evidence (claims,
specification, and prosecution history) does not yield a firm
construction of the claim at issue, only then may courts turn to
                                                          
1195. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1196. See id. at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 979,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1329).
1197. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 865, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying a hierarchical analysis to
the intrinsic evidence in Vitronics).
1198. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
1199. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
1200. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1201. See id. at 865, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
1202. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
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extrinsic evidence as a claim-construction tool.1203  The roles of the
different types of intrinsic evidence, as well as the roles that extrinsic
evidence and certain canons of construction may play in claim
interpretation are discussed below.
1. Claim language
Claim construction starts with the actual words of the claim.1204  A
claim term should be given its “ordinary meaning” unless the
specification or the prosecution history indicates otherwise.1205
Consistent with the Federal Circuit’s increasing use of presumptions
in claim construction inquiries, some cases explicitly invoke “a ‘heavy
presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language.’”1206
However, it is not entirely clear where to obtain the ordinary
meaning of a term appearing in a fully integrated patent document.
Despite the fact that patents should be interpreted from the vantage
point of the ordinarily skilled professional,1207 the overwhelming trend
in recent Federal Circuit cases is to find the ordinary meaning of
claim terms in general-purpose dictionaries, and to treat that
dictionary definition as controlling unless the specification or
prosecution history of the patent provides a basis for overcoming the
heavy presumption in favor of the dictionary definition.1208  Despite
                                                          
1203. See, e.g., Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1204. See Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1814, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1205. See Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1427, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1206. Kraft Foods, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817 (quoting
Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1207. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1650, 1654-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“‘As a general rule, the construing court
interprets words in a claim as one of skill in the art at the time of invention would
understand them.’” (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
114 F.3d 1547, 1555, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1997))); Hockerson-
Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1487, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“As a starting point, the court gives claim terms their
ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art.”); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1380, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although we recognize that ‘which the applicant
regards as his invention’ is subjective language, . . . once the patent issues, the claims
and written description must be viewed objectively, from the standpoint of a person
of skill in the art.”); see also Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214
F.3d 1302, 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that when
a patentee chooses to be his own lexicographer by redefining a term in the
specification, “the written description in such a case must clearly redefine a claim
term ‘so as to put a reasonable competitor or one reasonably skilled in the art on
notice that the patentee intended to so redefine that claim term.’” (quoting Process
Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029,
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
1208. See, e.g., Vanguard Prod. Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 234 F.3d 1370, 1372,
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the trend toward consulting ordinary, general-purpose dictionaries to
obtain the ordinary meanings of a claim term, the Federal Circuit
normally treats dictionaries as extrinsic evidence—but views them as a
special kind of extrinsic evidence.1209  Thus, the court frequently has
warned against giving dictionaries excessive weight in claim
construction so as to avoid converting dictionary definitions into
technical terms of art that have legal significance.1210  The best source
for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it
arose, and if necessary, information from the prosecution history.1211
Furthermore, the court has warned that, although it is permissible to
consult dictionaries to determine the meaning of certain claim terms,
the courts should not employ this practice if the dictionary defintion
contradicts any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the
patent documents.1212  It is important to note the difficulty in
reconciling the notion that dictionaries cannot contradict the
intrinsic evidence, with the approach of giving claim language a
presumptive, dictionary meaning before consulting the remainder of
the intrinsic evidence.1213
In 2000, the Federal Circuit continued its trend of increasing use
of dictionaries for claim construction in a number of its published
decisions.  In Vanguard Products Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp.,1214 the
panel majority held that a claim for a gasket requiring two “integral”
layers was properly construed using the dictionary defintion of
                                                          
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the district court’s
finding that the ‘854 patent uses the term “integral” in its ordinary dictionary
meaning and finding no evidence contrary to this interpretation in the specifications
or prosecution history); Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1356, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734, 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting the meaning of the term
“plate” directly from WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 901 (1990));
Optical Disk Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the dictionary definition provides the
ordinary meaning of a term).
1209. See Vanguard Prod. Corp., 234 F.3d at 1372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1089 (insisting
that a dictionary is permissible as extrinsic evidence but should not broaden the
scope of a term when the specification or prosecution history show that the inventor,
or the common usage in the field of the invention, have given the term a limited or
specialized meaning).
1210. See Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that dictionary definitions are
relied upon as they are often viewed as the least controversial source of extrinsic
evidence).
1211. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433 (explaining that meanings that evolve
during claim restriction and examination reveal intent of the inventor and the
patent examiner).
1212. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 866 n.*, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1653 n.*(Fed. Cir. 2000).
1213. See id. at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1214. 234 F.3d 1370, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  One of the
authors was counsel to Parker Hannifin Corporation in this case.
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“integral.”1215  The court reached this conclusion over the dissent of
Chief Judge Mayer, who noted that in his view, the applicants had
disclaimed layers joined by anything but a one-step process during
prosecution of the patent.1216  In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess
Technologies, Inc.,1217 the court looked primarily to Webster’s New World
Dictionary for the ordinary meanings of the terms “inner,” “expose,”
and “integral” in claims for a flooring panel.1218  In Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,1219 where the patent claim (drawn to a hospital
bed) called for a “cushion,” the court affirmed the district court’s
construction of “cushion” as meaning “a structure that provides basic
support and comfort,” by looking to Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary.1220  In Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics,1221 the court
looked again to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (as well as a
confirmatory technical dictionary) to determine the “ordinary
meaning” of the claim terms “ramped” and “decreasing” in a patent
directed to a method and apparatus for improving the quality of
compact discs.1222
In Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc.,1223 the panel
disagreed as to the proper use of dictionaries in claim construction.
At issue was the meaning of the claim term “a stop for preventing
upward flexing of the peripheral edge beyond a predetermined
amount located forward of the body and above and substantially
inward of the peripheral edge” of the flexible disc, in a patent
                                                          
1215. See id. at 1372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (noting that the district court,
using a dictionary, properly found the term “integral” to mean “formed as a unit with
another part”).
1216. See id. at 1373, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (taking
note of applicants who had filed an amendment, prior to the notice of allowance,
distinguishing their one-step system from other multi-step systems and effectively
placing this information in the prosecution history on which the public should be
able to rely).
1217. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1218. See id. at 967, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (agreeing with the district court’s
construction of terms and noting the consistency of the definitions in the patent
description with the dictionary definitions).
1219. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1220. See id. at 1340-42, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 (finding consistency between
the trial court’s construction of the term “cushion” and its meaning within both the
dictionary and the the intrinsic evidence that the patent provided).
1221. 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1222. See id. at 1338, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298 (indicating that to determine
the meaning of the term “ramped,” the court referenced WEBSTERS THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY and the MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS, and to
determine the meaning of the term “decreasing,” it relied upon WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, when the patent specification provided evidence of
“an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term”).
1223. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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claiming a vacuum system for cleaning swimming pools.1224  The
majority, citing no dictionary but invoking principles of “common
usage,” concluded that this limitation did not include a stop
extending to (or beyond) the peripheral edge of the flexible disc.1225
Dissenting on this point, Judge Bryson cited four different
dictionaries1226 to demonstrate that the word “substantially” may, in
context, mean “very much” or “far,” as the majority held (such that
the claim would require the stop to be “very much inward” or “far
inward” from the edge).  In Judge Bryson’s view, the dictionary
provided another, better definition:  “largely,” “essentially, or in the
main,” such that the claim element would require the stop to be
“mostly or mainly inward of the peripheral edge of the flexible
disc.”1227  The majority should have looked at alternative sources to
determine which meaning to adopt, he concluded, because the
differing dictionary definitions themselves demonstrated an
ambiguity, including the written description and prosecution
history.1228
The panel in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.1229
expressed a somewhat less exalted view of dictionaries.  After stating
the rules for evaluating the intrinsic evidence, the panel noted that if
the totality of the intrinsic evidence explains the claim limitations
clearly, the claim has been construed.1230  Extrinsic evidence may help
resolve the lack of clarity if the claim limitation is still ambiguous.1231
In an explanatory footnote, the panel noted that dictionaries, a form
of extrinsic evidence, may be considered together with the intrinsic
evidence.1232
It is difficult to reconcile the notion that dictionaries are extrinsic
                                                          
1224. Id. at 1413-14, 54  U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1225. See id. at 1414, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (stating the term’s common
usage negates the possibility that a stop which is “substantially inward” of an edge
could simultaneously extend to that edge).
1226. See id. at 1418, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (listing
WEBSTER’S NEW 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1817 (1983); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1454 (1962); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428
(6th ed. 1990); and WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1176 (1983)).
1227. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
1228. See Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 1418, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (looking to
claim language, written descriptions and prosecution history to determine the
meaning of a term that could have multiple meanings).
1229. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1230. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53 (noting further that if the claim
language is clear on its face, then that language is controlling unless the prosecution
history and written description call for deviation).
1231. See id. at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53 (remarking, however, that
“[s]uch instances will rarely, if ever, occur”).
1232. See id. at 866 n.*, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 n.*.
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evidence, or even the notion that they “may sometimes be considered
along with the intrinsic evidence,” with the more prevalent view that
the ordinary meaning of a claim term is to be presumptively
determined by reference to the dictionary before consulting the
specification and prosecution history in order to determine whether
the patentee has used the term otherwise.1233  Arguably, the use of
general purpose dictionaries to obtain the presumptive ordinary
meaning of a claim term is inconsistent with several other Federal
Circuit decisions, such as Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group
International, Inc.,1234 which stress that to begin an inquiry, the court
should determine the meaning of a claim term as an individual of
ordinary skill in the art would understand it.1235  Hockerson-Halberstadt,
in turn, relied on the Federal Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hoechst
Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,1236 which held that unless the patent
or prosecution indicate that the patentee intended a different
meaning, the definition of a technical claim term should be based
upon the meaning that an individual who is knowledgeable in the
field of the invention would give to that term.1237
It is not certain that the definition of a term in a general-purpose
dictionary will always provide the “ordinary and accustomed
meaning” of that term as one who is educated in the field of the
invention would understand it.  At a minimum, one would expect to
find that meaning in a specialized dictionary in the relevant art, not
in a general-purpose dictionary.1238  A prime example of this
shortcoming in dictionary definitions is illustrated in Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Articulate Systems, Inc.,1239 where the court could not easily
define, by reference to a general purpose dictionary, the claim term
“windows,” as used in a computer application.1240  Instead, the Apple
court immediately had to turn to the written description and the use
of the same term in prior-art references cited in the patent
                                                          
1233. See supra notes 934-938 and accompanying text.
1234. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1235. See id. at 955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v.
BP Chem., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1129 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
1236. 78 F.3d 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1237. See id. at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
1238. Cf. Optical Disc Corp. v. DelMar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (relying first on WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, and then on the MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS to
determine the meaning of the claim term “ramped” in a patent directed to an
improved process and apparatus for making compact discs).
1239. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1240. See Apple, 234 F.3d at 21, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (recognizing that the
court did not use a general purpose dictionary to define the claim term at issue).
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specification.1241
In any event, the ordinary meaning rule is not conclusive in every
case.  Rather, it creates, at most, a presumption that the ordinary
meaning (whether derived from a dictionary or elsewhere) is the
correct one.  Hockerson-Halberstadt v. Avia Group International, Inc.1242 is
one case where the presumption was overcome with the use of
intrinsic evidence.  The claim, directed to an article of outer
footwear, called for a “central longitudinal groove in the underside of
the heel part extending forwardly through the heel part into the
underside of the sole part to divide the lower surface of the heel part
into a pair of fins.”1243  The court concluded that in the course of
prosecuting the patent, the applicant modified the ordinary meaning
of “groove,” by disclaiming a particular interpretation of the term.1244
During prosecution, the applicant submitted drawings comparing the
features of his invention to a hypothetical combination of two prior-
art patents.1245  He noted that his invention provided a narrower
groove than in the prior art to maximize the amount of the
underneath surface of the footwear used for cushioning and
support.1246  The court thus concluded that “groove” in the claim in
suit could not simply be any “long and narrow structure,” but instead
had to be one that was narrower than the groove widths in the prior-
art patents that the applicant distinguished.1247  The court called the
patentee’s contrary arguments “a request for a mulligan that would
erase from the prosecution history the inventor’s disavowal of a
particular aspect of a claim term’s meaning.”1248
As there is a presumption in favor of a claim’s ordinary meaning,
presumptions also play a prominent role in the construction of
“means-plus-function” or “step-plus-function” claim elements.1249  In
                                                          
1241. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (defining the term “windows” by looking
to the written description of the patent and functioning of the computer
application).
1242. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1243. Hockerson-Halberstadt, 222 F.3d at 955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (quoting
the claim language).
1244. See id. at 956, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91 (conceding that the ordinary
meaning of “groove” in the claims and specification was “a long and narrow
structure”).
1245. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
1246. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (distinguishing the applicant’s invention
and insisting that the narrower groove serves an entirely different purpose than the
groove in the prior art).
1247. See Hockerson-Halberstadt v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the ordinary meaning of
the term as used in the claim).
1248. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
1249. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital
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Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,1250 the court found that use of the
term “means” in a patent claim created a presumption of a means-
plus-function claim, requiring the applicant to demonstrate that the
properly construed claim limitation recites definite structure to
perform the claimed function in order to rebut the presumption.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the claim term
“plastic envelope closing means” was in means-plus-function format,
because the claim term used the word “means” and failed “to recite
sufficient structure for closing the envelope that would otherwise
rebut that presumption.”1251
Similarly, in Watts v. XL Systems, Inc.,1252 the court reiterated and
expanded upon its prior holdings, concluding that the failure to use
the word “means” in a claim element created a “rebuttable
presumption”1253 that 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6 did not apply.
Demonstrating that the claim element “recite[s] a function without
reciting sufficient structure for performing that function” rebuts that
presumption.1254  The Watts court, in analyzing a claim element that
required two joints to be “sealingly connected,” first held that the
absence of “means” in this claim gave rise to a presumption that
Section 112, paragraph 6 did not apply.1255  Next, the court examined
the claim language and concluded that the presumption was not
rebutted because the claim limitation “refers to terms that are
reasonably well understood in the art as names for structure that
perform the recited function of sealing.”1256  Specifically, the court
noted the language in the claim limitation requiring “a second end
formed with tapered external threads” and “a first end” having
“tapered internal threads,” concluding that “[t]hese terms clearly
have reasonably well understood meanings in the art as names for
structure.”1257  The court drew further confirmation from the written
description, explaining that these interlocking threads would
perform the “sealing” function.1258  Accordingly, the court concluded
                                                          
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof . . . .”).
1250. 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1251. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
1252. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1253. Watts, 232 F.3d at 880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1254. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1255. See id. at 881, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (noting that the limitation does
not include the word “means” and therefore is not a means-plus-function limitation).
1256. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (noting that one with knowledge in the
art easily would recognize the terms and their functions).
1257. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
1258. See Watts v. XL Systs., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 881, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836,
1839 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging the clarity of the specification that the
interlocking threads perform the sealing function).
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that Section 112, paragraph 6 did not apply, and proceeded to
construe the claims in the customary way.1259
Another case involving means-plus-function claims, Ishida Co., Ltd.
v. Taylor,1260 highlighted some of the differences between the
customary way of construing claims and the manner in which claim
construction takes place under Section 112, paragraph 6.  In Ishida,
the claim in suit contained a means-plus-function claim element
requiring the function of “stripping and sealing” to be performed by
some means disclosed in the specification.1261  The district court
consulted the specification, which depicted two “structurally very
different” embodiments that were to perform the claimed
function.1262  The appellant, Taylor, argued that the district court
erred in not creating a single claim construction to cover all the
embodiments of the invention as shown in the specification, a task
the court described as “impossible.”1263  In support, the court noted
two prior cases, Serrano v. Telular Corp.,1264 and Micro Chemical, Inc. v.
Great Plains Chemical Co.,1265 in which patents disclosed alternative
structures for accomplishing the recited function, yet the courts were
not required to craft a singular claim construction that would cover
each.1266
In Clearstream Wastewater Systems v. Hydro-Action, Inc.,1267 another case
addressing construction of a means-plus-function claim element, the
court rejected the argument that the patentee’s criticism of a prior-
art device in the written description foreclosed consideration of the
elements of that prior-art device as “corresponding structure” for
purposes of Section 112, paragraph 6.1268  The court noted that in a
combination claim, a claim limitation often may read on the prior art
since old elements are part of the combination claims.1269  The court
                                                          
1259. See id. at 881-82, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (applying the principles of
standard claim construction).
1260. 221 F.3d 1310, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1261. See Ishida, 221 F.3d at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1262. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1263. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452 (rejecting appellant’s theory).
1264. 111 F.3d 1578, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1265. 194 F.3d 1250, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  Two of the
authors of this article were counsel for Micro Chemical, Inc. in this case.
1266. See Ishida, 221 F.3d at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53 (citing cases
interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 as requiring the identification of alternative
structures that perform the function, but not requiring a single claim construction to
cover all embodiments).
1267. 206 F.3d 1440, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1268. See Clearstream, 206 F.3d at 1445-46, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189-90 (noting
that while the written description avoids the conclusion that prior-art cannot
perform the appropriate function, even while pointing out the disadvantages of
prior-art).
1269. See id. at 1445, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
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concluded that, despite the fact that the written description
highlighted the disadvantages of the prior-art system, an element of
that system could be considered as “corresponding structure” in the
combination claims at issue.1270  The court nonetheless noted that in
certain situations, it would construe a means-plus-function limitation
as covering only new elements but those certain situations would have
to involve a clear teaching away from the prior art, or a clear
disavowal of the prior art as “corresponding structure” capable of
performing the claimed function, such as a statement that the prior-
art structure was “incapable” of performing the claimed function.1271
Beyond the limited area of means-plus-function claim elements,
the court in 2000 dealt with a handful of recurring issues of claim
construction: the use of claim preambles, the role of singular and
plural claim terms, the role of “open” and “closed” claim terms, the
use of “about” as a qualifier for a numerical claim element, and the
order of steps in a method claim.
The panel in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Systems, Inc.1272
addressed the use of claim preambles in interpreting patent claims.
Apple contended, based on a claim preamble, that two claims in suit
required that the claimed computer windows contain “data” on which
a user may operate.1273  The court rejected that argument, applying its
previously announced rule that “[l]anguage in a claim preamble . . .
acts as a claim limitation only when such language serves to ‘give
meaning to a claim and properly define the invention,’ not when the
preamble merely states a purpose or intended use of the
invention.”1274  The court treated the term “data” as referring to “a
purpose or intended use of the windows of the claimed invention”
and not as a claim limitation because in examining the claims as a
whole and in light of the written description, the recitation of “data”
is not used to define the invention.1275
In 2000, the Federal Circuit decided two cases dealing with the
rules for interpreting claim elements phrased in the singular or
                                                          
1270. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189-90 (noting that “a claim may consist of
all old elements and one new element, thereby being patentable”).
1271. See id. at 1445-46, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (differentiating Clearstream
from other cases where written descriptions clearly indicate the impossibility of prior-
art performing the necessary functions).
1272. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1273. See Apple, 234 F.3d at 22, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
1274. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1275. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (recognizing the recitation of “data” did
not give meaning to these claims).
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plural.  In Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,1276 the court
examined a claim that specifically recited the language “reproducing
in a material object.”1277  While the claim preambles and some
references elsewhere in the specification referred, somewhat
ambiguously, to multiple “material objects”1278 or “a plurality of blank
material objects,”1279 the court concluded that the totality of the
specification required that the reference to a plurality be understood
as referring to a “supply” of blank material objects that can consist of
one material object.1280  In support, the Interactive Gift Express court
cited its prior decision in Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc.1281 for
the proposition that the basis of a claim construction must be the
written description in its entirety, notwithstanding any isolated
conflicting passages.1282
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,1283 the claim was drawn to
a process for “‘controlling an immunizable disease’” in birds, calling
for “‘injecting a vaccine . . . into the egg embodying the embryo . . .
wherein said injection is made during the final quarter of the
incubation period whereby the embryo has developed immunologic
competence.’”1284  The question for the court was whether the process
required inoculation of an entire population of birds (and effective
immunization of a high percentage of treated birds), or whether the
method required only the inoculation of a single bird.1285  The court
held that inoculation of a single bird would suffice for infringement,
because the claim language and the rest of the specifications were
phrased in the singular.1286  Descriptions of “singular injections” into
“individual eggs,” without more, did not limit the claims to cover only
inoculations of an entire flock of birds; as use of the singular form of
a word does not preclude a meaning that encompasses the plural.1287
In Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products, Inc.,1288 the court
                                                          
1276. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1277. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 868, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654
(emphasis in original).
1278. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1279. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1280. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1281. 149 F.3d 1335, 1345, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1282. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 868, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1283. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
1284. Id. at 1348, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1285. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
1286. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (indicating that the process which was
patented involved “immunization of an individual egg, rather than a process for
entire populations of birds”).
1287. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
1288. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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addressed the distinction between “open” and “closed” claim
elements.1289  The claim element in Lampi called for a “housing having
two half-shells,” and the issue on appeal was whether the term
“having” meant that the device had to have at least two half-shells (an
“open” claim), or whether it had to have only two half-shells (a
“closed” claim).1290  The district court construed the term as a “closed”
claim, such that the accused device could not infringe because it
included five parts, not just the two called out by the claim.1291
Disagreeing with the district court, the Federal Circuit applied the
rule established by the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, that
transitional phrases, such as “having,” must be interpreted with
reference to the specification in order to resolve whether open or
closed language is intended.1292  The court concluded that the
specification indicated that the patentee’s intent was for the word
“having” to be open.1293
Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan Wheel International, Inc.1294 dealt
with the most prevalent “open” and “closed” terms used in patent
drafting: “comprising” and “consisting of.”1295  In discussing why the
trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit
noted that the claim language expressly required two springs,
whereas the accused product had only one.1296  Moreover, the use of
the introductory phrase, “consisting of,” emphasized the limitation
because in patent law the phrase “consisting of” is used to indicate
restriction or exclusion.1297  A drafter should use the phrase
“consisting of” to indicate “I claim what follows and nothing else.”1298
Hence, the drafter, by using the term “consisting of,” limited the
claim to “two concentric springs and nothing else.”1299
In Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Company, Inc.,1300 the court addressed
                                                          
1289. See Lampi., 228 F.3d at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1290. See id. at 1375-76, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1291. See id. at 1375, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1292. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453 (referring to M.P.E.P. § 2111.03
(7th ed. rev. 2000)).
1293. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1294. 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1295. See id. at 1382, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1296. See id. at 1382-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1297. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (citing Parmle Pharm Co. v. Zink, 285
F.2d 465, 469, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271, 275 (8th Cir. 1961), and JOHN LANDIS,
MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 11-13 (1974)) (clarifying that use of the term
“comprising” would have indicated an open-ended construction).
1298. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (comparing the use of the term
“comprising” to signify “I claim at least what follows and potentially more”).
1299. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1300. 205 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the practice of using the term “about” to describe a numerical range
in a patent claim.1301  The claim at issue in this preliminary-injunction
case was drawn to a porcelain composite for dental restoration
products.1302  The claim required the composition to have a “maturing
temperature of from about 750° to about 1050° C and a coefficient of
thermal expansion of from about 12 x 10–6/°C to about 17.5 x 10–
6/°C,” but then claimed the elements of the composition in specific
weight percentages unmodified by “about.”1303  The panel noted that
it could not give a precise construction to a term such as “about,” but
instead would rely on the factual situation presented.1304  On that
basis, the panel upheld the district court’s claim construction: “claim
1 uses the word ‘about’ to qualify the values of many variables . . . .  In
contrast, the claim recites precise ranges for the weight of dental
compositions.  Under these circumstances, the district court correctly
limited the weight ranges to those recited precisely in the table of
claim 1.”1305
Finally, in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,1306 the court
discussed the requirements of a method claim, and the circumstances
in which a method claim will be limited to methods which perform
each of the steps in a specified order.1307  The Federal Circuit
disagreed with the district court’s finding that the claims required
“step one of the claim to be performed prior to step four.”1308  The
steps of a method claim ordinarily are not construed to require
performing the steps in a particular order, “[u]nless the steps of a
method actually recite an order” or “when the method steps
implicitly require that they be performed in the order written.”1309  In
examining the claim language, the remainder of the specification,
and the prosecution history, the court found no support for the
notion that the method claims required the performance of step 1
prior to step 4.1310  The court emphasized the fact that, were the
method claim so limited, it “would not read on the preferred
embodiment,” resulting in a construction that is “rarely, if ever,
                                                          
1301. See id. at 1381, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089 (noting that this method is a
common claiming practice).
1302. See id.
1303. Id. at 1379, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 (emphasis in original).
1304. See id. at 1381, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
1305. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
1306. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1307. See id. at 875-76, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660-61.
1308. See id. at 875, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
1309. Id. at 875-76, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660-61.
1310. Id. at 876, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (“In this case, nothing in the claim
or the specification directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction”).
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correct.”1311
2. Specification (written description)
Beyond the claims themselves, a second aspect of intrinsic evidence
that is fundamental to patent claim construction involves the patent
specification.  Section 112, paragraph 1 requires a patent
specification to contain a written description of the invention in clear
and concise terms so that any individual skilled in the relevant art can
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode of carrying out his
invention.1312  Recently, some judges of the Federal Circuit have
begun demanding more statutory exactness in their terminology,
requiring the use of “written description” instead of “specification,”
because Paragraph 2 of Section 112 makes clear that the “claims” are
considered part of the specification, not separate from it.1313
Recent Federal Circuit decisions have reflected some uncertainty
regarding the proper use of the specification in construing patent
claims.  On the one hand, one line of decisions reflects an
application of the axiom that a court may not introduce a limitation
from the written description into the claim.1314  Another line of cases
suggests that the court should always consult the specification (or
written description) before arriving at a construction of a patent
claim.1315  Several panels have noted that there is a “fine line” between
the permissible use of the specification for claim-construction
purposes, and the impermissible “importation” of a limitation from
the specification to a claim.1316
                                                          
1311. Id. at 876-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661-62 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
1312. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (1994) (stating that a patent specification should also
include the manner and process of using the invention).
1313. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (1994) (“The specification shall conclude with one or
more claims . . . .”).  Compare Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In construing a claim, a court principally
consults the evidence intrinsic to the patent, including the claims, the written
description, and the relevant prosecution history.”) (emphasis added) (citing Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576), with Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at
865, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (“‘It is well settled that, in interpreting an asserted
claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent
itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution
history.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1576).
1314. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1109-10,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1315. See, e.g., Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951,
955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a court “must”
always look to the specification); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1577 (insisting that a court “always” consult the specification).
1316. See, e.g., Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 865-66, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
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Some panels have attempted, without much success, to give
definition to this “fine line” by clarifying that the purpose of looking
to the specification is to ascertain the meaning of the claim term as it
used in the context of the entire invention and not for the purpose of
“merely” limiting a claim term.1317  Although this phraseology stresses
the importance of understanding claims in their full context, it is
otherwise of little help to courts and litigants because the “fine line”
between “mere” importation and contextual construction is often
illusory, and certainly not predictive.  Thus, it is not surprising that
despite the seemingly hard-and-fast rule against importing limitations
from the patent specification, several decisions from the Federal
Circuit in 2000 could easily be understood as endorsing the
importation of limitations from the specification.
For example, in Watts v. XL Systems, Inc.,1318 the panel interpreted a
method claim requiring “tapered external threads [to be]
dimensioned” to be limited to only the method for doing so set forth
in the specification, the use of “misaligned taper angles.”1319  In Kemco
Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,1320 the panel disclaimed reading a
limitation into the claims from the preferred embodiment.1321  The
court nonetheless looked to the specification to determine what
structure the “closing means” limitation referred to in a means-plus-
function element of a claim to “tamper-evident” security envelopes.1322
And in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,1323 the claim language
referred broadly to “dissolving polydextrose in water,” without any
reference whatsoever to the catalyst that was to be used in the
dissolving process.  Nonetheless, the claim was properly construed as
limited to polydextrose dissolved in water using citric acid as a
catalyst.1324  The panel in Cultor explained that limiting a claim to the
preferred embodiment set forth in the specification had to be done
on a case-by-case basis.1325
                                                          
1652; SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1317. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
1318. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1319. Id. at 882-83, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1320. 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1321. See id. at 1362-63, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (finding no support in the
written description to support Kemco’s expansive interpretation of what structures
correspond to the closing means limitation).
1322. See id. at 1360, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
1323. 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1324. See id. at 1330-31, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209-10.
1325. See id. at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (explaining that the specificity
of the description of the invention and the prosecution history dictates whether the
court should limit a claim to the specific embodiment presented in the
specification); see also Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958,
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In view of this language from Cultor, it is clear that the “rule” that a
limitation cannot be imported from the specification is not actually a
rule at all, but simply the conclusion that is reached in certain cases.
But, where the application of a principle “depends in each case” on
case-specific factors, that principle has no predictive value.1326
Obviously, both Cultor and Watts, as well as several prior Federal
Circuit cases,1327 recognize that in certain cases it is permissible, even
mandated, to limit a claim to “the specific embodiment presented in
the specification.”1328  The reason that these two lines of authority are
in actual or potential conflict becomes clear when one considers the
consequences of the “bar” on importing limitations from the
specification into the claim.1329  If the specification must be consulted
before arriving at a correct understanding of a claim, as numerous
Federal Circuit cases require, a court cannot possibly determine
whether a limitation has been impermissibly “imported” from the
specification into a claim until the claim has received a fixed
meaning, a process which requires the use of the specification.1330
The court would have to find some other source of information,
                                                          
966, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although claims must be
read in light of the specification of which they are a part, . . . it is improper to read
limitations from the written description into a claim. . . .”) (citations omitted); Kemco
Sales, 208 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1314 (“‘[T]his court has consistently
adhered to the proposition that courts cannot alter what the patentee has chosen to
claim as his invention, that limitations appearing in the specification will not be read
into claims, and that interpreting what is meant by a word in a claim ‘is not to be
confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which
is improper.’” (quoting Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1348, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1199, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
1326. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (noting that lower
courts and litigants have no stringent rule that would help to predict how a court will
construct their claims).
1327. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1302, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069-70 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (involving a claim that called for a
cover “including” a restriction ring required permanent attachment of the ring to
the cover, in light of specification and drawings, which described only permanently
attached rings); Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The only embodiment described in
the ‘669 patent specification is the character-based protocol, and the claims were
correctly interpreted as limited thereto.”); O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576,
1581, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the claim term
“passage” does not include “smooth-walled, completely cylindrical” passage because
of statements contained in the written description); General Am. Transp. Corp. v.
Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 770, 772, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1803, 1805-06
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (limiting the definition of the claim element because the teaching
in the specification “is not just the preferred embodiment of the invention; it is the
only one described”).
1328. Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
1329. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1109-10,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (enunciating the rule against
introducing limitations from the specification into the claim).
1330. See id.
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extrinsic to the patent, that would give definition to the claims prior
to consulting the specification (or written description).
Although the court should avoid extrinsic evidence unless all of the
intrinsic evidence fails to yield a fixed meaning for the claims, one
place that some Federal Circuit panels have looked for such an initial
meaning is the dictionary.1331  This approach, however, yields the
strange result that a dictionary definition—considered by all to be
extrinsic evidence—obtains a mongrel status in which it is preferred
over intrinsic evidence such as the specification and prosecution
history.  Thus, it would seem preferable for the court to eliminate any
vestiges of a hard-and-fast rule that limitations can never be imported
from the specification into the claims, for unreflective application of
such a “rule” would be inconsistent with the court’s prior decisions.
Indeed, its application could actually prevent the proper required
consideration of the specification in certain cases.  The divide in the
cases is deep, and the lack of useful guidance so manifest, that
resolution of this divide may have to await en banc treatment.1332
Other doctrines or presumptions involving the use of the
specification are somewhat less controversial.  The court, on several
occasions, has resorted to the axiom that a claim construction that
would not read on the preferred embodiment is “rarely, if ever,
correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary
support . . .”1333  The reasoning behind this presumption is that it is
highly unlikely that an inventor would simultaneously set forth the
“preferred” mode of his invention in the written description and at
the same time draft claims to the invention that did not capture that
“preferred embodiment.”  This “rule” allows for an exception in cases
of “highly persuasive evidentiary support,” where the drafting of the
claims leaves little doubt that the preferred embodiment was not to
be covered by the claims, because the objective meaning of a claim
may change from application to issuance with amendments or
                                                          
1331. See supra notes 928-962 and accompanying text (explaining Federal Circuit
panels’ decision to use dictionary definitions to determine initial meaning of claims).
1332. See supra notes 1034-1048 and accompanying text (discussing in depth the
Federal Circuit’s conflicting decisions regarding the rule and its application).
1333. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1550, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1612 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[A] claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor’s device is rarely
the correct interpretation; such an interpretation requires highly persuasive
evidentiary support. . . .”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575,
1581, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We share the district
court’s view that it is unlikely that an inventor would define the invention in a way
that excluded the preferred embodiment, or that persons of skill in this field would
read the specification in such a way.”).
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arguments during prosecution.  Until 2000, however, the exception
was merely a hypothetical one, as the Federal Circuit had never
explicitly encountered a case where this “highly persuasive
evidentiary support” had been made out.
The exceptional “highly persuasive evidentiary support” was
demonstrated in Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific International,
Inc.,1334 where the claim was drawn to a “gamma unit” (also known as a
“gamma knife”), a medical device used for treating brain tumors
through focused doses of radiation.1335  The claim in suit, as well as
the written description, originally described a unit where the
radiation sources were oriented between latitudes of 0° and 45°.
After an obviousness rejection, the claim in suit was amended to
specify that the radiation sources were oriented “only within a zone
extending between latitudes 30°-45°, as seen from said diametrical
plane.”1336  The preferred embodiment set forth in the written
description, however, remained unchanged.
The patentee, Elekta, argued that the term “extending between
latitudes 30°-45°” should be understood as a ceiling.1337 Elekta further
argued that its proffered construction had to be the correct one,
because limiting the latitudes to a range of 30° to 45° would “fai[l] to
cover the preferred embodiment.”1338  The court agreed that the
preferred and only embodiment disclosed in the specification, which
disclosed radiation sources and beam channels oriented between the
latitudes of 0° and 45°, would not be covered by the claims under the
accused infringer’s claim construction.  Nonetheless, because the
totality of intrinsic evidence demonstrated that the applicant had
amended the claim to limit the claimed latitudes to “the zone which
is exclusively 30°-45°,” the court concluded that this is “the rare case
in which such an interpretation [i.e., one which excludes the
preferred embodiment from the claims] is compelled.”1339
Although not technically part of the “specification” (which is by
definition limited to the written description and the claims),1340 other
                                                          
1334. 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1335. See id. at 1304, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911 (explaining that in a gamma
unit, “multiple radiation beams are aimed at a single focal point on a patient’s
brain”, and when the beams meet at the focal point, their “combined energy destroys
abnormal brain tissue.”).
1336. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
1337. See id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (explaining that the term
“extending” should be understood as meaning “reaching” so that the claim would
cover latitudes of 0° to an upper boundary of between 30° and 45°).
1338. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1339. Id. at 1308, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
1340. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1, 2 (1994) (providing the guidelines for the written
description and the claims of the specification).
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textual aspects of the patent document, such as the title and the
abstract, are sometimes invoked for claim-construction purposes.  In
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,1341 the court rejected the
accused infringer’s attempt to limit the claimed invention, a mailer-
type business form, to business forms designed for use on an IBM
3800 printer.1342  Having already noted that the claims would not be
limited to the preferred embodiment because the specification
referred generally (in one place) to “a printer used to process the
mailers” and specifically (in the preferred embodiment) to the use of
an “IBM 3800 printer,” the court also rejected the accused infringer’s
effort to rely on the title of the patent—“Pressure Seal Adhesive
Pattern for IBM 3800 Printers”—in holding that “the bar on
importing limitations from the written description into the claims
applies no less forcefully to a title.”1343  As with the supposed “bar” on
“importing” limitations from the written description into the claims,
this “bar” on reading limitations into the claims from the title is less
rigid than one might suspect from this pronouncement, as the
Federal Circuit has, on at least two prior occasions, utilized the title of
a patent as an important claim-construction tool.1344
Another panel confronted a similar issue in Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic
Concepts, Inc.,1345 where the court—against the argument of the
patentee—utilized the abstract of the disclosure as a claim-
construction tool on a par with the written description itself.  The
patentee, citing a rule of the Patent and Trademark Office providing
that the abstract of a patent “shall not be used for interpreting the
scope of the claims,”1346 urged that it would be improper for the panel
to consider the abstract in determining whether the district court
correctly construed the claims of the patent.  Rejecting this
argument, Judge Bryson, writing for the panel, ruled that Section
1.72(b):  
                                                          
1341. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1342. See id. at 1111, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
1343. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239 (“[I]f we do not read limitations into the
claims from the specification that are not found in the claims themselves, then we
certainly will not read limitations into the claims from the patent title.”)).
1344. See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (using the title of the patent at issue
to bolster the court’s claim interpretation); Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner,
778 F.2d 775, 780, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 773, 777-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (suggesting that
the court should not overlook the title of the patent when interpreting claims).  Two
of the authors were counsel to The Lubrizol Corporation in the Exxon Chemical
Patents case.
1345. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1346. Id. at 1341 n*, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 n.1 (citing 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.172(b)(1996)).
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governs the conduct of patent examiners in examining patent
applications; it does not address the process by which courts
construe claims in infringement actions.  We have frequently
looked to the abstract to determine the scope of the invention, . . .
and we are aware of no legal principle that would require us to
disregard that potentially helpful source of intrinsic evidence as to
the meaning of claims.”1347
One can easily see the tension between this holding and the
seemingly absolute bar on the use of the patent title announced in
Moore U.S.A., given that this case states that a patent’s title could be a
“potentially helpful source of intrinsic evidence as to the meaning of
claims.”1348  One might also detect some tension between the panel’s
rejection of Patent Office claim-interpretation rules in Moore U.S.A.
and the panel’s reliance on Patent Office claim-interpretation
principles in Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc.,1349 where the
court looked to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure to interpret
the transitional phrase “having.”1350
3. Prosecution history
Like the specification or written description, the prosecution
history is one of the three aspects of intrinsic evidence that must be
considered in construing a patent claim.1351  Both the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court have stressed that the prosecution history, if
in evidence, is “always relevant to a proper interpretation of a
claim.”1352  There is a “clear distinction between such a use and the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel which estops later expansion
of a claim’s protection under the doctrine of equivalents.”1353  While
the more significant developments in 2000 with regard to
prosecution history came in the context of the doctrine of
equivalents,1354 in which prosecution history estoppel doctrine creates
the most significant limitation on application of the doctrine of
                                                          
1347. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 n.1.
1348. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 n.1 (comparing the title to the abstract
to illustrate that both are useful sources for determining the meaning of a claim).
1349. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1350. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1351. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966) (referring to the
prosecution history at times as the “file history” or the “file wrapper”).
1352. SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 376, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 678, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added); see also Graham, 383
U.S. at 33 (acknowledging that the law is well settled that the invention is construed
in light of the claims and with reference to the file wrapper in the Patent Office).
1353. Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 883, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1841
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
1354. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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equivalents, the Federal Circuit in 2000 nonetheless continued using
prosecution history in the law of claim construction.
The use of prosecution history in claim construction is similar to
the use of the specification or written description in claim
construction.  In other words, the ordinary meaning of a claim term
controls, unless there is some clear indication in the specification or
in the prosecution history that another meaning should be ascribed
to the claim term.  The panel in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v.
Compuserve Inc.1355 lumped the specification (or written description)
and the prosecution history together as “the rest of the intrinsic
evidence” in endorsing this approach to claim construction:
If the claim language is clear on its face, then our consideration of
the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a
deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified.  A
deviation may be necessary if ‘a patentee [has chosen] to be his
own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their
ordinary meaning.’ . . . A deviation may also be necessary if a
patentee has ‘relinquished [a] potential claim construction in an
amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or
distinguish a reference.’ . . . If however the claim language is not
clear on its face, then our consideration of the rest of the intrinsic
evidence is directed to resolving, if possible, the lack of clarity.1356
This approach suggests an initial analysis and presumption in favor
of the ordinary meaning of the claim language, followed by a review
of the specification and prosecution history to determine if a
deviation from that ordinary meaning is appropriate.
It remains for resolution on a case-by-case basis, what sort of
showing in the prosecution history will amount to a lexicographer’s
re-definition, or a relinquishment, to overcome the ordinary
understanding of the claim language itself.  Thus, for example, in
Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,1357  the court rejected
Samsung’s argument that the claim term “plasma etching” excluded
etching via ion bombardment, despite some language in the
prosecution history suggesting that the applicants were distinguishing
their invention from ion bombardment etching.1358  The court relied
on the “heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim
                                                          
1355. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000), opinion withdrawn
and superseded in part by, 256 F.3d 1323, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1356. Id. at 865, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652 (citations omitted) (quoting
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979,
52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1357. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1358. See id. at 1294-95, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074-75.
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language,”1359 and concluded that the isolated statements did not
“demonstrat[e] that the patentees—with reasonable clarity and
definiteness . . .—defined ‘plasma etching’ as excluding ion
bombardment.”1360  The Northern Telecom court repeatedly stressed that
the prosecution history would have to contain statements that
“exclude the possibility of ion bombardment” being covered by the
claims, “clearly call for a narrower definition,” or provide “a special
definition . . . with reasonable clarity and precision.”1361
Similarly, in Vanguard Products Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp.,1362 the
product claims were drawn to a gasket having two “integral” layers.1363
The accused infringer urged that the two layers could not be made
“integral” by any process other than co-extrusion, which was said in
the prosecution history to be “fundamental” and “require[d]” for the
claimed invention.1364  The panel majority rejected the accused
infringer’s argument, ruling that the dictionary definition of
“integral” prevailed, and that “[t]he method of manufacture, even
when cited as advantageous, does not of itself convert product claims
into claims limited to a particular process.”1365 Chief Judge Mayer
dissented.  In his dissenting opinion, he urged judgment as a matter
of law for the defendant, without remand for a new trial under his
claim construction, in light of the fact that the same prosecution
history representations would have “act[ed] as an estoppel barring
the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the material that was
surrendered during prosecution.”1366  This lends credence to the
notion that the law as it currently exists provides few generally
applicable or predictable standards for the use of prosecution history
in claim construction.1367
Yet another presumption that the Federal Circuit has created in
connection with patent claim construction, that is arguably at odds
with the the “reasonable clarity and definiteness” standard set forth in
Northern Telecom, provided the rule of decision in Watts v. XL Systems,
Inc.1368  In Watts, the court identified statements in the prosecution
                                                          
1359. Id. at 1295, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (quoting Johnson Worldwide
Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607, 1610 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
1360. Northern Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1294-95, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1361. Id. at 1295, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1362. 234 F.3d 1370, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  As noted above,
one of the authors was counsel to Parker Hannifin Corp. in this case.
1363. See id. at 1372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
1364. Id. at 1371-74, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089-91 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
1365. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089-90.
1366. Id. at 1374, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
1367. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
1368. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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history which, if applicable to the claim in suit, would have required a
deviation from the “ordinary understanding” of the claim term.1369
The panel rejected the patentee’s argument that the prosecution
history in question did not apply to the claim in suit, noting that “it
[was] irrelevant whether Watts’ prosecution history remarks were
directed to claim 18 specifically because there is no clear indication
that they were not.”1370  In other words, for claim-construction
purposes, prosecution-history remarks directed at language that
appears in claim A will be presumed to apply to the same language
appearing in claim B absent the patentee’s submission of a “clear
indication” to the contrary.
4. Extrinsic evidence
When the Federal Circuit, in 1995, decided Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.,1371 it rendered extrinsic evidence irrelevant to the
large majority of claim construction cases.1372  Under the prevailing
rule, “if the meaning of the claim limitations is apparent from the
totality of the intrinsic evidence, then the claim has been construed.
If however a claim limitation is still not clear, we may look to extrinsic
evidence to help resolve the lack of clarity.”1373  This is an exceptional
circumstance, as such instances will rarely occur.1374
Taking this rule into account, one type of extrinsic evidence,
dictionaries, has assumed a vaunted place in claim construction.1375
Some panels of the Federal Circuit have treated dictionary definitions
as so exalted that they seem to be on a par with the claim language
itself.  The “ordinary meaning” approach that has gained increasing
popularity relies largely on dictionaries to establish the “default”
meaning of patent claims.1376
The remainder of this discussion of extrinsic evidence will focus on
truly extrinsic evidence, such as expert and inventor testimony about
                                                          
1369. See Watts, 232 F.3d at 882, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (noting that in
constructing a claim, a court principally consults the evidence intrinsic to the patent,
including the claims, the written description, and the relevant prosecution history).
1370. Id. at 883, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1371. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
1372. See Markham, 52 F.3d at 986, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (providing
extrinsic evidence is designed to clarify ambiguities in claim terminology).
1373. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 866, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1652-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok,
Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(discussing the use of extrinsic evidence in clarifying claim limitations).
1374. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1375. See supra notes 927-961 and accompanying text.
1376. See supra notes 932-940 and accompanying text (discussing that courts may
consult a dictionary prior to considering the rest of the intrinsic evidence).
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the meaning of claim terms.  Despite the seeming rarity of
considering extrinsic evidence for claim interpretation, the Federal
Circuit has left the door wide open for judges to consider extrinsic
evidence to “understand” the particular art or technology at issue.1377
At issue in Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.1378 was the
meaning of “chromosome DNA fragment of a donor bacterium” in a
patent drawn to a method of modifying the genetic structure of
bacteria in order to increase production of amino acids.1379  The
panel’s entire discussion of the issue of claim construction (and
infringement under that claim construction) occurred without any
reference to the patent and prosecution history.  Instead, the Federal
Circuit’s affirmance rested on the “extensive expert testimony on all
the issues and arguments raised by ADM.”1380  Astonishingly, despite
the Federal Circuit’s previously stated views that extrinsic evidence
will “rarely, if ever” be the basis for a patent claim construction, the
panel in Ajinomoto affirmed the district court’s claim construction
entirely on the basis of extrinsic evidence, expert testimony and the
accused infringer’s (and its supplier’s) own usage of the
terminology.1381  Perhaps the panel had already concluded in its own
collective mind that the intrinsic evidence did not provide sufficient
clarity for the claims, but there is no evidence on the face of the
Ajinomoto opinion that this was the case.
The panel adopted a somewhat more typical approach to the use of
extrinsic evidence in claim construction in Aqua-Aerobic Systems, Inc. v.
Aerators Inc.,1382 although the opinion contains some curious dicta.  In
Aqua-Aerobic, the dispute was over the meaning of claim clauses
requiring “preventing passage of atmospheric air” and “preventing
the flow of atmospheric air” in a patent covering a mixer to be used
in water-treatment plants and tanks.1383  The patentee argued that the
clauses should be construed as “permitting the passage of more than
a minuscule or negligible amount of air,” while the accused infringer
                                                          
1377. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653
(asserting that the consultation of extrinsic evidence is appropriate to ensure the
judge’s understanding of technical aspects of the patent remains consistent with the
understanding of those knowledgeable in the art).
1378. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1379. See id. at 1348, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1380. See id. at 1349, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (explaining that the basis for its
affirmance was that “the district court’s claim construction and related conclusions
are supported by the testimony of experts and fully in accord with ADM’s and ABP’s
own usages”).
1381. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (affirming district court’s holding on the
strength of the extrinsic evidence).
1382. 211 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1383. See id. at 1244, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
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urged that the specification required the invention to “exclude all
atmospheric air.”1384  The court started its discussion of claim
construction by noting that “[t]he expert witnesses for both sides
agreed that persons of skill in this field would understand that the
structure depicted in the ‘771 patent is not air-tight.”1385
The district court, believing that prior Federal Circuit cases barred
consideration of extrinsic evidence, declined to rely on this agreed-
upon expert testimony.1386  Concurring with the district court’s
construction of the patent claim elements, the Federal Circuit
concluded that that construction was consistent with the teachings of
the specification, which do not allow more than a very small amount
of air to enter and pass through the mixer.1387  Were the claims
interpreted otherwise by reference to the extrinsic evidence, the
construction would be “directly contrary to the limitations in the
claims and the description in the specification.”1388  Even so, the court
noted in dicta that “expert testimony that is admissible in the
proceeding [under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence] may
be considered by the court and given weight appropriate to its
content.”1389  But what does “given weight appropriate to its content”
mean?  If this language was meant to state a standard for admissibility
of expert evidence for claim-construction issues, its development is
obviously going to have to await future cases.  Coincidentally, Judge
Newman, joined in both cases by the now-late Senior Judge Smith,
authored both Ajinomoto and Aqua-Aerobic.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States1390 involved the trial court’s overuse
of extrinsic evidence, resulting in a reversal of the judgment.  Dow’s
patent claimed a system for filling vacant underground mines in
order to prevent the collapse of the overlying land.1391  One claim
element called for:
injecting said suspension [a] combination of a carrier liquid and
solids] into said void through [a] conduit at an injection rate which
is sufficiently low such that initially upon entrance into [the] void
from [the] conduit the velicity of the suspension is below its
minimum linear velocity and at least a portion of said solid
                                                          
1384. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (setting forth summaries of the
respective arguments of the parties involved in the action).
1385. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1386. See id. at 1244-45, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1387. See id. at 1245, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1388. Aqua-Aerobic Systs., Inc. v. Aerators Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 1245, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1389. Id. at 1244, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1390. 226 F.3d 1334, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1391. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
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particles are deposited to form a mound which decreases the cross-
sectional area of [the] void and sufficiently high to propel the
suspension over [the] mound at a velocity at least equal to its
minimum linear velocity to carry particles over [the]
mound . . . .1392
The written description set forth a formula for determining “the
minimum rate at which the suspension must be injected.”1393
In construing this claim element, the Court of Federal Claims (the
trial court in patent-infringement claims against the government)
relied heavily on one of Dow’s witnesses who testified that the
formula was irrelevant, calling it the “brute strength” formula and
analogizing the formula to “driving a car through a brick wall at 100
miles per hour when one knows that 10 miles per hour will work.”1394
The Court of Federal Claims agreed with this testimony and explicitly
stated that “the formula was irrelevant.”1395  According to the Federal
Circuit, the trial court failed to weigh the instrinsic evidence
sufficiently; in fact, the intrinsic evidence was largely ignored.1396
In Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,1397  the court
found unpersuasive Samsung’s reliance on an article that the
inventor of a patent wrote at about the same time as the application
for the patent at issue.1398  Samsung argued the court should import
into the patent the definition of “plasma etching” contained in the
article.1399  The court rejected that argument, noting that “extrinsic
evidence is rarely, if ever, probative of a special and particular
definition of a limitation found in a [patent] claim.”1400  The court
reasoned that definitional statements in the patent claim terms could
modify the ordinary meaning of the claim terms, but reference to
extrinsic evidence should never alter those claim terms, for that
would allow the public record of the patent to be changed for
purposes of litigation, thus abrogating the notice function of the
patent documents.1401  The court ultimately concluded that the article
did not even support the definitional point for which it was proffered
                                                          
1392. Id. at 1340, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018 (quoting the language used in the
patent).
1393. Id. at 1340, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
1394. Id. at 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019.
1395. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1014, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1396. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019 (noting the flaws in the trial court’s
infringement analysis).
1397. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1398. See id. at 1295-96, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
1399. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
1400. Id. at 1295, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1401. See id. at 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
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and thus rejected Samsung’s argument.1402
One knotty question that has continued since the Federal Circuit’s
1995 Markman decision is this:  Since a patent is to be interpreted (at
least according to some panels) from the vantage point of one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art, how should courts use extrinsic
evidence, such as expert or inventor testimony, to gauge how one of
ordinary skill in the art would read the claim?  In other words, since a
judge is not one of ordinary skill in the relevant art, can he or she rely
on extrinsic evidence in order to understand how that ordinarily
skilled professional might read the claims?  The answer is unclear.
The court can probably admit the evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702,1403 under the standard of helpfulness to the trier of
fact.1404  It is not clear, however, whether the court can rely on that
testimony to support its claim construction.
In Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,1405 which was primarily an
invalidity case, the panel noted that the Federal Circuit had “not
specifically addressed the types of evidence that may be considered in
analyzing whether a claim complies with the ‘which the applicant
regards as his invention’ portion of [Section 112, paragraph 2].”1406
The court concluded that it should be the same type of evidence that
may be used to ascertain whether a claim satisfies the definiteness
portion of Section 112, paragraph 2.1407  “Despite this general rule,”
which focuses on the intrinsic evidence of claims and specification,
the panel in Solomon stated in a footnote that certain circumstances
require review of evidence beyond the claims and written description,
                                                          
1402. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076-77; see also id. at 1076, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1076 (rejecting as unpersuasive Samsung’s reliance on similar statements
made by the inventors in prosecuting a related Japanese patent application).
1403. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).
1404. See Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators, Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 1244, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]xpert testimony that is
admissible in the proceeding . . . may be considered by the court and given weight
appropriate to its content.”) (citations omitted).  Query, however, whether Rule
702’s reference to “the trier of fact” precludes its applicability to claim-construction
issues, which are viewed as questions of law).  See, e.g., Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461, 1465 (1996)
(describing the first issue in a patent case, construing the patent, as a question of law
the court should determine, and further characterizing the second issue, whether
infringement occurred, as a question of fact for a jury to resolve).
1405. 216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1406. Id. at 1378-79, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2).
1407. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280-82 (stating that the standard set forth in
§ 112, ¶ 2 “depends on whether those skilled in the art would understand the scope
of the claim when the claim is read in light of the specification”).
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because determining the perspective of one of skill in the art may
involve reference to extrinsic evidence including the prior art and
witness testimony.1408  There is good reason to believe that a future
panel might follow a similar standard in a case presenting a more
straightforward issue of claim construction, because the “which the
applicant regards as his invention” language of Section 112,
paragraph 2, is the language that sets forth the elements that a patent
claim must describe.  Following a similar path for claim-construction
purposes would also be in accord with the well-settled principle that
claims should be construed the same way for both validity and
infringement analyses.1409
In the end, the continuing tensions in the Federal Circuit’s
decisions with respect to use of extrinsic evidence seem to fall into
three categories:  (i) the role of dictionaries in claim construction1410;
(ii) the situations where extrinsic evidence will be allowed;1411 and (iii)
the tension between the claim-construction vantagepoint of one of
ordinary skill in the art and the disfavor of extrinsic evidence such as
testimony from those who are skilled in the art.1412
5. Canons of construction
Finally, beyond the issues of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the
Federal Circuit has often applied what one might call “canons of
construction” in order to assist the claim-construction task.  Each of
these canons can be understood much like the various other
“presumptions” (discussed above) that the Federal Circuit applies in
claim construction.  A “canon of construction” is little more than
saying that if a certain condition is present, then it should be
presumed (subject to rebuttal) that a certain claim construction
should follow.  For example, the presumption in favor of a claim
term’s “ordinary meaning” presumes, subject to rebuttal, that each
word in a claim was used in a manner consistent with its ordinary
meaning (which sometimes, but not always, means its “dictionary
definition”).1413 Similarly, the means-plus-function claim element
                                                          
1408. See id. at 1378-79 n.4, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 n.4.
1409. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1363, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Claims must be interpreted the same way for
determining infringement as was done to sustain their validity.”).
1410. See supra notes 927-961 and accompanying text (summarizing federal cases
addressing claim construction issues).
1411. See supra notes 1089-1132 and accompanying text (examining the types and
amount of evidence required by courts in patent cases).
1412. See supra notes 1353-1366 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of
equivalents).
1413. See supra notes 923-925 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s
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presumption assumes, subject to rebuttal, that the use of the term
“means” in a claim element requires that element to be understood
as a means-plus-function element subject to Section 112, paragraph 6,
and that the absence of the term “means” takes it out of the ambit of
that paragraph.1414  Other “canons of construction” can be
understood in much the same way.
One well-established canon of construction is the rule that “‘claims
should be read in a way that avoids ensnaring prior art if it is possible
to do so.’”1415  This is an easily understandable presumption:  since the
patent office issued the patent after an interactive exchange with the
applicant and an administrative evaluation of patentability, the patent
itself is entitled to a substantial presumption of validity.1416  Therefore,
a claim construction that would “ensnar[e] prior art”1417 (i.e., render
the patent invalid) is likely incorrect, since the patent office should
be presumed to have done its job correctly and not to have issued
invalid patents or claims.
The canon is merely a presumption, as two recent cases from the
Federal Circuit demonstrate.  In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate
Systems, Inc.,1418 the panel noted the canon that the claims should be
construed to preserve validity, but concluded that in the instant case
it was impossible to do so because the only claim construction that
was consistent with the claim’s language and written description
rendered the claim invalid.1419  Similarly, in Elekta Instrument S.A. v.
O.U.R. Scientific International, Inc.,1420 the patentee argued that to
adopt the accused infringer’s construction of the patent would
render the independent claim in suit invalid as inoperative.1421
Putting aside the issues of validity and operability, the panel
concluded that the canon was inapplicable in any event, because the
claim “is susceptible of only one reasonable construction.”1422  In
                                                          
interpretation of dictionary definitions).
1414. See supra notes 1249-1268 and accompanying text (describing the use of a
means-plus-function argument).
1415. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1057, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1556, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
The authors’ law firm was counsel to Eastman Kodak in the latter case.
1416. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
1417. See Apple, 234 F.3d at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1057.
1418. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1419. See id. at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064 (explaining that in this instance,
the axiom does not apply and the claim is simply invalid).
1420. 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1421. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1422. Id. at 1309, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.  The panel declined to reach the
issues of validity and also found the record was unclear on the issue of operability.
See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
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short, the canon of construction favoring claim constructions
preserving the validity of the patent over those that do not applies
only where the intrinsic (and perhaps even extrinsic) evidence leaves
the claims truly unambiguous, i.e., “susceptible of only one
reasonable construction.”1423  As a result, it will be the rare case where
this canon is anything but confirmatory of the correct construction of
a patent claim.
Another canon of construction is the doctrine of claim
differentiation, which “creates a rebuttable presumption that each
claim in a patent has a different scope.”1424  Again, this canon is
understandable as a presumption, since it is more likely than not that
the patent applicant, in prosecuting separate claims in his
application, did not intend two of them to be superfluous to one
another.1425  However, that is not always the case.  Indeed, it is not
impossible, when one understands how patents get prosecuted to
allowance, to see how overlapping claims might eventually issue.  For
example, the applicant might amend a claim so that, even though it
uses different words than another claim in the patent, the claim ends
up coextensive with the other claim.1426  Or the applicant might make
a statement in the prosecution history that defines a term in an
independent claim so narrowly that it renders narrowing language in
a dependent claim to be superfluous.1427  For these reasons, claim
differentiation has to be at most a rebuttable presumption, and
certainly not a conclusive one.
This point was illustrated in Kraft Foods, Inc. v. International Trading
Co., where the patent was drawn to food-packaging trays.1428  The first
claim (claim 1) of the patent called for a “back panel” comprised of a
“flat relatively stiff planar sheet.”1429  Claim 2 also called for a “back
panel” (specifically, a “protecting back panel”), but did not expressly
                                                          
1423. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (holding the canon was inapplicable in
the instant case).
1424. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1014, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
1425. See, e.g., id. at 1342, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020 (noting that accepting
inventor’s stated intent of a broader scope in an independent claim eliminated
perceived redundancy of a second, dependent claim).
1426. See Kraft Food, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1368-69, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814, 1818-19 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that the doctrine’s
rebuttable presumption can be overcome by the written description and procedural
history).
1427. See Dow, 226 F.3d at 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019 (determining that in
situations where this arises, the limitations stated in a dependent claim should not
ordinarily be read into an independent claim).
1428. See Kraft, 203 F.3d at 1368, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
1429. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
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require the panel to be “relatively stiff.”1430  The district court
recognized the doctrine of claim differentiation, but concluded that
the written description and the prosecution history rebutted this
presumption.1431  The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that claim
differentiation “only creates a presumption that each claim in a
patent has a different scope; it is ‘not a hard and fast rule of
construction.’”1432  The panel went on to note that the fact “that the
claims are presumed to differ in scope does not mean that every
limitation must be distinguished from its counterpart in another
claim, but only that at least one limitation must differ.”1433
Similarly, the court in Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies,
Inc.,1434 found the presumption overcome on the record in that case,
holding that the terms “inner layer” and “inner body portion” meant
the same thing in different claims, as did the terms “border” and
“integral contrasting border” as used in different claims.1435  The
panel in Tate Access Floors also noted that “the doctrine of claim
differentiation cannot broaden claims beyond their permissible
scope,”1436 which is a curious statement as it presents the question of
whether the doctrine of claim differentiation can play a useful role in
determining the “permissible scope” of claims, when the “permissible
scope” is already fixed before the doctrine of claim differentiation is
applied.
A related (but nonetheless distinct) canon of construction is the
principle that a word or phrase used throughout a patent should
ordinarily be given a consistent meaning throughout.  In CAE
Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG,1437 the issue was the
correct interpretation of the claim term “bottom plane” in a
patent.1438  The Federal Circuit disagreed with the patentee’s
argument that this “bottom plane” did not require the presence of a
physical structure, but merely defined an area of space, noting that
all other references to a “plane” in the patent required a physical
                                                          
1430. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-18.
1431. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
1432. Id. at 1368, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (quoting Comark Communications,
Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
1433. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
1434. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1435. See id. at 967-69, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-20 (comparing the claims
terms used in the different claims).
1436. Id. at 968, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1437. 224 F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1438. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804 (explaining that the claim term referred
to a covering device used to screen contaminants from paper slurry).
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structure.1439  At the same time, the panel noted that “[i]n some cases,
a claim term can be given a different meaning in the various claims of
the same patent, when a patent so provides.”1440  It is perhaps only a
slight exaggeration to say that this principle amounts to a lukewarm
“rule” that the same claim term generally will be given the same
meaning throughout a patent, except when it will not.  As with some
of the Federal Circuit’s other rules and presumptions, this one seems
little more than a statement of the likely result over a large number of
cases, and not a rule that can be applied in any useful or predictable
way by courts or litigants.
B. Infringement
Generally, an accused device or method can infringe a claim in two
ways—literally, or under the doctrine of equivalents.  To establish a
claim of literal infringement, a patentee must be able to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that every single limitation of his
patent claim is literally, exactly present in the accused device or
method.1441  As a consequence, any deviation from the claim
limitation will preclude a finding of literal infringement.
If the patentee cannot sustain a claim of literal infringement, he
may nonetheless be able to sustain a claim of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.  The doctrine of equivalents allows
infringement to be found, even when all of the elements of the
patent are not literally present in the accused device or method,
where there is equivalence between the elements of the accused
device and the claimed elements of the patented invention.1442
For example, a hypothetical patent claim to a carrot cake which
called for specific quantities of flour, sugar, carrots, raisins, and
butter would be literally infringed by a cake actually containing the
same elements in the called-for quantities.  That same patent claim
                                                          
1439. See id. at 1317, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (“Given this character of the side
planes, there is little reason to believe that the third component ‘forming’ the
grooves, the bottom plane, does not also refer to a groove structure, particularly
when all three groove components include the term ‘plane.’”).
1440. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
1441. See KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1358, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1835, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Literal infringement of a claim occurs when
every limitation recited in the claim appears in the acused device, i.e., when ‘the
properly construed claim reads on the accused device exactly.’” (quoting Amhil
Enter., Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1476 (Fed.
Cir. 1996))).
1442. See id. at 1359 (“Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires that
the accussed product contain each limitation of the claim or its equivalent.”) (citing
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)  1865, 1875).
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might be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents by a cake actually
containing all of the same elements in the called-for quantities,
except that an identical quantity of margarine was substituted for the
called-for quantity of butter.  Likewise, the same claim might be
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents by a cake actually
containing all of the same elements in the called-for specific
quantities, except for somewhat less sugar.  But the vagaries
engendered by these “might bes” under the doctrine of equivalents
have proven to be frustrating for courts and litigants alike.
The court’s most significant infringement opinion in 2000, the en
banc ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
Ltd.,1443 imposed some discipline on the vagaries of the equivalence
analysis.  This decision is the focus of much of our discussion of the
doctrine of equivalents for the year 2000, and it will be the focus of
the Supreme Court in its October 2001 Term.
1. Literal infringement
As noted above, an infringement inquiry consists of two steps—
legal claim construction, followed by factual comparison of the
accused device or method to the terms of the properly construed
claim.1444  When it comes to questions of literal infringement, the
disputes are largely resolved at the legal, claim-construction step, for
often there is no dispute between the parties as to the structure or
steps performed by the accused device or method.1445  Consequently, a
fair number of literal-infringement claims should be amenable to
summary judgment—if the literal-infringement claim involves a legal
determination of patent claim construction and an application of
that legal determination to the undisputed material facts of what the
accused device is (or what the accused method does), then there
should be no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and application
of these undisputed material facts should demonstrate that one party
or the other is entitled to judgment of literal infringement, or no
                                                          
1443. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
1444. See Purdue Pharm. L.P. v. Faulding, Inc. 230 F.3d 1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654,
669, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (clarifing that claim
construction is a question of law reviewed de novo while comparing the properly
construed claims to the accused device is a question of fact reviewed for clear error).
1445. See e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to
Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1187-88 (1999) (“[O]nce the
asserted claims of a patent have been construed fully as to any disputed terms, the
existence of literal infringement can frequently be determined as a matter of law
because the structure and operation of the accused device are rarely subject to
genuine evidentiary dispute.”) (footnotes omitted).
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literal infringement, as a matter of law.1446  As Judge Michel wrote in a
recent edition of this Law Review, “The role of summary judgment in
modern patent cases is difficult to overestimate.  Recent changes in
claim construction methodology have increased the number of issues
and, indeed, the number of cases amenable to final disposition on
summary judgment.”1447
Judge Michel’s statement is borne out by the cases.  Of the Federal
Circuit’s ninety-four published patent opinions in the year 2000, fifty-
one of them addressed issues of literal infringement.  Of those fifty-
one cases, the district court resolved the literal-infringement issues on
a motion for summary judgment in thirty of them.1448  Three others
came up to the Federal Circuit on judgments of no literal
infringement, to which the patentees’ stipulated, after the district
                                                          
1446. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (listing the criteria for granting summary judgment).
1447. Michel, supra note 1445, at 1187.
1448. See Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Bottom Line Mgmt. v. Pan Man, Inc., 228
F.3d 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v.
Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Caterpillar, Inc. v.  Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co., 224
F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2000); KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic
Concept, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hilgraeve
Corp. v. McAfee Assoc., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Rotec Indus., Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Vehicular Tech., Inc. v. Titan Wheel Int’l,
Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Bayer AG v. Elan
Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000); STX, LLC v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,
Inc., 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Optical Disk Corp.
v. Del Mar Avionics, Inc., 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2000); IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d
1422, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v.
Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 203 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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court construed the patent claims as a matter of law.1449  Although it
may be a mistake to extrapolate those figures across the entirety of
the Federal Circuit’s patent caseload (in part because summary
judgment records may provide “cleaner” or superior vehicles for the
court to issue published opinions, whereas “black box” jury verdicts
may be less attractive candidates for full published-opinion
dispositions), the numbers are nonetheless striking and indicate just
how many patent-infringement disputes are now amenable to
disposition on summary judgment.
A cursory affidavit from an expert will not prevent summary
judgment in patent cases.  In Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom
Ltd.,1450 the patent term at issue called for “a time-space-time (TST)
switch.”1451  In response to Northern Telecom’s (NorTel’s) motion for
summary judgment, in which it asserted that its accused device did
not infringe the Collins patents, NorTel stated that “Collins [the
patentee] asserted that NorTel’s [accused] DMS switches have either
a JNET or an ENET switching fabric, and that both JNET and ENET
are TST switches.”1452  Collins also produced an expert declaration
that the “JNET is a TST.”1453  The Federal Circuit held that the
expert’s conclusory assertion was insufficient to defeat summary
judgment, reasoning that “[a] party may not avoid that rule by simply
framing the expert’s conclusion as an assertion that a particular
critical claim limitation is found in the accused device.”1454  Thus, the
expert’s testimony was effectively disregarded because Collins’ expert
framed his conclusion without any “explanation of why JNET’s
structure renders it a TST switch in his view,”1455 and because, “[t]o
                                                          
1449. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 864, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the parties entered into a
stipulation after the district court provided construction of claim limitations, but that
district court made no findings of fact regarding infringement); Hockerson-
Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 954, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1487, 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting appellant stipulated to non-infringement after
district court’s claim construction); Canton Bio-Medical, Inc. v. Integrated Liner
Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(noting that appellant agreed that appellees’ method for binding “uncured”
elastomers did not literally infringe on patented covering process).
1450. 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1451. See id. at 1044, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1452. Id. at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
1453. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.  Collins’ expert also asserted that NorTel’s
ENET has “data memories” that are “interconnected in a switched matrix,” and that
“[s]uch a switching matrix is called a space switch.”  See id. at 1048, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1148 (emphasis in original).  This assertion was also found insufficient to
defeat summary judgment.  See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1454. Id. at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citations omitted).
1455. Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1046, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the extent that [Collins’ expert’s] construction of the term ‘TST
switch’ can be discerned from his several submissions to the district
court, his construction was broader than the one we have
adopted.”1456  Although the court noted that the sufficiency of an
expert affidavit to defeat summary judgment is a question of regional
circuit law,1457 the court also laid out some ground rules for a
sufficient expert affidavit:
When, as here, the construction of a critical claim limitation is in
dispute, a party may not avoid summary judgment simply by
offering an opinion of an expert that states, in effect, that the
critical claim limitation is found in the accused device.  Although
such testimony of an expert witness may be proper during trial
when the opposing party can challenge the factual basis of the
expert’s opinion during cross-examination, . . . the affidavit of an
expert submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
must do more by “set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. . .”  Thus, the expert must set forth the
factual foundation for his opinion—such as a statement regarding
the structure found in the accused product—in sufficient detail for
the court to determine whether that factual foundation would
support a finding of infringement under the claim construction
adopted by the court, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor
of the nonmovant.1458
Nonetheless, there remain some cases where there is truly a
material dispute as to the precise structure, qualities, or operation of
the accused product or process, such that a factfinder will have to
address the issue.  In Hilgraeve Corp. v. McAfee Associates, Inc.,1459
Hilgraeve held a patent on a computer virus protection program and
alleged that McAfee’s virus detection product, VirusScan, infringed
on it.1460  The district court’s claim construction required data
“storage” to occur after the data was “screened,” noting that “the
critical issue in the infringement analysis is whether VirusScan
screens before, or after, the time at which incoming data is present
on the destination storage medium and accessible by the operating
system and other programs.”1461  The parties submitted affidavits
about the operation of VirusScan from experts who had tested
                                                          
1456. Id. at 1047, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1457. See id. at 1048, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1458. Id. at 1047-48, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (citations omitted) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
1459. 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1460. Id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1461. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658 (indicating that neither party
disputed the district court’s claim construction).
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VirusScan and interpreted its source code.  The Federal Circuit
concluded that summary judgment was improper because these
experts’ testimony was in conflict on material factual issues.1462
Even beyond summary judgment cases, it remains clear that the
lion’s share of infringement disputes in patent cases are claim-
construction disputes, not truly factual ones, as illustrated in Hill-Rom
Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,1463 which arose after a bench trial.1464 After
holding in Section II of its opinion that the claim term “cushion”
necessarily carried with it the requirement of having “supporting”
and “comforting” qualities,1465 the panel, in Section III of its opinion,
addressed the parties’ factual infringement contentions.1466  The court
noted that “Hill-Rom’s principal theory of infringement is answered
by the district court’s claim construction, which we adopt.”1467  The
court also rejected Hill-Rom’s “alternative argument,” which was truly
a factual one:  Hill-Rom urged that—even under the district court’s
claim construction—the accused hospital beds still infringed because
the inflatable bladders on the bed, while they do make a patient “less
comfortable” than the patented bed, nonetheless “can still be said to
provide basic support and comfort.”1468  The court rejected this
“alternative argument” in short order as contrary to the district
court’s findings that the accused bladders “do not provide basic
comfort and support for the patient.”1469
Compared to the number of presumptions, doctrines, and rules
applicable to patent claim construction, the Federal Circuit’s patent
opinions in 2000 yielded relatively few elucidations of similar
doctrines applicable to the factual second step of literal infringement
analysis.  One such doctrine that was the subject of some discussion
in 2000, however, was the “rule” that the presence of additional
elements in the accused device (or additional steps in the accused
method) will not avoid a finding of infringement.  In Tate Access
                                                          
1462. See id. at 1352-54, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659-61 (reversing grant of
summary judgment, based on differences in expert’s descriptions of appellees’ virus
protection software).
1463. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1464. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (demonstrating how the factual
infringement inquiry is typically largely grounded in disputes not over facts, but
about the legal construction of patent claims).
1465. See id. at 1340-42, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439-41 (rejecting Hill-Rom’s
arguments and holding that the trial court correctly construed the term “cushion” to
mean a structure that provides basic support and comfort).
1466. See id. at 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1441.
1467. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1468. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1469. Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc.,1470 where the patent was drawn
to a floor panel having an “integral” border, the accused infringer
argued that the border on its accused floor panel was not “integral”
because it must be painted.1471  The Federal Circuit disagreed since
“the addition of paint does not eliminate a limitation or inherent
feature of the claim, Maxcess may not avoid infringement by merely
adding paint to the border of its floor panel.”1472
Likewise, in Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,1473 the
panel explained that this general rule applies unless the claims are
properly construed to exclude the possibility of an additional
element, noting that “if a patent requires A, and the accused device
or process uses A and B, infringement will be avoided only if the
patent’s definition of A excludes the possibility of B.”1474  Statements
that merely note a distinction between A and B are not helpful to
avoid infringement because what matters is that that A and B must be
mutually exclusive, not that the patent describes A and B as
different.1475
Such “mutually exclusive” claim drafting often appears in patent
claims containing numerical limitations.  Thus, in Jeneric/Pentron, Inc.
v. Dillon Co., Inc.,1476 where the patent claims required “a two-phase
dental porcelain composition with 0-1% cerium oxide,” there was no
infringement by a composition containing 1.61% cerium oxide.1477
The patentee nonetheless argued that the accused infringer’s
composition contained “0-1%” cerium oxide, because the total
                                                          
1470. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1471. See id. at 970, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1472. Id. (comparing Suntiger, Inc. v. Blublocker Corp., 189 F.3d 1327, 1336, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court erred
by finding different color coating on lens changed an inherent property) with
Insituform Techs. Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1106, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1602, 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that adding elements will prevent a
finding of literal infringement where the claim is specific and adding elements
eliminates an inherent feature of the claim)).
1473. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1474. Id. at 1296-97, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
1475. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065 (“The addition of features does not
avoid infringement, if all the elements of the patent claims have been adopted.”); see
also Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1057, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1434, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Adding features to an accused device will not result in
noninfringement if all the limitations in the claims, or equivalents thereof, are
present in the accused device.”); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.3d 700,
703, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 965, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“It is fundamental that one
cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements if each element recited in the
claims is found in the accused device.”)).
1476. 205 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1477. See id. at 1382-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (agreeing with the district
court’s determination that Jeneric had not shown a reasonable likelihood of success
on literal infringement).
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amount of cerium oxide was best understood as consisting of two
components:  “The first—0.92% of cerium oxide—acts as an
antigreening agent and, thus, falls within the 0-1% range of claim 1.
The remaining—0.69% of cerium oxide—acts as an opacifying or
fluorescing agent in a third phase outside the claimed two-phase
matrix.”1478  Here, the ordinary principle, that additional elements in
the accused infringing product do not prevent infringement, was
inapplicable, because the patentee had specified a precise range of
percentages in the claim.1479  Jeneric’s infringement theory essentially
proposes that the precisely claimed ranges do not limit the amount of
porcelain compositions, but this theory would read out of claim 1 the
express claim ranges.1480
Issues under the second, factual prong of the infringement analysis
are more prevalent with respect to infringement of “means-plus-
function” claim elements under Section 112, paragraph 6 of the
Patent Act.1481  Infringement of such a claim element requires the
factfinder to determine that the “structure, material, or acts
described in the specification” corresponding to the “means or step
for performing a specified function,” or “equivalents thereof,” are
present in the accused device.1482  “[E]quivalents thereof” under
Section 112, paragraph 6 will literally infringe a means-plus-function
claim element and it is therefore theoretically possible for an
equivalent (under the Doctrine) of an equivalent (under the statute)
to infringe a means-plus-function claim element.1483  The Federal
Circuit, in Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,1484  reiterated the
                                                          
1478. Id. at 1382, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
1479. See id. at 1282-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (rejecting any attempt to
carve out a portion of cerium oxide according to functions not recited in the claim).
1480. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
1481. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed
to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.”).
1482. Id.
1483. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting use of term “equivalent” in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
differs from use of term in “doctrine of equivalents,” as term is used in 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6 can lead to literal infringement, whereas doctrine of equivalents is a
different type of patent infringement); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d
1009, 1021 n.4, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1118 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J.,
additional views) (citing David R. Todd, How Modern Treatment of 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)
Has Caused Confusion:  Hilton Davis v. Warner-Jenkinson and the Right to a Jury on the
Issue of Patent Infringement Under the “Equitable” Doctrine of Equivalents, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 141, 156 & n.74).
1484. 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308, reh’g en banc denied, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12710 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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approach to infringement analysis under Section 112, paragraph 6 in
a discussion that aptly captures both the infringement standard
under Section 112, paragraph 6 and the overlap and interplay
between the “equivalents” of Section 112, paragraph 6 and
“equivalents” under the doctrine of equivalents:
In order for an accused structure to literally meet a section 112,
paragraph 6 means-plus-function limitation, the accused structure
must be either the same as the disclosed structure or be a section
112, paragraph 6 “equivalent,” i.e., (1) perform the identical
function and (2) be otherwise insubstantially different with respect
to structure. . . . Under a modified version of the function-way-
result methodology described in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co.
v. Linde Air Products Co., . . . two structures may be “equivalent” for
purposes of section 112, paragraph 6 if they perform the identical
function, in substantially the same way, with substantially the same
result. . . .
If an accused structure is not a section 112, paragraph 6
equivalent of the disclosed structure because it does not perform
the identical function of that disclosed structure and hence does
not literally infringe, it may nevertheless still be an “equivalent”
under the Doctrine of Equivalents.  Thus, if one applies the
traditional function-way-result test, the accused structure must
perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same
way, to achieve substantially the same result, as the disclosed
structure.  A key feature that distinguishes “equivalents” under
section 112, paragraph 6 and “equivalents” under the doctrine of
equivalents is that section 112, paragraph 6 equivalents must
perform the identical function of the disclosed structure . . . .
Because the “way” and “result” prongs are the same under both
the section 112, paragraph 6 and Doctrine of Equivalents tests, a
structure failing the section 112, paragraph 6 test under either or
both prongs must fail the Doctrine of Equivalents test for the same
reason(s). . . .1485
Thus, in Kemco, the court concluded that the district court had
correctly held that no reasonable jury could have found the accused
envelope to be infringing, either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents:
[B]oth the accused and disclosed structures perform the identical
function, which is to close the envelope.  However, unlike the
disclosed flap, which closes by folding over the envelope, the dual-
lip structure closes the accused envelope in a different way by
meeting together and binding via the internal adhesive.  The
                                                          
1485. Id. at 1364, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315-16 (citations and footnote omitted).
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accused structure’s different way of closing also yields a
substantially different result.  The first and second sealing means in
the disclosed structure are ultimately attached to the outside of the
envelope.  In contrast, the first sealing means in the TripLok
envelope is internally attached to the two lips of the dual-lip
structure, thereby sealing the envelope.1486
As a result of these substantial differences of “way” and “result,” the
accused dual-lip structure was held to be neither a section 112,
paragraph 6 equivalent nor an equivalent under the doctrine of
equivalents.1487
Two cases from 2000 addressed the specific acts that will constitute
patent infringement.  Section 271(a) of the Patent Act provides that
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.”1488  Until recently, the definition of
infringement was limited to making, using, or selling the patented
invention, but offers to sell and importation were added as acts of
infringement as of January 1, 1996.1489  Thus, the patent bar has only
recently had to grapple with proving infringement by importation,
and in particular the relationship of process patents to infringement
by importation.  This has meant coming to grips with some relatively
new statutes that help to define specific acts of infringement.
In Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,1490 the statutory issue
of first impression was the meaning of Section 271(g) of the Patent
Act, which provides:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers
to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is
made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as
an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the
product occurs during the term of such process patent. . . .1491
The accused infringer, Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM), argued
that its imported bacteria were not imported “without authority,”
                                                          
1486. Id. at 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
1487. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316 (holding “the dual-lip structure is not a
section 112, paragraph 6 equivalent of a fold-over flap because the ‘way’ and ‘result’
are substantially different; accordingly, the dual-lip structure also can not be an
equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents”).
1488. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
1489. See Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4089, 4988 (codified as 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a))(revising definition of infringement to include offers to sell or import
patented materials).
1490. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1957 (U.S. 2001).
1491. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1994).
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because a Soviet Union authority had authorized ADM’s purveyor to
use the patents exclusively to manufacture the bacteria in several
Scandinavian and nearby countries, and to sell and use the produced
bacteria non-exclusively everywhere else in the world, except the
United States and Japan.1492  The Federal Circuit rejected ADM’s
argument, stating that Section 271(g) applies to unauthorized actions
within the United States and it is irrelevant that authorization to
produce the product came from outside of the United States.1493
When the process used abroad is the same as the process that the
patent in the United States covers, liability for infringement arises
only upon importation, sale or offers, or use in the United States.1494
Consequently, the court held ADM liable for infringement when
ADM imported its particular bacteria strain because the process that
ADM used was the same as a process covered by a U.S. patent.1495
Another relatively new statututory provision, Section 295 of the
Patent Act,1496 was addressed by the Federal Circuit for the first time
in 2000.  This section is likely to be a particularly useful statute for
patent holders in infringement-by-importation cases.  For example, in
Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties and Food Ingredients GmbH v. International
Trade Commission,1497 the Federal Circuit noted that this burden-
shifting mechanism serves two purposes—it “works for the benefit of
the patentee” by shifting the burden (upon a sufficient showing) to
the accused infringer to prove that his accused process was in fact not
                                                          
1492. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1347-48, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339  (noting that
the license “to A.C. Biotechnics granted the exclusive right to use the licensed strain,
knowledge and patents for the purpose of manufacturing of L-threonine in the
territory [Belgium, Denmark, Finland, FRG, Holland, Iceland, Luxemburg, Norway,
and Sweden] and the non-exclusive right to use and sell L-threonine, thus produced
in the territory and the zone of non-exclusive right [worldwide except the U.S.A. and
Japan]”) (citation omitted).
1493. See id. at 1348, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1494. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (indicating the point at which
infringement occurs under § 271(g) of the Patent Act).
1495. See id. (noting that importation occurred without authorization of the patent
holder).
1496. See 35 U.S.C. § 295 (1994), providing that:
In actions alleging infringement of a process patent based on the
importation, sale, offer for sale, or use of a product which is made from a
process patented in the United States, if the court finds—
(1) that a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the
patented process, and
(2) that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process
actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so
determine,
the product shall be presumed to have been so made, and the burden of
establishing that the product was not made by the process shall be on the
party asserting that it was not so made.
1497. 224 F.3d 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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infringing, and “it also serves the needs of the court as a mechanism
for enforcing its processes and orders” by “provid[ing] the trial court
with a potent weapon to use against a non-cooperative defendant.”1498
In Nutrinova, an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the International
Trade Commission found, as a matter of fact, that the patent holder
(Nutrinova) had “failed to satisfy the second prong of § 295.”1499
Notwithstanding Nutrinova’s submission of test results which it said
were inconclusive (because they did not remove the possibility that
post-processing treatment might have changed the residual by-
products), in the ALJ’s view, “Nutrinova could, in fact, reasonably
determine from testing whether the acesulfame potassium produced
at that facility was manufactured by the [patented] process.”1500  The
court noted that this finding was not erroneous, but supported by
substantial evidence, because the Section 295 inquiry “is not
determined subjectively by the plaintiff, but is determined objectively
by the court.”1501
The court punctuated its discussion of Section 295 with an
interesting footnote, noting the possibility that Section 295 provides
that the burden shifts “if the court finds” the two prongs satisfied, the
panel said:  “It is possible that § 295 does not apply to proceedings
before the ITC, since the statute on its face applies to courts, not
agencies.1502  The court further noted that since the Commission did
not raise this point, it is treated as waived for purposes of this
opinion.1503  Thus it remains plausible that, in a future case where the
issue is not waived, the Federal Circuit could hold that Section 295
(or, for that matter, any other patent statute addressed to “courts”)
does not apply to proceedings before the International Trade
Commission (ITC), which is not, technically, a “court.”1504  Such a
result, however, would render a highly useful statute inapplicable to
an institution which deals exclusively with imports—a context where
the burden-shifting mechanism of Section 295 is most salutary, since
the accused infringer is often not even subject to the jurisdiction of
                                                          
1498. Id. at 1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1499. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1500. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1501. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1502. See id. at 1359-60 n.1, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954 n.1 (pointing out the
language of § 295 that states that the burden shifts “if the court finds” the two prongs
satisfied).
1503. See Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 224 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 n.1, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1951, 1954 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
1504. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994) (discussing composition of the International
Trade Commission).
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the ITC for discovery and other purposes (the ITC has in rem, not in
personam, jurisdiction).1505
Not applying Section 295 to ITC proceedings would also arguably
be inconsistent with the approach taken by the Federal Circuit in
Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc.,1506 where the court held that ITC
proceedings were “litigation” as that term was used in a license
agreement between the parties.1507  Indeed, if Section 295 were held
not to apply to the ITC, it would yield the strange result that its
burden-shifting mechanism would be forbidden to the ITC, but could
be applied by the Federal Circuit (which is indubitably a “court”),
which reviews ITC decisions.1508  The better view is the one that the
ITC seemingly adopted.  The ITC did not even raise this as an issue
in the Nutrinova case, thus indicating that the ITC considers itself
bound by Section 295 as a court.
2. Infringement by equivalents
The most significant infringement developments in 2000 came,
without a doubt, in the area of infringement by equivalents.  The
doctrine of equivalents (sometimes abbreviated as the “DOE”)
prevents an accused infringer from avoiding liability for patent
infringement by making only minor or insubstantial changes to an
invention covered by the claims of a patent, thereby avoiding literal
infringement while retaining the invention’s “essential identity.”1509
As Judge Learned Hand wrote over fifty years ago, the doctrine of
equivalents is utilized “to temper unsparing logic and prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention.”1510  The doctrine
is hotly contested, as it must strike a delicate balance between
                                                          
1505. See 19 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (stating, for example, that the ITC may invoke
the aid of any U.S. court in requiring attendance and testimony of witnesses).
1506. 231 F.3d 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1507. See id. at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79 (concluding that the term
“litigation” in the governing law clause of the license agreement includes section 337
procedings at the ITC).
1508. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (1994) (“The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . to review the final
determinations of the United States International Trade Commission relating to
unfair practices in import trade, made under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1337)”); see also Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1676 (stating that “the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over ITC
determinations made under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930”).
1509. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Grover Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 399 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)).
1510. Id. at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting Grover Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)) (in turn quoting Royal Typewriter
Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 517, 518 (2d
Cir. 1948)).
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ensuring that the patentee enjoys the full benefit of his patent
without opportunistic poaching by competitors, while at the same
time ensuring that the public receives “‘fair notice’ of the patent’s
scope.”1511  Or, as the Supreme Court has put it:  “There can be no
denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly,
conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the
statutory claiming requirement.”1512
In 1996 and 1997, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
attempted to resolve some of these inherent conflicts.  In retrospect,
neither effort was terribly successful.  In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co.,1513 the Federal Circuit held that, in addition to
the well-established function-way-result test,1514 a product or process
may also infringe if it contains an element with “insubstantial
differences” from the claimed element.1515  The authors of a prior
Area Summary in this Law Review remarked that the Federal Circuit
in Hilton Davis held that “there is simply no definitive test for
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”1516  The Federal
Circuit in Hilton Davis did recognize the evidentiary value of evidence
such as “copying,” “independent development,” and “designing
around,” but refused to impose any threshold evidentiary showing as
a prior requirement.1517  Over vehement dissents from Judge Plager,1518
among others,1519 the en banc court refused to impose an “equitable”
                                                          
1511. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting London v. Carson Pirie Scott &
Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458-59 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1512. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
1513. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (per
curiam), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
1514. See id. at 1518, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (noting a product or process will
infringe a patent claim under the doctrine of equivalents if it performs substantially
the same function as the claimed device or process, in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same result).
1515. See id. at 1517-18, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45 (noting that in recent
decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stressed the significance
of the “insubstantial differences” standard).
1516. Michael L. Leetzow et. al., 1996 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 46
AM. U. L. REV. 1675, 1762 (1997).
1517. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1527, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53 (stating that
neither evidence of copying, nor independent development, nor “designing around”
has relevance to the state of mind of the accused infringer in a doctrine of
equivalents analysis because infringement is a strict liability offense).
1518. See id. at 1536, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (Plager, J., dissenting) (opinion
joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judges Rich and Lourie) (differing with the
majority as to whether the function-way-result test is a proper analysis).  Judge Plager
offers an alternative to assess substantiality, such that “other objective indicia may be
considered, such as the known interchangeability of the accused and claimed
elements by persons reasonably skilled in the art; whether there is evidence of
intentional copying; and whether there is evidence of an attempt to design around
the patented matter.”  Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
1519. See id. at 1545, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (opinion
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limitation or threshold on application of the Doctrine, such that a
finding of “fraud on the patent” or knowing copying would be
required before a judge could apply the doctrine of equivalents.1520
Relatedly, the court also concluded that application of the doctrine
of equivalents was a factual question of infringement for a properly
instructed jury.1521  This conclusion, too, was met with stern objection
from dissenters.1522
The Supreme Court took the case, and, in 1997, reversed the
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.1523  The most
significant developments in the Supreme Court’s opinion were:  (1)
creation of a presumption that any amendment to a patent claim
invokes prosecution-history estoppel, which would become conclusive
unless the patentee could establish that the amendment was not
made for “a substantial reason relating to patentability;”1524 (2)
confirmation that the Federal Circuit’s long-standing “all elements
rule” imposed a significant and required limitation on application of
the doctrine of equivalents;1525 and, (3) suggestion that the doctrine
of equivalents could not be allowed such free play as to “vitiate” a
claim element “in its entirety.”1526  The Supreme Court also rejected
Warner-Jenkinson’s attempt to impose other limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents, such as the “equitable” role envisioned by
Judge Plager, a threshold requirement of “proof of intent” to copy or
infringe, or an “independent experimentation” defense.1527  The
Supreme Court also refused to limit the Doctrine to “equivalents that
                                                          
joined by Judges Rich and Plager) (dissenting because trial judge did not properly
instruct jury on doctrine of equivalents); id. at 1550, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672-73
(Nies, J., dissenting) (opinion joined in part by Chief Judge Archer) (dissenting
because Supreme Court precedent indicates that under the “doctrine of
equivalents,” questions of law and fact still exist and the meaning of the words of the
claim must be defined by the court).
1520. See id. at 1519-20, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47 (holding lack of
substantial differences, rather than the accused infringer’s motives or intent, triggers
application of the doctrine of equivalents).
1521. See id. at 1522, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648-49 (emphasizing that
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact for a jury and for a
judge in a bench trial).
1522. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1543,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1666 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (Plager, J.,
dissenting) (noting that doctrine of equivalents is equitable in nature and, since
juries do not exercise equitable powers, the doctrine of equivalents was not a factual
question of infringement for a properly instructed jury, contrary to the majority’s
holding).
1523. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (leaving
the heart of the en banc court’s ruling largely intact even after the reversal).
1524. Id. at 33.
1525. See id. at 28-30.
1526. See id. at 39 n.8.
1527. See id. at 35-40.
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are disclosed within the patent itself,” reasoning that evaluation of
equivalency should occur at the time of infringement rather than at
the issuance of the patent.1528
The Court did not otherwise disturb the en banc court’s
determinations, but noted its concern that the doctrine of
equivalents has “taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent
claims,”1529 and that it expected that “[a] focus on individual elements
and a special vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to
eliminate completely any such elements should reduce considerably
the imprecision of whatever language is used” to describe the
equivalence analysis, whether it be the “triple identity test” (function-
way-result) or the “insubstantial differences” test.1530  The court
declined to “micromanag[e] the Federal Circuit’s particular word
choice for analyzing equivalence,” and instead left it with the power
to refine the equivalence test by using case-by-case determinations.1531
We have noted the increasingly important role of summary
judgment in literal infringement cases.  The same is true in doctrine
of equivalents cases.1532  The Supreme Court, in Warner-Jenkinson,
presaged the importance of summary-judgment practice in
equivalents cases:
With regard to the concern over unreviewability due to black-box
jury verdicts, we offer only guidance, not a specific mandate.
Where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could
determine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged
to grant partial or complete summary judgment. . . .  Of course, the
various legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of
equivalents are to be determined by the court, either on a pretrial
motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment
as a matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the jury
verdict. . . . Thus, under the particular facts of a case, if prosecution
history estoppel would apply or if a theory of equivalence would
entirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete
judgment should be rendered by the court, as there would be no
further material issue for the jury to decide.1533
                                                          
1528. See id. at 37 (discussing the proper time for evaluating infringements).
1529. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28-29
(1997) (explaining that the doctrine of equivalents has been broadened by patent
claims).
1530. See id. at 40 (providing various methods and tools that courts can employ to
limit the doctrine of equivalents).
1531. See id. (placing confidence in the Federal Circuit to refine the equivalents
test).
1532. See supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of
summary judgment in the Federal Circuit).
1533. 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (citations omitted).
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This is easier said than done.  Recent decisions have confirmed the
difficulty of successfully applying the “function-way-result” test or the
“insubstantial differences” test to resolve equivalence infringement
cases on summary judgment.1534  In Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co.,1535
the panel reversed a summary judgment of noninfringement and
remanded for a trial under Section 112, paragraph 6 equivalents and
under the doctrine of equivalents, concluding that the district judge
had impermissibly resolved conflicting issues of material fact on
summary judgment.1536  Judge Plager, long the Federal Circuit’s
leading spokesman for limiting and rationalizing the doctrine of
equivalents, wrote a concurring opinion that aptly sums up many of
the perceived problems with the doctrine of equivalents as it had
been operating:
I join the opinion and concur in the conclusion that this case must
be returned for trial, but I do so without enthusiasm.  If the trial
judge sat as the trier of fact, I would find his assessment of the facts
unimpeachable.  But he does not.  Instead, under the rules as we
now have them, and because the patentee’s lawyer did a good job
of building a record of arguably disputable facts, the matter (unless
settled) will now go to a jury before whom there will be a lengthy
and costly battle of the experts.  The jury will then pick a winner; it
may be the judge’s winner, or it may not.  In either event, the case
provides a textbook example of the insubstantial nature of the
“insubstantial differences” test, and its marginally legitimate child,
“substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result,”
on which the outcome will turn.  May the best lawyer win.1537
The court confronted similar problems in the course of reversing a
grant of summary judgment in Optical Disk Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics.1538
One of the issues in the case, which involved compact disc (CD)
technology, was whether the claims’ requirement of a “ramped
trailing edge” was met by an equivalent in the accused device, a
double-step trailing edge (which had a different geometric shape
than the single-step “ramped trailing edge” called out by the
claims).1539  The district court analogized the case to Tronzo v. Biomet,
                                                          
1534. See, e.g., Vehicular Tech. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1383,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1844-45 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (“This
case presents the difficult problem of performing a doctrine of equivalents analysis
on the limited facts available for a motion of summary judgment.”).
1535. 224 F.3d 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1536. See id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311 (explaining the court’s rationale
for reversing the district court’s decision).
1537. Id. at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311 (Plager, J., concurring).
1538. 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1539. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Inc.,1540 essentitally concluding that where a patent calls for a specific
geometric shape in a claim element (e.g., “ramped trailing edge,” or,
as in Tronzo, a “conical” cup implant for a hip bone), that element
cannot be equivalent to a different geometrical shape (e.g., a double-
step trailing edge, or, as in Tronzo, a hemispheric implant).1541
The Federal Circuit rejected the analogy, concluding that Tronzo
used the conventional doctrine of equivalents law, which included
the “all elements” or “all limitations” rule.1542  The court
acknowledged that an expert for the patent holder submitted a
declaration and inspection report indicating his belief that the
double-step trailing edge of the accused CDs was equivalent to the
ramped trailing edge of the patent.1543  On much the same reasoning,
the court also reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of no equivalents infringement on another claim
element.1544
Similarly, in Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co.,1545 which did not
involve summary judgment but instead involved preliminary-
injunction practice, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s
denial of a preliminary injunction.1546  The district court had found
no realistic likelihood of success on the plaintiff’s infringement claim,
and as to literal infringement, the Federal Circuit discussed the issue
and agreed with the district court.1547  As to whether the patentee had
demonstrated a realistic likelihood of demonstrating infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit declined even
to reach the issue.1548  The court noted that although it affirmed the
district court’s decision to deny the preliminary injunction, it did not
use the doctrine of equivalents to reach the issue of infringement
                                                          
1540. 156 F.3d 1154, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1541. See Optical Disk, 208 F.3d at 1336-37, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297 (clarifying
the district court’s conclusions pertaining to specific geometric shapes).
1542. See id. at 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297 (rationalizing that Tronzo stated
no such black-letter rule).
1543. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298
Its function is to change the thermal profile at the ablative surface of the dye-
polymer disc master in the region of the trailing edge of the pit being
formed in that surface, by means of progressively reducing the energy
delivered to that surface in that region, to result in controlling the shape of
the trailing edge of that pit
Id.
1544. See id. at 1337-39, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298-99 (discussing the reversal of
the district court’s summary judgment).
1545. 205 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1546. See id. at 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1547. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1548. See id. at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (noting that the District Court
did not conduct an equivalents analysis).
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because it is a factual inquiry that is seldomly made clear on an
incomplete record.1549  This suggests that it will be the rare case
indeed when a patent holder will be able to establish a substantial
likelihood of success in an infringement case where his lone theory of
infringement is under the doctrine of equivalents.  Jeneric also
underscores the difficulty of making a conclusive infringement-by-
equivalents determination on anything less than a full trial record,
whether it be at the preliminary-injunction stage or on a motion for
summary judgment.1550
By contrast, summary rejection of infringement claims is much
easier on preliminary records when the issue can be resolved by
applying one of the legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.
Thus, in Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co.,1551 the court was able to affirm a
summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of
equivalents on two grounds: First, the district court correctly
concluded that no reasonable jury could find the elements of the
accused fishing reel to be insubstantially different from the
corresponding claimed limitation in the patent.1552  Second, the
patentee had, during prosecution, noted that a prior-art reel,
disclosed in the Duffelen patent, was “‘completely different than
applicant’s reel both in structure and function.’”1553  Noting that the
Duffelen patent disclosed a reel “very similar” to the accused reel, the
court concluded that Cortland’s statement makes clear that the
fishing reels were made using Duffelen’s teachings.1554  This latter
conclusion—essentially an application of argument-based
prosecution-history estoppel—foreshadowed the Federal Circuit’s en
banc elaborations of the doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel,
which came later in the year.1555
Indeed, the most significant developments in 2000 for the law of
equivalents involved not so much the application of the doctrine
itself, but limitations upon its application such as prosecution-history
estoppel, the all-elements rule, prior-art estoppel (as we have named
                                                          
1549. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (explaining the court’s reasons for not
using the doctrine of equivalents to deny the preliminary injunction).
1550. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (noting that the issue of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is a “highly factual inquiry”).
1551. 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1552. Id. at 1359, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
1553. Id. at 1360, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (quoting the language in the
prosecution history).
1554. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
1555. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564,
568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing the
doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel).
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it), an applicant’s failure to prosecute broader claims that he might
have otherwise successfully prosecuted, and—an issue that will be
taken up by the Federal Circuit en banc in 2001—“dedication to the
public.”  We address the significant developments in each of these
five areas below.
a. Prosecution-history estoppel
The doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel—also known, albeit
in more archaic usage, as “file-wrapper estoppel”1556—limits the scope
of patent protection available to a patentee under the doctrine of
equivalents.  It is, as the Federal Circuit describes, “one tool that
prevents the doctrine of equivalents from vitiating the notice
function of claims.”1557  It precludes a patentee using the doctrine of
equivalents from obtaining coverage of subject matter that the
patentee has relinquished during the prosecution of the patent
application.1558  Importantly, prosecution-history estoppel will bar a
claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents regardless of
whether the accused device or process meets the function-way-result
test or the “insubstantial differences” test.  For that reason, it is said
that “[t]he doctrine of equivalents is subservient to [prosecution-
history] estoppel.”1559  Additionally, since the court evaluates
prosecution-history estoppel on an objective reading of the
prosecution history,1560 and because it “is a question of law subject to
review without deference,”1561 prosecution-history estoppel can
provide a useful and litigation-saving threshold bar to an
infringement-by-equivalents claim which trial and appellate courts
can evaluate on motions for preliminary injunction or for summary
judgment.  The Federal Circuit noted that “[h]aving prosecution
history estoppel as a purely legal issue is consistent with fostering
certainty as to a patent’s scope, a consideration that is important for
                                                          
1556. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997).
1557. Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at  1869 (en banc) (citing
Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1526, 1529-30 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1558. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1559. Festo, 234 F.3d at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting Autogiro Co. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400-01, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 705 (1967)).
1560. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1254, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1555-56, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1616 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 867 F.2d 1572,
1576, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1561. KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1835, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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reliance by those in the marketplace.”1562
The policy reasons behind prosecution-history estoppel are largely
grounded in the public-notice function of patents.  “The logic of
prosecution history estoppel is that the patentee, during prosecution,
has created a record that fairly notifies the public that the patentee
has surrendered the right to claim particular matter as within the
reach of the patent.”1563  Thus, because the prosecution history of a
patent—beyond the initial application—consists primarily of
amendments and arguments made by the applicant, the Federal
Circuit has recognized two related, but nonetheless distinct, varieties
of prosecution-history estoppel:  estoppel by argument1564 and
estoppel by amendment.1565
“Argument-based estoppel” is the less controversial of the two
strains of prosecution-history estoppel.  Under the doctrine of
argument-based estoppel, “[a]rguments made voluntarily during
prosecution may give rise to prosecution history estoppel if they
evidence a surrender of subject matter.”1566  In KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic
Concepts, Inc.,1567 the patent applicant amended his claim by adding
two new clauses, and supplemented that amendment with remarks
that clearly indicated that the air mattress he was claiming had to
have airflow “throughout the entirety of the lower chamber.”1568  The
Federal Circuit concluded that the remarks “reflect a clear and
unmistakable surrender of mattresses without airflow ‘throughout the
entirety of the lower chamber.’”1569
The Federal Circuit applied the same “clear and unmistakable
surrender” standard, applied from the viewpoint of a “reasonable
competitor,” in another doctrine of equivalents case decided in 2000,
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp.1570  Bayer, which was
                                                          
1562. Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1254, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (citing Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) for the proposition that
“allowing claim construction to be a question of law promotes both uniformity and
certainty in the meaning of a patent’s claims”).
1563. Festo, 234 F.3d at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (providing the
underlying rationale of prosecution-history estoppel).
1564. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373,
1377, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Haynes Int’l, Inc. v.
Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1579, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652, 1657 (Fed. Cir.
1993), for the proposition that a wide range of activities can give rise to prosecution
history estoppel, including arguments submitted to obtain the patent).
1565. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-34
(1997) (describing the theory of estoppel by amendment).
1566. Festo, 234 F.3d at 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1567. 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1568. See id. at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42 (noting that the applicant
had surrendered claims to any air mattress that did not have this characteristic).
1569. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
1570. 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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authored by Judge Schall (later the author of Festo) involved Bayer’s
patent on a high-blood-pressure medication.1571 Bayer’s patent
claimed “an effective amount of nifedipine crystals with a specific
surface area of 1.0 to 4 m2/g, in admixture with a solid diluent, to
result in a sustained release of nifedipine.”1572  In connection with
amendments to the patent claim that added the specific-surface-area
range of “1.0 to 4 m2/g,” Bayer made “affirmative statements about
the superiority of the 1.0 to 4 m2/g range.”1573  Bayer went so far as to
call its claims directed to “‘a special form of nifedipine, namely,
having a specific surface area of 1.0 to 4 m2/g’.”1574  “In short, through
its statements to the PTO and the declarations it filed, Bayer made
statements of clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter
outside the claimed SSA range of 1.0 to 4 m2/g.”1575
The Federal Circuit also held that this “clear and unmistakable
surrender” standard was to be evaluated “with respect to how a
competitor would reasonably view the ‘446 patent’s prosecution
history.”1576  Rejecting Bayer’s claim that an expert declaration created
a genuine issue of material fact on how a competitor would view the
prosecution history, the court concluded that
testimony as to what a reasonable competitor would conclude from
the prosecution history cannot create a genuine issue of material
fact so as to bar summary judgment.  Such testimony is only a tool,
which the judge can use at his or her discretion, to aid in the legal
determination of prosecution history estoppel.1577
The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would transform
prosecution-history estoppel into a question of fact, in turn making
the standard of review more deferential than the well-established de
novo review applicable to prosecution-history estoppel issues.  In turn,
such a holding would “hamper the promotion of uniformity by
binding this court to the deference required with respect to fact
findings at the trial level.”1578  Although the court did not explicitly
mention it, treating prosecution-history estoppel as a purely legal
issue which is evaluated from an objective standpoint allows district
                                                          
1571. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
1572. Id. at 1246, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1573. Id. at 1252, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
1574. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
1575. Id. at 1253, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
1576. Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1254, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1711, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1577. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
1578. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (“[I]f claim construction had underlying
factual inquiries, the goal of national uniformity would be frustrated”) (citing Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1173-74
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
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courts free rein to grant summary judgment of noninfringement.
Concomitantly, such treatment prevents patentees from automatically
avoiding summary judgment by submitting expert affidavits, as Bayer
sought to do in that summary judgment case.1579
The more controversial arm of prosecution-history estoppel,
amendment-based estoppel, was addressed in Festo.  In 1988, Festo
Corporation sued Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (also
known as SMC Corporation) and SMC Pneumatics, Inc. in federal
court in Massachusetts.1580  Festo’s claim was that SMC had infringed
two of its patents relating to magnetically coupled rodless cylinders,
which are used to repeatedly move articles a short distance, most
typically in assembly lines.1581  The judge on summary judgment, and
later a jury, found infringement of both patents under the doctrine
of equivalents.1582  SMC appealed, and a panel of the Federal Circuit
(Judges Rich, Newman, and Michel) affirmed, relying in part on its
then-recent en banc decision in Hilton Davis.1583  Prosecution-history
estoppel was not an issue on this first appeal.1584
SMC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,1585 which
was granted by the Supreme Court following its decision in the
Warner-Jenkinson case.1586  The Supreme Court vacated the Federal
Circuit’s judgment, and remanded to the Federal Circuit for further
consideration in light of the Warner-Jenkinson decision.1587  This grant-
vacate-remand order, colloquially known as a “GVR,” allowed the
Federal Circuit to give further consideration to its decision in Festo
with the benefit of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Warner-
Jenkinson.1588  The Supreme Court issued GVR orders in two other
                                                          
1579. See id. (noting submission of affidavit of Professor Jorda).
1580. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361, 1364,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1386 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 187 F.3d 1381, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999), rev’d,  234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
1581. See id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
1582. See id. at 1365, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
1583. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 862, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court’s decision).
1584. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1161.
1585. The relevant question presented in SMC’s petition for certiorari was: “In a
patent case, can the statutory requirement for patent claims (35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2)
and the statutory restriction for correcting them (35 U.S.C. § 251, ¶ 4) be nullified
by the judicially created doctrine of equivalents?” See Festo, 172 F.3d at 1365, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting SMC’s petition for certiorari).
1586. Warner-Jenkinson Corp. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
1587. See Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp., 520 U.S. 1111
(1997).
1588. See generally Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996) (delineating the
Supreme Court’s GVR practices); Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193 (1996)
(same).
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equivalents cases at or around the same time.1589
The Federal Circuit ordered further briefing on the case,1590 and
heard reargument.  In connection with rebriefing and reargument,
SMC urged that the “new” presumption established by the Supreme
court in Warner-Jenkinson applied to bar Festo’s infringement claims
under the doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel.1591  SMC also
submitted additional materials, not previously part of the trial and
appeal record, dealing with possible estoppel under one of the two
patents in suit.1592  On April 19, 1999, the same panel (Judges Rich,
Newman, and Michel) issued a new opinion dealing with the doctrine
of equivalents.1593  With respect to one patent, it reinstated its earlier
judgment, and with respect to the other patent, the panel ruled that
the new evidentiary materials submitted by SMC—which the Federal
Circuit decided to allow into the record “[i]n full implementation of
the GVR”1594—needed to be considered by the district court to
determine “whether [the Warner-Jenkinson] presumption has arisen,
whether it can be rebutted, and the scope of any resultant
estoppel.”1595
The “scope” of any particular prosecution-history estoppel has
been a divisive issue in the Federal Circuit almost since that court’s
inception in 1982.1596  In the court’s first significant doctrine of
equivalents case, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,1597 the Federal
Circuit noted that some of the regional circuit courts of appeals
(which had jurisdiction over most patent-infringement cases prior to
the creation of the Federal Circuit) had “expressed the view that
virtually any amendment of the claims creates a ‘file wrapper
                                                          
1589. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. 1111 (1997); United States v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. 1211 (1997).
1590. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 117 F.3d 1385,
1386 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1591. See Festo, 172 F.3d at 1372, 1374, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392, 1394.
1592. See id. at 1378-80, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397-98 (evaluating SMC’s
arguments).
1593. See id. at 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
1594. Id. at 1380, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1595. Id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1596. See Note, To Bar or Not to Bar: Prosecution History Estoppel After Warner-
Jenkinson, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2330, 2331 (1998) (“The Federal Circuit has struggled
to answer [questions regarding the scope of prosecution-history estoppel] for some
time, and has been unable to do so in a consistent manner.”); Paul J. Otterstedt,
Unwrapping File Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit: A New Economic Policy Approach,
67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 405, 407 (1993) (“The Federal Circuit is currently divided over
whether the narrowing of claims during prosecution bars all resort to the doctrine of
equivalents.”).  See generally Glen K. Beaton, File Wrapper Estoppel and the Federal Circuit,
68 DENV. U. L. REV. 283, 284 (1991) (reviewing the policy of prosecution-history
estoppel).
1597. 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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estoppel’ effective to bar all resort to the doctrine of equivalents, and
to confine patentees ‘strictly to the letter of the limited claims
granted.’”1598  The panel in Hughes Aircraft rejected this “wooden
application of estoppel,”1599 choosing instead to follow a case-by-case
approach to estoppel, whereby,
 [d]epending on the nature and purpose of an amendment, it may
have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small
to zero.  The effect may or may not be fatal to application of a
range of equivalents broad enough to encompass a particular
accused product.  It is not fatal to application of the doctrine
itself.1600
But this was not the uniform approach of the Federal Circuit, as
another case decided just ten and a half months after Hughes Aircraft,
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.,1601 demonstrates.  Kinzenbaw was decided by
a five-judge panel1602 of the Federal Circuit consisting of then-Chief
Judge Markey and Judges Friedman, Rich, Davis and Baldwin.1603
Interestingly, the five-judge Kinzenbaw panel included all three judges
from the Hughes Aircraft panel—Chief Judge Markey and Judges Davis
and Baldwin.  The five-judge Kinzenbaw panel unanimously held—
and arguably contrary to Hughes Aircraft—that by “intentionally
narrow[ing] his claims in order to avoid the examiner’s rejection and
obtain the patent,” the patentee was properly estopped from
“avoid[ing] that limitation upon the claims through the doctrine of
                                                          
1598. Id. at 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481 (quoting Nationwide Chem. Corp. v.
Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 719, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1978)).
1599. Id. at 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
1600. Id. at 1363, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
1601. 741 F.2d 383, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1602. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1996)
In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of
cases and controversies by separate panels, each consisting of three
judges . . . . The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
determine by rule a procedure for the rotation of judges from panel to panel
to ensure that all of the judges sit on a representative cross section of the
cases heard and, notwithstanding the first sentence of this subsection, may determine
by rule the number of judges, not less than three, who constitute a panel.
Id. (emphasis added).
Although several of the Federal Circuit’s early cases, such as Kinzenbaw, involved
five-judge panels, that practice—though still authorized by statute and by court
rule—has fallen into disuse in the past several years.  But see 1 DONALD R. DUNNER ET
AL., COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.01, at
5-4 (2000) (opining, seemingly contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) and Federal Circuit
Rule 47.2(a), that “the court’s rules no longer provide for such augmented panels”).
1603. The Federal Circuit is the only court of appeals entitled to sit in sub-en banc
panels consisting of five judges.  See FED. CIR. R. 47.2(a) (“Cases and controversies
will be heard and determined by a panel consisting of an odd number of at least
three judges, two of whom may be senior judges of the court.”).
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equivalents.”1604  Although the patentee (Deere) “attempt[ed] to
avoid the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel on the ground that
[the inventor’s] limitation of his claims . . . was unnecessary to
distinguish the prior art,”1605 the Kinzenbaw panel “decline[d] to
undertake the speculative inquiry whether, if [the inventor] had
made only that narrowing limitation in his claim, the examiner
nevertheless would have allowed it.”1606
It was obvious that Hughes Aircraft and Kinzenbaw were not easily
reconcilable.  As three commentators, writing in the second of these
Area Summaries published in the American University Law Review,
noted at the time:
The Federal Circuit’s continued reluctance to define the precise
boundaries of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
exemplifies the court’s unease in dealing with certain issues that
were outside of the former CCPA’s jurisdiction.  Prior to this past
year, the Federal Circuit applied two divergent lines of authority
dealing with prosecution history estoppel.  The first, following the
lead case of Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, states that under
some circumstances, statements made during prosecution can be
ignored for purposes of estoppel.  The second, following the lead
case of Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., holds the patentee more firmly to
the representations he has made to the PTO.  No test is able to
predict adequately which line of authority the court will apply in a
given case.1607
The authors concluded that:
“[t]he Federal Circuit’s continued statements that it will be guided
in this area by ‘equitable and public policy principles’ and the facts
of the case are so broad and diffuse that they are essentially useless
as precedent.  No one can predict the outcome of a future case that
the court will evaluate under this anti-rule. . . .  The court’s vague
language in reality reflects the Federal Circuit’s inability to
articulate the criteria on which its decisions are actually based.  The
court’s continued reluctance to engage in the task of defining
those criteria may be the single largest failing of the court.”1608
                                                          
1604. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 933.
1605. Id., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 933.
1606. Id., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 933.
1607. Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., Patent Law Developments in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 861, 887-88 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
1608. Id. at 888-89 (footnotes omitted).  Similarly, other commentators had noted,
or been critical of, the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent approaches to prosecution-
history estoppel.  See, e.g., 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.05[3][b], at 18-492
(1998) (noting the development by the Federal Circuit of two lines of authority on
the scope of prosecution-history estoppel); Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit’s
Modern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 921
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Despite these divergent lines of authority, however, it is undeniable
that most (although not all) of the Federal Circuit’s post-Hughes
Aircraft-and-Kinzenbaw published decisions followed the “flexible”
approach of Hughes Aircraft rather than the “absolute bar” approach
of Kinzenbaw.1609
On June 9, 1999, less than two months after the panel’s decision on
remand from the Supreme Court, and while a petition for rehearing
en banc was pending in the Federal Circuit in Festo, one of the Festo
panel members, Judge Rich, died.1610  While it is uncertain what effect,
if any, Judge Rich’s departure had on the outcome of the Festo en banc
poll, it unquestionably did not reduce the number of votes required
to accept the case for en banc review.  His passing reduced by one the
number of active judges who could have participated in such a poll1611
from eleven to ten, but six votes in favor of en banc review were still
required.1612  A majority of eleven active judges would have been six
judges, but a majority of ten active judges also would have required
six votes.1613  Nonetheless, it is possible that Judge Rich’s passing may
have eased the way for the remaining members of the court to take
up the issue.  For not only was Judge Rich a legendary figure in the
history of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, the Circuit
Court of Patent Appeals (CCPA), but he was also the last active
member of the Federal Circuit from the Kinzenbaw panel, as well as
the author of another early Federal Circuit decision arguably
applying a complete-bar approach to prosecution-history estoppel.1614
                                                          
(1989); Note, To Bar or Not to Bar:  Prosecution History Estoppel After Warner-Jenkinson,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2330, 2336 (1998) (comparing the two approaches and arguing
that any attempt to harmonize them would be flawed).
1609. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ruling that prosecution-history estoppel does not
absolutely bar any equivalents to limitation added by amendment, nor does it bar a
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding
that an amendment of a patent claim during prosecution does not automatically bar
all equivalents for the element that is the subject of the amendment); see also Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 612-15, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1908-10 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Michel, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (collecting Federal Circuit cases from 1983-2000 applying flexible estoppel).
1610. See Bart Barnes, Giles S. Rich Dies at 95: Oldest Active Federal Judge in U.S. History:
As an Authority on Patent Law, He Helped Establish Legal Precedents for the Biotechnology
and Computer Industries, WASH. POST, June 11, 1999, at B6.
1611. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (providing that “a majority of the circuit judges in
regular active service” must agree to hear a case en banc) (emphasis added).
1612. See id. (indicating that a case will be accepted for en banc review only “if a
majority of the judges in regular active service agree to hear it en banc.”).
1613. See, e.g., United States v. Leichter, 167 F.3d 667, 667 (1st Cir. 1999) (“We
construe this language [in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)] to require
that an absolute majority of the court’s active judges vote in favor of the petition.”).
1614. See Prodyne Enter., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581, 223
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Whatever the effect of Judge Rich’s passing, the Federal Circuit
granted en banc review in Festo on August 20, 1999, only two months
after his death.1615  The court’s en banc order in Festo posed five
questions:
1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a
claim creates prosecution history estoppel, is “a substantial reason
related to patentability,”1616 limited to those amendments made to
overcome prior art under § 102 and § 103, or does “patentability”
mean any reason affecting the issuance of a patent?
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a “voluntary” claim
amendment—one not required by the examiner or made in
response to a rejection by an examiner for a stated reason—create
prosecution history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel,
under Warner-Jenkinson what range of equivalents, if any, is available
under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so
amended?
4. When “no explanation [for a claim amendment] is
established,”1617 thus invoking the presumption of prosecution
history estoppel under Warner-Jenkinson, what range of equivalents,
if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim
element so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate Warner-
Jenkinson’s requirement that the application of the doctrine of
equivalents “is not allowed such broad play as to eliminate [an]
element in its entirety.”1618  In other words, would such a judgment
of infringement, post Warner-Jenkinson, violate the “all elements”
rule?1619
In response to this order, the court received supplemental briefs,
including amicus curiae briefs, and heard oral argument on March 29,
2000.1620
Eight months to the day later, on November 29, 2000, the en banc
court issued its decision in Festo.1621  In response to en banc question 1,
                                                          
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  Judge Rich’s opinion was joined by Judges
Friedman and Cowen, both of whom are now Senior Judges on the Federal Circuit.
1615. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1616. Warner-Jenkinson Corp. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
1617. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
1618. Id. at 29.
1619. Festo, 187 F.3d at 1381-82, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960.
1620. See T. Whitley Chandler, Note, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 477 n.56 (2000)
(recounting the chronology of Festo).
1621. See 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the court concluded that the term “a substantial reason related to
patentability,” as used in Warner-Jenkinson, “is not limited to
overcoming or avoiding prior art, but instead includes any reason
which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent.”1622  Thus, an
amendment made to satisfy the Patent Act’s utility,1623 best mode,1624
and claiming1625 requirements will also give rise to prosecution-history
estoppel.1626  The court viewed this result as more in keeping with “the
functions of prosecution history estoppel—preserving the notice
function of the claims and preventing patent holders from
recapturing under the doctrine of equivalents subject matter that was
surrendered before the Patent Office.”1627  Given the breadth of that
result, it is difficult to imagine that any kind of claim amendment,
other than one to make a minor ministerial or scrivening change, will
not give rise to estoppel.
With regard to en banc question 2, the court concluded that a
“voluntary” claim amendment—just as with one made in response to
an examiner’s request or rejection—should give rise to prosecution-
history estoppel as to the amended claim element.1628
Both voluntary amendments and amendments required by the
Patent Office signal to the public that subject matter has been
surrendered.  There is no reason why prosecution history estoppel
should arise if the Patent Office rejects a claim because it believes
the claim to be unpatentable, but not arise if the applicant amends
a claim because he believes the claim to be unpatentable.1629
Indeed, the court viewed its holding as to “voluntary” amendments
as “consistent with the doctrine of argument-based estoppel,” under
which a patentee’s arguments, comments and representations to the
Patent Office, even though the choice and scope of those arguments
is made voluntarily, will nonetheless serve to estop the patentee from
later asserting claim scope that is inconsistent with those prior
voluntary remarks via the doctrine of equivalents.1630  The court also
                                                          
1622. See id. at 566, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
1623. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (“Whosoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process . . . may obtain a patent therefore . . . .”) (emphasis added).
1624. See id. § 112 (“The specification . . . shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
1625. See id. (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention.”).
1626. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 567, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (reviewing the
statutory requirements for obtaining a patent).
1627. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1628. See id. at 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1629. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
1630. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.  For examples of cases in which
“[a]rguments made voluntarily during prosecution may give rise to prosecution
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viewed its holding on question 2 as consistent with Warner-Jenkinson,
where the Supreme Court noted that the patent’s lower pH limit of
6.0 was apparently a voluntary amendment, but “[n]evertheless . . .
could give rise to prosecution history estoppel.”1631
The en banc court’s answer to question 3 was the most controversial
of its holdings, for here the court overruled the entire Hughes Aircraft
line of “flexible bar” cases:  “When a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is
no range of equivalents available for the amended claim element.
Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is
completely barred (a ‘complete bar’).”1632  The court concluded that
“the question of the scope of equivalents available when prosecution
history estoppel applies to a claim element has not been directly
addressed or answered by the Supreme Court, at least in
circumstances where the claim was amended for a known
patentability reason.”1633  The court first addressed several pre-Warner-
Jenkinson Supreme Court decisions applying prosecution history
estoppel, concluding that in none of them had the court “analyze[d]
the actual scope of equivalents that might be available when
prosecution history estoppel applied, i.e., the extent of the subject
matter surrendered by amendment.”1634  Here, the majority
responded to the dissenting opinion of Judge Michel, who claimed
that several prior Supreme Court decisions had in fact allowed some
range of equivalents even where prosecution-history estoppel applied,
concluding that in the cases cited by Judge Michel, “the range of
                                                          
history estoppel if they evidence a surrender of subject matter,” see KCJ Corp. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1359-60, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1841-42
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that voluntary supplements to a claim amendment which
narrow the claim, preclude the recapturing of subject matter by the doctrine of
equivalents); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252-53, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that it would be reasonable
for a competitor to believe that the disputed subject matter had been surrendered
given the prosecution history as a whole); Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan
Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1377, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting activities that may give rise to prosecution history estoppel); Southwall
Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1682
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“We must examine the character of the assertions made in the
prosecution history in addition to the result of those assertions . . . when determining
whether they create an estoppel.”); Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
1631. Festo, 234 F.3d at 568-69, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (citing Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 34, for the proposition that a voluntary amendment may give
rise to prosecution-history estoppel).
1632. Id. at 569, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1633. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1634. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
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equivalents available to an amended claim element simply was not
before the Supreme Court in th[ose] cases.”1635
Having concluded that the Supreme Court had not previously
passed on the question, the en banc majority went on to
“independently decide the issue,” invoking its congressionally
mandated duty “to resolve issues unique to patent law.”1636  The court
noted the divergent lines of authority headed by Hughes Aircraft and
Kinzenbaw,1637 and concluded that the “flexible bar” represented by
the Hughes Aircraft decision should be repudiated in favor of the
complete bar of Kinzenbaw, a conclusion reached “after nearly twenty
years of experience in performing our role as the sole court of
appeals for patent matters,” during which “the notice function of
patent claims has become paramount, and the need for certainty as
to the scope of patent protection has been emphasized.”1638  This
experience, the Federal Circuit said, led it to conclude that “the
flexible bar approach [makes it] virtually impossible to predict before
the decision on appeal where the line of surrender is drawn.”1639  The
majority concluded that “the current state of the law regarding the
scope of equivalents that is available when prosecution history
estoppel applies is ‘unworkable’” and “‘poses a direct obstacle to the
realization of important objectives.’”1640  By contrast, the majority
concluded that the complete bar “enforce[s] the disclaimer effect of
a narrowing claim amendment,”1641 “serves the definitional and notice
functions” of patent claims,1642 and “eliminates the public’s need to
speculate as to the subject matter surrendered by an amendment that
narrows a claim for reasons related to patentability.”1643  The bar
therefore “lend[s] certainty to the process of determining the scope
of protection afforded by a patent.”1644
With respect to en banc question 4, the majority concluded that
“[w]hen no explanation for a claim amendment is established, no
                                                          
1635. Id. at 570-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74 (addressing the dissenting
arguments of Judge Michel).  For Judge Michel’s dissent, see 234 F.3d at 601-05, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899-1902.
1636. Id. at 571-72, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75.
1637. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 572-73, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875-76 (noting that the
Federal Circuit has followed both the “strict rule of complete surrender” approach
and the “flexible bar approach to prosecution history estoppel”).
1638. Id. at 574-75, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
1639. Id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
1640. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877-78 (discussing the “traditional
justification[s] for overruling a prior case” (alteration in original) (quoting Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989))).
1641. Id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1642. Id. at 576, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878-79.
1643. Id. at 577, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1644. Festo, 234 F.3d at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
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range of equivalents is available for the claim element so
amended.”1645  The court viewed this question as already answered by
the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson:  “Where no explanation is
established, . . . prosecution history estoppel would bar the
application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element.”1646  The
court found it unnecessary to reach en banc question 5, whether a
judgment of infringement by equivalents in the present case would
violate the “all-elements” rule.  In other words, according to of
Warner-Jenkinson, it would have been superfluous to inquire whether a
judgment of infringement by equivalents would “eliminate [an]
element in its entirety” from the patent claims.1647
Judge Plager, who assumed senior-judge status the day after Festo
was decided, filed a brief concurring opinion.1648  Although he joined
the opinion and judgment of the court, he viewed the en banc
decision as “a second-best solution to an unsatisfactory situation.”1649
In keeping with several of his prior criticisms of the application of the
doctrine of equivalents,1650 he noted that the “insubstantial
differences” standard announced in Hilton Davis was “a wonderfully
indeterminate phrase, lending itself to making every decision under
the doctrine an individualistic choice, if not simply a flip of the
coin.”1651  Judge Plager’s preferred solution, as he noted in Hilton
Davis, “would be to declare the doctrine of equivalents—a judge-
made rule in the first place—to have its roots firmly in equity, and to
acknowledge that when and in what circumstances it applies is a
question of equitable law, a question for which judges bear
responsibility.”1652  No other Federal Circuit judge joined Judge
Plager’s concurring opinion, so with his subsequent election of
senior-judge status, the Federal Circuit appears to have lost—at least
as far as en banc decision-making goes—its principal spokesman for an
“equitable” doctrine of equivalents.  Note, however, that Judge
                                                          
1645. Id. at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1646. Id. at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997)).
1647. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29).
1648. See id. at 591-95, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890-93 (Plager, J., concurring).
1649. Festo, 234 F.3d at 591, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (Plager, J., concurring).
1650. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1661  (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting) (“[I]t may
be asked why the court needs to undertake this inquiry into the doctrine of
equivalents at all.  Is something broke that needs fixing?  The short answer is yes.”);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Plager, J., concurring) (criticizing the “insubstantial
differences” test and arguing that the current rules will create a “lengthy and costly
contest of the experts”).
1651. Festo, 234 F.3d at 591, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (Plager, J., concurring).
1652. Id. at 593, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891 (Plager, J., concurring).
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Lourie, who joined Judge Plager’s Hilton Davis dissent but not his
Festo concurrence, remains.
Indeed, Judge Lourie wrote his own concurring opinion in Festo,
despite having authored several opinions supporting a flexible bar
rather than a complete bar,1653 in which he had “followed what
seemed to be the strongest line of precedent at that time,”1654 he
concluded that,
in light of experience, and recognizing the Congressional
requirement for precision in claims, . . . I am persuaded that when
we have the opportunity en banc to depart from an unworkable rule
by holding patent applicants to their actions in the PTO, we should
do so.  Adoption of a firmer rule today is in the best interest of the
patent system.1655
Judge Michel, joined by Judge Rader, filed a lengthy dissent from
the court’s disposition of en banc question 3 (the flexible-bar-versus-
complete-bar issue).1656  Judge Michel viewed the majority’s decision
as disturbing the balance struck by the Supreme Court between “a
patentee’s need for meaningful protection against copying and the
public’s need for notice as to the effective scope of a patentee’s
claims.”1657  In his view, the complete bar paid insufficient attention to
whether a reasonable competitor would view the prosecution history
as surrendering any equivalents for amended claim elements.1658
Judge Michel also concluded that the majority’s complete-bar
holding was flatly contrary to two Supreme Court cases from the late
nineteenth century which, on his reading, allowed some range of
equivalents even though prosecution-history estoppel was held to
apply,1659 as well as six other Supreme Court decisions that suggest a
more flexible approach to prosecution-history estoppel was
mandated.1660  The majority dismissed all of these Supreme Court
                                                          
1653. See id. at 595, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893-94 (Lourie, J., concurring) (citing
examples of cases in which he claimed to have followed the “strongest line of
precedent”).
1654. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893-94 (Lourie, J., concurring).
1655. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (Lourie, J., concurring).
1656. See id. at 598-619, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896-1913 (Michel, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1657. Id. at 598, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (Michel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1658. See id. at 600, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (Michel, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority’s “concept of prosecution history
estoppel is hardly an ‘estoppel’ at all”).
1659. See id. at 601-605, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898-1902 (Michel, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis,
102 U.S. 222 (1880) and Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U.S. 456 (1889)).
1660. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 605-08, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902-04 (Michel, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S.
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cases as either not actually involving prosecution-history estoppel or
being otherwise inapposite.1661  Judge Michel further viewed the
“complete-bar” line of cases as not actually being another “line of
authority,” but at best an aberration1662 represented by two cases—
Kinzenbaw and Prodyne Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz.1663  Conceding
that both Kinzenbaw and Prodyne “contain language which, taken
alone, is arguably consistent with the complete bar imposed by the
court today,”1664 Judge Michel nonetheless urged that “neither
opinion departs from” Hughes Aircraft, for “each opinion purports to
follow and quotes [Hughes Aircraft]” and in fact (despite the arguably
contrary language) applies a flexible bar, not an absolute one.1665
Finally, Judge Michel stated his view that the majority’s opinion
would reduce the settled expectations of patent holders by
diminishing their value: “I feel that today’s ruling will upset basic
assumptions regarding the effective scope of patents, and will unfairly
disrupt commercial relations based on those assumptions.”1666
Judge Rader also filed a separate opinion dissenting in part,
principally focusing on the role of after-arising technology in
equivalents analysis.1667  In Judge Rader’s view, the complete bar of
the majority’s opinion at a minimum should not apply to after-arising
technology because a patentee cannot possibly surrender in
prosecution that of which he does not (and could not) know.1668
                                                          
77 (1900); Royer v. Coupe, 146 U.S. 524 (1892); Phoenix Caster Co. v. Spiegel, 133
U.S. 360 (1890); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 (1886); Sutter v. Robinson, 119
U.S. 530 (1886); and Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408 (1883)).
1661. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 570-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74 (concluding
that the “range of equivalents available to an amended claim element simply was not
before the Supreme Court in the cases Judge Michel cites, and the Supreme Court
did not discuss the issue presented in en banc Question 3”).
1662. See id. at 610, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (rejecting the majority’s
proposition that there are two lines of authority regarding prosectuion-history
estoppel).
1663. 743 F.2d 1581, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1664. Festo, 234 F.3d at 610, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (Michel, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
1665. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (Michel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1666. Id. at 619, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (Michel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1667. See id. at 619-20, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Rader, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1668. Id. at 620, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) stating that:
The court reasons today that it will not inquire about the scope of an
estoppel because it cannot with certainty ascertain the scope of the
applicant’s surrender.  Although that premise is questionable for the reasons
enunciated by Judges Michel and Linn, one thing is beyond question:  That
premise does not apply to after-arising technology.  Because after-arising
technology was not in existence during the patent application process, the
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Judge Linn, who joined the Federal Circuit after en banc
consideration had been ordered in Festo, but before oral argument,
also filed an opinion dissenting in part as to en banc question 3.  His
opinion was also joined by Judge Rader.1669  Although Judge Linn
joined the majority’s conclusions on the other en banc questions, he
broke from the majority on the issue of the complete bar by
amendment.1670  Judge Linn focused on the purposes of the patent
system, the policies behind the doctrine of equivalents, and the fact
that patent claims must use ordinary language to describe difficult
concepts, making the level of precision demanded by the majority
elusive, if not impossible.1671  But perhaps his most significant
contribution was to point out the striking conflict between the
majority opinion and the Warner-Jenkinson opinion that it purported
to implement:
If the doctrine of equivalents is completely barred when no reason
for an amendment can be discerned from the prosecution history,
and it is likewise completely barred when a reason is stated, what is
the point of exploring the “reason (right or wrong) for the
[examiner’s rejection of the claim prior to its being amended] and
the manner in which the amendment addressed and avoided that
[rejection?]”  Thus, adoption of a rebuttable presumption of
estoppel for an amendment that was made for an unknown reason
necessarily presupposes the possibility that no estoppel will apply
where the reason for the amendment is known, or where that
presumption is rebutted.1672
The majority opinion had no good answer to this apparent conflict
between Warner-Jenkinson and its own abolition of the flexible-bar
approach to estoppel by amendment.
Judge Newman also filed an opinion dissenting in part.  She, too,
pointed out the tension between the Supreme Court’s remand order
in Warner-Jenkinson, linking the reason for an amendment with the
question of prosecution-history estoppel, and the majority’s
approach, making the reasons for an amendment far less central to
                                                          
applicant could not have known of it, let alone surrendered it.
Id.
1669. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).  Similarly, Judge Dyk, who joined the majority opinion in Festo,
became a member of the Federal Circuit after argument but before decision.
1670. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 620, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Linn, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1671. See id. at 626, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1672. Id. at 625, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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the estoppel analysis.1673  Judge Newman also noted that the
disapproved Hughes Aircraft decision dealt with the application of the
doctrine of equivalents to “later-developed technology.”1674  Finally,
Judge Newman dealt with the complex issues of public policy raised
by the doctrine of equivalents, noting that while the Doctrine does
tend to diminish incentives for competitors, it also encourages
competitors to make real and substantial patentable innovations
instead of simply nibbling around the edges of the claims.1675
As of the initial writing of this Area Summary, the final chapter of
Festo is yet to be concluded.  On April 9, 2001, after much
complicated and public wrangling over positional conflicts of
interest,1676 Festo filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court of the United States, urging that the Court accept the
case to resolve two issues:
(1) Whether every claim-narrowing amendment designed to
comply with any provision of the Patent Act—including those
provisions not relating to prior art—automatically creates
prosecution history estoppel regardless of the reason for the
amendment; and
(2) Whether the finding of prosecution history estoppel completely
bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents.1677
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 18, 2001,1678
received briefing during Summer 2001, and will hear arguments
during October Term 2001.
While there were ample reasons for the Supreme Court to exercise
its discretion to accept Festo for review, there were at least as many
reasons against such review.  For one, the Supreme Court in Warner-
Jenkinson said that it was leaving the development of the law of
equivalents largely to the Federal Circuit, in the exercise of its
specialized and congressionally mandated jurisdiction to administer
the patent laws.  For another, because the Festo approach is a new
one, it might have been more appropriate for the Court, at a
                                                          
1673. See id. at 630, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1674. See id. at 635, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
1675. See id. at 640, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1676. See, e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Conflict Gives Bork a Starr Turn:  Kirkland & Ellis
forced to give up role in Festo, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at 6 (discussing the firm’s
conflict of interest in representing Honeywell, a company which stands to financially
benefit from overturning Festo).
1677. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co. (2001) (No. 00-1543).
1678. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 121 S. Ct. 2519
(2001).
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minimum, to defer ruling at this time and await a future case, so that
the Supreme Court’s deliberations would benefit from a body of
Federal Circuit (and lower-court) experience in interpreting and
applying the Festo rules.
Finally, although it is at least arguable (for the reasons stated by
Judges Michel and Linn) that the Festo decision conflicts with the
Supreme Court’s approach in Warner-Jenkinson, the complete bar
announced in Festo does what the Federal Circuit has rarely done in
its history, i.e., rather than announcing a vague and unpredictable
“totality of the circumstances”-type test, it goes a long way toward
creating an actual rule that can be applied predictably and (more or
less) uniformly by courts and litigants alike.1679  And there is little
doubt that the present Supreme Court is much more favorably
disposed to bright-line rules such as the one adopted by the Festo
majority than to murky, multifactor, case-by-case inquiries.1680
Because Festo was pending in the Federal Circuit for most of the
year, there were few opportunities for the court to apply Festo in 2000,
and the court—consistent with its prior practice of not backing up its
docket in anticipation of en banc rulings such as Markman and Hilton
Davis—continued to issue prosecution-history estoppel rulings
throughout the year.  Since the judges deciding these cases, and
writing these opinions, presumably had an inkling of how Festo was
going to come out in the end,1681 it is interesting to look back on the
court’s pre-Festo prosecution-history estoppel rulings and see how
consistent the pre-Festo rulings were.  There was, indeed, a
remarkable foreshadowing of Festo in results, if not approaches,
because most pre-Festo panel decisions rested on alternative
prosecution-history estoppel grounds.  For example, in Hilgraeve Corp.
v. McAfee Associates, Inc.,1682 the panel ruled that an amendment made
by Hilgraeve resulted in prosecution-history estoppel.1683  However,
                                                          
1679. See, e.g., Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323
n.2, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450-53 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting, in the context of the
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) on-sale bar, that the Federal Circuit’s “standard of the totality of
circumstances has been criticized as unnecessarily vague”).
1680. See, generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (examining the Supreme Court Justices’ divisions over
rules and standards in the 1991 term and the implication for the Court’s apparent
centrism); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2177 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s replacement of the Chevron doctrine with a
“totality of the circumstances” test); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989) (exploring the “dichotomy between general
rules and personal discretion within the narrow context of law that is made by the
courts”).
1681. Oral arguments in the case took place in March 2000.
1682. 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1683. See id. at 1355, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661-62.
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the panel’s rationale was grounded primarily in the arguments that
Hilgraeve made to the PTO in connection with that amendment,
rather than the fact of the amendment itself.1684  It appears that the
court followed similar belt-and-suspender strategies in other pre-Festo
equivalents cases, including KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.1685 and
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp.,1686 both of which
grounded their estoppel decisions in an amalgam of estoppel-by-
amendment and estoppel-by-argument rationale.  Since the line of
estoppel-by-argument cases was discussed, but not otherwise put at
issue in Festo, it was safe for pre-Festo panels to ground their decisions
not merely on estoppel by amendment, but also in the estoppel-by-
argument line of authorities, even though Festo’s estoppel-by-
amendment holding would have yielded the same result in cases like
Hilgraeve, KCJ, and Bayer.
b. The all-elements rule, or the anti-vitiation rule
“[T]he second legal limitation on the doctrine” of equivalents is
the “all elements rule,” variously known as the “all limitations rule” or
the rule against vitiation of a claim element.1687  The “all elements
rule,” which holds that there can be no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents if even one element of a claim or its
equivalent is not present in the accused device, is the same rule
served by Warner-Jenkinson’s principle that an infringement-by-
equivalents claim cannot be “allowed such broad play as to effectively
eliminate that element in its entirety,” or “vitiate the central functions
of the patent claims themselves.”1688  Aside from the first legal
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, that of prosecution-history
estoppel, the anti-vitiation rule was invoked by several Federal Circuit
cases in 2000.
Although the panel in Elekta Instrument, S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l,
Inc.1689 remanded for the district court to consider equivalence in the
first instance, the panel nonetheless offered significant dicta (or,
more positively viewed, guidance for the district court on remand)
regarding application of the anti-vitiation rule.1690  In Elekta, the
                                                          
1684. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
1685. 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1686. 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1687. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 587,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1887 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the “all elements” rule
should be used if prosecution history estoppel does not bar the application of the
doctrine of equivalents).
1688. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
1689. 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1690. See id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (discussing the elements that
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Federal Circuit reversed a summary judgment of literal infringement
in favor of the patent owner, concluding that the gamma knife
claimed in the Elekta patent was limited to those having radiation
sources “only within a zone extending between latitudes 30°-45°, as
seen from the diametrical plane.”1691  After concluding—contrary to
the district court’s claim construction—that the 30°-45° range stated
in the claim was the exclusive range for location of the radiation
sources and not merely an upper limit for their positions,1692 the
Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment of literal
infringement and (effectively) ordered summary judgment of no
literal infringement in favor of the accused infringer.1693  Although
the panel nominally remanded for consideration of Elekta’s
equivalents claim, it offered the following in a footnote:  “We note,
however, that in light of our claim construction, a finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would seemingly
vitiate the clear limitation ‘only within a zone extending between
latitudes 30°-45°‘ in claim 1.”1694  Thus, the court opined that any
claim of equivalents that would capture radiation sources not within
the latitudes of 30°-45° would effectively rub out that numerical claim
limitation.1695
The court reached a similar result, on similar reasoning, in Moore
U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.1696  There, the patent claim, a
mailer-type business form, required paper adhesive strips which
extend “a majority of the lengths” of the longitudinal margins of the
patented form.1697  The accused form had strips that extended 47.8%
of its longitudinal margins.1698  The panel concluded that:
 the applicant’s use of the term ‘majority’ is not entitled to a scope
of equivalents covering a minority for at least two reasons.  First, to
allow what is undisputedly a minority (i.e., 47.8%) to be equivalent
to a majority would vitiate the requirement that the ‘first and
second longitudinal strips of adhesive . . . extend the majority of
the lengths of said longitudinal marginal portions.’ . . . If a
minority could be equivalent to a majority, this limitation would
hardly be necessary . . . Second, it would defy logic to conclude that
                                                          
should be considered when interpreting patent claims).
1691. Id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1692. See id. at 1309, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (holding that the district court
erred when construing the claim to cover gamma units outside the range between
30°-45°).
1693. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
1694. Id. at 1309 n.2, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 n.2.
1695. See id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1696. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1697. See id. at 1105, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (quoting the patent language).
1698. See id. at 1106, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
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a minority—the very antithesis of a majority—could be
insubstantially different from a claim limitation requiring a
majority, and no reasonable juror could find otherwise.1699
Citing the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in Sage Products Inc. v.
Devon Industries, Inc.,1700 the court in Moore U.S.A. suggested that this
result was the inevitable consequence of “the inherent narrowness of
the claim language.”1701  Judge Newman dissented on this point,
concluding:
Whether 47.8% is equivalent to a majority is a question of fact, and
could not be decided adversely to the patentee as a matter of law.
The evidence of identity of function, way, and result, and of
insubstantial difference, was not disputed on summary judgment;
the question requires findings of fact, not summary disposition.1702
The panel in Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc.,1703 also
bottomed much of its “vitiation” holding on Sage Products.  The patent
there, drawn to a vacuum cleaner for a swimming pool, required a
“stop” structure to be located “substantially inward” of the peripheral
edge of a disc.1704  The panel held that the accused device could not
literally infringe this claim element, because it had weight arms that
“clearly extend at least to the peripheral edge of the flexible disc.”1705
Relying on Sage Products, the court concluded that this same evidence
also prohibited a finding of infringement by equivalents.1706  These
cases may reach the correct result, but this aspect of “vitiation”
doctrine—like so many areas of the Federal Circuit’s case law—lends
itself only to case-by-case adjudication, not broad application.  The
very essence of a claim of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is that one or more of the limitations of the written claim
is not literally met by the accused product or process.1707  Thus, the
                                                          
1699. Id. at 1106, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235-36.
1700. 126 F.3d 1420, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1701. Moore U.S.A, 229 F.3d at 1106, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1702. Id. at 1119, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1703. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1704. See id. at 1414, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d  (BNA) at 1146.
1705. Id. at 1415, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
1706. Id. at 1416, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (quoting Sage Products, 126 F.3d at
1424, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107).
[L]ike the patent at issue in Sage Products, the ‘382 patent contains “clear
structural limitations,” including a limitation that the stop be located
“substantially inward” of the peripheral edge of the disc.  Given the proper
construction of this limitation, a verdict of infringement under the [doctrine
of equivalents] would reduce the claims to nothing more than “functional
abstracts, devoid of meaningful structural limitations on which the public
could rely.”
Id.
1707. See id.
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“equivalent” is, by definition, something that is not literally within the
scope of the claim element in question.  In some sense, then, every
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents could be
said to “vitiate” a claim element because it does not require one (or
more) elements to be literally present.  In the words of Sage Products,
a finding of equivalence will always, in some sense of the term, vitiate
a “clear structural limitation” in the patent.1708  Precise numerical or
spatial limitations are seemingly the easiest examples of patent claims
for which Sage Products’ anti-vitiation rule can be applied.  Even so, it
is clear from Warner-Jenkinson itself, in which the lower 6.0 pH limit
was in play under the doctrine of equivalents, that not all numerical
limitations in a patent claim will inherently invoke the rule against
vitiation.  More help in this area is desperately needed from the
Federal Circuit.
c.  Prior-art estoppel
The doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied in such an
expansive manner that it allows patentees to recapture prior art by a
reflexive application of the doctrine.1709  Indeed, where an accused
device reads on the prior art, that—“in and of itself,” without regard
to whether infringement is alleged literally or by equivalents—
“mandates a finding of noninfringement.”1710  Thus, the Federal
Circuit has created a “hypothetical claim” mechanism for evaluating
whether a claim of infringement by equivalents would invade the
prior art.  Under “hypothetical claim” analysis, the patentee alleging
a claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents must
“propos[e] a hypothetical claim that is sufficiently broad in scope to
literally encompass the accused product or process . . . If that
[hypothetical] claim would have been allowed by the PTO over the
prior art, then the prior art does not bar the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.”1711 We have given this doctrine the
shorthand nickname of “prior-art estoppel.”  Under proper
hypothetical-claim analysis, “the accused infringer must come forward
                                                          
1708. Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425-26, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
1709. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
683-85, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1947-49 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that “a
patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage
which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims”).
1710. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoki Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 570, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Smith v. Magic City Kennel
Club, 282 U.S. 784 (1931) and Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 683-85, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947-49).
1711. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1364-65, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1896 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).
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with evidence that the hypothetical claim reads on the prior art.”1712
“[O]nce the patentee makes out his prima facie case of infringement
by equivalence, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the
patentee to show that the hypothetical claim does not read on the
prior art.”1713
Although the hypothetical-claim analysis was originally designed to
cabin patentees’ reliance on the doctrine of equivalents, it has gained
some currency with patentees as a methodology to “freely redraft
granted claims.”1714  In Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Brothers Chemical
Co.,1715 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination
that the patentee’s equivalence claim was barred by prior-art estoppel
on two independent bases.  First, the court agreed with the district
court that “Ultra-Tex used hypothetical analysis to ‘freely redraft’ its
claim by impermissibly broadening and narrowing it at the same
time, a practice our case law clearly forbids.”1716  As the court noted,
quoting its prior opinion in Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Systems,
Inc.,1717 “‘one cannot, in the course of litigation and outside of the
PTO, cut and trim, expanding here, and narrowing there, to arrive at
a claim that encompasses an accused device, but avoids the prior art.
Slight broadening is permitted at that point, but not narrowing.’”1718
Second, and aside from the prohibition on narrowing a claim to
simultaneously avoid prior art yet capture the accused device, the
court concluded that Ultra-Tex’s hypothetical claim described a
process that had been in public use more than one year prior to the
application’s filing date, and thus would be invalid under the public-
use bar of Section 102(b).1719  This was the first time that the Federal
Circuit had invalidated a hypothetical claim under Section 102(b),
but it was hardly a shocking result.1720
To the extent that Ultra-Tex and Streamfeeder state a rule, for
hypothetical-claim analysis, that “[s]light broadening is permitted . . .
but not narrowing,” the rule is halfway useful.  An absolute
prohibition on “narrowing” a claim for hypothetical analysis is
                                                          
1712. Id. at 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
1713. Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
1714. Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., Inc., 175 F.3d 974, 983, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1515, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1715. 204 F.3d 1360, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1716. Id. at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
1717. 175 F.3d 974, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 515 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1718. Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (quoting
Streamfeeder, 175 F.3d at 983, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521).
1719. See Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
1720. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (“An invalidating public use is just as
damaging to the patentability of a proposed hypothetical claim as any other type of
prior art.”).
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relatively clear and predictably informs the public, litigants, and
courts that a particular sort of hypothetical claim will prove
unsuccessful.  But to the extent that there is a legally significant
difference between permissible “[s]light broadening” and
“impermissibly broadening” a claim in hypothetical analysis, the
distinction is elusive and standardless.  While the line between
“slight” and “impermissible” broadening necessarily requires case-by-
case adjudication, that line is neither obvious from the case law nor
applicable before the fact in a useful, predictive fashion.
The court also addressed hypothetical-claim analysis in Moore
U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,1721 a decision that was primarily
grounded in the anti-vitiation rule.  There, the patentee offered a
hypothetical claim to support its contention that the claim language,
requiring adhesive strips that extend the “majority of the lengths” of
the margins of the patented mailer, could have been patentably
broadened by a hypothetical claim where the language “about half of
the length of the first face, or essentially the entire length” replaces
“the majority of the lengths of said longitudinal marginal portions” in
the claim.1722  The court rejected this hypothetical claim as
establishing a valid equivalents claim in view of its holding, under the
all-elements rule, that claim language requiring a “majority” cannot
capture an accused device having only a “minority.”
Such an analysis is not divorced from the claim language, but
rather must be anchored in the limitation for which a range of
equivalents is sought . . . A hypothetical claim analysis cannot
operate to the exclusion of the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel or the All Limitations Rule . . . Given our holding that
the All Limitations Rule bars Moore’s desired scope of equivalents,
Moore’s poorly-articulated hypothetical claim analysis must also
fail. 1723
Thus, as Moore U.S.A. makes clear, proving the absence of a prior-art
estoppel by hypothetical-claim analysis may be a necessary condition
for establishing a claim of infringement by equivalents, but it is
plainly not a sufficient one.
                                                          
1721. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1722. Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1105-06, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
1723. Id. at 1106-07, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
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d.     Failure to prosecute broader claims
Another judge-made limitation on the doctrine of equivalents has,
not surprisingly, proven to be similarly elusive.  In 1997, in Sage
Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries Inc.,1724 the Federal Circuit barred a
patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents in an attempt to
capture “a relatively simple structural device” not literally covered by
the claims, not involving after-arising technology, and foreseeable by
“[a] skilled patent drafter.”1725  As the court reasoned in Sage Products:
If Sage desired broad patent protection for any container that
performed a function similar to its claimed container, it could have
sought claims with fewer structural encumbrances.  Had Sage done
so, then the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) could have
fulfilled its statutory role in helping to ensure that exclusive rights
issue only to those who have, in fact, contributed something new,
useful, and unobvious.  Instead, Sage left the PTO with manifestly
limited claims that it now seeks to expand through the doctrine of
equivalents.  However, as between the patentee who had a clear
opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the
public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its
claimed structure.1726
Judge Rader’s concurrence in Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan
Wheel International, Inc.,1727 addressed the application of the Sage
Products bar to a summary judgment of nonequivalence.  The
Vehicular patent was directed to a locking differential for use in
automobiles.  One of the elements of that locking differential was “a
spring assembly consisting of two concentric springs bearing against
one end of [a] pin.”1728  The accused device used one spring in
conjunction with a plug.1729  The panel held that the district court
properly granted summary judgment of noninfringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, largely in view of the claim’s use of the closed
term “consisting of two concentric springs.”1730
Judge Rader concurred, but on a substantially different ground.
After noting that the case “presents the difficult problem of
performing a doctrine of equivalents analysis on the limited facts
                                                          
1724. 126 F.3d 1420, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1725. Id. at 1425, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
1726. Id., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
1727. 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1728. Id. at 1379, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
1729. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
1730. Id. at 1383, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
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available for a motion of summary judgment,”1731 he nonetheless
joined the majority’s disposition “because this case fits well within this
court’s reasoning in Sage Products . . . .”1732  As he noted, “a skilled
patent drafter would readily foresee the limiting potential of the
‘consisting of two concentric springs’ limitation.  [He] would not
confront the need for particularly subtle or ambiguous language to
describe inventive features that are complex, or were never described
before in scientific discourse.”1733  Foreshadowing his later dissent in
Festo,1734 Judge Rader also found it significant that “this limitation does
not call into question issues of after-arising technology which, by
definition, cannot be foreseen at the time of claim drafting.”1735
Judge Rader also pointed out that Vehicular had asserted its
infringement claim against Titan
within the two-year period allowed for reissuing a patent under 35
U.S.C. § 251.  Section 251 permits a patentee, who “through error
without any deceptive intent . . . claim[s] more or less tha[n] he
had a right to claim,” to enlarge the patent claims within two years
of the grant of the original patent.1736  He concluded that Vehicular,
“as in Sage, . . . fits the circumstances for restricting the application
of the doctrine of equivalents without further fact finding.1737
The Sage Products estoppel doctrine has sound policy justifications.
Yet, and particularly because Judge Rader’s views in Vehicular
Technologies were not shared by the other Judges, the Sage Products bar
remains somewhat fuzzy.  Its notion of “foreseeable alterations” seems
more conclusory than broadly applicable and thus difficult to
administer at the margins, at least at an appellate level.
“Foreseeability,” in tort and damages law, typically presents a fact
question for the jury.1738  The Sage Products bar does not seem to go so
                                                          
1731. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (Rader, J., concurring).
1732. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (Rader, J., concurring).
1733. Vehicular Techs., 212 F.3d at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1734. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1735. Vehicular Techs., 212 F.3d at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1736. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 251 (1994)).
1737. Vehicular Technologies, at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1738. See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir.
2000) (noting that “[a] foreseeability determination in and of itself is also a question
of fact for resolution by the finder of fact.”); cf. First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A.
v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
“[f]oreseeability is a question of fact in many contexts.  However, in defining the
boundaries of duty, foreseeability is a question of law for the court.” (quoting Nichols
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far as to impose an absolute prohibition on capturing, through the
doctrine of equivalents, anything that existed at the time of the
patent application—although in both Sage Products and Vehicular
Technologies, the court and Judge Rader, respectively, took pains to
ground their analyses in substantial part on the fact that the accused
device was not after-developed technology.  Such a bar would be at
least predictable and easily applicable, even if perhaps overbroad (a
charge that might appropriately be leveled at Festo, as well).  But the
most intriguing suggestion in Judge Rader’s concurrence from
Vehicular Technologies involves the interplay between the reissue statute
and the doctrine of equivalents.  According to Judge Rader, it seems
fair to patentees, consistent with the notice function of patents that
protects competitors, and workable in practice, to forbid a patentee
from resorting to the doctrine of equivalents if the patentee knows
(or should know) of the accused technology during the two-year
reissue period, during which the patentee would be allowed to obtain
(or at least attempt) reissue of claims that would literally cover the
accused device.1739  Though it is not presently the law (but simply the
view of a single judge), it will be interesting to follow this argument to
see if it becomes Federal Circuit law in the years to come.
e.     Dedication to the public
One final legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents—the
doctrine of dedication to the public—is, at this writing, the subject of
a pending en banc determination in the Federal Circuit.  The origins
of this debate in the Federal Circuit are recent, being rooted in the
court’s 1996 ruling in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.1740  In Maxwell, a panel
of the court (Judges Lourie, Skelton, and Schall) held that “subject
matter disclosed but not claimed in a patent application is dedicated
to the public.”1741  Two years later, another panel of the court (Judges
Newman, Rich, and Smith) in YBM Magnex, Inc. v. United States
International Trade Commission,1742 limited Maxwell to its “particular
facts.”1743  In reality, though, the panel in YBM Magnex simply held, in
                                                          
v. Keller, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 1686 (1981))).
1739. Vehicular Technologies, 212 F.3d at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader,
J., concurring).
1740. 86 F.3d 1098, 1112, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1115 (1997) (finding the defendant liable for claim infringment but
remanding the case to recalculate damages).
1741. Id. at 1106, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500, 1504 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1742. 145 F.3d 1317, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1743. See id. at 1321, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (“Maxwell is not the only case
that has held, on particular facts, that unclaimed subject matter is deemed
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polite language, that Maxwell was wrongly decided.1744  Most notably,
the YBM Magnex panel viewed Maxwell as inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co.,1745 which held that an asserted equivalent
disclosed in the specification (manganese silicate) actually supported
the patentee’s case for equivalency because “the patent itself fully
discloses that welding compositions composed chiefly of manganese
silicate and prepared according to the teachings of the patent are
equivalent to those in which the alkaline earth metals [called for by
the claim] are the principal constituents.”1746  According to the panel
in YBM Magnex, “[t]he Supreme Court sustained this conclusion
against the Court’s dissenters, who urged that ‘what is not specifically
claimed is dedicated to the public.’”1747  This argument, however, had
already been answered in Maxwell, where the court explained that in
Graver Tank, compositions including manganese silicate had been
claimed, but the Supreme Court had, in the prior term, “affirmed the
district court’s decision in which it held these broad claims to be
invalid on the ground that many metal silicates embraced by the
claims, but not disclosed in the specification, were inoperative.”1748
Thus, after YBM Magnex, the Federal Circuit had two divergent
lines of authority.  One line, with Maxwell and Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Brown1749 anchoring the poles, holds that any subject matter that has
been disclosed in a patent application, but not claimed, is dedicated
to the public.”1750  Another, with YBM Magnex carrying the flag, and
ostensibly supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Graver Tank,
holds, in the words of a recent Area Summary in this law review, that
“the doctrine of equivalents criteria must be applied to the specific
facts of the case, thereby producing individualized results.”1751  While
                                                          
abandoned.”).
1744. Id. at 1320, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. (“The statement made in Maxwell
must be received, as it was given, in light of precedent and its context.  The
[International Trade] Commission’s interpretation of Maxwell would place Maxwell
into conflict with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent.”).
1745. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
1746. Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F. Supp. 191, 199-200, 75
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231, 238 (N.D. Ind. 1947).
1747. YBM Magnex, 145 F.3d at 1321, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (quoting Graver
Tank, 339 U.S. at 614, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 332 (Black, J., dissenting)).
1748. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001,
1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1749. 939 F.2d 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1750. See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1106, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006; see also Miller v.
Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) (“[T]he claim of a specific device or
combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on
the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not
claimed.”).
1751. Robert J. McManus et al., Survey of Patent Law Decisions in the Federal Circuit:
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those authors viewed the Federal Circuit’s decision in YBM Magnex as
a decision that “clarified its holding in Maxwell v. J. Baker,”1752 we view
YBM Magnex as not clarifying, but only serving to muddy the court’s
body of precedent.  Thus, YBM Magnex makes the Federal Circuit’s
decisions seem less grounded in law and more grounded in the
preferences of the particular panel assigned to hear the case.
In one decision from 2000, Judge Michel, writing for the panel in
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,1753 tried valiantly to mediate
the conflicting views by seeking to portray Maxwell and YBM Magnex
as coherent members of a uniform body of law:
Likewise, while Moore argues that the written description’s
teaching that the length of the first and second strips may be about
“half the length” of the longitudinal marginal portions gives rise to
a scope of equivalents that would cover a “minority,” our case law
reveals that Moore is mistaken.  In Maxwell v. J. Baker, . . . , we
explained the contrary principle that “subject matter disclosed in
the specification, but not claimed, is dedicated to the public” in
determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. . . .
Having fully disclosed two distinct embodiments, one in which the
first and second longitudinal strips extend a majority of the length
of the longitudinal marginal portions, and one in which they do
not, Moore is not entitled to “enforce the unclaimed embodiment
as an equivalent of the one that was claimed.”1754
But by quoting the broadly applicable, absolute “rule” of Maxwell in
tandem with YBM Magnex’s description of the holding of Maxwell, the
panel in Moore U.S.A. left little doubt that it was siding with the
Maxwell view of the world.  Little wonder that Judge Newman, the
author of YBM Magnex, dissented on this point.1755
On January 24, 2001, in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E.
Service Co., Inc.,1756 a case that had been argued on December 7, 1999
before a panel of Judges Newman and Rader and Senior Judge
Archer, the Federal Circuit “sua sponte order[ed] that the case be
heard en banc” to address the following questions:
(1) Whether and under what circumstances a patentee can rely
upon the doctrine of equivalents with respect to unclaimed subject
                                                          
1998 In Review, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1319, 1422 (1999).
1752. Id. at 1420.
1753. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1754. Id. at 1107, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
1755. Id. at 1119-20, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The panel majority also states that Moore dedicated to the
public all embodiments less than the majority of the length.  There is no support for
such statement.  Neither prosecution history estoppel nor prior art was asserted as
limiting equivalency to over 50% of the length.”).
1756. 238 F.3d 1347, 1349, [U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) citation not available].
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matter disclosed in the specification.
(2) Whether in this case the jury’s finding of infringement should
be reversed because the patentee was foreclosed from asserting the
doctrine of equivalents with respect to unclaimed subject matter
disclosed in the specification.1757
At this writing, briefing in Johnson & Johnston has been completed,
and oral argument was held on October 3, 2001.1758
The Federal Circuit’s path from Maxwell to YBM Magnex to Johnson
& Johnston ought to be a cautionary tale for the court.  Regardless of
whether Maxwell was correctly decided, the panel in YBM Magnex
ought not to have tried to eviscerate the prior panel decision in
Maxwell by confining it to its facts, or by attempting to re-define the
holding.  Instead, the YBM Magnex panel should have either followed
the prior panel decision, as it is obligated to do under Federal Circuit
precedent,1759 or, as the court’s rules allow, sought en banc review of
the issue either when Maxwell was decided in 1996, or when YBM
Magnex came before the court.1760  And it is equally unfortunate that
the full court did not exercise its prerogative to resolve this facially
apparent conflict en banc when YBM Magnex was first decided by the
panel.  But what panels of the court should not do is what, it appears,
the panel in YBM Magnex did—it effectively swept aside the prior
panel decision because it disagreed with that decision, and left intact
for three years two obviously conflicting strands of authority, which
only serves to confuse courts and litigants.  Lower courts and litigants
(actual and potential) alike cannot effectively conduct their affairs
when every case to come before the Federal Circuit has the potential
to turn not upon predictable and effective legal rules or prior panel
decisions, but upon the particular panel members’ views of the
“totality of the circumstances” and the potential that prior panel
decisions will be “limited to their facts,” whatever they might be.  As
Justice Scalia wrote, those are the sorts of tests “most beloved by a
court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who
want to know what to expect).”1761
                                                          
1757. Id. at 1347.
1758. See id.
1759. See, e.g., Newell Co., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“This court has adopted the rule that prior
decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless
and until overturned in banc.”).
1760. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (stating that an en banc hearing should be ordered
when it is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decision); FED.
CIR. R. 35.
1761. United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2178 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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The costs of this uncertainty to litigants are manifest, but the price
to the court may ultimately be more costly: a loss of public
confidence in its decisions.  At a minimum, the court should
demonstrate a willingness to use its en banc procedures more
frequently so that the full court can effectively police the consistency
and predictability of the court’s jurisprudence.  That, in turn, ought
to make individual panels less likely to ignore (or distinguish away to
a vanishing point) prior panel decisions.
3. Other infringement doctrines
In 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of other
infringement doctrines, including inducing infringement under
Section 271(f) of the Patent Act, infringement by the filing of an
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, and willful infringement.  Additionally, in one case the court had
the occasion to discuss exceptions to findings of patent infringement.
a. Inducing infringement
In Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd.,1762  the Federal
Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment holding that the
defendant, NorTel, did not induce infringement of the two patents in
suit.1763  Noting that the plaintiff had to “show a direct infringement
of the [two] patents” in order to establish liability for inducing
infringement,1764 the court upheld the summary judgment on the
basis that it had affirmed the summary judgment of no direct
infringement.1765
b. Infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended and modified the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),1766 as well as the patent laws.1767
Under the amended FDCA, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may
submit an Abrreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) in order to
seek expedited approval from the Food and Drug Administration
                                                          
1762. 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1763. See id. at 1049, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49.
1764. See id. at 1048, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1765. Arthur A. Collins, 216 F.3d at 1049, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. (“Because
there is no evidence of direct infringement, an essential element of induced
infringement, we need not reach Collins’s assertion that the district court committed
legal error in other aspects of its analysis of the induced infringement claim.”).
1766. See Pub. L. No. 52-675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1994)).
1767. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (defining patent infringement in the context of
drugs and biological products).
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(FDA) of a generic version of a previously approved (i.e., “listed”)
drug.1768  A generic-drug manufacturer may file an ANDA if the active
ingredient of the generic drug is the “bioequivalent” of the listed
drug.1769  In the course of submitting an ANDA, the generic-drug
manufacturer must certify to at least one of the following statements
concerning the listed drug:
• the listed drug is not patented;
• the listed drug’s patent has expired;
• the expiration date of the listed drug’s patent; or
• the listed drug’s patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug” disclosed in the
ANDA.1770
If the generic-drug manufacturer files the last of these
certifications (known as a “Paragraph IV certification” in view of its
statutory location), the applicant must notify the patent’s owner of
the certification.1771
An ANDA certified under Paragraphs I or II is approved
immediately by the FDA, once it has determined that the generic
drug satisfies all applicable scientific and regulatory requirements.1772
An ANDA certified under Paragraph III cannot be certified until the
applicable patent expires.1773  But the notice required under
Paragraph IV allows the patent holder forty-five days from receipt to
bring suit for infringement under Section 271(e)(2)(A) of the Patent
Act.1774  A Paragraph IV certification thus cannot be approved, if suit
is brought, until (i) the court decides that the patent is invalid or not
infringed; (ii) the patent expires; or (iii) thirty months from the
notice (subject to court approval).1775  Because of the need to “tee up”
the validity and infringement issues for prompt judicial resolution
upon the filing of a Paragraph IV certification, Congress has deemed
a Paragraph IV certification itself to be an act of infringement, “if the
purpose of such a submission is to obtain approval under the [FDCA]
to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . .
claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before
the expiration of such a patent.”1776  If the patent holder prevails in
                                                          
1768. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
1769. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
1770. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
1771. See id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
1772. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(A), (B)(i).
1773. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(A), (B)(ii).
1774. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
1775. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(III).
1776. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
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that infringement suit, he “is entitled to an order that FDA approval
of the ANDA containing the paragraph IV certification not be
effective until the patent expires.”1777
In many ways, an infringement case premised on the filing of an
ANDA resembles a garden-variety patent-infringement case, as
illustrated by the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Upjohn Co. v. Mova
Pharmaceutical Corp.1778 and Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co. v. Danbury
Pharmacal, Inc.1779  At the same time, such an infringement case is
somewhat artificial because it is premised on a “hypothetical inquiry”
into “what the ANDA applicant will likely market if its application is
approved, an act that has not yet occurred.”1780  In Bayer AG v. Elan
Pharmaceutical Research Corp.,1781 the court affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the generic-drug manufacturer, rejecting the
patent holder’s arguments that genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether the generic manufacturer’s biobatch infringed the
patent in suit.1782  The reason that the biobatch (a batch of the
proposed generic drug made and tested for the ANDA process1783)
created no genuine issues, according to the court, was that the
“hypothetical inquiry” called for by Section 271(e)(2)(A) “is properly
grounded in the ANDA application and the extensive materials
typically submitted in its support.”1784  Where “the ANDA ‘is to sell [a]
well-defined compound,’ then the ‘ultimate question of infringement
is usually straightforward.’”1785  The specification of the generic
manufacturer’s ANDA specified that the drug manufactured
pursuant thereto would avoid the literal language of the patent
claims, found to be dispositive by the Federal Circuit for two reasons:
first, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides an ANDA applicant with
immunity from allegations of infringement for “acts that are
necessary in preparing an ANDA,” such as “[t]he production of a
biobatch, and the submission of a [certificate of quality and analysis]
regarding this biobatch.”1786  Second, in light of all the criminal and
                                                          
1777. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co. v. Royce Lab., Inc., 69 F.3d 1130, 1135, 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1778. 225 F.3d 1306, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1779. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1780. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1569, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1257, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1781. 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1782. See id. at 1248, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
1783. See id. at 1246, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1784. Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1248, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715 (quoting Glaxo, 110
F.3d at 1569, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263).
1785. Id. at 1249, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16 (quoting Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1569,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263).
1786. Id. at 1249, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
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civil penalties attendant to the submission of a false ANDA, and the
fact that a generic manufacturer is prohibited by law “from selling
any product that does not meet its ANDA’s requirements,” the court
must conclude that the generic manufacturer “is bound by this
specification,” and thus must measure allegations of infringement
against that specification.1787  The court distinguished its prior
decision in Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.,1788 in which the Federal
Circuit “approved of the district court looking to a biobatch for help
in deciding the issue of infringement,” as one where “the biobatch . .
. was properly considered because the ANDA specification in that
case did not define the compound in a manner that directly
addressed the issue of infringement.”1789
c. Willful infringement
A competitor who has actual notice of an existing patent has an
affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringing that patent.1790  Failure
to exercise that level of care can result in a finding of willful
infringement, particularly in cases tried by a jury.  If a properly
instructed jury finds willful infringement, it is difficult to disturb that
finding on appeal, since willful infringement “turns on
considerations of intent, state of mind, and culpability.”1791  The
punitive consequences of a finding of willful infringement are
significant, as such a finding authorizes (though it does not mandate)
the trial judge to enhance damages, up to three times the actual
damages awarded.1792
Appellate review of jury findings of willful infringement is limited.
Thus, for example, in Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc.,1793 the court affirmed a
verdict of willfulness as supported by substantial evidence, with little
need for discussion of the point.1794  Likewise, in Ajinomoto Co. v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,1795 the Federal Circuit upheld a district
                                                          
1787. See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1249-50, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
1788. 110 F.3d 1562, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1789. Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1250, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.
1790. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418, 425 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1791. National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1188, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1792. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating that the minimum
damages assessed must include a reasonable royalty for use plus interest and costs).
1793. 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1794. Id. at 1259, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (“[T]he jury reasonably could have
credited the testimony that Davol’s reliance on the opinions of counsel was not
reasonable, and that it did not in fact follow those opinions, and that the designs for
the accused devices were finalized before obtaining an opinion of counsel.”).
1795. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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judge’s finding of no willful infringement in similar short order.1796
Challenges to the district court’s granting or denial of enhanced
damages under the second paragraph of Section 284 may be treated
less deferentially; even though that paragraph of Section 284 grants
the district court substantial discretion,1797 the Federal Circuit
demands a certain level of rational explanation by the district courts
in exercising that discretion.  Thus, in Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess
Technologies, Inc.,1798 the court vacated that portion of the district
court’s judgment denying the patent holder an award of attorneys’
fees after a jury finding of willful infringement.  While noting that
such a willfulness finding “‘does not mandate that damages be
increased or that attorneys fees be awarded,’”1799 the court concluded
that it could not let the denial of fees stand without requiring an
explanation from the district judge as to why he denied fees in the
face of the jury finding of willfulness.1800  Although the Federal
Circuit’s cases do not use the term, one could easily view this
procedural rule as a “presumption” similar to those created in the
areas of claim construction and infringement analysis.  That is, where
willful infringement is found, it will be presumed that enhanced
damages will attach.  Thus, the district court will be obliged to
provide a reasoned explanation, based on the facts and circumstances
of the case, for finding that the presumption has been overcome and
enhanced damages are not appropriate.
d. Exceptions to infringement
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,1801 the accused infringer
of a patent claiming a method for controlling immunizable diseases
                                                          
1796. Id. at 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
The [district] court referred to the representations made to ADM by ABP
and Genetika’s subsequent failure to enforce the condition in the
Biotechnics license, and declined to impute bad faith to ADM’s dealings with
ABP.  The district court observed that ADM mounted a substantial, albeit
unsuccessful, challenge on the issues of validity and infringement.  We do
not discern clear error in the district court’s finding on the issue of no willful
infringement.
Id.
1797. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed”).
1798. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1799. Id. at 972, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (quoting Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d
1566, 1573, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1800. Tate Access Floors, 222 F.3d at 972, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (“On remand,
the district court is directed to consider whether Maxcess sought the opinion of
counsel or otherwise exercised due care, and whether there was a reasonable basis
for concluding that the accused floor panel did not infringe the claims of the . . .
patent.”).
1801. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
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in birds urged that its acts of infringement—tests performed on
birds—“did not infringe because they were scientific experiments and
did not result in the sale of any machines, and therefore were either
merely de minimis, or exempt under the experimental use
exception.”1802  The panel majority, noting that the Federal Circuit
“has construed both the experimental use and de minimis exceptions
very narrowly,”1803 concluded that the defendant’s usages of the
patented invention fell under neither exception.  The court in Embrex
noted that “[b]inding precedent from the United States Court of
Claims” had previously acknowledged a “narrow defense to
infringement performed ‘for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry’1804 [but that the defendant’s tests
were] performed . . . expressly for commercial purposes.”1805  The
defendant’s “chief commercial purpose was to demonstrate to its
potential customers the usefulness of the methods performed by its in
ovo injection machines.”1806
Judge Rader concurred separately.  In his view, “the Patent Act
leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use excuses for
infringement.”1807  Judge Rader viewed the per curiam majority’s
approach as conflating the two concepts, when “clarity call[ed] for
separate analyses.”1808  As to the de minimis exception, Judge Rader
pointed out that “[s]ince its inception, this court has not tolerated
the notion that a little infringement—de minimis infringement—is
acceptable infringement or not infringement at all.”1809  Rather than
try to force-fit notions of de minimis infringement into Section
271(a),1810 whose language admits of no such exception, Judge Rader
concluded that “the statute accommodates concerns about de minimis
infringement in damages calculations.”1811  And as to the
“experimental use” exception, Judge Rader noted that both the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court—most notably in the area of
                                                          
1802. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1803. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1804. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1805. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
1806. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
1807. Id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (Rader, J., concurring).
1808. Id.
1809. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1352-53, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1810. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“[W]hoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States . . .
during the term of the patent therefore, infringes on the patent”).
1811. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
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infringement under the doctrine of equivalents—“have recently
reiterated that intent is irrelevant to infringement.”1812  Since intent is
irrelevant, there is, according to Judge Rader, no “reason to excuse
infringement because it was committed with a particular purpose or
intent, such as for scientific experimentation or idle curiosity.”1813
Judge Rader has the better of this argument as an original matter,
for there seems to be no statutory basis for these apparently judicially
constructed exceptions.  But the panel majority has precedent on its
side, and in an appellate court, that—more than logic—is power.
Thus, if Judge Rader’s view is ever to hold sway in the Federal Circuit,
it appears that either the court en banc or the Supreme Court will
have to intervene.
IV. REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
Overall, the Federal Circuit broke little new ground regarding
remedies in 2000; rather, its cases tended to address specific factual
situations in traditional damages contexts, and to apply existing rules
to those situations.  One area of interest was the subject of future
damages and future price erosion, where the Federal Circuit did to
some degree reach out past its prior, seminal decision in Lam, Inc. v.
Johns-Manville Corp.1814
A. Damages
1. General damages
In Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,1815 the district
court awarded damages calculated as a royalty of $1.23/kg of
threonine produced by the defendant’s infringing use of certain
strains of genetically modified bacteria for the period May 1993 to
March 1998.1816  ADM challenged the award for the period
subsequent to November 1996, when it allegedly switched, the day
after the trial concluded, to a different bacterial culture which was
non-infringing when compared to the previous culture.1817  ADM had
not told the court about the change in strain, despite the year-and-a-
half gap between the end of the trial and the rendering of judgment,
                                                          
1812. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Rader, J., concurring).
1813. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Rader, J., concurring).
1814. 718 F.2d 1056, 1069, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
1815. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1816. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1349-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.  See generally
35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
1817. See id. at 1349, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
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and moved to amend the judgment to reflect the change.1818  The
district court denied the motion, and the Federal Circuit, reviewing
the denial of the motion to amend under an abuse-of-discretion
standard, affirmed, noting that the facts before the district court fully
supported the damage award over the entire period, based on the
record evidence.1819  ADM had within its power the ability to inform
the district court, and its opponent, of the change in strain, but had
affirmatively taken steps prior to trial to prevent discovery of its shift
to the new bacterial culture, and had produced a trial witness who
dissembled on the point during his testimony.1820  In this light, the
district court did not run afoul of its “broad discretion” under Rule
59(e) by denying ADM’s motion without a further hearing on the
alleged non-infringement of the later culture, when that issue could
have been presented and resolved concurrently in the first trial.1821
2. Lost-profits damages
Several Federal Circuit decisions in 2000 addressed lost-profits
damages.  In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc.,1822 Tate
Access succeeded in securing a jury verdict of literal infringement
and non-invalidity for its ‘491 patent, which was directed to an
elevated floor panel with a laminate floor covering.1823  Maxcess
contended that Tate Access failed to prove the absence of non-
infringing alternatives, and also failed to prove that it would have
captured all of Maxcess’s infringing sales “but for” the infringement,
particularly given that the parties each sold their respective products
through exclusive dealerships.1824  Tate Access noted that its own
patented floor panel and Maxcess’s Duratrim floor panel were the
only two available panels that had self-formed recessed edges, and
that all other panels had add-on trims that made them non-
acceptable substitutes.1825
The Federal Circuit held that there was substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s finding that Tate Access was entitled to lost
                                                          
1818. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (discussing the time periods in which
ADM claimed to use the infringing strain).
1819. See id. at 1350-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (noting that ADM had no
explanation for its silence in finding no abuse of discretion).
1820. See id. at 1349, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (highlighting the testimony of
ADM’s group leader, and final witness, who gave no indication that a change in
strains was planned for the next day).
1821. See id. at 1350-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
1822. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1823. See id. at 963, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
1824. See id. at 970, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1825. See id. at 971, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
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profits, and that the district court therefore had not erred in denying
JMOL as to lost profits.1826  The court recited the tried and true “but
for” standard:  “To recover lost profits, a patentee must show a
reasonable probability that, ‘but for’ the infringement, it would have
made the sales made by the infringer.”1827  The court also noted that a
useful but non-exclusive way to prove lost profits was to satisfy the
four-part Panduit test.1828
The court concluded, agreeing with Tate Access, that no non-
infringing substitutes for the patented floor panel were available,
because customers who wanted a panel with recessed edges could
choose only the Tate Access product or the infringing Maxcess
Duratrim panel.1829  Substantial evidence of the non-acceptability of
panels with add-on trim existed, including Maxcess’s own product
brochure, which said that applied or add-on trims were not
acceptable for purchasers of the Duratrim panel.1830  Given the
absence of any acceptable non-infringing substitutes, the court
agreed that there was a reasonable probability that Tate Access would
have made the sales made by Maxcess.1831
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.,1832 the court affirmed a
jury verdict of infringement relating to a circular blade paper cutter
covered by Fiskars’ patent.1833  The jury also awarded Fiskars lost
profits of $114,760, which Hunt challenged on the ground that
Fiskars would not have made the sales Hunt did make, because
Fiskars failed the “but for” lost profits test.1834  Hunt stressed that 90%
of its sales were made to Staples, which as a matter of internal policy,
preferred to deal with a single supplier who would provide a full line
of paper cutters, linear as well as rotary.1835  Because Fiskars (unlike
Hunt) did not make a full line of paper cutters, Hunt argued that
Fiskars would not have made any sales of the rotary paper cutters to
                                                          
1826. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1827. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1828. The Panduit test “requires that the patentee establish: (1) demand for the
patented product; (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3)
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount
of the profit it would have made.” Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (citing Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 557 F.2d 1152, 1156 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
726, 730 (6th Cir. 1978)).
1829. See Tate Access Floors, 222 F.3d at 971, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (detailing
the similarities between the Tate Access panel and the Maxcess Duratrim panel).
1830. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1831. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1832. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1833. See id. at 1324, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1834. See id. at 1324-25, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574-75.
1835. See id. at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1665
Staples.1836
The court disagreed, concluding that there was, in fact, substantial
evidence supporting the verdict of lost-profits damages.1837  The trial
evidence showed that no single supplier would have been able to
provide a full line of paper cutters without infringing, for no non-
infringing substitute was commercially available for Fiskars’ rotary
cutter.1838  But, applying the deferential JMOL review of the jury’s
verdict, the district court concluded that the jury had enough
evidence from which to conclude that Hunt’s customer, Staples,
would in fact have purchased its supply of rotary cutters from Fiskars
but for Hunt’s infringement, and the Federal Circuit agreed.1839  Even
so, the court offered no explanation as to where Staples would obtain
linear cutters, and did not explicitly reject Hunt’s contention that
Staples would only deal with one full-line supplier.  This theory could
have prevailed in a trial court, but was not likely to provide a basis for
reversal on appeal.  As in Tate Access, the argument and proof on this
Panduit element was too weak.
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,1840 Embrex was awarded
damages for Service Engineering’s infringement of the ‘630 patent,
including direct damages.1841  Embrex was the exclusive licensee of
the ‘630 patent, which was directed to a method of inoculating birds
against disease by injecting vaccines into a specified region of an egg
before hatching.1842  On receiving the ‘630 patent license, Embrex
began designing machines to perform the innoculation in large-scale
industrial chicken farms.1843  Service Engineering tried to interest
Embrex in using its equipment in the practice of the method, but
Embrex refused.1844  Service Engineering then worked with two other
companies to design around the ‘630 patent, resulting in an
infringement suit by Embrex against all three, which was resolved by
a settlement and dismissal.1845
Service Engineering, however, continued to build a machine to
practice the patented innoculation method, leading to the
                                                          
1836. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1837. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1838. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1839. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1840. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
1841. See id. at 1345-46, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
1842. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
1843. See id. at 1346, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162 (explaining Embrex’s
production process).
1844. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162 (discussing Service Engineering’s
attempts to work with Embrex).
1845. See id. at 1345-46, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
1666 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1435
development of a prototype and tests by retained consultants.1846
While preparing the prototype and running the tests, Service
Engineering offered to sell the machines to a U.S. company and to a
Canadian company, effectively depriving Embrex of the sales.1847
Embrex again filed suit,1848 alleging willful infringement of the ‘630
patent, breach of the settlement agreement, and violation of Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.  The jury returned a verdict for Embrex on
breach of contract, infringement and willfulness, awarding $500,000
in direct damages.1849  Service Engineering challenged the award on
the ground that there was no evidence that it had practiced the
claimed method, but had only offered to sell machines that
performed the method, which by law is not a sale of the process.1850
The court agreed, and vacated the direct damage award, finding that
“SEC’s offer to sell its machines cannot supply adequate evidentiary
support for a compensatory damage award.”1851
Although not technically a patent case, one decision issued by the
Federal Circuit in 2000 applied analogous state contract-damages law
principles in a license dispute.  In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray,1852 Dray
exclusively licensed his patents to U.S. Valves in 1991.1853  After the
business relationship with U.S. Valves deteriorated, Dray began
manufacturing and selling valves himself, including the patented
technology.1854  U.S. Valves sued for breach of contract, claiming that
Dray sold valves covered by the licensed patents, with Dray
counterclaiming for damages for unpaid royalties.1855  After a bench
trial the district court found that Dray had sold valves in violation of
the license and issued a permanent injunction against further sales by
Dray and awarded $241,351 in damages.1856
The court vacated the damages award, finding numerous errors
under controlling state contract law in the method the district court
                                                          
1846. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1346-47, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162-63
(acknowledging attempts by Service Engineering to avoid infringement of the ‘630
patent).
1847. See id. at 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163 (noting Service Engineering’s
solicitation of orders).
1848. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1849. See id. at 1347, 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163, 1165.
1850. See id. at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
1851. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165; see also Joy Tech. Inc. v. Flakt Inc., 6
F.3d 770, 773, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that
sales of equipment capable of performing a patented process is not direct
infringement of a patent).
1852. 212 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1853. See id. at 1370, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1854. See id. at 1370-71, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835-36.
1855. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835-36.
1856. See id. at 1369-70, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
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had used to arrive at the amount.1857  The problem was that Dray had
developed another valve model—a sliding ring valve—that was not
established at trial to be covered by the licensed patents or the
license.  Dray sold his ring valve at various times along with his
original valve, which did fall within the license.1858  Yet the damages
award did not differentiate between the two.  The district court, not
having determined the number of valves sold by Dray that were
covered by the license, used summary figures alleged to show Dray’s
shipments and invoices as a base for the award.1859  But because these
summary figures included both infringing and noninfringing valves,
the Federal Circuit sent the case back for a proper determination by
the district court.1860
3. Price-erosion damages
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.,1861 the jury awarded both
past price-erosion and future price-erosion damages in Fiskars’ favor.
Hunt challenged both awards as “speculative and contradictory.”1862
Financial and marketing officers and accounting witnesses for both
sides presented damages evidence to the jury.  Fiskars’ damages
expert testified as to the effect of Hunt’s past infringement on
Fiskars’ prices for the patented circular blade paper cutters, and the
effect this price erosion would have in the future.1863  The expert
apparently applied the Panduit factors, adopted by the Federal Circuit
as noted in Rite Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.1864
Hunt responded that Fiskars’ damage expert had failed to take into
account that Fiskars would have sold fewer cutters had it not reduced
its prices in the face of Hunt’s competing, infringing cutter.1865  Hunt
also challenged the Fiskars’ expert testimony that Fiskars’ sales of
rotary cutters would have grown at a ten percent rate, despite the fact
that the overall growth rate of the industry was one percent.
According to the testimony of a member of Fiskars’ marketing
department, Fiskars had experienced this substantial growth rate in
the sales of its rotary cutters and therefore the witness estimated the
future growth rate and described the price reduction Fiskars had
                                                          
1857. See id. at 1370, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1858. See U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
1859. See id. at 1374-75, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1860. See id. at 1374-75, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838-39.
1861. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839-40 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1862. 221 F.3d at 1324-25, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574-75.
1863. Id. at 1324, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1864. 56 F.3d 1538, 1545, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (reciting the Panduit four-factor test).
1865. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
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been obliged to make to remain competitive in response to Hunt’s
infringing sales.1866
The Federal Circuit tersely rejected Hunt’s challenge, stating that
“[o]n these conflicting positions and arguments, there was substantial
evidence whereby a reasonable jury could have reached the damages
verdicts reached.”1867  In support of that statement, the court cited its
prior decision in Brooktree Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.1868
for the proposition that a jury’s award of damages will be upheld
unless “‘grossly excessive or monstrous,’ clearly not supported by the
evidence, or based only on speculation or guesswork.”  The court also
cited the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Rowe1869 for the
proposition that “[d]amages assessed by a jury are largely
discretionary with it . . . To reverse the judgment of the trial court,
the appellate court must conclude that the verdict was so ‘gross’ or
‘monstrously excessive’ that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting it to stand.”
Fiskars appeared to be less rigorous in its consideration of the
future price-erosion evidence than the Lam court had been.  This
may presage a more receptive view of future price-erosion damages
awarded by a jury, under substantial-evidence appellate review—
especially the acceptance of an estimate of future growth rate rather
than projected figures, as was used in Lam.
4. Future profits damages
In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray,1870 the Federal Circuit agreed with the
district court’s refusal to award future damages in view of the fact that
it had enjoined Dray from selling the valves covered under the license
agreement at issue.1871  The court found that any future harm arising
from the infringement would be speculative at best since the district
court had enjoined Dray from producing any additional infringing
products.1872  Also, the license agreement gave no basis to award
damages for future sales; it did not mention future sales, but instead
set up an ongoing arrangement in which the parties would apportion
future revenues from the continuing sale of licensed valves.1873
                                                          
1866. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1867. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1868. 977 F.2d 1555, 1579-80, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1418-19 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1869. 761 F.2d 360, 368 (7th Cir. 1985).
1870. 212 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1871. See id. at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1872. See id. at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1873. See id. at 1375-76, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
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Moreover, the termination date of the agreement was unknown.1874
Without any way to determine future profits, the court held that any
award of damages for future profits would be wholly speculative.1875
U.S. Valves tried to avoid this problem with high-tech
computations: it presented expert testimony on lost future profits
calculated with a computer-forecasting model.1876  While the Federal
Circuit noted that the record did not make clear whether the district
court had actually used the evidence, or tested it under the Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.1877 or Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael1878
standards, it found that “[w]ithout such assurance, and in the light of
the impossibility of calculating at the time of the simulation the life of
the license agreement, this testimony also appears conjectural.”1879
The court stated that “[s]peculative or contingent profits, as opposed
to those a plaintiff would certainly earn but for the default, are
recoverable only when the record permits estimation of probable
profits with reasonable certainty.”1880  The record failed in that respect
and the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of future
damages.1881
B. Enhanced Damages
The Federal Circuit considered a number of cases raising
enhanced-damages issues in 2000.  These cases continue to
demonstrate the fact-specific nature of enhanced damages awards
under the flexible and unpredictable “totality of the circumstances”
standard for willfulness and exceptional-case determinations.
In Stryker Corp. v. Davol, Inc.,1882 a court reviewed the district court
finding that Davol had willfully infringed certain claims of Stryker’s
‘402 patent, which was directed to a endoscopic surgical suction
irrigator.1883  The district court denied a JMOL motion and motion for
new trial brought by Davol, and awarded enhanced damages and
costs to Stryker for pre-verdict infringement.1884  The district court’s
first judgment was for a reasonable royalty and prejudgment interest,
                                                          
1874. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (“The agreement was to last until ‘the
expiration of the patent or subsequent improvement patents . . .’”).
1875. See id. at 1375-76, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1876. See id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1877. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
1878. 526 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1999).
1879. 212 F.3d at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1880. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1881. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1882. 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1883. See id. at 1254-55, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134-35.
1884. See id. at 1259, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138-39.
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together with enhanced damages of fifty percent of that amount.1885
The court then entered a permanent injunction.1886  Based on Davol’s
continued willful infringement of the ‘402 patent during the period
between the jury verdict and entry of the injunction, the district court
awarded additional reasonable royalty damages and prejudgment
interest, and then doubled those amounts as the quantum of
enhanced damages.1887  Davol contended that the district court had
abused its discretion in awarding enhanced damages.1888  The court
disagreed, concluding that the district court properly considered the
evidence of Davol’s culpability and correctly applied the
enhancement factors.1889  The court found that the district court was
well within its discretion in enhancing the pretrial infringement
damages by fifty percent and doubling damages for post-verdict
infringement until entry of the permanent injunction.1890
In Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,1891 Ajinomoto
cross-appealed the district court’s finding that Archer-Daniels-
Midland (ADM) had not willfully infringed the patent, which led in
turn to the court’s refusal to award enhanced damages.1892  Based on
(1) ADM’s knowledge of the ‘765 patent at the time it bought the
infringing bacterial strain (culture 3) from ABP for use in the United
States, (2) ADM’s knowledge that Ajinomoto held exclusive rights
under the U.S. patent, and (3) ADM’s assertion that it failed to
obtain counsel’s opinion before begining its infringing activities,
Ajinomoto contended that the district court clearly erred in failing to
find the case exceptional and declining to award enhanced
damages.1893  However, the court found no clear error on willful
infringement, and affirmed the district court’s withholding of
enhanced damages.1894
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc.,1895 Maxcess
appealed a jury finding that it had willfully infringed the ‘491 patent.
                                                          
1885. See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1886. See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1887. See id. at 1256-57, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1888. See Stryker, 234 F.3d at 1259, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1889. See id. at 1259-60, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (“The paramount
determination in deciding to grant enhancement and the amount thereof is the
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and the
circumstances.”) (citing Read Corp. v. Portee, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1426, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1890. See id. at 1260, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1891. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1892. See id. at 1351-52, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342-43.
1893. See id. at 1351-52, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342-43.
1894. See id. at 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
1895. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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The district court had denied Tate Access’s motion to amend the
judgment to increase damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, and Tate
Access cross-appealed from that denial.1896  Maxcess contended that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to
enhance damages because it was a close case.  According to Maxcess,
there was evidence that the ‘491 patent was invalid, and Maxcess
believed in good faith that its floor panel did not infringe the
patent.1897  The court vacated the denial of Tate Access’s motion for
enhanced damages, because the district court abused its discretion
when it refused to award enhanced damages without articulating any
reason for refusing to make the award.  While a finding of willful
infringement does not mandate that damages be increased, following
an express finding of willful infringement a trial court should provide
reasons for not increasing the damage award.1898 The court specifically
instructed the district court “to consider whether Maxcess sought
counsel’s opinion or otherwise exercised due care, and whether there
was a reasonable basis for concluding that the accused floor panel did
not infringe the ‘491 patent.”1899
C. Attorneys’ Fees
Several of the Federal Circuit’s year 2000 cases addressed attorneys’
fee awards, usually under the exceptional-case provision of 35 U.S.C.
§ 285.  Again, these cases are consistent with the court’s typical
practices, and focus on specific facts and circumstances, with a willful
infringement finding or invalidity of the patent in suit the usual basis
for the exceptional-case holding.
In Stryker Corp. v. Davol, Inc.,1900 Davol appealed a jury verdict of
willful infringement.  After entry of a permanent injunction, and a
refusal of Stryker’s request for attorneys’ fees for pre-verdict
infringement, Davol began selling a modified version of the irrigator
that had been found to infringe by the jury.1901  The court awarded
attorneys’ fees, costs, and reasonable royalties for post-injunction
infringing sales, and then tripled those royalties as enhanced
damages for willfulness.1902
Stryker, however, cross-appealed the denial of its attorneys’ fees for
pre-verdict infringement.  The Federal Circuit rejected that challenge
                                                          
1896. See id. at 961, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
1897. See id. at 971-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1898. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1899. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1900. 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1901. See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1902. See id. at 1256-57, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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and affirmed the district court’s ruling.1903  Stryker argued that it was
entitled to its pre-infringement attorneys’ fees due to Davol’s alleged
deliberate copying and litigation behavior.  The district court’s
approach in enhancing damages for pre-trial infringement by fifty
percent, and doubling damages for infringement after the verdict
and before entry of the permanent injunction was, in the court’s
view, a reasonable measurement of the culpability of Davol’s conduct.
Relying on the discretionary nature of the district court’s reasonable
measurement, the Federal Circuit concluded that Stryker’s request
for additional attorneys’ fees was not an abuse of discretion.1904  The
award of attorneys’ fees in relation to Davol’s contemptuous conduct
was also affirmed on Davol’s direct appeal.  Considering the
conclusory nature of the opinion of counsel used by Davol to justify
selling the revised device and the minor changes made to the original
device, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding the compensatory royalty damages,
attorneys’ fees and costs.1905
In Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,1906 the court reviewed a district court trial
finding that Chance’s patents in suit were invalid for obviousness,
even though they were infringed.1907  Ruiz cross-appealed the denial
of its motion for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.  Whether a
case is “exceptional” under Section 285, which allows for the award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees, is a question of fact reviewed under a
“clearly erroneous” standard.1908  The prevailing party has the burden
of proving the case exceptional by clear and convincing evidence.1909
Only if the prevailing party satisfies its initial burden of proving an
exceptional case does the district court even consider whether to
award attorneys’ fees.1910
Ruiz had based its request for an exceptional-case finding on the
                                                          
1903. See id. at 1259-60, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1904. See id. at 1260, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1905. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139; see also Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v.
Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik AG, 903 F.2d 1568, 1578, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it awarded attorneys’ fees and increased damages for flagrant
contemptuous conduct).
1906. 234 F.3d 654, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1907. See id. at 660, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163 (finding that the patent was
infringed, but vacating the finding that the patent was invalid for obviousness and
remanding with instructions to make factual findings on obviousness in accordance
with the four factor test set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
1908. See Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 669, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
1909. Id. at 669, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
1910. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (“If the district court applied the correct
legal standard and did not clearly err in its factual findings, then we review the
court’s decision whether or not to award attorney fees for abuse of discretion.”).
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alleged inequitable conduct of Chance in failing to submit
information that had, in part, been relied upon by the district court
in finding the patents invalid for obviousness.1911  The district court,
however, found that the prior-art information was properly disclosed
in the specification of the patents in suit and that there was no
evidence of intent to deceive.1912  The Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment of no liability for attorneys’ fees because, “at
the very least the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous.”1913
In Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.,1914
Yamanouchi, the owner of a patent for the anti-ulcer drug
famotidine, brought an infringement action under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A) against Danbury, who had filed an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA) for a generic version of the drug.1915  The
district court, granting Yamanachi’s JMOL motion after a bench trial,
held for the patent owner, finding that the patent was not invalid as
obvious and was willfully infringed, and awarded attorneys’ fees and
costs for the filing of a baseless ANDA.1916  The district court found
that Danbury, in its paragraph IV certification in the ANDA,1917 had
not shown any motivation to combine selected portions of various
prior-art compounds to create the specific compound famotidine.
“The district court characterized Danbury’s obviousness case as
largely hindsight, speculation and argument without adequate
foundation.”1918  That finding in turn led to the district court’s finding
                                                          
1911. See id. at 660, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (noting that failure to disclose
information will be measured in terms of the information’s materiality and the intent
to deceive, in determining whether the nondisclosure amounted to inequitable
conduct).
1912. See id. at 670, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (discussing the district court’s
conclusion that the language in the specifications of the patents and the materials in
the patent file wrapper history were sufficient for proper disclosure).
1913. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (noting that Ruiz had not offered clear and
convincing evidence of the intent to deceive or of the materiality of the withheld
information).
1914. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1915. See id. at 1342, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman
Act, also known as The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
provides that an ANDA can be filed with the Food and Drug Administration to
obtain expedited approval to market a generic drug); see also Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
(1994)).
1916. See id. at 1341-43, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642-44.
1917. See id. at 1342-43, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (explaining that an ANDA
proponent must certify one of four things: that the previously approved drug is not
patented (paragraph I certification); its patent has expired (paragraph II
certification); its patent will soon expire on a specific date (paragraph III
certification); or its patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the new drug” covered by the ANDA (paragraph IV certification)).
1918. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
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that Danbury had willfully infringed the patent, which in turn
qualified the case as exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and
supported the attorneys’ fees award.  In addition, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(4) independently provided a basis for an attorneys’ fee
award to the prevailing party in an exceptional ANDA-based case.1919
The award of fees for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), is
not, as the Federal Circuit noted, limited to cases involving infringing
commercial sales because “[t]he mere act of filing an ANDA
constitutes infringement.”1920  Danbury appealed the award of
attorneys’ fees and the court, finding no abuse of discretion in the
award, affirmed.
Although the district court had found Danbury’s conduct to be
willful infringement, such a finding was not, in the Federal Circuit’s
view, necessary to the fees award.1921  The Hatch-Waxman Act, the
court stated, imposes a duty of care on a party making an ANDA
certification, such that, in a case initiated by a Section 271(e)(2)
filing, the case may become exceptional if the ANDA filer makes
baseless certifications.1922
The court agreed that the conclusion of a baseless certification was
not clearly erroneous, pointing to particular district court findings:
that Danbury’s case for obviousness presented at trial contained
“glaring weaknesses,” leading to a JMOL at the close of its evidence
on obviousness;1923 that the ANDA certification notice1924 and
supporting affidavits, on which Danbury relied to show a good faith
                                                          
1919. See id. at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.  Section 271(e)(4) states that
“[f]or an act of infringement described in paragraph (2) . . . a court may award
attorneys’ fees under section 285.’”  Section 285, in turn, provides ‘[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  The
“paragraph (2)” infringement specified in §  271(e)(4) is the filing of an ANDA.
Id.
1920. Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646 (explaining that
a submission of an ANDA can qualify as an infringement if the purpose of the ANDA
is to gain approval to market or manufacture the generic drug).
1921. Id. at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
An ANDA filing by its very nature is a ‘highly artificial act of infringement,’
therefore, the trial court need not have elevated the ANDA certification into
a finding of willful infringement . . . Rather, Danbury’s misconduct in filing a
wholly unjustified ANDA certification and misconduct during the litigation
that followed warranted the district court’s finding that this case was
exceptional.
Id.
1922. See id. at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (noting that a paragraph IV
filing requires “a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his
knowledge, [that] each patent . . . for which the applicant is seeking approval . . . is
invalid.”) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)).
1923. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
1924. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that the person filing for an
ANDA send notice to the patentee of “the factual and legal basis” of invalidity).
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belief in invalidity, suffered “similar weaknesses,” viz. that it did not
present a prima facie case of invalidity, and made “no reference to
famotidine’s potency, safety and lack of side effects, among other
distinguishing properties accompanying its unusually high activity;”1925
that Danbury’s expert could not tell from famotidine’s chemical
structure whether it would be toxic and could not predict its freedom
from side effects or its potency; and that, “when Danbury proceeded
in the face of these weaknesses, its certification amounted to baseless
and unjustified misconduct.”1926  According to the court, Danbury, in
certifying the alleged invalidity, had disregarded its duty to exercise
due care.1927
An additional factor that the court noted, in stating that the district
court must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining a
case to be exceptional, was Danbury’s introduction into evidence of a
1993 legal opinion from its patent attorney containing a basic
chemistry error that was critical to the conclusion of obviousness.
Danbury’s expert was forced to concede the flat incorrectness of the
opinion due to that error.1928  All in all, the court agreed that the
district court properly found Danbury’s ANDA filing “without
adequate foundation and speculative at best.”1929
The question remains whether Yamanouchi will have a chilling
effect on generic drug ANDA filers who seek to challenge the validity
of a patent covering the proprietary drug product, consistent with the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s underlying philosophy.  At a minimum,
Yamanouchi cautions generic-drug manufacturers to put a rigorous
case together before starting down the ANDA road, lest they risk
paying the other side’s legal bills.
In Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc.,1930 Syntex manufactured a
drug it sold under the TICLID brand.  Syntex held patents both on
the drug itself and on the process of making it.1931  Hoffmann-La
Roche (Roche) was the exclusive distributor of TICLID.  Torpharm
and other generic drug manufacturers filed an ANDA to the generic
                                                          
1925. Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
1926. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
1927. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (concluding that the district court’s
finding that Danbury’s certification was baseless was not clearly erroneous).
1928. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (pointing out that Danbury’s expert
admitted at trial that the lawyer’s “interpretation of the [‘408] patent was patently
incorrect and that the [‘408] patent nowhere described the formulation relied upon
by [the lawyer]”) (quoting Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.,
21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
1929. See id. at 1348, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (quoting Yamanouchi Pharm.
Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
1930. 213 F.3d 1359, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1931. See id. at 1361, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
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form of the TICLID brand drug.1932  Roche and Syntex then sued,
alleging that in manufacturing the generic product, the companies
used a process that infringed various Syntex patents.1933
In the pleadings, Syntex and Roche alleged that before suit they
sought information from each defendant as to how the generic drug
material was being made, to “assist Roche and Syntex in confirming
whether each defendant’s synthesis . . . is within the lawful scope of
one or more claims of the Syntex Patents.”1934  They also alleged that
while the generic manufacturers provided samples, no defendant
provided any process information.1935  Further, the plaintiffs pled that
there was no analytical technique which could be used to determine
if the generic drug was made by use of the claimed process, and that,
in the absence of that information, Syntex and Roche were forced to
“resort to the judicial process and the aid of discovery to obtain
under appropriate judicial safeguards such information as is required
to confirm their belief and to present to the court evidence that
each . . . defendant infringes one or more claims of the Syntex
Patents.”1936  A pre-filing attempt to reverse-engineer the process of
manufacture from the samples was unsuccessful.1937
After suit was filed, the parties entered into settlement discussions,
which led to the execution of a non-disclosure agreement and
Torpharm’s disclosure to Roche and Sytex of the process used to
make its generic drug.1938  Roche and Syntex concluded that the
process did not infringe the process patents, and they voluntarily
dismissed the case.1939
Torpharm then moved for an award of sanctions under Rule 11,1940
                                                          
1932. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1933. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1934. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1935. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (noting that Torpharm refused to
provide process information because of a confidentiality agreement with the
manufacturer of the drug).
1936. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (quoting from Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.
Genpharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (D.N.J. 1999)).
1937. See id. at 1361-62, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (“[P]laintiffs could not
ascertain the process and could not determine whether it infringed the Syntex
process patents”) (quoting from Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Genpharm, Inc., 50 F.
Supp.2d 367, 372 (D.N.J. 1999)).
1938. See Hoffman-La Roche, 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1848.  During the
settlement negotiations, a Torpharm representative questioned whether Roche
should pay Torpharm’s legal costs.  A Roche representative responded that Roche
would not do so, arguing that Torphram was responsible for the costs because
Torphram had not complied with Roche’s pre-filing inquiries.  See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1848.
1939. 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
1940. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (providing for sanctions for bringing improper
or frivolous suits).
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and for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, asserting that the suit
was baseless and that Roche and Syntex had brought the suit in bad
faith.  The district court denied sanctions and attorneys’ and baseless-
suit fees.1941  The court denied Rule 11 sanctions because, although
Roche’s and Syntex’s “pre-filing inquiry with respect to defendant
Torpharm was unsuccessful, it was reasonable.”1942  The district court
similarly refused to find the case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285,
because Torpharm had not met its “burden of establishing that this is
an exceptional case. . . .  Even if plaintiff’s pre-suit investigation was
unreasonable, an unreasonable investigation alone does not
demonstrate that the ensuing litigation was vexatious, unjustified, or
brought in bad faith.”1943  Torpharm appealed, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed.  Reviewing the refusal to award Rule 11 sanctions
under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court agreed with the
district court that Roche’s and Syntex’s prefiling inquiry with respect
to Torpharm was reasonable, and that their attempts to ascertain
whether the processes used were infringing were the best they could
manage under the circumstances.1944
Torpharm’s position was that, because Roche and Syntex were
unable to obtain and set forth in their complaint facts showing
infringement, they should not have filed suit at all.1945  Although
Hoffman and Syntex “could have assumed non-infringement” when
“[a]t the end of the plaintiff’s pre-suit investigation it had neither
evidence of infringement nor non-infringement . . ., that they chose
to file suit and engage in discovery instead does not subject them to
sanctions,” as the district court had noted.1946  The Federal Circuit
stated that if Torpharm had initially disclosed the manufacturing
process under the cover of a nondisclosure agreement, as it
subsequently did, Torpharm “could have avoided this litigation and
the expenses incurred in defending it.”1947  The court remarked that
“[i]t is difficult to imagine what else Roche and Syntex could have
                                                          
1941. See id.
1942. 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1848.
1943. 213 F.3d at 1362-63, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848 (quoting Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Genpharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (D.N.J. 1999)).
1944. See id. at 1363, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849 (“[A]n appellate court should
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s rule
11 determination.”) (quoting Cooter and Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405
(1990)).
1945. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849 (rejecting Torpharm’s position and
noting that Torpharm did not point to any other options, other than filing suit,
available to Roche and Syntex).
1946. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849 (quoting Hoffman-La Roche, 50 F. Supp.
2d (BNA) at 373).
1947. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
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done to obtain facts relating to Torpharm’s alleged infringement of
their process patents.”1948
Turning to 35 U.S.C. § 285, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district court’s refusal to find the case exceptional as a factual
finding, reviewable under the clear-error standard.1949  The district
court found that Torpharm had not carried its burden to show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Roche and Syntex’s suit was
“vexatious, unjustified or brought in bad faith.”1950  The court stated
that rejection of Torpharm’s Rule 11 claim, based on affirmance of
the district court’s ruling that Roche and Syntex made a reasonable
pre-filing inquiry, also supported the district court’s finding that the
case was not exceptional.1951  Torpharm presented no facts showing
that when Roche and Syntex filed their complaint, they had reason to
believe that their patents did not cover the processes used to make
Torpharm’s generic drug.  Absent that, the court found no reason to
overturn the district court’s conclusion of no bad faith or baseless
claims.1952
Contrasted with Yamanouchi, Hoffman-La Roche demonstrates that it
is far better to be the patentee than an ANDA-filing generic drug
manufacturer, at least for purposes of Section 285.  Hoffman-La Roche
stands for the proposition that it is permissible to go forward and sue
for infringement of a process patent where analysis will not disclose
the process, or where no other information about the process is
available, and the patentee has not concluded that the process is not
being used.  In these circumstances, not knowing one way or the
other is sufficient to satisfy Rule 11 and avoid an exceptional-case
finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285, even if time, events, and later
information prove the accusation of infringement wrong, and
certainly so where, as in Hoffman-La Roche, the patentee has tried but
failed to obtain relevant information from the accused infringer.
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc.,1953 the jury
returned a willful-infringement verdict, but the district court denied
Tate Access’s motion for attorneys’ fees, leading to a cross-appeal of
that denial.  The Federal Circuit vacated in part the district court’s
                                                          
1948. Hoffman-La Roche, 213 F.3d at 1363, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
1949. See id. at 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850 (noting that § 285 provides for
the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in exceptional cases, and that the
district court’s determination of whether a case is exceptional is a factual finding
only reviewed for clear error).
1950. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
1951. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
1952. See id. at 1365-66, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
1953. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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denial of Tate Access’s motion for damages and attorneys’ fees and
remanded without reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments
relating to attorneys’ fees.1954  In view of the jury’s finding of willful
infringement, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
award attorneys’ fees, because it failed to articulate any reasons for its
refusal.1955  The case was returned to the district court with specific
instructions for that court to consider whether Maxcess had obtained
a competent opinion of counsel or otherwise exercised due care, and
whether there was a reasonable basis for concluding the accused floor
panel was non-infringing.1956
In Embrex Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,1957 the jury returned a
verdict of willful infringement in an infringement action that arose
after settlement of earlier litigation.  The jury, in a special verdict,
found that Service Engineering had acted in bad faith and had
breached the agreement, which supported the award of attorneys’
fees.1958  The district court awarded attorneys’ fees under the terms of
the settlement agreement as well as under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and
285.1959  Service Engineering appealed, arguing that the district court
erred because the award of fees was based in part on the willfulness
verdict, which was in turn flawed because of an erroneous jury
instruction.1960  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award
of attorneys’ fees in accordance with the terms of the agreement.1961
The court likewise found no clear error in the district court’s finding
                                                          
1954. See id. at 972, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (noting but not relying on Tate
Access’ argument that, because Maxcess willfully infringed and engaged in vexatious
litigation, Tate Access was entitled to increased damages and attorneys’ fees).
1955. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (noting that while an express jury
finding of willful infringment does not automatically dictate that attorneys’ fees and
enhanced damages will be awarded, after such a finding the lower court must
provide reasons for refusing to award such fees).
1956. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1957. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1958. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
1959. See id. at 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1960. See id. at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (noting that while the court
requires proof of willfulness by clear and convincing evidence, the jury was instructed
that willfulness could be proved by the lower standard of preponderance of the
evidence).  Embrex maintained that Service Engineering had waived its right to
appeal the instruction for failure to object at trial.  The court determined that
Service Engineering had not waived its appeal, as the jury instructions had been
“plain error.”  See id. at 1350-51, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66 (relying on Fourth
Circuit precedent allowing appeal of jury instructions in the absence of a timely
objection only when there is “plain error”) (citing Rice v. Community Health Ass’n,
203 F.3d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 2000)).
1961. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (noting that even
if the SEC’s argument that the fee award was erroneous because it was based on
erroneous jury instructions was valid, the settlement agreement provided for
attorneys’ fees and costs).
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that the case was exceptional, under 35 U.S.C. § 285, nor an abuse of
discretion in setting the amount of attorneys’ fees on that ground as
well.1962
In Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Industries Inc.,1963 Hoffinger cross-
appealed the district court’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees as to the
claims surrounding the ‘068 patent, which Hoffinger had been found
not to infringe on summary judgment.1964  The district court denied
fees on the ground that Zodiac and its expert had a good-faith belief
that Hollinger infringed through sale of its accused pool cleaners.1965
The Federal Circuit affirmed that denial as well within the district
court’s discretion, relying on the record evidence that Zodiac had
hired an expert and secured an opinion of infringement before filing
suit.1966  The district court had heard and witnessed testimony from
the expert during trial, and had the opportunity to observe his
demeanor.  Under those circumstances, the court concluded, “it
cannot be said that the ‘record contains no basis on which the district
court rationally could have made its decision or . . . [that] the judicial
action is arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.’”1967
In Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop Inc.,1968 Speedplay, the licensee of several
clipless bicycle pedal and cleat patents, sued Bebop, the
manufacturer of a competing clipless pedal system, for patent and
trademark infringement.  Bebop counterclaimed, seeking a
declaration that the patents were invalid.  The ‘894 Speedplay patent
was found invalid because the invention was “on sale” more than one
year before the patent was filed, but the district court denied Bebop’s
motion for attorneys’ fees.1969  Bebop appealed the denial of fees,
                                                          
1962. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (noting that the SEC did not carry its
burden of showing that the district court committed clear error).
1963. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1964. See id. at 1410-13, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143-45 (reiterating the district
court’s finding on summary judgment that Hoffinger did not literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents (DOE) infringe the ‘068 patent, and did not literally infringe
the ‘382 patent).  The case proceeded to trial on the issue of infringement of a third
patent, the ‘382 patent, and the jury found it was willfully infringed under the DOE.
Both parties then moved for a JMOL, and the district court, granting Hoffinger’s
motion, found that he had not infringed the ‘382 patent. See id. at 1410, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
1965. See id. at 1413, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1966. See id. at 1417, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (utilizing an abuse of discretion
standard of review).
1967. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (quoting Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn
Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1968. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The patents at
issue concerned clip-less bicycle pedal and cleat asssemblies, which allow bicyclers to
secure their feet to the pedals and transmit more power to the wheels by applying
both pushing and pulling force.  See id. at 1248, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985-86.
1969. See id. at 1260, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986.
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urging that Speedplay had acted inequitably and had failed to
conduct an adequate investigation before bringing suit, making the
defeated infringement accusation under the ‘894 patent rise to the
level of an exceptional case under 35 U.S.C. § 285.1970  The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Speedplay did not
engage in inequitable conduct.  As to the inadequate investigation,
although the district court’s “on sale” invalidity ruling was based on
an invoice Speedplay delayed in producing at trial, the court
concluded that this conduct was less extreme than other cases where
fees were awarded under Section 285.1971
In Automated Business Companies, Inc. v. NEC America, Inc.,1972 the
district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, after
which NEC moved for sanctions against ABC, the plaintiff-patentee.
NEC Corp. was the parent of NEC USA, which in turn was the parent
of NEC America, the defendant.  In a meeting between NEC Corp.
personnel and ABC’s counsel, ABC described its basis for alleging
infringement: the description of the NEFAX 790 unit in a facsimile
machine buyer’s guide.1973  NEC explained that the information in the
guide was incorrect and showed ABC why the new NEC product, the
FAX 791, did not infringe.1974  After the meeting, ABC stipulated that
none of the accused devices, the original units and the new FAX 791,
infringed.  When asked to dismiss the case with prejudice, ABC
refused, proposing a dismissal without prejudice or that discovery
continue to determine if any other NEC products infringed.1975
NEC America moved for summary judgment of non-infringement
on the old and new units.  ABC admitted non-infringement but
maintained that the action should remain docketed for ABC to
determine if any other product infringed.  The district court granted
                                                          
1970. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986 (noting that Bebop contended that it
incurred unnecessary legal costs preparing for a trial on a patent that was
subsequently found to be invalid).
1971. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1995 (distinguishing Eltech Systs. Corp. v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 810, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1969 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(noting that a fee award was affirmed because the trial court had evidence that the
patentee knew that its suit was unfounded).  The court also distinguished Judin v.
United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784, 42 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(explaining that an imposition of sanctions was upheld because the patentee had not
obtained a sample of the allegedly infringing device before bringing an infringement
action) and Hughes v. North Am. Inc., 724 F.2d 122, 124, 220 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 707,
709 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that a fee award was upheld because the patentee had
resisted the defendants’ efforts to have the patent declared invalid despite the fact
that the patentee had widely sold the product for more than two years before the
date of the patent application).
1972. 202 F.3d 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1973. See id. at 1354, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
1974. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
1975. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
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NEC America’s motion for summary judgment, and NEC America
moved for sanctions, which the district court granted under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285.1976  The district court found that circumstances demonstrated
that ABC’s litigation was baseless, and awarded fees, including fees
paid by NEC America’s grandparent company, NEC Corp.1977  On
appeal, ABC did not challenge the finding of the case as exceptional,
or the discretionary decision to award fees, but did question the
amount of the fees awarded.  ABC’s point was that only the fees paid
by the prevailing party NEC America, not NEC Corp., should have
been included in the award.1978  The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding
that for purposes of the attorneys’ fees award, the degree of
participation or control of NEC Corp. was not a critical factor.1979  In
determining the compensatory quantum of an award under Section
285, the Federal Circuit noted that a trial court should not be, and in
the past has not been, limited to reimbursement of only the actual
amount paid by the injured named party.1980  Where a company’s
closely related grandparent company assisted in the defense of an
infringement action, and assumed some of the legal expenses, that
company is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, even though that
company was not a named party.1981
D. Pre-Judgment Interest
In C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc.,1982 the plaintiff brought suit against
a competitor and restaurant chain for patent infringement and
various torts, including misappropriation of trade secrets.1983  The
district court found the patent in suit invalid under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) as being on sale more than one year before the patent-
application date, and dismissed the trade-secret allegations against
                                                          
1976. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (noting that NBC moved for sanctions
on three grounds: failure to perform a pre-filing investigation as required by Rule 11,
initiation of an improper lawsuit, and filing and pursuing a baseless lawsuit which
would warrant an exceptional case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285).
1977. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (noting that the district court rejected
NBC’s first two bases for sanctions, but found against ABC on the third, the
exceptional case finding).
1978. See Automated Business Companies, 202 F.3d at 1355, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1603.
1979. See id. at 1355-56, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603 (reviewing the award under
an abuse of discretion standard and noting that NEC Corp. was a participant in
settlement meetings and had paid ABC’s legal fees).
1980. See Automated Bus. Co., 202 F.3d at 1355-56, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
1981. See id. at 1356, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603 (affirming the full attorneys’ fees
award after finding no abuse of discretion or other error in the district court’s
award).
1982. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1983. See id. at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
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Pizza Hut on statute-of-limitations grounds.1984
The trade-secret claim against IBP proceeded to trial.  The jury
awarded C&F Packing $10.9 million in unjust-enrichment damages,
and $5.1 million in prejudgment interest.1985  IBP moved for JMOL
and, after its motion was denied, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
damages award, but reversed the award of prejudgment interest
under controlling Illinois law.1986  Under Illinois law, a party may
generally recover prejudgment interest only by express agreement, by
statutory authorization, or if it is “warranted by equitable
considerations.”1987  There being no express agreement or statutory
basis for interest, IBP urged that the equity exception could not be
justified because IBP had no fiduciary or confidentiality obligations
to C&F.1988  The court disagreed.  The court also rejected C&F’s
attempt to rely upon patent and trademark cases in support of the
prejudgment interest award on the ground that those cases have no
application to trade-secret cases.1989
E. Permanent Injunctions
The court’s year 2000 cases addressing permanent injunctions
stayed the traditional course: if the manufacturing patentee wins
against an accused infringer, the patentee is (barring extraordinary
circumstances) entitled to a permanent injunction.
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies Inc.,1990 the district
court entered judgment following a jury verdict of willful
infringement in favor of Tate Access.  Tate Access cross-appealed
from the denial of its motion for entry of a permanent injunction.1991
The court concluded that because the jury’s finding of literal
infringement was supported by substantial evidence, and because
Maxcess had represented that it would not oppose the entry of a
permanent injunction, the district court’s refusal to order a
permanent injunction was an abuse of discretion, and on remand
ordered the district court to grant the requested injunction.1992
                                                          
1984. See id. at 1300-01, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
1985. See id. at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867-68.
1986. See id. at 1305, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (noting that the district court
had awarded the prejudgment interest “as a matter of fairness and equity”).
1987. See id. at 1305-06, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1988. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1305-06, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1989. See id. at 1305, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (noting that the cases relied on
by the district court involved parties who had fiduciary relationships).
1990. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1991. See id. at 961, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
1992. See id. at 971-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (noting that Tate Access also
argued that there was no strong public policy against an injunction).
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In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray,1993 the district court, after a bench trial,
found that Dray had violated his license agreement with U.S. Valves
and permanently enjoined Dray from selling valves covered under
the license agreement.  The license agreement related to valves
covered by Dray’s ‘282 and ‘514 patents for internal piston valves,
which regulate the flow of molten plastic in an injection-molding
process.1994  On appeal, Dray contended that the injunction awarded
more relief than was justified by the license agreement because it
permanently enjoined Dray from selling the valves covered by the
license agreement.1995  The Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that
the injunction, properly understood, enjoined only sales of valves
covered under the license agreement according to the license’s
terms.  The life of the injunction thus spanned only the life of the
license terms, or until expiration of the patents.  Once the patents
expire, the court said, the license protection of the patented valves
lapses, and the injunction ends.1996  The wording of the injunction,
under the terms of the license, thus gave fair and precise notice of
what was covered, and of what the injunction actually prohibited.1997
Because the district court’s injunction was neither indefinite nor
effective in perpetuity, it was proper in law.1998
F. Post-Injunction Infringement/Contempt
In Stryker Corp. v. Davol, Inc.,1999 the fact that Davol made post-
permanent injunction sales of devices that were allegedly modified to
avoid infringement was at issue.2000  Davol received an oral opinion of
counsel, committed to writing eight days before entry of the
permanent injunction, advising that the modified Hydro-Surg Plus
                                                          
1993. 212 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1994. See id. at 1370, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1995. See id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (noting that the injunction
stated that “Dray is permanently enjoined from selling the dry valve (including the
continuation-in-part valves) covered under the license agreement between Dray and
U.S. valves.”).
1996. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (noting that upon expiration of the
patents, the valves are no longer “covered by the license agreement”).
1997. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (“[T]he wording of the injunction gives
‘fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits’” (quoting
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 424, (1974))).
1998. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1999. 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2000. See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (remarking that the district
court had entered a permanent injunction against Davol’s infringement on
December 23, 1998, and within one week, Davol was selling modified versions of the
irrigator).  Davol’s modifications included changing the method by which the motor
was attached, replacing a spike in the original design with a narrower spike, and
adding clips used to attach the irrigator to an IV pole.  See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1136.
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suction irrigator did not infringe the ‘402 patent.  The opinion
noted, however, that Stryker might assert infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, that sales of the modified irrigator would
likely be said to violate any permanent injunction that might be
issued, and that Stryker might move to hold Davol in contempt.2001
The opinion further stated that it was more likely than not that the
district court would consider allegations of infringement by the
modified irrigator in a contempt proceeding, and that, while it could
not state with certainty that there was no risk whatsoever, the risk in
selling the revised irrigator was “well within acceptable limits.”2002
The district court found the new irrigator insubstantially modified
from the enjoined design after entry of the injunction, and awarded
attorneys’ fees, costs, and reasonable royalties for the post-injunction
infringing sales, tripling those royalties for willful infringement.2003
Davol appealed, and the court, applying the abuse-of-discretion
standard of appellate review, affirmed both the contempt finding and
the awards of damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.2004
Reviewing the district court’s decision to proceed via a contempt
hearing, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the differences between
the original infringing product and the redesigned irrigator were not
so marked that a wholly new infringement case was warranted.  The
Federal Circuit found contempt proceedings were appropriate
because the new device did not raise “substantial open issues” of
infringement.2005  In the contempt proceedings, Stryker submitted
evidence, including unrefuted anecdotal evidence that hospitals
using the modified irrigator were not using the modification that
allegedly caused the new irrigator to avoid infringement.  Davol also
conceded that it had not investigated whether customers would
actually follow the instructions provided with the product to use the
modifications necessary to avoid infringement.2006  The court
                                                          
2001. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
2002. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
2003. See id. at 1256-57, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (detailing the evidence Davol
offered when ordered to show cause that he was not in contempt of the injunction).
Davol asserted that adding clips to the original design was a substantial change, and
supported his assertion with affidavits from medical professionals which stated that
the added clips were necessary for the new design.  See id. at 1257, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1136.  Stryker countered this evidence, pointing to several occassions when
hospitals had used the new design without the clips.  See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1136.
2004. See id. at 1259-60, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (noting that Davol appealed
the award of enhanced and supplemental damages, and Stryker cross-appealed the
District Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees after it found the case to be exceptional).
2005. See id. at 1260, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
2006. See Stryker, 234 F.3d at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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concluded that the district court had thus properly found
contempt.2007  The court also found no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s award of treble damages, attorneys’ fees and costs,
particularly considering the conclusory nature of the opinion of
counsel used by Davol to justify selling the revised device, and the
minor changes made to the original device.2008
V. ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIABILITY
A. Licenses/Construction and Validity
The court considered several license issues in its decisions
rendered in 2000.  In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc.,2009 Texas
Instruments (TI) sought to enjoin Tessera from continuing to
participate in a U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
investigation that Tessera had commenced against TI and Sharp, on
the basis of a license agreement between TI and Tessera.2010  The
license provided that “if such disputes, controversies, claims or
differences cannot be settled between the parties, any litigation
relating to this Agreement shall take place in California.”2011  The
Federal Circuit, reversing the district court, held that “litigation,” as
used in the license agreement, included ITC proceedings, and
reversed the district court’s conclusion on the likelihood-of-success
prong of the preliminary-injunction anlaysis.2012
In Dow Chemical Company v. United States,2013 the government was
licensed to use Dow’s subsidence-control-material patents, with
royalty payments to be made as stated in the agreement.2014  In 1975,
                                                          
2007. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
2008. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (noting that in Spindelfabrik Suessen-
Schurr v. Shubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1558, 1578, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1990),  the court found that the lower court
had not abused its discretion in trebling damages and awarding attorneys’ fees).
2009. 231 F.3d 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  All four of the
authors were counsel to Texas Instruments Incorporated in this case.
2010. See id. at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (noting that the license
agreement contained a governing law clause and a provision governing venue).
2011. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675.
2012. See id. at 1330-32, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-80 (asserting that the
governing law clause in this case, as in any patent license agreement covers patent
dispute issues).  For a more detailed discussion of this case, see supra Part I.D.
2013. 226 F.3d 1334, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2014. See id. at 1336, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. The court stated specifically
that:
the terms of the license provided for (i) a royalty-free right to use the
invention for government purposes on federal lands only; (ii) a royalty-free
right to use the invention for government purposes to cover up to 2.5
million cubic feet of mine filling material on other than federal land; and
(iii) thereafter, to use the invention at a royalty rate that would not exceed
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Dow requested an accounting of royalties due from the government
under the license, and negotiations continued during the remainder
of 1975 and into 1976.  In December 1976, the government informed
Dow that it had not, in fact, practiced the covered invention, and as a
result, no royalty payments were due.  Dow asked the government to
reconsider.2015  In 1978, the government told Dow that there were
“seriously litigable issues” as to validity, infringement and the viability
of the license.2016  The government stated that no royalty payments
would be made, that this was the government’s final decision, and
that no further reconsideration would occur.2017  Five years later, in
January 1983, Dow filed suit seeking a reasonable royalty for the
government’s infringement of the licensed patent, and in the
alternative sought damages for breach of the license.2018  By letter
dated January 10, 1985, Dow told the government it was terminating
the license effective as of the date of the breach of contract or the
date of notice, whichever was earlier.2019
The Court of Federal Claims found that the patent was not invalid
and was therefore infringed by the government.  Consequently, the
government’s non-payment of royalties and repudiation of the license
constituted material breaches of the license that warranted voiding
the contract ab initio—leading to an award of patent damages on the
basis of unlicensed infringement, instead of breach-of-contract
damages.2020  The government appealed the Court of Federal Claims
decision, including the judgment that the license was void ab initio
and the method of assessing damages.2021
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that although the government
had repudiated the license, the contract should not be treated as
rescinded, or that rescission should be allowed as a remedy.  The
court reversed the determination that the license was void ab initio.2022
Applying basic contract law principles, however, it found that the
government’s material breach and repudiation of the license gave
                                                          
25% of a reasonable commercial rate to be agreed upon by the parties.
See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
2015. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
2016. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
2017. See id. at 1337, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (noting that Dow again asked
the government to reconsider its decision regarding royalty payments).
2018.   See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
2019. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
2020. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
2021. See Dow, 226 F.3d at 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (noting that the
government also appealed the judgment as to the validity and infringment of the
patent).
2022. See id. at 1345-46, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1022-24 (discussing how recission of
an equitable contract can void a contract).
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Dow the right to either terminate the license or to continue to treat it
as outstanding.2023  Dow’s letter of January 1985 effected a termination
of the license, which confirmed the propriety of calculating damages
under Section 1498 only for a period subsequent to the
termination.2024  For the period prior to termination, the provisions of
the agreement were applicable in calculating damages for breach of
contract.  Following termination, damages under Section 1498 were
proper.2025  The court remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for a
proper recalculation of the damages.2026
The Federal Circuit decided serveral other license-related cases,
including Prima Tek II, LLC v. A-Roo Company,2027 Speedplay, Inc. v.
Bebop, Inc.,2028 and Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.2029  Each
of these cases addressed issues related to standing to sue and are
discussed earlier in this Area Summary.2030
B. Trade Secrets
The Federal Circuit decided two cases involving significant issues of
trade secret misappropriation in 2000.  In C&F Packing Co. v. IBP
Inc.,2031 C&F sued IBP and Pizza Hut for trade-secret misappropriation
involving a process for making and freezing precooked sausage for
pizza toppings.  Precooked sausage made under the protected
process had the appearance, taste and other characteristics of freshly
cooked sausage.2032  In 1985, Pizza Hut agreed to buy C&F’s
precooked sausage, on the condition that C&F divulge its secret
                                                          
2023. See id. at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (citing the government’s denial
to pay royalties and its challege to the legality of the license, which made the lack of a
termination clause in the license immaterial).
2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994).
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without a license
of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture.
Id.
2025. See Dow, 226 F.3d at 1347-48, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1024-25 (noting that the
method used by the Court of Federal Claims to calculate damages was too
speculative).
2026. See id. at 1347-48, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 (asserting that the Court of
Federal Claims should have used a more conventional and proven method to
compute damages).
2027. 222 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2028. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2029. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2030. See supra Part I.A.2.
2031. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2032. See id. at 1299, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (noting that C&F’s precooked
sausage exceeded competitors’ in price and quality).
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process to several other Pizza Hut suppliers.2033  In exchange for the
process disclosure, Pizza Hut promised to purchase a large quantity
of precooked sausage from C&F.2034  C&F disclosed the process under
confidentiality agreements with those other companies.  By 1986,
Pizza Hut’s other suppliers had learned the C&F process, and Pizza
Hut told C&F it would not purchase any more sausage without drastic
price reductions.2035
In 1989, Pizza Hut started talks with IBP about purchasing
precooked sausage pizza toppings.2036  Pizza Hut furnished IBP, under
a confidentiality agreement, information about C&F’s sausage
process via documents and personal discussions with IBP employees.
IBP also hired a former supervisor in C&F’s sausage plant as a
production superintendent, who used information from C&F while
helping IBP refine its process.2037
In its Second Amended Complaint, filed in May 1993, C&F added,
inter alia, trade-secret misappropriation claims against Pizza Hut and
IBP.2038  The district court dismissed C&F’s misappropriation claim
against Pizza Hut in January 1994, on the basis of a statute-of-
limitations defense: the court determined that Kansas law, which had
a 3-year statute of limitations, and not Illinois law, which had a 5-year
statute of limitations, controlled.2039  C&F’s trade-secret claim against
IBP proceeded to trial.  In December 1998, a jury determined that
IBP had misappropriated C&F’s trade secrets, awarding $10.9 million
for unjust enrichment and $5.1 million in prejudgment interest.2040
The district court denied IBP’s JMOL motion, and IBP appealed.2041
Applying Illinois state court standards for JMOL, as is required in
the Seventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial with
respect to the trade-secret verdict.2042  IBP contended that for C&F to
show it had trade secrets that could be misappropriated, it had to
                                                          
2033. Pizza Hut’s ostensible motivation was to ensure that back-up suppliers were
available. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
2034. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (stating that C&F filed an application for
a patent for its process for making pre-cooked sausage in 1985).
2035. See id. at 1299, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866-67 (observing that C&F had
invested $4.5 million in a new plant for Pizza Hut).
 2036.   See id. at 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
2037. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
2038. See id. (noting that claims against Pizza Hut also included fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with
business expectancy).
2039. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867-68 (finding
that C&F should have known of the misappropriation as early as March, 1986).
2040. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
2041. See id. at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69 (stating that C&F’s claims
would still be time barred under Kansas’s five-year statute of limitations).
2042. See id. at 1301-02, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
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corroborate the existence of the trade secret [process] with evidence
beyond the testimony of interested parties, basing this theory on the
“analogous context” of patent-priority contests.  The court rejected
this analogy on the grounds that patent-law requirements do not set
the standard for detecting the existence of a trade secret; rather, the
trade-secret law of the relevant state—here, the Illinois Trade Secrets
Act2043 and Illinois common law—controls in misappropriation
cases.2044  The court then concluded that, under Illinois law, the jury
was presented with substantial evidence that C&F possessed trade
secrets.2045
Addressing damages, IBP complained that the damages finding did
not properly account for IBP’s costs, and assumed IBP would make
no profit without using the misappropriated trade secrets.  Opposing
expert testimony was offered to the jury on the effect of the
misappropriated trade secrets on profits.  The jury chose to believe
C&F’s expert, with IBP’s profits being calculated by the jury from
IBP’s own financial reports and reasonably extrapolated for those
years where the figures were not available.2046  A jury instruction
expressly directed the jury to deduct IBP’s costs, and the record did
not show that the jury ignored that instruction.  As a result, the panel
concluded that there was no manifest error or unreasonableness in
the jury’s assessment of damages.2047
In Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,2048 Vanmoor brought suit for
infringement of the ‘331 patent, directed to a construction for a
cartridge used to dispense caulking compound, and further alleged
misappropriation of trade secrets relating to the cartridge.  The
district court, on summary judgment, found that the ‘331 patent was
invalid under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act, and that no trade
secrets had been misappropriated because Vanmoor had failed to
present anything beyond conclusory allegations that the
manufacturers had violated their confidentiality agreements with
                                                          
2043. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/2(d)
(West 1995).
2044. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69
(mentioning that both Illinois statutory law and common law emphasize the
characteristic of secrecy when defining “trade secret”).
2045. See id. at 1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869 (stating that the evidence
presented fit the six-factor test for determining the existence of a trade secret).
2046. See id. at 1304, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870-71 (noting that under Illinois
law, “[d]amages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the
unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss”).
2047. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1304-05, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (holding
that the jury’s award of damages was not unreasonable or manifestly erroneous).
2048. 201 F.3d 1363, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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him.2049
The Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of no trade-
secret misappropriation, agreeing with the district court that
Vanmoor’s conclusory allegations were insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact.2050  The manufacturers contended that
they did not use or disclose any information received from Vanmoor
under the confidentiality agreements they entered into with
Vanmoor.  They supported their position with documentary evidence
that the agreements were entered into in October/November 1994
and that the accused products had been manufactured to
specifications that remained unchanged since before October
1994.2051
C. RICO
For the first time, the Federal Circuit in 2000 addressed the
application of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”) Act2052 to inequitable procurement and
enforcement of United States patents.  In Semiconductor Energy
Laboratories Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.,2053 Samsung alleged
RICO counterclaims under the federal and New Jersey RICO
statutes.2054  The district court granted summary judgment dismissing
the RICO counterclaims, even although it allowed Samsung’s
inequitable-conduct defense with respect to the ‘636 patent, and
ultimately found that patent unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct.2055  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s unenforceability holding, finding no abuse of discretion, and
also affirmed the RICO summary judgment ruling.2056
Samsung’s RICO claim was undeniably creative.  It urged that
Semiconductor Energy Laboratories (SEL) had committed predicate
acts of mail fraud in its prosecution of the ‘636 patent.2057  Samsung
alleged that SEL made material misrepresentations to, and withheld
                                                          
2049. See id. at 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (stating that the motion for
summary judgment was supported by evidence illustrating that manufacturing
specifications and methods of operation were identical to those manufactured, used,
and sold).
2050. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
2051. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379-80 (observing that Vanmoor
offered no evidence to support a claim for trade secret misappropriation).
2052. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
2053. 204 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2054. See id. at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
2055. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
2056. See id. at 1371, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002-03.
2057. See id. at 1379, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
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material references from, the PTO using the U.S. mail.2058  The
Federal Circuit stated that it would apply its own law to determine
whether SEL’s conduct before the PTO qualified as mail fraud for
purposes of the predicate acts required of the federal RICO
statute.2059  The Federal Circuit held as a matter of law that
inequitable conduct before the PTO would not qualify as an act of
mail fraud or wire fraud for purposes of the predicate-act
requirements, since such inequitable conduct does not “defraud” the
government of any “property” as those terms are used in the federal
mail or wire-fraud statutes.2060  Because the failure of Samsung’s mail-
fraud claim meant that it had failed to establish a “predicate act” for
purposes of the federal RICO Act, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment dismissing Samsung’s federal RICO claims was
affirmed.2061
With respect to Samsung’s counterclaim under New Jersey’s state
RICO statute, the court was faced with different issues.  Although the
New Jersey act was modeled after the federal statute, the qualifying
predicate acts under the state law were different and arguably
broader than the federal predicate acts.2062  For example, fraudulent
practices and making false statements to PTO examiners in violation
of federal penal provisions would satisfy the New Jersey statute.2063
SEL contended that summary judgment regarding the New Jersey
statute should be affirmed not on substantive grounds, but on the
ground of federal preemption.2064  The Federal Circuit agreed that
the federal patent laws preempted Samsung’s New Jersey RICO
counterclaims, consistent with its ruling in Abbott Laboratories v.
Brennan,2065 that state abuse-of-process claims were preempted by the
federal patent laws.
Semiconductor is likely to dispose of any further attempt to apply
federal (or state) RICO laws to inequitable-conduct-based
procurement and enforcement allegations relating to U.S. patents.
                                                          
2058. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009 (stating that under Supreme Court
precedent and federal patent law, an issued patent is property).
2059. See id. at 1380, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009-10.
2060. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009-10 (stating that a patent application that
has not yet matured into a patent cannot be defined as “government property”).
2061. See Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
2062. See id. at 1380-81, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
2063. See id. at 1381, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010-11 (discussing Samsung’s
argument that the patent statute does not expressly exclude RICO remedies).
2064. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
2065. 952 F.2d 1346, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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D. Antitrust
Patent issues often come to the Federal Circuit hand-in-hand with
antitrust issues.  In its only major pronouncement on the
patent/antitrust interface in 2000, the Federal Circuit continued in
its view that it, and not the regional circuits, will make antitrust law
related to patents, at least in appeals that reach the Federal Circuit.
In In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,2066 a
group of independent service organizations (“ISOs”) brought suit
against Xerox, claiming that its refusal to sell patented parts and
copyrighted manuals and to license copyrighted software violated the
federal antitrust laws.2067  The district court granted summary
judgment for Xerox, and the ISOs appealed.  The Federal Circuit
affirmed, holding that the ISOs had not raised any genuine issue as to
any material fact and that Xerox was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.2068
The ISOs’ complaint alleged that Xerox violated the Sherman
Act2069 by setting prices on its patented parts for ISOs which were
higher than the prices charged to end-users of the copiers, which
were designed to force ISOs to raise their prices and in turn
eliminate ISOs as competitors in the relevant market for high-speed
copier and printer servicing.  Xerox had counterclaimed for patent
and copyright infringement, and contested the ISOs’ antitrust claims
as relying on injury caused solely by Xerox’s lawful refusal to sell or
license patented parts and copyrighted software.2070  Citing
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,2071 the court confirmed
that it would apply Federal Circuit law to the ISOs’ antitrust claims
arising from Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts, but it would
apply Tenth Circuit law to the ISOs’ antitrust claim based on Xerox’s
refusal to sell or license its copyrighted manuals and software.2072
Initially, the court noted that intellectual property rights do not
confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws, but at the same time
                                                          
2066. 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2067. See id. at 1324, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853-54 (noting that Xerox
counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement).
2068. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856 (stating that “Xerox’s refusal to sell or
license its copyrighted works was squarely within the rights granted by Congress to
the copyright holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws”).
2069. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
2070. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1324, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1854.
2071. 141 F.3d 1059, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
2072. See In Re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1325, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1854 (noting that when reviewing a district court’s decision regarding
antitrust law, the Federal Circuit will look to the regional circuit law in which the
district court sits).
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the antitrust laws do not negate the patentee’s statutory right to
exclude others from patent property.2073  A patent does not, without
more, demonstrate market power for purposes of the antitrust
laws.2074  And even where market power exists, the court said, that
does not impose on the patent owner an obligation to license the use
of that property to others.2075
The ISOs did not allege a Walker Process violation.  Nor did they
allege that the counterclaims were shams.  Instead, they alleged that
the patents were being misused by Xerox illegally trying to leverage
its (presumably legitimate) dominance in the equipment and parts
market into dominance in the service market.2076  In support, the ISOs
relied upon Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,2077 a
tying case where no patent had been asserted in defense to the
antitrust claims against Kodak. The panel noted, however, that absent
any claims of illegally tying the sale of Xerox’s patented parts to
unpatented products, Kodak did not resolve the issue. 2078  The court
stated that Kodak did nothing to limit the right of a patentee to refuse
to sell or license in markets within the scope of the statutory patent
grant.2079
The ISOs also relied upon the Ninth Circuit’s holding on remand
in Image Technical Services, which adopted a rebuttable presumption
that the exercise of the statutory right to exclude provides a valid
business justification for consumer harm which required an
evaluation of the patentee’s subjective motivation for refusing to sell
or license its patent and products for pretext.2080  The court refused to
                                                          
2073. See id. at 1325, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854-55.
2074. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854-55.
2075.
[A] patent owner who brings suit to enforce the statutory right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention, is exempt from
the antitrust laws, . . . unless the infringement defendant proves one of two
conditions: . . . he may prove that the asserted patent was obtained through
knowing and willful fraud within the meaning of Walker Process Equipment . . .
[o]r he may demonstrate that the infringement suit was a mere sham to
cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor.
Id. at 1326, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845-55 (internal citations omitted).
2076. See id. at 1326-27, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855-56.
2077. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
2078. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1327, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1855-56 (indicating that a patent holder is not allowed to use its statutory
right “to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the
scope of the patent”).
2079. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855-56 (observing that absent exceptional
circumstances, a patent holder may have the right to stop competition completely in
more than one antitrust market).
2080. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Tech. Serv., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a jury must reject
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follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Image Technical Services.  Under
Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit law has held that unless a patent-
infringement suit was objectively baseless, an antitrust defendant’s
subjective motivation is immaterial.2081  Therefore, so long as the
anticompetitive effect of refusing to sell or license a patented
invention does not illegally extend beyond the statutory patent grant,
no inquiry into subjective motivation is necessary, even though that
refusal may have some anticompetitive effect.2082  Concluding that
Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts did not exceed the scope of
the patent grant, the inquiry was over; Xerox was under no obligation
to sell or license its patented parts, and did not violate the antitrust
laws by refusing to do so.2083
With respect to the ISOs’ copyright-based antitrust allegations, the
panel initially noted the lack of United States Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit guidance regarding the antitrust implications of a
unilateral refusal to sell or license copyrighted expression.2084  That
left the court in the position of having to predict where the Tenth
Circuit would come out on the point, so it looked to and evaluated
the strength of other circuits’ precedent.2085  Reviewing the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp.,2086
the First Circuit’s decision in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems
Support Corp.,2087 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Image Technical
Service,2088 the court concluded that the First Circuit’s approach was
most consistent with both the antitrust and copyright laws, and would
be most likely followed by the Tenth Circuit in considering the effect
of Xerox’s unilateral right to refuse to license or sell copyrighted
manuals and diagnostic software under the antitrust laws.2089  The
First Circuit followed the rule that an author’s desire to exclude
others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid
                                                          
the presumptively valid business judgment as pretextual)).
2081. See id. at 1327-28, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
2082. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856 (asserting that the party accused of
infringment bears the burden to prove exceptional circumstances).
2083. See id. at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
2084. See id. at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856-57 (noting that the Supreme
Court has ruled that a property right granted by federal copyright law cannot extend
beyond congressional intent).
2085. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1857.
2086. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
2087. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
2088. 203 F.3d at 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
2089. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1329, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1857-58 (arguing that the First Circuit conducted the most thorough
analysis in the area of copyright law).
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business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.2090  The
Federal Circuit refused to examine Xerox’s subjective motivation in
asserting its right to exclude under the copyright laws for pretext, in
the absence of any evidence that the copyrights were obtained by
unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly power beyond the
statutory copyright granted by Congress.2091
E. Trade Dress/Lanham Act
In Speedplay Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.,2092 Speedplay alleged that Bebop, in
addition to infringing several Speedplay patents, was also infringing
Speedplay’s trade dress for clipless pedal and cleat assemblies for
bicycles under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  Following a bench
trial, the district court entered judgment against Speedplay on all
claims in its amended complaint, including the trade-dress
allegations.  Speedplay appealed.2093
The court, applying Ninth Circuit trade-dress law, affirmed.  Under
Ninth Circuit law, Speedplay was required to prove that its trade-dress
was distinctive and non-functional, and that consumers were likely to
confuse Bebop’s pedals with Speedplay’s pedals.  The district court
found that Speedplay had proved its design was distinctive, but did
not prove non-functionality or likelihood of confusion.2094
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s standard of review for a trial court’s
finding, the district court’s finding that there was little likelihood of
confusion was held to be not clearly erroneous:  Despite Speedplay’s
contrary evidence, the district court correctly found, based on the
record, that the two products were sold in distinct markets, and that
the isolated instances of actual confusion were entitled to little weight
under the circumstances.  The court therefore did not need to reach
the district court’s alternative ground of decision, that the design of
the pedals was functional and not in the nature of trade dress.2095
                                                          
2090. See id. at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
2091. See id. at 1329, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
2092. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2093. See id. at 1249, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986 (asserting that the district court
found the patent invalid because the invention was on sale for a year before the
patent application was filed).
2094. See id. at 1258, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993 (citing Disc Golf Ass’n v.
Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1005, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132, 1134 (9th
Cir. 1998) (observing that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ applies the “clearly
erroneous” standard of review)).
2095. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993 (holding that the district court’s ruling
on trade dress was correct).
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F. Copyright
The Federal Circuit’s only significant discussion of copyright issues
in 2000 came in the context of alleged antitrust violations for refusal
to license copyrighted works in In re Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust Litigation.2096
G. Trademark
In Cortland Line Company, Inc. v. The Orvis Company, Inc.,2097 the
district court granted summary judgment of no trademark
infringement, and of non-infringement of Cortland’s ‘003 patent.
Although affirming the patent non-infringement holding, the
Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment of no
trademark infringement and remanded.2098
Cortland sued Orvis, alleging infringement of the registered mark
CASSETTE; Orvis defended on the grounds of genericness and fair
use.  The district court agreed that fair use under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(6)(a) had been shown, granted summary judgment, and
declined to reach the genericness issue.2099  The Federal Circuit
applied Second Circuit law in reviewing the summary judgment.2100
To establish a fair-use defense, Orvis had to prove that its use of
“cassette” was used only descriptively, fairly and in good faith.2101  The
court stated,
Cortland raises disputed issues of material fact on whether the
trademark CASSETTE is descriptive of specific characteristics
exhibited by both Cortland’s CASSETTE Reels and the Orvis Rocky
Mountain Reel.  For example, evidence of record indicates that
before Cortland’s use of the term cassette, the fishing reel market
used other terms to describe similar products, including spare,
extra, or cartridge spools.  [Cortland further] asserts that no
manufacturer had used the term cassette to describe either fishing
equipment or spare cartridge spools.2102
Cortland also alleged “that Orvis used the disputed term in a
trademark sense by referring to the Rocky Mountain Reel as a
                                                          
2096. See 203 F.3d at 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852; see also supra Part V.D.
2097. 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2098. See id. at 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (stating that claims asserted by
the plaintiff did not cover the specific device).
2099. See id. at 1360-61, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
2100. See id. at 1360-61, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (stating that since the issues
of the case were not exclusive to patent law, the Federal Circuit will apply the law of
the regional circuit).
2101. See id. at 1361, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (stating that with respect to fair
use, genuine issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment).
2102. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
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cassette type reel.”2103  There was also evidence of actual customer
confusion, including past customer inquiries, product compatibility,
and questions on electronic bulletin boards.  In addition to the
disputed facts on the extent of use of the mark and actual confusion,
the intent underlying Orvis’ use—whether Orvis used the mark in
good faith—was also in dispute.2104  Additionally, the district court had
stated in its opinion that “[h]ow often Orvis used the term ‘cassette’
and in what context is a matter of some debate.”2105
In addition to remanding for further proceedings on the disputed
fair-use issues, remand for consideration of generic-ness was also
ordered, as the determination over whether a mark is generic is
relevant to the existence of an enforceable trademark.2106
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in 2000 continued and expanded its role as
perhaps the most important court for United States (and
international) business.  However, the court also continued its
practices—which can be enormously frustrating for business planning
and settled expectations—of limited en banc review, inconsistent
panel-to-panel adjudications, fluid totality-of-the-circumstances tests,
and pliable “presumptions.”  It is said by some who practice before
the Federal Circuit that this is the result of its being a court disposed
to “do equity” in individual cases, but the price of such individualized
decision-making is ultimately paid by the public at large.
                                                          
2103. Cortland Line Co., 203 F.3d at 1361, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
2104. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
2105. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
2106. See id. at 1361-62, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740-41.
ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR 11/20/01  4:51 PM
2001] PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000 1699
ADDENDUM
As practitioners, our clients often ask us, “When can we expect a
decision?”  For years, we have been trying to answer these and other
similar questions anecdotally, rather than with any systematic or
studied information on which to base our guesses.  In an attempt to
provide our impressionistic augery with some empirical support, we
have tried, in the tables and discussion that follow, to provide a
statistical “snapshot” of the Federal Circuit’s work in the year 2000,
based on our study of the court’s 92 published patent opinions from
last year.  We recognize, of course, that any such statistical study has
its limitations.  First, the universe of opinions being surveyed consists
of the court’s published, patent opinions.  Our survey fails to account
for the presumably much shorter disposition time of unpublished
patent opinions, or “Rule 36” affirmances, or the other areas of the
court’s work (government employment cases, government contract
cases, etc.).  Second, in many cases, the statistics set forth below are of
limited predictive value, since they are based on a statistically
insignificant number of data points.  Finally, every case is unique, and
treating each decision as a data point for statistical averages may not
be fair or accurate in every case.  Nevertheless, we have found many
of the results set forth below to be enlightening, and for that reason
we are sharing them with the bench, bar, and other persons
interested in the work of the Federal Circuit.
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TABLE 1
PUBLISHED PATENT OPINIONS BY JUDGE,
JANUARY 1, 2000 - DECEMBER 31, 2000
Judge
#
authored
#
on panel
#
separate
opinions
#
authored
generating
separate
opinions
%
author
(3-
judge
panel)
Mayer 7 23 2 1 31.8
Newman 9 21 5 1 45.0
Michel 7 22 1 1 33.3
Plager2107 5 22 2 0 23.8
Lourie 11 27 4 2 42.3
Clevenger 4 22 0 1 19.0
Rader 12 34 4 2 36.3
Schall 6 20 0 1 26.3
Bryson 8 23 1 0 36.3
Gajarsa 10 26 1 3 40.0
Linn2108 4 9 1 0 50.0
Dyk2109 0 3 0 0 0.0
Cowen 0 0 0 0 —
Skelton 0 6 0 0 0.0
Friedman 2 8 0 0 25.0
Smith 0 4 0 0 0.0
Archer 2 14 0 0 14.3
Rich2110 — 1 — — —
Per
Curiam
5 — — 3 —
                                                          
2107. Judge Plager assumed Senior status on November 30, 2000.
2108. Judge Linn assumed his seat on the Federal Circuit on January 1, 2000.
2109. Judge Dyk assumed his seat on the Federal Circuit on June 9, 2000.
2110. Judge Rich, who passed away on June 9, 1999, was a member of the panel
hearing oral argument in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Dow Chemical was argued on December 4,
1997, before a panel consisting of then-Chief Judge Archer and Judges Rich and
Gajarsa.  The case was decided on September 6, 2000, by the remaining two
members of the panel.  See FED. CIR. R. 47. 11.
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Table 1 sets forth some raw numbers about the ninety-two
published patent opinions issued by the Federal Circuit during 2000,
listed by judge.
The first column (“# authored”) reflects the number of majority
patent opinions each judge published in 2000.  Thus, Chief Judge
Mayer authored seven majority patent opinions that were published
in 2000, Judge Newman wrote nine, and so on.  Judges Rader, Lourie,
and Gajarsa led the way with twelve, eleven, and ten opinions
respectively.  Judges Clevenger, Plager, and Schall trailed with four,
five, and six, respectively.  Five cases were decided per curiam.
The second column (“# on panel”) sets forth the number of times
each judge was on a panel for one of those ninety-two cases decided
in 2000.  One interesting discovery from our statistical work is that,
while nine of the ten “established” judges (i.e., those active on the
court prior to 2000) participated in anywhere from twenty to twenty-
seven of the published patent opinions, one judge—Judge Rader—
participated in thirty-four of the published decisions, a difference
that is arguably statistically significant.  One possible explanation for
this difference—assuming that all active judges are likely to
participate in roughly the same number of cases during the course of
a year—is that Judge Rader is somewhat more likely than his
colleagues to request that the panel publish its disposition, which a
single judge may do under Circuit Rule 47.6(b).  (We posit this as
theory, not fact.)
The third column (“# separate opinions”) lists the number of
separate opinions (concurrences and dissents) that each Federal
Circuit judge filed in 2000.  Two observations about this column are
in order.  First, these numbers reflect a high degree of unanimity in
reasoning and result—only twenty-one separate opinions were filed in
2000 (and in only fifteen cases—the en banc Festo case alone
generated six separate opinions aside from the majority opinion, and
another case, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Deere & Co.,2111 generated both a
concurring and a dissenting opinion in addition to the majority
opion).  Second, three judges—Judges Newman, Lourie, and
Rader—are most likely to write separately in patent cases, far more
than their colleagues, statistically speaking.
Because of the small number of separate opinions issued by
Federal Circuit judges in 2000, the fourth column (“# authored
                                                          
2111. 224 F.3d 1374, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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generating separate opinions”) may not prove much at all.  It is
meant to indicate the authoring judge for the majority in the fifteen
cases where separate opinions were filed.  Here, Judge Gajarsa led the
way, with three opinions that occasioned a separate statement from
another judge.
The final column (“% author (3-judge panel”)) on Table 1
indicates, based on the published patent opinions from 2000, how
likely it was that a particular Federal Circuit judge would be the
author of the resulting opinion in a particular case argued before a
three-judge panel.  (For purposes of this column only, we have
excluded the court’s en banc decision in Festo.)  In a hypothetical
world where opinions are randomly and evenly assigned, one would
expect that each judge on a three-judge panel would wind up writing
33.3% of the opinions.  What stands out as significant (if not entirely
surprising) is that Judges Linn, Newman, Gajarsa and Lourie each
authored over 40% of the opinions in patent cases in which they were
involved.  Of course, those four judges also are the four active judges
who came to the Federal Circuit already having a significant patent
background prior to their appointments.
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TABLE 2
SEPARATE OPINIONS IN PATENT CASES 2000
Judge
Concur
in
Opinion
Concur
in
Judgment
Concur
in part,
Dissent
in part
Dissent
Mayer 0 0 0 2
Newman 0 2 2 1
Michel 0 0 1 0
Plager 2 0 0 0
Lourie 1 0 0 3
Clevenger 0 0 0 0
Rader 2 0 1 1
Schall 0 0 0 0
Bryson 0 0 1 0
Gajarsa 0 1 0 0
Linn 0 0 1 0
Dyk 0 0 0 0
Cowen 0 0 0 0
Skelton 0 0 0 0
Friedman 0 0 0 0
Smith 0 0 0 0
Archer 0 0 0 0
Court 5 3 6 7
Table 2 sets forth a breakdown of the twenty-one separate opinions
by type and by authoring judge.  Again, because of the relative
paucity of separate opinions, these statistics may not carry much
meaning.  It is worth noting that these figures again include the six
separate opinions in Festo, two of which were styled as concurrences,
and four of which were styled as partial concurrences and partial
dissents.  Again, these numbers illustrate the Federal Circuit’s largely
unanimous nature—only seven dissents, and six partial dissents, were
filed all year, with Judges Lourie (three dissents), Newman (one
dissent, two partial dissents), Mayer (two dissents), and Rader (one of
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each) leading the way.
TABLE 3: DISPOSITION TIME BY JUDGE (IN DAYS)
JANUARY 1, 2000 - DECEMBER 31, 2000
Judge
Avg. time
per
opinion
authored
Avg. time
Per
unanimous
Opinion
authored
Avg. time
when
writing
separately
Avg. time
when on
panel
Mayer 83 81 203 138
Newman 318 329 289 250
Michel 131 115 245 164
Plager 204 204 172 184
Lourie 138 145 167 139
Clevenger 208 109 — 169
Rader 143 139 167 163
Schall 163 147 — 189
Bryson 101 101 137 128
Gajarsa 131 110 150 137
Linn 187 187 245 155
Dyk — — — 112
Cowen — — — —
Skelton — — — 200
Friedman 67 67 — 175
Smith — — — 273
Archer 704 704 — 217
Rich — — — 1007
Per
Curiam
159 95 n/a n/a
Court 170 154 205 170
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Table 3 sets forth average statistical information regarding the
length of time it takes the Federal Circuit and its judges to dispose of
published Federal Circuit patent appeals. This table is at the same
time the most interesting of these statistics, and also perhaps the one
most subject to the criticism that every case is unique and demands
unique treatment, and thus cannot be “averaged” together with other
cases to yield meaningful results.
Because the Federal Circuit does not publish the date of argument
on the face of its opinions, we obtained from the public docket
records available in the Federal Circuit clerk’s office the date of
argument for each of the ninety-two published patent opinions.  We
then calculated the difference, in days, between oral argument and
decision, and utilized those calculated figures in our statistics.  (For
the insatiably curious, leap day—February 29, 2000—was counted
when the argument took place prior to that date and the decision
rendered afterward.)
The first column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per opinion authored”)
lists, in days, the average time from argument to decision for each
judge of the Federal Circuit.  Thus, for the seven published patent
opinions Chief Judge Mayer authored in 2000, the average amount of
time from argument to decision was eighty-three days (slightly less
than three months), while for the nine published patent opinions
authored by Judge Newman, the average time from argument to
decision was 318 days (about ten and a half months).  The average
time of disposition for all ninety-two Federal Circuit published patent
opinions was 170 days, or a bit less than six months.  It should be
noted that outliers can have a disproportionate impact on the
statistical averages in this and other columns on Table 3.  Thus, to use
an extreme example, Judge Archer’s average of 704 days from
argument to decision is affected greatly by his authoring of Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,2112 which was argued on December 4,
1997.  The publication of this decision was quite possibly delayed by
the intervening death of panel member Judge Rich (on June 9,
1999), but was ultimately issued by the remaining two judges on the
panel on September 6, 2000.  Taking away the Dow case—which was
1007 days from argument to judgment—Judge Archer’s average time
per opinion authored would drop from 704 to 401, which is the
number of days from argument to disposition for the only other case
he authored in 2000.
The second column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per unanimous
                                                          
2112. 226 F.3d 1334, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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opinion authored”) is meant to account for one type of delay in
publication not attributable to the author of the majority opinion—
the authoring and issuance of a separate concurring, or dissenting,
opinion.  In most—but not all—cases, limiting the relevant data set to
unanimous opinions decreases the average disposition time per
judge.  The most notable effect can be seen in the average disposition
time for Judge Clevenger, whose 208-day overall average dropped to
109 days when one non-unanimous opinion—which took 505 days
from argument to disposition—is removed from the calculus.  The
average time for the entire court for issuance of unanimous
published patent opinions was 154 days after argument, or about five
months.
The third column (“Avg. time when writing separately”) supplies
the average time from argument to disposition when the judge in
question has written a separate opinion.  This data may suffer from
some inadequacies:  first, it is based solely on the limited number of
separate opinions in published patent cases in 2000.  Second, it
cannot account for the unknown factor of how long the author of the
majority opinion took to prepare the draft opinion which occasioned
the separate concurrence or dissent.  Here, the overall court average
is 205 days, or about seven months.
The fourth and final column on Table 3 (“Avg. time when on
panel”) supplies the average time from argument to disposition
whenever a certain judge is on the panel hearing the case.  We have
supplied this statistic on the assumption that the time a non-
authoring judge spends reviewing one of his or her colleagues’ draft
opinion, even if it does not ultimately occasion a separate opinion,
may have some influence on the disposition time.  For active judges,
the results range from 112 days for Judge Dyk (on limited data, since
he took the bench in June 2000) to 250 days for Judge Newman.  The
court average, as earlier noted, was 170 days from argument to
decision for published patent cases.
